LeuCeaMia

How does [C-BOO] not have a description yet? It should definitely be this:
 
EVERY MORNING I WAKE UP AND OPEN PALM SLAM A BR-471B SHELL INTO THE BREECH. ITS AN IS-2 AND RIGHT THERE AND THEN I START DOING THE MOVES ALONGSIDE WITH THE MAIN CHARACTER, STALIN. I DO EVERY MOVE AND I DO EVERY MOVE HARD. MAKING WHOOSHING SOUNDS WHEN I SLAM DOWN SOME FASCIST BASTARDS OR EVEN WHEN I MESS UP TECHNIQUE. NOT MANY CAN SAY THEY SURVIVED THE GALAXY'S MOST DANGEROUS WAR. I CAN. I SAY IT OUTLOUD EVERY DAY TO PEOPLE ON THE FORUMS AND ALL THEY DO IS PROVE PEOPLE IN WORLD OF TANKS CAN STILL BE IMMATURE JERKS. AND IVE LEARNED ALL THE COMMANDS AND IVE LEARNED HOW TO MAKE MYSELF AND MY BARRACKS FEEL LESS LONELY BY SHOUTING EM ALL. 2 HOURS INCLUDING WIND DOWN EVERY MORNIng.

If Tied was the villain of a vampire movie

"Success" is very hard to determine with Cold War era Soviet tanks.  A lot of the information that isn't just cold, hard technical data is slanted by the respective design houses of the tanks, and as you know those guys had a serious agenda and hated each other.  This is ongoing; look at the back and forth that breaks out on Tanknet on T-72 vs T-64.
 
On top of that there were higher-level political considerations.  I've read from several sources that Khrushchev disliked heavy tanks, and we all know how hard he worked to de-Stalinize the USSR.  Given that most of the nation's heavy tanks were named after his arch nemesis, is it possible that Khrushchev-era sources unfairly slandered the IS-3 and T-10?  I wouldn't discount the possibility.
 
Note that the article above was written by the same person who wrote Why Three Tanks?  He definitely doesn't seem to care for Kotin.  I wonder how much archival material is left in Ukraine; it would be interesting to hear their side of the story.
 
From everything I can determine objectively, the IS-3 looks like an excellent design from an armor architecture standpoint and space utilization standpoint, and less amazing in other ways.  T-10 looks goddamn terrifying.
 
The late-service 122mm 3BK9M HEAT ammunition had 490mm penetration, which is substantially more than the ~380mm achieved by M469 HEAT for the M58 (which is about the same as Obus-G), and more even than the early 115mm HEAT rounds, let alone L7 HEAT.  So for a brief period near the end of its service life, the T-10 had the scariest gun of any tank in service anywhere.
 
Armor is about as good as possible for an all-steel tank that can still actually move, and the angles should induce fuse failure in some of the earlier HEAT rounds as well as really screw with period APDS.  P/W is respectable, and ground pressure was low-ish thanks to those enormously long tracks.

RIP T-35

http://focustaiwan.tw/news/afav/201511040001.aspx
 
I was going to write a pretty massive summary of this, but basically, while it may seem like something rather minor, this is actually a massive thing for the 2 (arguably 1 to some) nations that I can't even describe for those who don't know the history of 1900's China and the Post WW2 removal of the Republic leadership from the mainland by the Communist forces at the "end" of the civil war.
 
It's not without controversy, people in Taiwan are protesting in the streets as, even before this, Ma Ying-Jeou has proven to be an unpopular president in Taiwan, but I await to see what, if anything actually comes out of this.

Also posted here.
 
