Mighty_Zuk

Okay, I got a little request here:
 
1) @LoooSeR , some of these videos are reposted in Otvaga. I usually post them here first, so they also get reposted here numerous times. 
 
2) @asaf , the THOR system is an old one that was likely only activated because it was nearby. It did not enter service in large numbers, and it's unknown whether it will continue operating for long.
 
3) Please don't link news articles in Hebrew. Try finding its equivalent in English, but if you don't find one then at least translate it for the others.
 
Since it was already posted, I will do the translation if anyone is interested:
 
Crusher of the Dahieh
Saturday eve, July 2014. The ground maneuver phase of Operation Protective Edge commences, and with it one of the most complex battles the Golani had seen in the last 20 years. 
Notes: Dahieh is a quarter in Beirut, likely mentioned because the new howitzer has sufficient range to hit it from Israeli territory. Golani is a frontline mechanized infantry brigade.
After days of warnings, where leaflets written in Arabic were dispersed, radio and TV messages on Palestinian channels, and phone calls to civilians, and smoke shells were fired into village surroundings, began the "softening" phase for the artillery, who fired up to the first line of houses. At its end, Isaac Turgeman, commander of the 36th division gave the green light for the 4 brigades under his command to move deep into Palestinian territory.
 
Golani fighters made their way into the heart of the Shujaiya neighborhood in the Gaza strip to locate attack tunnels that were dug under the cover of Palestinian houses. The tunnel array was defended by the elite Shujaiya battalion of Hamas, which included 860 veteran warriors that prepared for years for an IDF ground maneuver. The "reception", some would call it a well planned ambush, included advanced AT, mortars, snipers, IEDs, and defensive tunnels dug under the houses to help the terrorists fire and vanish under the ground.
 
The night began with the injury of an armor officer, and the friction further increased. A Golani APC was hit and caught fire without being able to extinguish it, and 7 warriors died. 
Note: It was an M113 APC that wasn't even supposed to be used there.
Later it was discovered by the high echelon that Oron Shaul's body was kidnapped using a nearby tunnel. 
The Shujaiya battalion's fire intensified, and the brown brigade (Golani) paid their price.
The then-Golani-commander Rasan Elian was injured and had to evacuate, and later 3 battalion commanders, including one of the recon battalion, were injured and also had to evacuate. The command chain was shaken and disturbed, and the 36th division commander received an ever elongating list of killed and injured men. The ground forces tried to suppress the fire sources and direct aerial firepower, but stumbled upon effective "firewalls" every time they tried to get out of the line of houses to evacuate injured or to move to safer areas. The effort of the Golanis had shown acts of heroism, but was insufficient.
 
It was dawn. The top artillery officer commanded in those frustrating hours on the fire center in the division command center, and received from the Golani support unit commander, info on what's happening on the field and the situation of the enemy. He devised a plan that was not implemented since the 1982 Lebanon war - firing masses of artillery shells on Hamas fighters operating just 100-150 meters from the Golani troops, while heavily risking IDF soldiers as well.
 
The firing plan had to be based on quality and effective intel, and the division intel officer helped create a very clear picture of the enemy location. At 09:00 the artillery officer realized the brigade firing plan had to be converted to divisional firepower - and he relayed to the 3 artillery battalions of the division that they're under his command.
 
In parallel, a building collapses on a Golani force, and the intel officer draws on a digital map the layer of information that is required to hit concentrations of the enemy. He also assembled a rescue plan for the injured.
The artillery officer then explains to the division commander why this extraordinary action is required, and stresses "If we don't do this we won't evacuate the injured. There will be none else to help the Golani". Turgeman approves the plan but under one condition: The Golani troops will withdraw to a pre-determined line and enter the Namer APCs, a condition that was based on the assumption that these vehicles will withstand the attack despite the great security risk.
 
After thorough analysis and corrections, the firing plan was approved. Every battalion was asked to prepare 200 artillery shells, and fire them to the pre-determined areas. The fire rate and accuracy were critical. It was clear to everyone that some of the fire would go right above the heads of the soldiers on the ground, and some of it would be fired to just 100-150m from them - far below the pre-set safety bar.
In parallel, the artillery officer gave the air force officer an urgent firing procedure that focused on several high rise buildings.
 
