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Mighty_Zuk

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Everything posted by Mighty_Zuk

  1. They're using the same L/52 made in Soltam's Yokneam plant. Not exactly sure what you mean.
  2. Again, the ATMOS is the architecture of the system. It's not the truck or the gun. They're using expansions based on the ATMOS architecture to create this new howitzer. The IDF will give it a new name, but it's obvious what Elbit is basing this on. This one's an estimate of one guy, that the blurred Namers are using Spike missiles. IMO they're not a suitable platform for that. The Eitans are a much better choice, as they're cheaper to maintain and use, and because a 30km missile launcher does not need so much protection. And don't forget the first blurry image was of Merkava tanks, not Namer APCs. My personal guess is a replacement to the ELAWS. In case some of you haven't noticed, for a very long time now, the Merkava tanks have had these mounts for Elbit's laser warning systems (ELAWS): But they've been empty for god knows how long. It's possible the IDF wants to replace them with something of similar size (new tanks are still built with these mounts), perhaps something that combines soft-kill or threat detection.
  3. Yes, it is that box. But it's not going to be on that stand. They could put it in some neat way above the gunner's sight, in which case it might be okay.
  4. What's funny about that? It was talked about for a long time, and not too long ago Elbit have shown a standalone ATMOS turret with its autoloading system. Very simple, and very much real. The ATMOS is not that small 6x6 Tatra truck with a short L/39 gun that was shown 15 years ago. It's the electronic architecture behind it. It's the combination of the BMS, laying system, fire control computer, and communications network. It was shown in many variants - 6x6, 8x8, L/39, L/45, L/52, fully manual, semi-automatic, and now they have created a fully automatic version for the L/52, to be mounted on a HEMTT truck. The RoF is to be 8RPM in a limited mode, with an override option to increase it to an unknown amount. So what? The cameras of the IronVision were publicly shown a long time ago. And Elbit's video of the IronVision from 2016 also shows a live demonstration. But there's a difference between showing a demonstrator and testing the system, and having it already in service. Any change in any AFV, necessarily requires retraining the maintenance crews. The more complex the system is, the more likely the IDF are to wait for the next cycle of recruits to implement the new courses. The IronVision could have been fully ready on an AFV about a year ago. But there's a lot of work to be done if the IDF want it to enter service properly, with a secured chain of logistics, maintenance capability, and technical support. It's not without reason that the IDF very clearly stated that the system enters service in 2021, not 2019. And these tanks are on the border with Gaza. These are active units, not experimental units. Whatever kit they have, they're going into Gaza with it, if the decision comes for a ground maneuver (for non-Israelis reading this, recently tensions have gone up and Hamas launched multiple rockets at Tel Aviv, one of which has destroyed a home and injured its residents, to which the IDF responded by destroying strategic Hamas assets).
  5. Which are directly connected to the FCS, BMS, and APS. These are the most complex computer systems in the tank, and involve almost all sensors onboard the tank. These connections are never simple to make and troubleshoot.
  6. I would normally support the installation of systems like Elbit's IronVision or BAE's BattleView on any AFV above 20 tons, but how are Elbit going to fit both the IronVision AND Iron Fist (yeah I get it now, everything Iron) at the same time?
  7. I doubt it. IronVision is part of the Barak MBT. They're not going to just retrofit segments of the Barak to existing tanks because of logistical issues. It's also a complex system which may require revamped training courses for maintenance staff. And without the many upgrades going into the Barak, it may be somewhat out of context, and not fulfilling its potential. It's also why we're not seeing the IronVision tested on the Namer or Eitan yet. When you're posting, please make sure you're not reposting. I have already posted these news, no need to repeat it. Anyway, it seems this contract also includes prototypes.
  8. I just noticed that as well. But seeing as the blur is quite mild, I'm under the impression they're just trying to conceal some minor changes for now. In other news, Elbit received a contract for the production of howitzers for the IDF: http://ir.elbitsystems.com/node/16041/pdf $125 million may seem like a considerable sum, and 12 years somewhat stands in line with the ex-MoD's claim that it will be done within a decade, but it only seems like it would be enough for maybe 25% of the needed vehicles. If every howitzer costs $2.5 million dollars, which I assume would actually be more but still, we're talking about maybe 50 howitzers, out of a total needed 200.
  9. And yet, this data is contested even by Rafael's official data. They say the range of the Tamir is classified, as is the range of the David's Sling, and therefore only provide very vague figures that appear to be only true in very specific cases, in order to give the public something without revealing the true range. A 150 square kilometer protected area does imply 7km range, but Rafael claimed in 2011 that a test of the system proved a then-newly-identified capability to intercept drones at a 10km altitude. A system with a 7km range on the horizontal plain would hardly reach even half that on vertical. I think what the 150 sqkm figure tells is over what area a single battery's components can be spread (mainly the launchers) without interrupting real-time communications. With a 10km altitude, any heavy rocket with a range of even 200km or more, comes within the interception range of the Iron Dome if it overflies it. That's what happened over the Hermon, and that's what happened numerous times over Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in 2014. Yep, the Iron Dome has a combat proven capability to defeat heavy rockets far larger and far more powerful than the officially stated "against rockets with 70km range" claim. All the areas surrounding Gaza are pretty much covered by the Iron Dome already. Therefore the David's Sling operators can focus on the much faster ballistic missiles possessed by Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah, rather than Gaza's long range rockets. It was indeed possible for the David's Sling to react in both these cases, but I repeat that this duty overlaps with the Iron Dome, and the Iron Dome's inactivity, not failure, is being investigated. Finally, it's quite sad Rafael didn't throw in its bid in the Swiss program. It could have been a key opportunity. In Poland they also withdrew their bid, but that was because the US offered them to have their missiles be part of the US offer in the Patriot system. Here it seems Raytheon entered a bid with only the PAC-3, but time may tell us more.