RD-0410
  The history of American efforts to develop nuclear thermal rockets is relatively well known. Similar Soviet efforts have remained far more obscure. However, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed and tested an advanced nuclear thermal rocket engine, designated the RD-0410. Unfortunately, relatively little English-language information about the RD-0410 can be found (at least in easily available sources).   Similar to the American NERVA program, development of Soviet nuclear rocketry began in the mid-1950s. Serious research began in 1955, with development of a rocket beginning in 1956 (the people working on this project included such notable people as Kurchatov, Keldysh, and Korolev). Initially, the Soviets planned to use the nuclear rocket to power an intercontinental ballistic missile, or possible a cruise missile. However, it was quickly realized that chemical rockets were good enough for suborbital flights. As a result, by the 1960s, it was decided to develop the engine for usage in space.   The engine was developed by the KBKHA bureau, which had also developed engines such as the RD-0105 (used on some derivatives of the R-7). The goal was to develop an engine with a specific impulse of roughly 800-900 seconds, double what can be achieved with normal chemical rockets. Doing this would require creating a nuclear reactor that was both very light, and capable of withstanding very high temperatures around 3000 Kelvin. I have seen a few references to a program to develop a 2,000 isp engine, but this would require temperatures (over 15,000K) well in excess of what was possible in the 1950s (or even today) for a solid core design.   The test site selected for the Soviet nuclear engine was Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan, a remote location similar to Jackass Flats in Nevada. The Soviets had already tested numerous atomic weapons (including their first in 1949 there), so the place was no stranger to nuclear activity. It appears that tests of the engine were conducted in a mine shaft approximately 150 meters deep, unlike the American NERVA, which was tested aboveground. Most likely, this was due to concerns over radiation should the engine malfunction. At some point, the engine acquired the designation RD-0410, it is less commonly known by its GRAU designation 11B91. That the engine received a GRAU designation means that it was almost certainly considered for military applications.   The American NERVA had a thrust of approximately 330 kilonewtons. This was much more than the RD-0410, which had about 35 kilonewtons. This was both by design, and due to political/monetary considerations. The Soviet government had somewhat lost interest in the project once it had become apparent that the nuclear engine was not usable as an ICBM upper stage. More importantly, by developing a lower power engine, the reactor assembly as a whole would be smaller. The RD-0410, including propellant, was planned to mass roughly 15 tons when completed; putting it well within the payload capabilities of Soviet launchers like Proton. The actual engine itself weighed only about two tons. In contrast, the American NERVA was much heavier, and could only be launched by a Saturn V or similar vehicle.    There were other important differences between NERVA and RD-0410. The NERVA’s fuel elements were hexagonal in cross section, with several holes drilled in them for hydrogen to pass through. Hundreds of these elements (each about an inch wide) made up the NERVA’s reactor. NERVA Fuel Elements
   It has been difficult to find exact information about the geometry of the RD-0410’s fuel rods, however, it appears that they had a complex shape. The fuel rods were twisted, and had a complex cross section, shaped like the petals of a flower. This was intended to lock the fuel rods together, and prevent fuel from falling out of the reactor if a few rods cracked or became dislodged. The fuel elements were made of uranium carbide, in order to better withstand the high temperatures of the core.     Development and testing of the RD-0410 proceeded slowly. By 1973, America’s NERVA had already been test fired, then cancelled before actually flying. However, large scale tests of the RD-0410’s components did not begin until 1978. The test reactor was first started on March 27, 1978, and ran for 70 seconds. Gradually, the reactor was run for longer, and at higher temperatures. By 1981, the RD-0410 was running for an hour, its design duration. A specific impulse of 910 seconds was achieved; this was superior to that which was obtained with NERVA. The American Timberwind/SNTP project from the late 1980s planned to achieve similar efficiency with much higher thrust to weight, but it encountered numerous technical problems and did not reach the test stage.    All accounts of the RD-0410 state that it’s testing at Semipalatinsk went very well. Originally, it was planned that the engine would fly in 1985 (likely replacing the Block D 4th stage on Proton). However, as the Soviet Union imploded during the 1980s, development slowed, then halted. Other Soviet nuclear rockets were planned, such as the RD-0411; a high thrust (~400 kN) engine that would have been used on a Mars mission, and an engine designated 11B97, which would have had the capability of either nuclear thermal or electric propulsion. However, like all other nuclear rocket programs, none of them came to be.   via Astronautix, a concept for a Soviet Mars spacecraft, that likely would have used RD-0411
    Important Stats:   Unfueled Mass: ~2,000 kg Total Stage Mass ~14,000 kg Thrust: 35 kN ISP: 910 sec Maximum Run Time: 3600s Height: 3.50m Diameter: 1.6m   Bibliography: http://www.astronautix.com/engines/rd0410.htm http://www.popmech.ru/made-in-russia/5983-k-marsu-na-reaktore-vzryvnaya-sila/ http://www.cosmoworld.ru/spaceencyclopedia/programs/index.shtml?yard.html

I asked the question over at TankNet at a while back what the Soviets thought of the F-4 Phantom (their response was basically "lol i have no idea"). I figured I'd start a thread for this and related subjects, since, you know, we have actual former Soviets on this forum.
So, Soviet opinions of:

F-4 Phantom
F-8 Crusader
F-89 Scorpion
F-106 Delta Dart
F-94 Starfire
F-100 Super Sabre
F-86 Sabre
F-111 Aardvaark
B-52 Stratofortress
B-47 Stratojet
 
And anything else anyone wants to mention.

What were they?

"They keep telling us to work harder, and that if we don't keep these tigers going we'll be transferred to a panther unit as punishment."

I disagree about T-64. T-80UD was pushed by Kharkov factory so that Kharkov could produce T-80s. T-80U was clearly a better vehicle that had (and still has) upgrade potential [Oplot, lol]. While T-64 - don't. T-64BM Bulat already have overstressed suspension, while being just worse T-80U, and there is no way to bypass this problem without serious redesign work. T-64 suspension clearly hit it's limits, including how it perform at high speed. 
 
   T-80 was needed just because of suspension, but this tank was designed by LKZ, design team of which did not had much experience during initial work. This tank didn't went too far from T-64, which was it's main problem IMO. But in several parts where it went futher than T-64/72 - those changes were absolutely needed. With Object 292, T-80 could have got reasons to exist - gas turbine with 152 mm gun was exactly what people would consider as "heavy" tank. T-64's puny rollers would not be able to handle gas turbine and 152 mm gun.
 