The action was set for 10:00, amid heroic efforts by the Golani fighters to evacuate the injured under fire, but not everything went smoothly. An operational dialogue between the battalion commanders to the fire center commander, centered around the plan and focused on the fact that it has crossed the safety lines on which they trained from the very beginning. The fear that the shells - weighing 43kg - would hit the ground troops was very much real.
The dialogue was professional and to the point, and ended with the support of all commanders for this plan. "I trust you", he stressed.
 
Later, the artillery officer explained to the cadets of the IDF national security academy, that what gave him the great confidence to pull off this plan was understanding of the artillery profession, understanding the doctrine, his personal acquaintance with the battalion commanders' and understanding their quality, understanding their high level of professionalism, and understanding the tools (howitzers) in the batteries.
 
At 10:10 the command was given, and for 45 minutes 600 shells were rained on the battle zones of the Shujaiya neighborhood. The Golani fighters told "The ground shook like jelly, we've never experienced such thing". Some of the commanders yelled on the comms: "Stop the fire, it's hitting us", and the firing center had to cope with the urgent calls. Aircraft flying over the area provided a live feed of the situation to the computer screens in the Golani brigade command room, headed by Yoeli Or, and in the division fire center headed by the officer.
 
At 11:00 the last howitzer went quiet. The Palestinian territory was silent. Shortly afterwards, an urgent request came from Hamas, through international aid organizations, to declare a humanitarian ceasefire. The Hamas forces did not regain operational capability for the next 24 hours. Golani troops evacuated the injured and prepared anew for an attack.
 
The fire support of the artillerymen lasted throughout the whole 51 days of the operation, and only by the end of it, the scope of the achievement of the artillery and intel in the division was realized: 81 terrorists were killed in the attack, among them more than 10 chief Hamas commanders. 
 
The said combat legacy - that underlines the importance of heavy statistical fire, alongside the precise guided rockets and missiles - explains clearly why the security cabinet approved last week the new howitzer for the corp. It is one of the most central projects for the ground arm for the next couple of years, and the delay in its implementation was the result of budgetary difficulties. Some of the cannons that rained fire on Shujaiya were over 40 years - an outdated system with a limited range, whose operation requires a crew of at least 10 men. The new cannon, made by Elbit, will save more than 50% of the manpower as it is semi-automatic, will greatly increase the operational range and rate of fire, and will dramatically improve the accuracy and lethality.
 
Every new cannon will replace an old battery, and will provide the corp with better flexibility for relocation, while its command and control systems will allow connectivity with the other corps.
In parallel, the ground arm will finalize by the end of this year a purchase of smart rounds, that will increase the quality of the existing howitzers.
 
Pics from article:
 
The artillery corps is going through, in the last years, more than just a face-lift. He's simply transforming. Aside from the howitzers, the rocket array (MLRS) that includes also a Romach battery that possesses the fire rate and capabilities to work against multiple targets simultaneously, the geolocation array, that said goodbye to the Nurit radar and accepted the Raz radar (Raz - Rav Zroyi - Multi-arm/branch, EL/M-2084). The IDF website also chose to highlight the Kelah David brigade, whose outstanding unit is the Rochev Shamaim, the one that uses small UAVs for the artillery corps.
 
One of the more classified units is Moran, that was established in 1982 and participated since - through using the Spike-NLOS missile - in many operational activities, including precision attacks and hunting rocket launching units.
The UAV unit of the ground arm in the artillery corp is a parallel unit to the air force's UAVs, but different in its missions, operational culture, and type of aircraft. Its primary destination is to support the ground maneuvering forces - something the chief of staff Major General Gadi Eizenkot constantly speaks of. These units, and the overall activity of the corp, leads to to one main question: Are the artillery commanders capable of turning it into the ground arm's air force?
 
Unlike in Operation Protective Edge, the next war will require the IDF to maneuver deeper and quicker. The threat on the forces will also be more complex, and will require complex artillery firepower: Warning fire to distance the population, deterring firepower, screening, evacuation, and hitting the centers of gravity of the enemy - command and control centers or concentrations of fighters.
 
Another change on which the corp's revolution is based on is the Hupat Atar system. Uploading the target to a force-wide net allows a wide range of attacking solutions - an especially critical advantage when the enemy against which the IDF deals with, hides most of the time, shows up for short periods of time, and avoids face to face combat, except for unusual raids. Hence, every second in the IDF's reaction time is critical.
 
