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Showing content with the highest reputation on 09/01/2018 in all areas

  1. 2 points

    General news thread

    The Pentagon has cut aid to Pakistan over militant ties
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    I cannot think of a Ford product OTHER than A truck I would consider buying.
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    So this is a bit of an outgrowth of my comments on the LCS... Corvettes and Cruisers - Surface Combatants in 2015 and Beyond The year 2015 is an interesting time for the oft-forgotten surface combatants - corvettes, frigates, destroyers, and cruisers - which are used to operating under the shadow of aircraft carriers that have dominated naval combat. On the Western side, you have numerous sources in the Internet reporting doom and gloom for the American Navy, citing warship shortages compared to a growing Chinese Navy. Even the Russian Navy, which mostly remains underfunded, is featured in sensationalist articles like this one: http://theweek.com/articles/583294/tiny-russian-warship-just-shocked-world Which question how small Russian warships are able to carry many more missiles than much larger American warships. The problem, unfortunately, lies with the lack of naval knowledge among the general news media and the public. Sensationalism and trivia tend to override context and timelines in the search for more viewers and clicks. Fortunately, that's why this article exists to set things straight. The Myth of the Declining American Surface Fleet One of the most enduring and popular misconceptions on the Internet is the idea that the American surface fleet is declining. Too much focus is placed on the problems of the navy's two latest ship designs - the Zumwalt and the Littoral Combat Ship - while commentators whose naval knowledge is limited to playing Harpoon wax nostalgic about the days of a massive US Navy that had dozens of cruisers and frigates. All of this tends to disguise a startling revelation: The US surface fleet is in fact incredibly strong now; and is more powerful than it was in the 90s. The key really, which everyone doesn't seem to notice, is the US Navy's concentration on a single, proven warship type: The Arleigh Burke class. There are now 62 of these powerful warships serving in the US Navy, half of which only joined the fleet after the year 2000. This production run in fact exceeds the production run of any US warship for the past 30 years - the Knox class frigate for instance had only 36 units, while only 51 of the "cheap" OH Perry class were built for the USN, And that's not even the end of the run yet. An additional 14 units had already been authorized - to make up for the cancellation of most of the Zumwalts - with potentially thirty more to be ordered. It may in fact come to pass that the Arleigh Burke's production run would exceed a hundred; which is quite an investment given that these are 10,000 ton warships that are more equivalent to World War 2 cruisers than the 2,000 ton destroyers from the same era. Yet even with the existing run of 62 ships the production of Arleigh Burkes had in fact already outweighed the production total of the OH Perry class (which was half the weight of a Burke) and the Spruance class - the two ship classes they were really meant to replace. So while the total number of ships may have decreased, in terms of tonnage the fleet's overall weight in fact increased - while lowering manpower cost. The Burkes are also simply much better ships than the old frigates and destroyers because of the improved AEGIS sensors and the versatility of its VLS system; which can load many different types of missile depending on its mission. A single Burke for instance could theoretically carry 96 SAMs for air defense or 96 Tomahawk missiles instead - the latter loadout being four times more cruise missiles that the Russians fired on Syria using their four small ships. An old OH Perry by contrast could only carry 40 short-ranged SAMs and a handful of anti-ship missiles in its main missile magazine. Moreover, the numbers of Arleigh Burkes available - alongside the twenty-two original AEGIS cruisers, give the US a grand total of eighty-four top-of the-line escorts. Compared to the nineteen US Navy Supercarriers and Marine carriers, the USN in fact has enough to provide four of AEGIS escorts per carrier. China by contrast has a mere dozen Type 51 and 52 destroyers that come close in weight class - but not in capability - as the Burkes. Indeed, their only match unit per unit are the six Kongo and Atago class ships of the Japanese SDF - who are of course American allies! In this context, it also becomes easier to see why much of the "controversy" around the Littoral Combat Ship is misplaced. Many of its critics want it to be as capable as the outgoing OH Perry class frigates. What these critics don't realize is that the replacement for these ships were in fact the dozens of new Arleigh Burkes. The LCS was instead meant to fill the roles that the Burkes could't perform - and in doing so they spelled the doom of the 4,000 ton frigates. The Death of the 4,000 ton Frigate A perennial problem in amateur warship discussion is the insistence of many commentators on the need for particular ship types. "We need cruisers/destroyers/frigates", often uttered without realizing what the particular ships were actually meant to do. This applies to the 4,000 ton "multirole" frigate - which is an enormously popular type of warship worldwide and the OH Perry is an exemplar of this type. In essence, the multirole frigate promises decent all-around capability at an affordable cost. However, for the present-day US Navy, there is no place for the multi-role frigate. The Burkes served as carrier escorts and independent cruisers for showing the flag in dangerous hotspots. The LCS meanwhile was a utility ship in a carrier battle group, or a low-intensity combat ship for showing the flag in safer waters. There was no space in between for a multirole