   This tank potential was not fully used because of 1990s and problems with LKZ and later "Spetsmash". Object 299, a promising design, was also never made into anything substantial. LKZ probably was one of most interesting tank design bureau in USSR. I already posted somewhere a T-80-based prototype with crew capsule and pretty interesting crew compartent design. Driver even got a drive wheel instead of tractor leverstm! 

Sort of like the Sherman variants, they're a lot easier to tell apart looking at their engine decks and rears than they are from the front.
 
T-64 has a wide rectangular exhaust.

 
T-64 also has upright flaps on the rear with the intakes located at the front of the engine deck.

 
T-80 has a narrower centered exhaust.

 
T-80's intake is towards the front of the engine deck when it isn't covered by the turret filter.

 
T-72 has a removable rear port and no exhaust.(Earlier T-72s also had single pin tracks.)

 
T-72 Intakes are located towards the rear of the engine deck.

 
T-80UD has an engine deck similar to that of the T-64.

I wanted to get this in before I hit the sack. 
 
40,005 words now, not including the individual spec sheets I did. 
 
The Tank Battalion or how Sherman tanks were used.
There were two types of tank battalion, the type attached to infantry divisions, as ‘independent’ tank battalions,  and the type that were a part of an armored division. They were pretty much the same in organization, if not in how they were used. The life of a tanker could vary wildly from another’s depending on where he got assigned, and the tamest would probably be when they got sent to an armored division.
The Tank Platoon:
Let’s start with the smallest sub unit of the Tank Battalion, The tank platoon.  A Sherman platoon would be made up of five Sherman tanks, by late 44, they might be a mix of types. The likely mix would be some M4A3 75 tanks, and M4A3 76 tanks, with some M4A1 76s mixed in with some small hatch M4s and M4A3s. The optimal number of men for a tank platoon is 25, 1 Officer, 9 NCOs, and 15 regular GIs.
These men would be permanently assigned to one of the tanks. In most cases the tanks were named, and the name reflected the platoons, company designation, for this example we’ll say the platoon belongs to B Company, so all five tanks will be named something starting in B.
 
No. 1 Brenda: M4A3 76w, Platoon leader, Commander by a Lieutenant, Gunner: Corporal, Loader, Driver and Co Driver: Jr enlisted.  New tank, has commanders radios.
 
No. 2 Bonnie: M4A3 75w, Commander by a Sargent Gunner: Corporal, Loader, Driver and Co Driver: Jr enlisted. Nice new large hatch tank
 
No. 3 Battlingbitch: M4A1 76w, Commander by a Sargent Gunner: Corporal, Loader, Driver and Co
Driver: Jr enlisted. Tank been around since Cobra.
 
No. 4 Bronco: M4A3 75, Commander by a Staff Sargent Gunner: Corporal, Loader, Driver and Co Driver: Jr enlisted.  Another small hatch survivor, has all updates, and C/O radio.
 
No. 5 BettyW: M4A1 75, Commander by a sergeant, Gunner: Corporal, Loader, Driver and Co Driver: Jr enlisted.  Small hatch survivor.
 
This was as small as the unit was broken down in an armored division, at least most of the time. In a separate tank battalion things would be different. Often a battalion would be assigned to an infantry division for an extended period of time, a few the whole war, and they used tanks differently.  At a tactical level, when operating with infantry in direct support, they could be broken down into a two tank light section, and a three tank heavy section.  Sending a tank out by itself, even with infantry support was something they tried to avoid.
In a separate tank battalion, once assigned to a division, for battle they were often broken down much further. The way they usually did it was each regiment of the division would get a company, and then each battalion of the regiment got a platoon. The HQ platoon would be held in reserve or used to beef up a special combat team.  One tank platoon could get to know a battalion of troops very well if they worked together often, and that made for a better team. The longer they stayed assigned together the closer that bond got.
The Tank Company:
The next unit up in the Battalion is the Company. A Company is made up of three Platoons, just like the example we just talked about and an Headquarters platoon. The unit has now grown much larger B Company has 5 Officers, 39 NCOs, and 73 Jr. Ems The HQ Platoon had three tanks, a pair of M4 tanks of any 75/76 variety for the Company Commander and 1st Sargent. The third tank would be a M4A3 105 tank or an M7 priest if the 105 tank was in short supply. The HQ platoon would also have ARV assigned.
It would also have a maintenance section and admin, mess and supply Section attached. This parts of the company HQ would have their own trucks and jeeps and would hang back with the ARV and the 105 tank while the fighting was going on. Sometimes the truck would run ammo out to a tank or the ARV would move out to get a tank unstuck or deal with another problem of that type.  It would not be uncommon for the men in the HQ platoon not assigned to the combat vehicles to not see the rest of the men in the company for weeks at a time when assigned to a separate tank battalion. When part of an armored division, the companies worked together, and the company commander would lead his company into battle.
A late 1944 tank battalion would have four tank companies; three just like the ones we have just covered and one made up of M5 light tanks. It would also have its own HQ Company. The HQ Company had a pair of tanks, M4A3 76w tanks, and the 105 Shermans. They also had 3 self-propelled mortar half-tracks. The tanks would be held back in most cases when in an armored division, only committed where needed during an on the spot basis, often with the battalion commander commanding one.  In the separate battalions, the tanks were often put together as another light section and sent out to a trouble spot, usually with sergeants from Battalion HQ commanding both.
Commanding a battalion was very different depending on if you were an independent battalion, or part of an armored division. In an Armored Division, the battalion worked together as a unit a lot, it would be very rare for one to be broken up for some reason. He would have tight control over his company commanders and would know them all well.  They would also have worked with the division infantry for a longer time though rarely in the direct support role. They would have much easier access to spare parts and replacements since they would have the fixed asset of the division to work with.
The Commander of a separate battalion could have anything from a similar time to a much harder time depending on how his battalion got assigned. In a few cases separate battalions really got taken in by the Division they worked with, and got tied into their supply system and were accepted into the divisions command structure making keeping track of his men and tanks easier, but this was rare. The best they could really hope for was getting to stay with the same infantry division for extended periods of time. Some didn’t even get this, and a battalion commander could have a lot of work just keeping track of where all his tanks and people were. He would rarely man his tank, and the Battalion HQ assets combat assets would be farmed out like the companies.
. . .
The main point behind all this is, up to this section, we’ve always talked about the Sherman tank as an individual thing, and it wasn’t. At worst, you would be facing two or three at once but you could face up to seventeen or much much more, because they were part of the greatest combined arms team of the war.
It’s possible that the myth you need five Shermans to face a tiger has some roots in a historic misunderstanding. The Sherman units didn’t need five Shermans to kill a single panther, but that’s what they operated in as the smallest unit, and more often than not, there are going to be twelve other Shermans, all blood thirsty, looking for that tiger, cause just like the real animal, they were a rare and sought after prize to kill.     

