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Sturgeon's House

Egregious Aviation Safety Violations


LostCosmonaut

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For discussion stupid shit like Pinnacle 3701 and this: http://www.rapp.org/archives/2015/12/normalization-of-deviance/

For reference, here's what a gust lock looks like on a Cessna 172;


s-l300.jpg

As you can see, it's essentially a pin that goes in the control column and keeps it from moving. Even starting the airplane with this installed would be utterly ludicrous to me, as would not doing the checklist. If your car runs out of oil in the middle of a drive you're going to have a bad day and engine repair bill, if your plane runs out of oil muffling there's a good chance you're going to turn yourself into chunky salsa on the side of a mountain.

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For discussion stupid shit like Pinnacle 3701

 

For reference, Pinnacle 3701 is the one where a ferry flight's pilots decided to take their plane up to the maximum altitude by setting their autopilot to too aggressive a climb, overrode warnings until they stalled and their engines flamed out. With six airports they could have reached without engines and having recovered from their stall. They then went to restart their engines and didn't actually check they were going fast enough to get the turbines going fast enough. They then told ATC they had lost one engine rather than the two they had, and after spending the altitude they needed to reach their emergency airport trying to restart their engines, which were locked by that point. By that point they tell ATC they actually lost both engines, they didn't have enough altitude to reach an airport.

 

They finished their airmanship display by attempting to land on a lit road and crashed the plane.

 

This is also the place for:

 

The DC-10's cargo door, American Airlines 96 and Turkish Airlines 981,

 

Japan Airlines 123 and the world's shittiest repair job, which used two different plates with two and one row of rivets rather than one plate with three rows to fix a cracked rear pressure bulkhead,

 

Air France deciding that they could wait to replace pitot tubes with a freezing problem until routine maintenance and Air France 447, which combined that with a crewman who just wouldn't stop pulling back on the stick and other crew who didn't manage their information properly all the way into the ocean,

 

isn't it?

 

Honestly the scary one is the last, because I'm pretty sure that airlines still aren't doing good long flight simulations and training workflow for a three person crew running shifts.

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Yes.

 

Also, Asiana 221, the time a plane in perfectly good working order was crashed into a seawall on a day with no wind and perfect visibility.

Is that the one where a crash victim was run over by the firemen, an understandable tragedy considering the conditions, but then their response is to remove helmet cams from the fire department, the thing that proved they did it, after they said they didn't? 

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Watch the throttles (and flaps)

 

There's also the Elmendorf C-17 and Fairchild B-52 that go to show that lax attitudes towards rules and flight envelopes and air show flight plans do not and cannot be allowed to go together.

 

Also just saying, people who screw with a whistleblower should be liable for murder.

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Yes.

 

Also, Asiana 221, the time a plane in perfectly good working order was crashed into a seawall on a day with no wind and perfect visibility.

 

And then this year a Asiana flight manages to take out Hiroshima Airport's ILS antennas by again landing short.

 

Edit:

Fuckin Korean airlines man.

http://code7700.com/mishap_korean_airlines.html

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And then this year a Asiana flight manages to take out Hiroshima Airport's ILS antennas by again landing short.

 

Edit:

Fuckin Korean airlines man.

http://code7700.com/mishap_korean_airlines.html

 

Huh. I was reading through earlier stuff and reminding myself that no matter how bad decent airliners get, it's way better than cars, with no real CRM or anything.

 

That list reads like what I'd expect from drivers, not pilots.

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  • 1 month later...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_6502

 

While approaching Kurumoch Airport, Kliuyev made a bet with Zhirnov that he, Kliuyev, could make an instrument-only approach with curtained cockpit windows, thus having no visual contact with the ground, instead of NDB approach, suggested by the air traffic control.[1] Kliuyev further ignored the ground proximity warning at an altitude of 62–65 metres (203–213 ft) and did not make the suggested go-around.[1] The aircraft touched down at a speed of 280 kilometres per hour (170 mph)[1] and came to rest upside down. Sixty-three people died during the accident and seven more in hospitals later.[1] Among the passengers were fourteen children, all of whom survived the accident.[2] The top secret report of the Chairman of Kuibyshev oblispolkom V.A. Pogodin to the Premier of the Soviet Union Nikolai Ryzhkov gave slightly different figures: 85 passengers and 8 crew members aboard, 53 passengers and five crew members died in the crash and 11 more in hospital later.[2]

 

Even though Zhirnov made no attempt to avert the crash, he subsequently tried to save the passengers and died of cardiac arrest en route to hospital.[3] Kliuyev was prosecuted and sentenced to fifteen years in prison, later reduced to six years served.
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In which the plane actually calls the pilot a retard;

 


A US Airways Airbus A320-200, registration N113UW performing flight US-1702 from Philadelphia,PA to Fort Lauderdale,FL (USA) with 149 people on board, was accelerating for takeoff from runway 27L, rotated, struck its tail onto the runway and was about 20 feet above the runway when the crew rejected takeoff, the aircraft came to a stop off the side of the runway with the nose gear collapsed. The aircraft was evacuated. There were no injuries.

The airport reported there were no injuries, all passengers have been bussed to the terminal.

On Mar 14th 2014 NTSB spokesman Terry Williams told The Aviation Herald, investigators were on site, they could not confirm or rule out the takeoff was rejected before or after V1, no details about the final position were known and asked for further communication on Monday. So far no reply to the Aviation Herald's follow up has occurred.

The French BEA reported in their weekly bulletin released on Mar 18th 2014, that the aircraft was at about 20 feet AGL when the takeoff was rejected. During the rejected takeoff the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft slightly veered off the side of the runway. The passengers were evacuated. Initial examination showed foreign object ingestion into engine #1.