frigate. And that's because the well-loved frigate was in fact always riddled by compromise. It simply could not be good at anti-air combat, anti-submarine combat, and surface combat with only 4,000 tons displacement. Specialist ships meanwhile - such as the Knox - could not operate independently because they could not deal with all possible threats they encountered. Even the idea that they could serve as "backup" for the primary carrier escorts proved problematic, particularly in anti-air combat. Experience in the Falklands showed that having multiple average SAM systems operating independently was problematic - you had mere minutes or even seconds to coordinate your defense volleys which proved impossible with multiple ships; leading to the possibility that some of the enemy aircraft/missiles were left un-engaged. Long-ranged SAM systems also tended to be radar-guided leading to the possibility of the escorts interfering with each other's radar. The solution was a centralized and computerized SAM system on a single ship with a powerful radar - the AEGIS system on the US cruisers and the Burkes. Indeed, so powerful was this system that the Americans quickly scrapped their remaining non-AEGIS air defense cruisers while the OH Perry class was allowed to lose their SAM systems - it was better to have a handful of AEGIS ships doing air defense than a lot of lesser ships. Interestingly, the only type of SAM system that would complement AEGIS was the short-ranged RIM; which was an IR-guided weapon that did not interfere with other ship's radar while providing last-ditch defense against an enemy missile that got through the long-ranged SAM volleys of AEGIS. It was probably not a coincidence that RIM was the only SAM system equipped on the LCS; while all of the US Navy's remaining carrier escorts were large AEGIS ships. Meanwhile, anti-submarine combat had also progressed. The Knox and OH Perry class were designed with the idea that the warship itself may have to engage an enemy submarine in direct combat; which is why it had its own anti-submarine torpedo tubes and the ASROC launcher. The speed of nuclear submarines and their own guided torpedoes had long made this approach suicidal however, hence the switch to using helicopters to attack submarines without fear of retaliation. With this in mind, the only contribution of a multirole frigate in anti-submarine warfare was its helicopter pad - a helicopter pad also present on the LCS. In short, the problem with the multirole frigate was that too much of its systems had become dead weight. Its SAM systems were more of a liability if it were not up-to-date, and the anti-submarine weapons redundant in the context of using the helicopter for submarine hunting. Indeed, it could be considered wasteful to use multirole frigates in carrier battlegroups since some of their tasks were so mundane - such as the "plane guard" whose mission was to pick up any pilots who may have crashed into the sea while trying to land on the carrier. Is it really necessary for a 4,000 ton frigate with a large number of weapons (most of which it cannot use while so close to the carrier) to be saddled with this role, or is better for a smaller, cheaper vessel like the LCS whose sole anti-air weapon can be used to defend the carrier? Quiet New Dreadnoughts: Corvettes and Cruisers Put together, the Burke and the LCS both point to two emerging trends in surface combatants; as well as the dangerous continuation of many navies down the path of the multirole frigate. First, the Burkes showed it was possible to have a powerful surface combatant theoretically capable of surviving heavy air attack (theoretical as the system has never been tested fully in combat) that nonetheless retains sufficient anti-surface and anti-submarine punch. However, this design requires the ship to be nearly 10,000 tons. The Chinese Type 52D for instance is now around 7,500 tons in weight compared to the original Type 52's 6,000; and the future proposals are definitely looking at a 10,000 ton design. The British Daring class had an even more dramatic size increase, doubling in size from the previous Type 42s. All of these ships are equipped with VLS with actual or theoretical capability to load multiple types of missiles for different missions. These 10,000 ton "Destroyers" are more rightly classified as "cruisers" given they are also capable of independent action in addition to serving as escort; and their presence spells the obsolescence of the 4,000-5,000 ton "multirole" frigate. The new 10K Cruisers can simply do everything the frigates are supposed to do and better except in terms of acquisition cost; which is why the frigate will remain primarily with budget-stricken navies trying to pursue paper advantages at a discount. The higher-end Corvettes like the Sa'ar V, which are even more cash-strapped implementations of the multirole frigate that also sacrifice seakeeping, may also soon suffer the same fate. Meanwhile, new 1,000-3,000 ton corvettes like the LCS will be developed to fill the existing gap in warships suitable for low-intensity conflict or mundane tasks with a battlefleet. Given the cost of the 10K cruisers these smaller ships will focus not on packing as many weapons or capabilities as possible, but focus on a handful of roles at the most efficient possible cost. These ships will be characterized by omitting features seen by traditionalists as "standard" pieces of equipment - kept "just in case" - but for the most part really only add to the operating cost of the ship in the long run. Of course future technological developments may result in new ship types and capabilities - including perhaps a renewed interest in long-ranged naval gunnery. However, I suspect that many of these new technologies will simply be incorporated in the large cruisers and then the smaller corvettes as necessary; and that these two core types will serve as the basis of future surface combatants for the world's fleets.
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    Polish small arms.