BDD

Snippet of a declassified British report:
 

AT guns, cheap and easy to produce, these guns were a big threat to tanks, but had little value to a mobile force.     
AT guns were just what they sound like, large, Anti-Tank guns, on towable mounts. Most were as small and low slung as possible. Unless it was a US 3 inch AT gun, then they are huge. Even guns normally not a huge threat to a Sherman like the PAK 38 50mm AT gun could punch through the Shermans side if it was hidden well enough for the Shermans to give them the shot.  All the larger PAK guns had no trouble punching right through most Shermans.  Guns setup in ambush would have pre range cards, giving them an advantage shooting and getting hits.  They are much easier to hide than a tank and can even have bunkers built around them. Those are all reasons why these things made Sherman tankers lives harder.
Towed AT guns have a lot of negatives. For one, they are towed, by trucks, or halftracks, they have to be limbered and unlimbered, or set up, or packed up to go.  This is very hard to do in a useful way if you’re attacking with a mechanized force. By the time the guns are set up, if done at safe distances, the battle has moved on. At guns only have a small lightly armored shield, the crews would have to rely on personal foxholes or larger trench works if they had time.  The more time it had to get in place and camouflaged the position the better things would be for the gun and crew. But unless they had fortifications with overhead cover for the gun and crew, making it effectively a fixed gun, any kind of indirect fire weapon is going to make their lives hard. If the artillery fire wasn’t killing the crew, it would at least be keeping it from firing.    
 About half of the US tank destroyer battalions used only towed anti-tank guns. The battalions were not very successful, even during German offensives like the Battle of the Bulge. Both tracked TD battalions and towed were quickly disbanded after WWII, and towed anti-tank guns would not be a big part of most western nations militaries after the war either. AT guns would prove very useful the Germans from mid war on, after they were losing. They had a lot of these guns, and they accounted for a lot of tank kills. It was hard to determine in many cases what type of gun killed a tank, but tanks were much rarer than AT guns.
The Sherman 75mm tanks were actually better at dealing with AT guns than the later model tanks that had the 76mm gun, since it had a smaller explosive charge. It was far from useless though.  A tank’s best way of dealing with an AT gun was shoot the hell out of it with all guns available once it was spotted, and sometimes if the crew was suppressed, they’d even get a dose of the tracks.
Pak 38 50mm AT Gun:
This little gun was the main German AT gun from 1941 until superseded by the Pak 40. It was still used until the end of the war though. The Germans were so desperate they couldn’t afford to retire any weapons. Crewed by five men, it could be moved around pretty handily by the crew, but required a light truck or some kind of tow vehicle to go any real distance.  I won’t go into great detail about the gun but it needed to be very close to a Sherman to knock it out from the front, not so much from the sides. Nearly 10,000 produced.
Pak 40 75mm AT Gun:
This gun was larger; almost double the weight of the Pak 38.  This gun could also take the Sherman out at the combat ranges they normally faced each other. They Germans made nearly 20,000 of these guns, so they are probably responsible for a lot of knocked out Shermans. In some cases the same type of gun may have knocked the same Sherman out multiple times.  This gun required a bigger truck or halftrack to haul, but overall, it was a great gun.
Pak 43 88mm AT Gun:
This ‘fearsome’ gun had the same PR people as the big cats, but at least in this case the gun performed well, though not to the mythical levels some would have you believe. No it can’t take out an M1 ‘Abrahams’, it could take out any allied tank it faced, but it was nearly as rare as the Tiger I&II. They only produced around 2000 of these guns, so they only outnumber the combined Tigers production number of 1839. Overkill for most of the combat it saw, it would have been more useful if the Allies had made the same mistake of wasting resources on heavy tanks, but since they didn’t this gun was almost entirely a waste of time.  The gun weighed almost 10,000 pounds, and it was a heavy awkward gun mount, even worse than the US 76 AT gun mount.  It needed a very large tow vehicle and its size and weight limited where it could be employed.
 Flak 18/36/37 88mm dual purpose AA/AT Guns.   
 Another ‘mythical’ German weapon, this one started life as a mediocre AA gun that was pressed into use as a direct fire weapon when needed. As a direct fire weapon it was pretty good, these larger and much more powerful guns were better at penning armor than anything being mounted on a tank before or at the beginning of the war.  Capable of destroying all the French and British tanks the Germans faced, this gun could even handle the T-34 and KV-1/2 tanks, and it was the only thing the Germans had in any real numbers that could. This led to it being mounted in the Tiger I. The Pak 43 was more powerful, but this gun was more numerous with over 20,000 being produced. If any allied troops were right when an they thought an 88 was shooting at them it would be one of these.  
There was a Flak 41 88mm, but it was a failed attempt to improve upon the 18/36/37 failings as an AA gun.  The reason the basic 88 Flak gun failed as an AA gun was that it had optical range finding, and couldn’t lob a shell high enough to hit US heavy bombers, even the older models like the B-17. They also lacked radar ranging or laying unlike the superior US M1/2/3 90mm AA gun system. Had these guns not found their nitch in the direct fire role they would have gone down in history as the mediocre AA guns they were.
Next up, Panzerfausts, or AT-sticks as I now call them. 