On Jul 9th 2014 The Aviation Herald learned that the pilot flying was the first officer. The aircraft suffered a tail strike on rotation for takeoff, the takeoff was subsequently discontinued. The aircraft received damage beyond (economic) repair.

On Feb 24th 2016 the NTSB released their factual report stating, the captain rejected takeoff after rotation on Philadelphia's runway 27L. Two passengers received minor injuries, the aircraft sustained substantial damage.

The NTSB summarized crew testimonies that the captain (61, ATPL, 23,800 hours total, 7,500 hours on type) was pilot flying, the first officer (62, ATPL, 13,000 hours total, 4,700 hours on type) was pilot monitoring. During cockpit preparation for departure the captain was talking to the flight dispatcher while the first officer loaded the ATC flight plan into the flight management computer (FMC). Both pilots verified the flight plan on the FMC, but neither pilot recognized that runway 27R had been entered as departure runway rather than runway 27L, that had been assigned to the flight. While taxiing out for departure the crew received the final weight and balance data, the resulting takeoff performance data were manually entered into the FMC.

When ATC advised the aircraft would be next to depart, the first officer began reading the remainder of the taxi checklist when a flight attendant advised a passenger was in the lavatory, subsequently advising the passenger was on the way back to the seat. The checklist was completed while the captain taxied the aircraft onto runway 27L. While lining up for departure the captain recognized the wrong runway 27R had been entered into the FMC and instructed the first officer to correct the entry. The aircraft came to a full stop on runway 27L while awaiting takeoff clearance. The FMC was reprogrammed to runway 27L a few seconds prior to receiving takeoff clearance.

11 seconds after receiving takeoff clearance the thrust levers were moved into the MAX CLIMB detent and nose down inputs were provided by the captain's side stick. The thrust lever was subsequently moved into the FLEX detent, a chime sounded together with an ECAM message that thrust had not been set, the thrust levers were moved to the CL detent for a second and again into the FLEX detent, 3 seconds later the captain announced "They are set."

According to the cockpit voice recorder neither pilot called out 80 knots. Both pilots recognized at about the same time, that no V-speeds were displayed on the primary flight displays. When the aircraft accelerated through 86 knots an aural alert "RETARD" sounded. The captain queried "what did you do, you didn't load. We lost everything", while accelerating through 143 KIAS the captain stated "we'll get that straight when we get airborne" and continued takeoff. Accelerating through 152 KIAS the captain initiated rotation, the first officer stated "wh*. I'm sorry", the aircraft reached 6.9 degrees nose up at 164 KIAS and the nose weight on wheel sensors indicated airborne.

Over the next 4 seconds, with the nose wheel indicating airborne and the main wheel sensors indicating ground, the captain's side stick was pushed forward (nose down) and back (nose up) two times reaching 16 degrees nose up and 16 degrees nose down maximum inputs, the aircraft's pitch and vertical acceleration followed the pitch inputs. In response to the next nose down input, as vertical acceleration reduced, the thrust levers were reduced and the side stick was again pulled (nose up input). The vertical acceleration decreased, the thrust levers were reduced to idle, 4 seconds after the nose gear indicated airborne the weight on wheel sensor changed to ground again, the pitch reduced to -0.4 degrees, and the vertical acceleration suddenly increased to +3.7G consistent with the gear impacting the runway surface, at the same time the captain's pitch input again reached the maximum of 16 degrees nose up. The side stick input cycled nose down and nose up inputs over 2 seconds again and reached 16 degrees nose up again, nose and main gear sensors indicated airborne and the radio altimeter reached 15 feet AGL, the side stick input went to a nose down input, and the aircraft descended, the stick input changed to nose up again and the aircraft pitched up hitting the runway surface with the tail first, then the main landing gear, the nose rotated down until the nose gear impacted the runway and collapsed.

38 seconds after the nose gear had first indicated airborne the aircraft stopped at the left side of the runway, the crew advised ATC they had rejected takeoff and were evacuating the aircraft.

The NTSB described the aircraft damage: "The airplane nose gear collapsed upon impact with the paved runway, resulting in fuselage and engine cowling damage. As a result of the tailstrike, additional damage occurred to the lower aft fuselage section of the airplane, including the aft pressure bulkhead, fuselage, struts, and cross beams. Damage to the left engine occurred after the nose gear collapse due to ingestion of debris. "

The NTSB stated that in previous similiar occurrences, when the crew had received "Thrust not set" indications and "RETARD" calls during takeoff acceleration, the assumed temperature had not been set for flex takeoff, however, crews did not advance the thrust levers into the TOGA detent.

 

 

http://avherald.com/h?article=471583da&opt=0

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  • 3 weeks later...

62 killed in FlyDubai 737-800 Crash at Rostov-On-Don.  Looks like it laded short by about 300 m.

 

'

A passenger FlyDubai Boeing-737-800 en route from Dubai to Russia’s Rostov-on-Don crashed at the city's airport after missing the runway amid poor visibility. There were 7 crew members and 55 passengers on board the crashed Boeing 737-800 plane, the Russian Emergencies Ministry said in a statement.

http://sputniknews.com/russia/20160319/1036558984/passenger-plane-crash-russia.html

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I know they shot this in Russia, so I assume there were some possible FAA violations. One of which is that it seems the FAA only allows 3 20-second periods of "zero" gravity while the video needed 8 21-22 second periods of "zero" gravity. 

 

I don't think that is "egregious", but it seems to be a violation even if it was worth breaking. 

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