    Welcome to SH.
  7. 1 point

    Competition: Tank Design 2239

    looks a bit familiar.... For some unknown reason the renderer crapped out on me so I had to change the coloring on the Norman. Anyhow, short of vents and rough shapes of equipment in the engine bay, the Norman is DONE. Some details are stand-ins for things I don't have the time to model properly; for example, the loader's MG should be on a skate ring, not a pintle, and the commander's MG is supposed to have linkages for elevation and firing (enabling its use under armor, Abrams-style). Also the bustle stowage rack is not modelled. I may not have time to properly model a light tank, which means I might have a low-visuals submission for that part. Full writeup will come later, when I again have time. By the way, if anyone's wondering, the frontal turret spaced armor isn't a shot trap, as it's the same thickness as the hull roof underneath it, and therefore anything capable of penetrating the roof after bouncing will penetrate the spaced armor, not bounce.
  8. 1 point
    "What a puerile comment.....Are you somehow under the impression that the Express is the voice of the UK Government or Her Majesty's Opposition?" (expressing that said commenter is beneath understanding of media in discussion) I know your 'country' has been subject to rule by media for some time, but that's just not how it works in the civilised world. (Inferring said country is somehow "beneath" other nations or collectives) Granted, this for me is an amusement at most, but if you did not see this coming, you were wearing blinders in the railroad tunnel.
  9. 1 point
    Yeah, it's BS, Ford had already announced they were killing their entire CAR line other than the Mustang, and producing more trucks and SUVs since that's what sells.
  10. 1 point

    Land 400 Phase 3: Australian IFV

    It’d be interesting to see the costs of changing configurations (e.g. from manned to unmanned) over the course of the vehicle’s life. Also interesting from a concept of employment (CONEMP) perspective is the organisational change from mounted infantry (i.e. light infantry that boards & rides in vehicles that belong to a separate organisation) to mechanised infantry (vehicle is organic to, and owned by, the section itself. The vehicle crew is drawn from the section that operates the IFV) and how (if?) that informs some of the requirements. The Operating Concept Document (OCD) released with the RFT was V.4, published in Q4/2014.....before the re-constitution of Mechanised Infantry battalions. So what? In Australian doctrine, the mechanised infantry commander (section, platoon, company) almost always dismounts when the entity he has overall command of does. So, when the vehicle stops to let its dismounts debus, the commander will have to get out of the turret, through the fighting compartment and down the ramp. Having done this in a “previous life”, ditching the CVC, squirming out of the T50 turret, putting on the PASGT (dating myself there, I guess) before dismounting was a pain in the arse. At least with a two-man turret, the section 2IC, Mech CPL, or Mech SGT is already in the turret and continue to fight the vehicle uninterrupted. How do you (potentially) quickly, and safely, ditch a helmet with AR? Not a problem if the crew & vehicle belongs to the ACR & doesn’t dismount. Different if they’re mech as discussed above.
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    Armata IFV with 57mm canon, top view.
  12. 1 point
    German concept proposed during the Kampfpanzer 3 / FMBT project to the UK via https://andrei-bt.livejournal.com/928203.html Twin-gun casemat tank from Maschinenbau Kiel: Low-profile turret tank with driver in turret by Krauss-Maffei (similar to MBT-70, but with 120 mm smoothbore gun and manual loader - maybe derived from the Eber concept): Data: Armor is spaced steel plates, sometimes with fuel inbetween them. The MaK design has 727 mm thick armor, but the actual steel thickness is just 259 mm... Note that according to Krapke a third concept (AFAIK either turretless or with unmanned turret?) was proposed.
  13. 0 points

    General news thread

    Old crusty, New York Post columnist... we are not so different, you and I. NYC should stop coddling young white bros on bikes https://nypost.com/2018/09/01/nyc-should-stop-coddling-young-white-bros-on-bikes/ Cycling isn’t just a guy thing — it’s a white guy thing. Despite lack of data, anyone can see that in a city that’s 55 percent nonwhite, black, Latin and Asian faces on wheels are relatively scarce. (The exception is hard-working food delivery people, for whom access to bike lanes makes their backbreaking jobs somewhat less risky while ensuring that more affluent citizens won’t have to wait too long to get their General Tso’s chicken.) It isn’t just a white guy thing — it’s a young white guy thing. Neither the DOT nor any major biking organization could provide data on cycling use by age. But another scroll through those 185 Citi Bike trips turned up only 29 uses by riders aged over 45. It’s also an able-bodied young white guys’ thing. Many cyclists look more suited to running the New York Marathon than to merely getting from Point A to Point B. Meanwhile, subway riders with every imaginable disability brave jammed platforms, stairs and trains. Legless men hop from car to car. Now, it isn’t inherently sexist, racist, ageist or ableist that cycling is most popular with athletic, younger white males. What’s sexist, racist, ageist and ableist is that the wishes of so narrow a slice of the populace are institutionally favored over those of all others. @Oedipus Wreckx-n-Effect Y DO YOU H8 POOR, LEGLESS minorities forced 2 EWES SUBWAY???!?!???
  14. 0 points

    Documents for the Documents God

    This article would later appear in ARMOR magazine. It's by Jim Warford, a regular over at Tank net. One of the funniest things about this article is that Sparky/Blacktail wrote a ridiculous rebuttal to it years after the fact.
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    We live in a post context world, just look at Count Dankula. Context is born from toxic masculinity, the patriarchy, and white privilege. We must do away with context and the oppression it brings.
  17. 0 points

    General news thread

    In retrospect, I think the important thing to remember is that it's not important that Donald Trump or Sarah Palin aren't attending, what's important is that John McCain will be at the funeral.