Gas turbine engines in Kharkov factory storage area.

Tied has been trying to get me to post here for months, and he has finally convinced me to join up. So without further ado here is a post I made on the SA forums since I see there isn't a T-80 thread.
________________________________________________________________________________
T-80 Program
 
The T-80 MBT was another offshoot of the T-64 program. It entered service around the same time as the new generation of NATO tanks such as the Leopard 2, M1 Abrams and Challenger. While it was a capable and effective tank, it also carried a horrifically high price to deliver these qualities. Which considering the economic conditions of the USSR at the time of its introduction, could charitably be considered "negligent". To borrow a phrase, it was an example of "The best being the enemy of the good".
 

Despite its problems, The T-80U was certainly aesthetic.
 
Video
"Made in the USSR: T-80 main battle tank".

 
Origins
 
The T-80 was a child of two lineages, primarily, the T-64 design from Kharkov, and secondly the various tank turbine engine projects that had existed in the USSR for decades. In 1971, the soviet tank industry began work on new designs that would replace the T-64 and T-72 after 1981. These new designs were nicknamed "Perspektivy" or "NST" from "New Standard Tank".
 
There was a number of submissions, such as the unorthodox T-74 offered by Kharkov. Leningrad's Kirov KB offered the turbine powered Object 225 and the diesel Object 226, while Chelyabinsk offered the Object 780. Over time these projects were refined and replaced with the Leningrad Object 258, Chelyabinsk Object 785 and Kharkov adding the Object 480. Out of the three, only Kharkov remained enthusiastic about their project. Chelyabinsk had been moving away from the tank business after a change in management, and Leningrad had shifted their efforts onto a new T-64 remix, the Object 219T. After the problems with the T-64, along with Morozov's upcoming retirement, the army rejected the T-74.
 
 
Turbines, a Primer.
Interest in turbine engines for tanks had existed since the 1950's. Turbine technology offered engines that would be significantly smaller, lighter and more powerful than equivalent diesel engines. However they also had much higher requirements in terms of air filtering, maintenance and foremost, fuel. The appetites of a Turbine averaged at 240kg/hour of fuel to the 83kg/hour of a comparable diesel, a significant increase! These engines would also cost more than 10x equivalent diesels, an example figure is R9,600 for the V-46 to the R104,000 demanded of the GTD-1000.
 
Object 219 Development
The first experimental GTD-1000T turbine engine was mounted on a modified T-64 tank chassis. During early trials, it was found that the T-64 running gear would limit the top speed of the vehicle due to the extreme vibrations of the metal road wheels and the track at high speed. As a result, a new suspension was designed for the Obj.219 but with no attempted made to standardize this with the rival T-72's suspension.
 
During trials from 1968 to 1971, various suspension and subcomponent options were explored. Dust ingestion was a significant problem for the new tank, leading to a redesign of the air filters and the fitting of rubber side skirts to reduce the amount of dust kicked up during movement.
 