The massive cuts in the reserve forces and shutting down of units did not go over this corp, and in the frame of re-organization it was decided that whoever stays in the corp will be better trained and better prepared than before. Additionally, the artillery school in Shivta was united with the reserve division - the 252nd division. 
 
 
 
 
 

Okay, I got a little request here:
 
1) @LoooSeR , some of these videos are reposted in Otvaga. I usually post them here first, so they also get reposted here numerous times. 
 
2) @asaf , the THOR system is an old one that was likely only activated because it was nearby. It did not enter service in large numbers, and it's unknown whether it will continue operating for long.
 
3) Please don't link news articles in Hebrew. Try finding its equivalent in English, but if you don't find one then at least translate it for the others.
 
Since it was already posted, I will do the translation if anyone is interested:
 
Crusher of the Dahieh
Saturday eve, July 2014. The ground maneuver phase of Operation Protective Edge commences, and with it one of the most complex battles the Golani had seen in the last 20 years. 
Notes: Dahieh is a quarter in Beirut, likely mentioned because the new howitzer has sufficient range to hit it from Israeli territory. Golani is a frontline mechanized infantry brigade.
After days of warnings, where leaflets written in Arabic were dispersed, radio and TV messages on Palestinian channels, and phone calls to civilians, and smoke shells were fired into village surroundings, began the "softening" phase for the artillery, who fired up to the first line of houses. At its end, Isaac Turgeman, commander of the 36th division gave the green light for the 4 brigades under his command to move deep into Palestinian territory.
 
Golani fighters made their way into the heart of the Shujaiya neighborhood in the Gaza strip to locate attack tunnels that were dug under the cover of Palestinian houses. The tunnel array was defended by the elite Shujaiya battalion of Hamas, which included 860 veteran warriors that prepared for years for an IDF ground maneuver. The "reception", some would call it a well planned ambush, included advanced AT, mortars, snipers, IEDs, and defensive tunnels dug under the houses to help the terrorists fire and vanish under the ground.
 
The night began with the injury of an armor officer, and the friction further increased. A Golani APC was hit and caught fire without being able to extinguish it, and 7 warriors died. 
Note: It was an M113 APC that wasn't even supposed to be used there.
Later it was discovered by the high echelon that Oron Shaul's body was kidnapped using a nearby tunnel. 
The Shujaiya battalion's fire intensified, and the brown brigade (Golani) paid their price.
The then-Golani-commander Rasan Elian was injured and had to evacuate, and later 3 battalion commanders, including one of the recon battalion, were injured and also had to evacuate. The command chain was shaken and disturbed, and the 36th division commander received an ever elongating list of killed and injured men. The ground forces tried to suppress the fire sources and direct aerial firepower, but stumbled upon effective "firewalls" every time they tried to get out of the line of houses to evacuate injured or to move to safer areas. The effort of the Golanis had shown acts of heroism, but was insufficient.
 
It was dawn. The top artillery officer commanded in those frustrating hours on the fire center in the division command center, and received from the Golani support unit commander, info on what's happening on the field and the situation of the enemy. He devised a plan that was not implemented since the 1982 Lebanon war - firing masses of artillery shells on Hamas fighters operating just 100-150 meters from the Golani troops, while heavily risking IDF soldiers as well.
 
The firing plan had to be based on quality and effective intel, and the division intel officer helped create a very clear picture of the enemy location. At 09:00 the artillery officer realized the brigade firing plan had to be converted to divisional firepower - and he relayed to the 3 artillery battalions of the division that they're under his command.
 
In parallel, a building collapses on a Golani force, and the intel officer draws on a digital map the layer of information that is required to hit concentrations of the enemy. He also assembled a rescue plan for the injured.
The artillery officer then explains to the division commander why this extraordinary action is required, and stresses "If we don't do this we won't evacuate the injured. There will be none else to help the Golani". Turgeman approves the plan but under one condition: The Golani troops will withdraw to a pre-determined line and enter the Namer APCs, a condition that was based on the assumption that these vehicles will withstand the attack despite the great security risk.
 
