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Showing content with the highest reputation since 11/10/2018 in all areas

  1. 2 points
  2. 2 points
    most kawaii death machine 2018
  3. 2 points
    As shitty as it looks having him vote, I agree with Walt on principle on this. Also, I'm not sure what the legal method would be to deny somebody a constitutional right without being convicted of anything. Not that that's stopped people like DHS before, of course.
  4. 2 points
    http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a237212.pdf
  5. 2 points
    Cruz is eligable to vote because he has not been convicted yet. Are we going to start taking away voting rights to people not convicted? That makes no sense.
  6. 2 points
    Dean Speir covered this over at "The Gun Zone" back when it happened in 2001. Initial Report https://web.archive.org/web/20160317190046/http://www.thegunzone.com:80/m1akb.html Shooter's Reply https://web.archive.org/web/20160315120725/http://thegunzone.com/m1akb/762d2.html Necropsy https://web.archive.org/web/20160315121736/http://thegunzone.com/m1akb/762r.html
  7. 2 points
    Molota_477

    French flair

    And there is a livejournal post about AMX-30 test with Radar FCS(in Russian) https://strangernn.dreamwidth.org/1786004.html
  8. 2 points
    No, most image queries will be polluted with well-known pictures of the 120S (many of those pics will be screenshots from Armored Warfare; the devs have erroneously used the 120S pics to model their premium "M60-2000"), the Super M60/M60AX, the Magach and/or the Sabra. EDIT - an interesting detail: another AW forum member, Jarink, suggested the vehicle seen in the background here could possibly be a M1015 Electronic Warfare Shelter Center (based on the M548 chassis) due to the presence of a grounding rod on the front. ^--- M1015 with ELINT-gathering AN/MSQ-103 "TEAMPACK". Note the grounding rod at the front. ^--- M1015 with AN/MLQ-34 "TACJAM" communications jammer. Note the more modern grounding rod with square box, similar to the one in the first picture.
  9. 2 points
    it's posted by Jon Bernstein Armor Modeling and Preservation Society Social Group on FB
  10. 1 point
    Serge

    NGCV/OMFV. Forwarding to... the past

    Let us open a topic dedicated to the Optionally maned fighting vehicle. What we know now is that we don’t know so much. What is sure, the US Army : - wants 9 men strong dismounted section ; - doesn’t want to continue to share an IFV between two sections when mounted ; - is awared that it’s complicated to fight with an IFV carrying a 9 men section. Platforms showed available at AUSA 2018 were : Griffin III from General Dynamic CV90 from BAE Lynx from Rheinmetall Maybe a proposal from SAIC ? My point here is the following : I have the strange feeling that there’s a misunderstanding. During last years, US Army spend lots of money to study new manufacturing process, new designs... and today, when we are looking at news, all we see is old concept. The Lynx is optimized to be a cost effective platform with proven components. But what is its upgrading capability to stay in services until 2070 ? CV90 is very good but it got limitations too. It need a deep reworked of its hull. The Griffin was introduced as the response to the Army call but in fact there’s no other tracked other platform in the GD catalog. I may be wrong but I can’t see any real disruption. What about monolithic forged hull ? What about decoupled running gear ? Are torsion bars still a solution for suspensions ? I think, this is the very beginning of the story but it’s very strange.
  11. 1 point
    Sturgeon

    Designing A Rifle From Scratch(ish)