The Curse of the 5TDF lived on however and the engines had woefully low average times before failure, falling far below the targeted life of 500hrs. Trials also showed that the voracious fuel appetite of the engine forced the use of external fuel drums to meet the basic range requirement of 450km. Fuel consumption of the engine was an astounding 1.6 to 1.8 times higher than the T-64A. Wisely, Minister of Defense Andrei Grechko rejected plans to put the new Object 219 into production, citing that it offered no improvements to firepower or armor and consumed twice as much fuel as the T-64A.  
 
Unfortunately for the soviets, Grechko died in 1976 and replaced by Dmitry Ustinov, who immediately set about getting his pet project approved. Production was to start at LKZ and Omsk. Furthermore, any major tank system upgrades would be earmarked for priority use on the T-80 platform, such as new fire controls, stabilizers and etc.
 
In the original production configuration, the much delayed T-80 was essentially a T-64A with a turbine engine and new suspension. In all other respects the vehicle was equivalent, armor, armament, fire control and etc. But not the price! The T-80 was hideously expensive at R480,000 to the R143,000 of the T-64A. Not to mention, the tank had already fallen behind the T-64's newest version; the T-64B (which cost R318,000 I might add). As a result, the T-80 did not last long in production, with about less than 200 tanks made between 1976 and 1978.
 
 
T-80B
 

Ustinov used his position to ensure that the T-80 would be the new standard tank of the Soviet Army, and it was imperative that the quality of its systems be brought up to the level of the T-64B. To achieve this, the systems of the T-64B turret such as the LRF, ballistic computer, autoloader, Kobra complex, and etc were adapted to a new T-80B turret.  This turret used the same protective technology as well (combination-K) and offered the same protection. The hull was unchanged. This upgrade was designated the Object 219R. The T-80B would be the primary production variant of this tank.
 
The T-80B was put into production in 1978 at LKZ and at Omsk in 1979. The T-80B would also later be fitted with Kontakt-1 ERA,
 
Unfortunately there is not much to be said about the T-80B really as it was essentially a T-64B with a turbine engine that in cost more in total.
 
T-80U
The evolutionary links between the T-80B and what would become known as the T-80U were the Object 219A and 219V. The Object 219A would be a combination of a T-80B hull and a new T-64 turret that had been developed in Kharkov as another upgrade for their tank line, the Object 476. This time, rather than waste time and resources on another pissing match where a perfectly fine T-64 turret would be remade for the T-80, the turret was dropped in directly. This new combined effort would leave the LKZ responsible for the overall program, while Kharkov would continue to work on the turret and armament.
 
The Object 476 turret included a new generation of technology, such as the 1A45 fire control system, a new 1G46 sight and new laminate armor in the turret. This new generation of Laminate armor had been developed at NII Stali, with two versions. A simpler “reflecting-plate” system that would be used in the T-72B. The Object 476 turret however used the more expensive “semi-active filled-cell” armor design. In this design, plates of steel were suspended in polymer filled cells backed by a plate of resin and another layer of resin. When penetrated by HEAT, the shockwaves from the detonation would cause the reverberation of the semi-liquid filler, degrading the penetrating jet. 
 
While the Object 219A was ready for production in 1982, only a handful were made for use in technology trials. The new tank would have to wait for new technology initiatives to bear fruit, such as the Refleks missile complex and Kontakt-5 ERA. The Refleks laser beam riding missile was a brother of the Svir mounted on the T-72B, and both had been based of the Bastion/Sheksna missiles developed for the T-55 and T-62 respectively. The Refleks and Svir offered the most penetration of all, at 700mm RHA equivalent, compared to the 600mm offered by Kobra. The range was also extended from 4km to 5km. Kontakt-5 ERA also provided an impressive degree of protection against HEAT, and in a first for ERA, against APFSDS rounds as well. Against KE rounds, it is claimed that it will degrade their performance by 20% to 35%.
 
While integration of the object 476 turret with the 219A hull, the object 219V was fitted with a new GTD-1000F engine with a supercharger and the refleks missile complex. Both of these designs have been sometimes dubbed the T-80A, even though they were never accepted for service under this name.
 
A new object 219AS merged the features of both the 219A and the 219V. Twenty were produced in late 1983 with eight sent for troop trials and the remainder used in factory and state trials. The Object 219AS was accepted for Soviet Army service in 1985 as the T-80U. Series production of this type began in 1987 at Omsk, which would be the primary producer of this type as production at LKZ had been winding down and Kharkov was busy retooling for the job.
 
The T-80U would be the definitive version of this tank, and offered impressive protection against APFSDS (780mm), HEAT (1,320mm) on the turret front, a very high degree of cross country capability and high speed. However this astronomical performance also came with astronomical cost: a VNII Transmash study found that the T-80U offered only 10% improvement over the T-72B but cost 824,000Ru compared to only 280,000Ru; nearly three times more.
After Ustinov popped his clogs in December 1984, his turbine fetish was finally pried from his cold, dead hands. The following death of Leningrad party-boss Romanov 7 months later in July 1985 removed the second major benefactor of the T-80 program. This cleared the way for a return to more conventional engines for the T-80.
 