After thorough analysis and corrections, the firing plan was approved. Every battalion was asked to prepare 200 artillery shells, and fire them to the pre-determined areas. The fire rate and accuracy were critical. It was clear to everyone that some of the fire would go right above the heads of the soldiers on the ground, and some of it would be fired to just 100-150m from them - far below the pre-set safety bar.
In parallel, the artillery officer gave the air force officer an urgent firing procedure that focused on several high rise buildings.
 
The action was set for 10:00, amid heroic efforts by the Golani fighters to evacuate the injured under fire, but not everything went smoothly. An operational dialogue between the battalion commanders to the fire center commander, centered around the plan and focused on the fact that it has crossed the safety lines on which they trained from the very beginning. The fear that the shells - weighing 43kg - would hit the ground troops was very much real.
The dialogue was professional and to the point, and ended with the support of all commanders for this plan. "I trust you", he stressed.
 
Later, the artillery officer explained to the cadets of the IDF national security academy, that what gave him the great confidence to pull off this plan was understanding of the artillery profession, understanding the doctrine, his personal acquaintance with the battalion commanders' and understanding their quality, understanding their high level of professionalism, and understanding the tools (howitzers) in the batteries.
 
At 10:10 the command was given, and for 45 minutes 600 shells were rained on the battle zones of the Shujaiya neighborhood. The Golani fighters told "The ground shook like jelly, we've never experienced such thing". Some of the commanders yelled on the comms: "Stop the fire, it's hitting us", and the firing center had to cope with the urgent calls. Aircraft flying over the area provided a live feed of the situation to the computer screens in the Golani brigade command room, headed by Yoeli Or, and in the division fire center headed by the officer.
 
At 11:00 the last howitzer went quiet. The Palestinian territory was silent. Shortly afterwards, an urgent request came from Hamas, through international aid organizations, to declare a humanitarian ceasefire. The Hamas forces did not regain operational capability for the next 24 hours. Golani troops evacuated the injured and prepared anew for an attack.
 
The fire support of the artillerymen lasted throughout the whole 51 days of the operation, and only by the end of it, the scope of the achievement of the artillery and intel in the division was realized: 81 terrorists were killed in the attack, among them more than 10 chief Hamas commanders. 
 
The said combat legacy - that underlines the importance of heavy statistical fire, alongside the precise guided rockets and missiles - explains clearly why the security cabinet approved last week the new howitzer for the corp. It is one of the most central projects for the ground arm for the next couple of years, and the delay in its implementation was the result of budgetary difficulties. Some of the cannons that rained fire on Shujaiya were over 40 years - an outdated system with a limited range, whose operation requires a crew of at least 10 men. The new cannon, made by Elbit, will save more than 50% of the manpower as it is semi-automatic, will greatly increase the operational range and rate of fire, and will dramatically improve the accuracy and lethality.
 
Every new cannon will replace an old battery, and will provide the corp with better flexibility for relocation, while its command and control systems will allow connectivity with the other corps.
In parallel, the ground arm will finalize by the end of this year a purchase of smart rounds, that will increase the quality of the existing howitzers.
 
Pics from article:
 
The artillery corps is going through, in the last years, more than just a face-lift. He's simply transforming. Aside from the howitzers, the rocket array (MLRS) that includes also a Romach battery that possesses the fire rate and capabilities to work against multiple targets simultaneously, the geolocation array, that said goodbye to the Nurit radar and accepted the Raz radar (Raz - Rav Zroyi - Multi-arm/branch, EL/M-2084). The IDF website also chose to highlight the Kelah David brigade, whose outstanding unit is the Rochev Shamaim, the one that uses small UAVs for the artillery corps.
 
One of the more classified units is Moran, that was established in 1982 and participated since - through using the Spike-NLOS missile - in many operational activities, including precision attacks and hunting rocket launching units.
The UAV unit of the ground arm in the artillery corp is a parallel unit to the air force's UAVs, but different in its missions, operational culture, and type of aircraft. Its primary destination is to support the ground maneuvering forces - something the chief of staff Major General Gadi Eizenkot constantly speaks of. These units, and the overall activity of the corp, leads to to one main question: Are the artillery commanders capable of turning it into the ground arm's air force?
 
Unlike in Operation Protective Edge, the next war will require the IDF to maneuver deeper and quicker. The threat on the forces will also be more complex, and will require complex artillery firepower: Warning fire to distance the population, deterring firepower, screening, evacuation, and hitting the centers of gravity of the enemy - command and control centers or concentrations of fighters.
 