  10. Yes, and? Replacing them will take well over a decade so get used to seeing them.
  11. The failure to defeat two SS-21 missiles in 2018 was not a system failure. Or at least not fully. One of the missiles has suffered a malfunction, but overall it was a mistake by the crew. Despite the Stunner missiles being stupid fast, the operators failed to take into account that the SS-21 would hit their intended targets BEFORE a Stunner missile could hit them. The other, non-malfunctioned missile, self-destructed in the air when the trajectory calculation showed the SS-21 would fall in Syrian territory, not Israeli. I will clarify on this one that due to the SS-21's rather poor accuracy, and the need to fire on it when it's still in a very early stage of flight, the predicted area of impact could be quite large, and thus encompassed Israeli territory. Iron Dome missiles also show failures from time to time, but just like in this case, they are mostly operator's errors that stem from difficult circumstances. The M-302 missile fired recently, and the Iranian long range rocket intercepted over the Hermon, both did not require a Stunner missile. A Stunner missile is much more suitable for targets like cruise missiles at long range, and short and medium range ballistic missiles, for example the Iskander-M, or Scud missiles. These were within the realm of the Iron Dome. Over the Hermon, the Iron Dome fared well. Over Tel Aviv, not so much. It was said that in both incidents, no interceptors were launched despite advanced early warning, and the IDF is investigating why in neither incident were the batteries not activated.
  12. The intention was to completely eliminate the "SEP" thing, and simplify it to single letters. While there was no confirmation, it is safe to assume there are an M1A2A and B.
  13. Only way this could be effective is with a much lighter vehicle, like a JLTV instead of FMTV, and actual guidance for the rockets. It seems not even Roketsan makes guidance kits for 107mm. Without guidance, you're basically putting a lot of a light formation's resources and capacity towards a weapon designed for saturation, but without the actual means of a meaningful saturation. It really loses out to 120mm mortars. More than that, it is actually far less attractive than contemporary systems that offer a lighter package, with more powerful rockets, at least double the range, and with guidance to make every shot count.
  14. Made FOR the UAE, but not by them. It's made as a joint venture by Jobaria and Roketsan, with Roketsan quite obviously being the chief developer and integrator here, and Jobaria doing the manufacturing. They also made the following system just a couple years ago: Both firing essentially just Grad copies.
  15. Cool pod, very poor implementation. These rockets, even when guided, are only suitable for direct fire or close range fire. Bringing a truck to the frontline, where ATGMs, ATRs, and medium cannons are abundant, is a big NO. Also where is the control station? Or the armor kit to protect the cabin from the heat and toxic smoke? Far too many manufacturers decide to only showcase their weapons, on platforms that are often absolutely ridiculous for that purpose. Why is it so hard to understand that a customer ALWAYS prefers seeing a proper application, a valid spot for the presented system, and not the standalone system with no context.
  16. It's a bit offtopic, but the Puma's assymetry has always bothered me.
  17. https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/37870 Israel and the USA completed a test of the David's Sling system, in a "newly developed configuration", that is said to expand its envelope of targets, and prepare it for more complex types of targets. I'll remind that this system is currently being integrated to the Patriot architecture as part of a contract with Poland.
  18. Plus they're so worn by now that they have to be replaced with something. Might as well be something that is still in production.
  19. Add side mounted ROSY launchers, a machine gun of any sort, and you can use it for convoy protection. Otherwise only good as a demonstrator. But I like the idea of 70mm rockets more than LAW launchers or anything of that sort. Especially if the 70mm rockets come with IR or optical guidance.
  20. From the article, the new Namer ARV variant will be deployed with the 401st brigade first, and will be in service with all relevant units by 2022.
  21. Sorry I don't have anything of value to add, but I'd like to point out the IDF is also in some way looking at turning into a professional force. Unfortunately, the debate is too limited in scope. 2 points, however, that will have to be part of that debate, are the maintenance of large formations, and technological advancements. The IDF wants at least 10 BCTs of the Gideon type, and 3 BCTs of the Yeshuron type, plus an unknown amount of Yiftach brigades (not BCTs likely) that will have worse equipment and do lower priority missions, as a form of backup as either reserves or for guard duties. That requires a serious amount of manpower on the field alone. Add to that a twice larger manpower base for support duties (logistics, human resources, and anyone who doesnt see combat). There are, however, the advancements that could make manpower reductions substantial in all these areas, AND necessitate a professional army. In the field, you got AFVs that get a reduction in manpower by about a half. Artillery that can now use only a third or a quarter of the manpower they used to. Ships will become unmanned in at least some roles, primarily in ASW, offshore patrol, and more roles soon enough. Infantry will not be reduced in any substantial matter, but it does not need to be. Support units will be reduced due to improvements in AI, Big Data, and UI. Many technologically heavy services will be handled by companies, rather than continuously newly trained conscripts. This includes cyber, data management, and maintenance of complex systems such as avionics. A balance is yet to be determined by any special committee or research, in the context of the IDF's structure. The big problem is reservists. Israel relies heavily on its reserves for any war. In the current state, you can get an average man fully equipped, with his unit, and mobilized, in less than 24 hours. Backing him are anything from a few days of training, to a month worth of training, on an annual basis after his 3 year service. Without some form of conscription, the IDF loses a significant portion of its reservists.
  22. Unit price for Tamir missiles actually goes up the 2nd year? That's weird. It could mean they are investing in replicating Rafael's Israel-based manufacturing to US sites (and I say replicating instead of relocating). That does not explain the yet unheard of unit price for FY18.
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