The pushback concerning turbine engines was focused primarily on cost. A GTD-1000 cost R104,000 which is ten times more than the R9,600 cost of the V-46 used in the T-72. Additionally, turbines had shorter running life, consumed an atrocious amount of fuel and were complicated and expensive to repair. Kharkov had been working on a diesel powered T-80 since 1976 (object 478), which used the new 6TD 1,000hp diesel that had been destined for the Object 476. This would be used in the new diesel powered T-80 
 
Kharkov’s production of the T-80U had been limited, only reaching 45 until the government approved the creation of a new diesel powered T-80U. Kharkov had wanted to follow the tradition of the T-34, T-44, T-54 and T-64 and name the new tank the T-84. Their hopes were dashed and it was called the T-80UD (UD= Improved diesel), to avoid the embarrassment of acknowledging having not three, but actually four similar tanks in production. This slap fight over names had to actually go all the way up to Gorby’s desk in order to be resolved.
 
The T-80UD was approved for trials in September 2nd, 1985 and for production in 1986. About 500 T-80UD were produced before the fall of the Soviet Union and eventually found life beyond death of revolution in one country, morphing into the Ukrainian T-84 program.
 
~Controversial Opinions Zone~
 
While I feel like I am about to trigger Lost Cosmonaut or T___A here. I feel that having now read about the tank I got say that I am flabbergasted and have no idea what the fuck the Soviets were thinking. 
 
The T-80 was a tank design that seemed to offer only the dubious benefit over its competition of a high speed and considerable power to weight ratio. While these two qualities may be very important on the tank show circuit, the famous “flying tank” demonstration, it is questionable just how much benefit this would confer over its older brothers the T-64 and T-72 on a real battlefield. Not to mention, this impressive performance came as a significant cost to fuel range. The engine would always be drawing the same quantity of fuel, be the tank rolling at maximum speed down a road or idling at a position. In short, and more technical terms, they were increasing their tactical mobility while severely compromising the operational mobility of the tank.
 
When one considers that the armor and armament of the T-80U were effectively stolen from the T-64 program, and that the T-72 had managed to produce a roughly equivalent vehicle at a fraction of the cost, you have to ask, what was the point? The money and effort that had gone into the T-80 program would have been better spent on the T-64 and T-72 lines. 
 
Consider the benefits; T-64 could have been upgraded in line with the object 476 program which would have given a spiritual T-80UD much sooner. The T-72B could have received the upgraded fire controls, stabilizers and etc reserved for the T-80U that were eventually fitted anyway in the form of the T-72BU (aka T-90). Along this line of thought, the main thing that had been holding back the T-72 program was its designation as the “cheaper” line that was not deserving of the extra funding to turn a solid vehicle into a superior one (as what happened with the T-90). At the very least, you could justifiably assume that these options would be cheaper due to the lack of the expensive gas turbine.
 
The only thing that I can really give separate praise for in my current impression was that the suspension. To what I gather, it is quite effective and offered a very smooth ride compared to the T-64 or T-72 suspension. But this system could have been adapted for either of these two tanks anyway which brings us back to the original question: what was the point, really? While the new generation of NATO tanks in the form of the Leopard 2, M1 Abrams and Challenger were a major step up, the soviets should have waited for a much more substantially improved design to appear, rather than making their bets with a fattened T-64 with a turbine stuck in it.
 
While overall the tank was not a failure that we in the thread mock the Tiger2 for being (the T-80 at least didn’t set itself on fire, ho ho), it however does share the same fundamental problem in that it just wasn’t appropriate for the strategic needs of the state at the time of its production. It cost too much, consumed too much fuel and offered only mild performance increases over more workhorse designs

To be honest, the Sherman was kind of shit when used by the British.  Oh yeah, I said it.  British in WW2 were just bad at tanks.  
 
"Cheerio, here's the plan chaps, we will be grouping our tanks into a narrow frontage and attacking straight into the Jerry's anti-tank guns.  Once Jerry has exhausted himself from reloading his guns so many times, we will have weakened them to the point where the American's can pull of a successful breakthrough somewhere else."  
 
We gave the British a perfectly fine medium tank and they have trash-talked it ever since.  

In 1944 the Red Army began looking for a replacement for the battle proven T-34. Their initial action was to simply up-gun the T-34 again, this time with the 100mm D-10T from the SU-100. However deficiencies in the transmission prevented this plan from coming to fruition. As a result the Red Army turned to the T-44. Relying on experience gained from the T-44's own up-gun project they created what was called the T-44B. Given the major changes compared to the current T-44 they later changed the name to the T-54. Designed by A.A. Morozov between October 1944 and December 1944 it had reached sufficient development by November 1st 1944 that People's Commissar of Tank Industry of the USSR V.A. Malyshev ordered Factory №183 to produce a prototype. The factory built the original prototype by January 30th 1945 where until mid-February it underwent testing. On February 22nd it was sent to a NIBT training ground to undergo government testing. Despite identifying several flaws such as a lack hydraulic shock absorbers for the road wheels the T-54 was deemed superior to all existing domestic designs and recommended for eventual adoption.
 