    After four major iterations, the charging handle is finished: [comrade kalashnikov to the rescue again] Only thing left to do is throw the LPK in and we have a complete gun. Current weights (unlikely to change meaningfully) SCAR-alike config: 2.78 kg / 6.14 lb 14.5" / 13" w/ ACR stock: 3.10 kg / 6.84 lb 10.5" / 8.5" w/ ACR stock: 2.68 kg / 5.90 lb
  12. 1 point
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  14. 1 point
    guided artillery shell and GLATGMs
  15. 1 point
    The full title of this work is "Weaponeering - Conventional Weapon System Effectiveness" by Morris Driels, who teaches at the USN Postgraduate School, and the cover of the edition I have in hand can be seen below. The book aims to "describe and quantify the methods commonly used to predict the probably of successfully attacking ground targets using air-launched or ground-launched weapons", including "the various methodologies utilized in operational products used widely in the [US military]." Essentially, this boils down to a series of statistical methods to calculate Pk and Ph for various weapons and engagements. The author gave the book to my mother, who was a coworker of his at the time, and is of the opinion that Driels is not as smart as he perceives himself to be. But, hey, it's worth a review for friends. I will unfortunately be quite busy in the next few days, but I have enough spare time tonight to begin a small review of a chapter. I aim to eventually get a full review of the piece done. Our dear friends @Collimatrix and @N-L-M requested specifically chapter 15 covering mines, and chapter 16 covering target acquisition. Chapter 15 Mines The mine section covers both land mines and sea mines, and is split roughly in twain along these lines. The land mine section begins with roughly a page of technical description of AT vs AP, M-Kill vs K-Kill, and lists common US FAmily of SCatterably Mines (FASCAM) systems. The section includes decent representative diagrams. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the specification and planning of minefields, beginning with the mean effective diameter of a mine. Driels discusses a simplified minefield method based on mine density, and then a detailed method. The simplified method expresses the effectiveness of the minefield as a density value. Diels derives for the release of unitary mines from aircraft NMines = Fractional coverage in range * fractional coverage in deflection * number of mines released per pass * reliability * number of passes and for cluster type NMines = FRange * FDefl * NDispensers * Reliability dispenser * NMines per Dispenser * Reliability Submunition * number of passes and then exploits the evident geometry to express the Area and Frontal densities. Most useful is the table of suggested minefield densities for Area Denial Artillery Munition and Remote Anti-Armor Mine System, giving the Area and Linear densities required to Disrupt, Turn, Fix, and Block an opponent. Whereas the simplistic method expresses effectiveness as a density, the detailed model views the targets and mines individually, assuming the targets are driving directly through the minefield perpendicular to the width and that there is only one casualty and no sympathetic detonations per detonation. The model computes the expected number of targets destroyed by the minefield, beginning with the Mean Effective Diameter and the PEncounter based on distance from the mine. Driels derives the number of mines encountered which will be encountered, not avoided, and will engage the target. I can't be arsed to type the equations in full, so here you go. The section concludes with an example calculation using the detailed mine method. Overall, this shows the strengths and weaknesses of the book fairly well - it is a reasonable derivation of open-source statistical methods for predicting Pk and Ph and the number of sorties required, but US-specific and limited in scope and depth. The treatment of Sea Mines begins by describing the various types and uses of said mines, importantly noting that they have both defensive and offensive uses, and that the presence of the threat of mines is equally important as the actual sinking which occurs. There are three classifications of sea mines, contact, influence, and controlled. Shallow water mines are treated trivially, considering them equivalent to land mines with Blast Diameter in the place of MED, and assuming that the mines cannot be avoided. Deep water mines are approached in a similar manner, with the desire to determine the number of mines needed to achieve the required probability of damage, and planning missions from there. Two features of sea mines must be considered, however - mine actuation by passing of the target, and mine damage to the target. The probability of activation is, unfortunately, dependent on the depth of the mine and distance, forming a series of stacked bowls as below. The mean value of PActivation is the statistical expectation of the curve. Because I don't feel like screencapping another equation, the Width of Seaway where an actuation can occur is qualitatively merely the area under the actuation curve calculated for a specific mine and target combo. The damage function is also of interest - because we require the mine to both actuate and damage the target, this limits our earlier area under the curve to that area integrated to the limits of the damage function. The selection of mine sensitivity plays a very large role in the effectiveness of our mines. A high setting will lead to many more actuations than damages, which can be indicated by the ratio of the actuation area and the damage area from earlier. Setting the actuation distance equal to the damage distance means that every actuation causes damage, but the probability of actuation is only around 42%. The compromise which selects some Areadamage / Areaactuation of around .8 to .93 is generally preferred. This gives us several useful terms - PA+D = Reliability * Areadamage / Widthminefield . The probability that the first ship to transit a minefield is referred to as the threat, or Threat T = 1 - (1 - PA+D)^NMines = 1 - (1 - Reliability * Areadamage / Widthminefield ) which can obviously be solved for NMines to get the desired number of mines for a desired threat level. Anti-submarine mines are an interesting subset of deep sea mines, as they turn the problem from two-dimensions to three. Driels accounts for this by replacing the mine damage width with the mine damage area, to no one's surprise. Driels claims that the probability of actuation and damage is PA/D = Damage Area / (Width * Depth of minefield). Despite my initial confusion, the reliability term safely reappears in the threat definition below. T = 1 - (1 - (Reliability * Area damage)/(Width * Depth of minefield))^NMines, with a solution for number of mines for given threat level fairly easily taken out as before. Lastly, there is a summary of topics for each chapter, though unfortunately they are qualitative descriptions. Including the final derived equations in this part would be a major benefit, but is overlooked. Ah well. They are quite good for review or refreshing the material. As before, this is a relatively interesting if shallow engagement with the statistical methods to calculate Pk and Ph and the number of sorties required. Going more into detail regarding selecting Threat values or common (unclass) parameters would be interesting, but is lacking. Assuming I don't slack off tomorrow, I should have most or all of the Target Acquisition chapter covered.
  16. 1 point
    Mighty_Zuk

    The Leopard 2 Thread

    Of course I can. Apparently it goes way back to at least 2011: http://www.defence-point.gr/news/νέες-επιτυχείς-βολές-του-leo2-a4-με-πυροβόλο
  17. 1 point
    Also few rare photo from Directorate A facility (i guess). Some of them translated: Also, MP-5s if i see it right.
  18. 1 point
    LoooSeR

    Tanks guns and ammunition.

    Claimed to be DU Svinets.
  19. 1 point
    Heh, always knew that.
  20. 1 point
    @LoooSeR @EnsignExpendable Edit: I mentioned our resident Russian spies, but for the capitalist pigs, the title of the book reads "girl on the train".
  21. 1 point
    The more I look at this, the angrier I get. Personally: I would rip out ~60% of US funding (leaving about $250 tril) and let NATO figure out how to pay their own bills. If they can’t, no skin off my back, and maybe that money could be used to pay for stuff over here. And, let’s be honest, it’s not like there’s anything threatening Europe that NATO couldn’t (theoretically) handle themselves: the Russians sure as hell cant afford a real fight with NATO, and Turkey isn’t a threat either. Hell, the biggest threat to the EU is themselves and their retarded immigration policies, but that’s nothing a little coup can’t change
  22. 1 point
    Akula_941

    Contemporary Western Tank Rumble!

    OH YOU HAVE NO IDEA HOW THE BLOODY SHITSTORM LOOKS LIKE IN ANOTHER SIDE OF THE OCEAN
  23. 1 point
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  25. 1 point
    Woah, the establishment is trying to rig it against the anti-establishment in favor of itself? Unthinkable!
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