T-54 (first prototype)
 
They had reason for their claim; with a transverse mounted engine and a torsion bar suspension the T-54 was much smaller than the T-34. This size decrease allowed the Soviets to significantly up-armor the tank without greatly increasing the weight. The front hull was 120mm thick angled at 60 degrees, the turret was 150mm thick. Despite the armor increases the T-54 only weighed 35.5 tons. Despite the wishes of of the Soviets (who wanted a 700hp engine on their T-34 replacement) the venerable V-2 sill powered the T-54. With an output of 520hp the T-54 was capable of 43.5 km/h. In addition to the increased armor the T-54 was armed with the 100mm D-10T-K gun which was capable of 7-4 rounds a minute. Like other Soviet tanks the turret design limited gun depression with only -3. So despite only being 35.5 tons the T-54 had comparable firepower and armor protection to the 45 ton IS-2.
 
 
 

 
Armor of the T-54 (first prototype)
 
 
In response to the deficiencies identified by the Red Army Factory №183 created another T-54 prototype. Still designated T-54, though by this point in time it would receive it's GABTU designation of Object 137. The tank was produced in July 1945 with government testing beginning in July and ending in November of that year. The T-54 second prototype had many changes, the hull and turret were redesigned, the transmission was replaced with a different one, the gun was replaced with the 100mm LB-1, among other changes. The new turret was up-armored to 200mm thick. In combination with the new gun and turret the T-54 second prototype had increased gun depression compared to the original with -5. All of these modification caused a weight spiral to 39.15 tons, which with the same V-2 engine as before the speed was reduced to 42.5 km/h. As before the Soviet Government recommended it for Red Army service along with the corrections of some defects.
 

T-54 second prototype (Object 137) 

Once upon a time when I was a youngling just learning the ways of the HAV, I posted this in hopes of getting the attention of the HAV and as a way of spoofing all the "Top List" threads then prevalent at the WoT Gameplay Discussion.
 
The Top Can Openers of World War 2
 
1) Germany Sieger Can opener

The superior Teutonic technology behind the Sieger can opener had the highest K:ration ratio of the war and was able to open thirteen cans-to-one when compared to any Allied or Soviet devices. All modern day can opener technology is based off of work from captured German can opener scientists who jump-started the lagging American can opener industry in the late 1950s. Over-engineered and complicated, German industry was unable to produce enough Siegers to supply both fronts and Wehrmacht troops were often reduced to using captured equipment.
 
 
2) United States P-38

The ubiquitous P-38 can opener was first fielded by American troops in 1942 and was praised for its ease of use and manufacture and saw active service in the deserts of North Africa and the Italian Peninsula. However, by the time the Normandy campaign, the P-38 was already showing its age, particularly when faced by the metallurgic prowess of superior Krupp K-ration tins. Rumors that the Germans had a superior can-opener further demoralized GIs (known as Sieger Fright). The American top brass had actually developed a superior can opener in the larger P-51 design but because of logistic constraints, opted for the smaller and more reliable "John Wayne" and the tactical doctrine that enough can openers can overwhelm any tin can.
 
 
3) British/Australia FRED

The Field Ration Eating Device was deployed by Australian and New Zealand troops although the British used something similar. Borrowing from the same tactical doctrine that created the "Funny" tanks, British and Commonwealth commanders required a can opener that could not only open a can of bully beef, but act as a spoon, a bottle opener, an entrenching tool, barbed wire cutter and beach obstacle buster. It was affectionately known as the "F.cking Ridiculous Eating Device".
 
 
4) French Ouvre-boiite, Modele 1912

The French pioneered the use of military can openers, creating the pocket-sized "Ouvre-boitte" in 1912. However, post-World War I lethargy and the convenience of using conventional kitchen can-openers in the Maginot Line fortifications left the average French Poilu at a disadvantage when left in the field with only this out-dated can opener.
 
5) Soviet Spam key

The beneficiary of American Lend-Lease, the average Soviet soldier fought the entire war on Spam and vodka. Nikita Kruschev publicly remarked that Russia would have lost the war if it had not been for Spam. Technologically inferior to anything that the Germans produced, the Soviets overwhelmed their rations by sheer numbers of keys produced.
 
6) Chinese Spam Key

An entirely different tech tree from the Soviet Spam key, the Chinese Spam key offers a unique play style that is totally separate, unique and - repeat - different than the Soviet line. These are completely different tanks... I mean keys.
 
7) Japanese can opener

The Japanese Army pocket knife/can opener is the embodiment of Bushido. It was forged by artisans who folded superior Japanese steel eleventy-thousand times and was imbued by the spirits of their ancestors. Later models were able to be mounted on the bayonet lugs of Type 99 Arisaka rifles, Type 99 Light machine guns and the Type 96 150mm Infantry Mortar.

Meanwhile...
 

That was close.

Animea ruins Syria
 
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