Another change on which the corp's revolution is based on is the Hupat Atar system. Uploading the target to a force-wide net allows a wide range of attacking solutions - an especially critical advantage when the enemy against which the IDF deals with, hides most of the time, shows up for short periods of time, and avoids face to face combat, except for unusual raids. Hence, every second in the IDF's reaction time is critical.
 
The massive cuts in the reserve forces and shutting down of units did not go over this corp, and in the frame of re-organization it was decided that whoever stays in the corp will be better trained and better prepared than before. Additionally, the artillery school in Shivta was united with the reserve division - the 252nd division. 
 
 
 
 
 

https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/03/16/first-next-gen-combat-vehicle-and-robotic-wingman-prototypes-to-emerge-in-2020/
 
NGCV prototypes in 2020, 2022, and 2024.
 

This is an article simply to show you guys here how Waffentrager is a faker. The original article  ( https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404213101531682050) was written in Chinese and Japanese. For better understanding I will translate and edit the article and post it here. 
  And I must tell you why I want to reveal this shit: Long time ago I found many sayings from Waffentrager’s blog which I had never heard of, so I turned to my Japanese friend and IJA tank researcher Mr.Taki and asked him to confirm a few of them. In the end it turned out that none of Waffentrager’s article is true. I once argued with him and he not only failed to give out his reference but also deleted my replies! I’m very angry!
 
  Now let’s get started.
 
  At the very beginning I recommend all of you who opened this post to take a look at Waffentrager’s original article, that will help you understand what I’m debating.
 
  Here is the link to the original article: https://sensha-manual.blogspot.jp/2017/09/the-ho-ri-tank-destroyer.html?m=0  
 
  In China we need to use VPN(aka “ladder-梯子” or “the scientific way of browsing the Internet-科学上网” in Chinese)to open that link above so at first I post out Waffentrager’s original post in the form of screenshots in my article. I’ll skip that here.
 

 
Fig.1: I will skip his original article.
 
  Now, I had raised my first question here: Please take a look at the screenshot:
 

 
Fig.2: My first question
 
  In the original article, Waffentrager insisted that the Type 5 gun tank was built in July, 1944 and fully assembled in August. It was also put into trials at the same time.
 

 
Fig.3: Waffentrager’s original article.
 
  But, is that true? Let’s have a look at the Japanese archive:
 

 
Important Fig.4: Archive code C14011075200, Item 4
 
  Notice the part with the red, this is the research and develop plan for the Japanese Tech Research center in 1943, and had been edited in 1944. ◎砲１００(Gun-100) is the project name for the 105mm gun used by Type 5 gun tank. The column under it says: “Research a tank gun with 105mm caliber and a muzzle velocity of 900m/s”. This means that the gun had just begun to be developed and from the bottom column we can know that it was PLANNED to be finished in 1945-3[完成豫定 means ”plan to be finished” and 昭２０、３ means ”Shouwa 20-3”. Shouwa 20 is 1945 in Japan (you can wiki the way for Japanese to count years I’m not going to explain it here)]
  Next let’s move on to the Type 5 gun tank itself, here is the Japanese archive:
 

 
Important Fig.5: Archive code C14011075200, Item 7
 
  “新砲戦車(甲)ホリ車” is the very very first name of Type 5 gun tank, it should be translated into:”New gun tank(A), Ho-Ri vehicle”. “ホリ” is the secret name of it. Still from the column we can easily know that Ho-Ri was also planned to be finished in 1945-3. But under that column there is another one called:”摘要(Summary or outline)”, in this it says:”砲１００、第一次試作完了昭和１９、８”, In English it is: “Gun-100, First experimental construction(prototype construction) finished in Shouwa 19-8(1944-8)” What does it mean? It means that in 1944-8, Only the 105mm gun used by the Type 5 gun tank was finished! If the Ho-Ri tank itself was finished why it was not in the 摘要 column? So how could an unfinished tank mounted the prototype gun? Waffentrager is talking bullshit.
Also from Mr.Kunimoto’s book, he gave the complete schedule of the 105mm gun, here it is:
 

 
Important Fig.6: Kunimoto’s schedule
 
  “修正機能試験” means ”Mechanical correctional test”, it took place in 1944-8, this matches the original Japanese archive(though this chart was also made from original archives). At that time the gun had just finished, not the tank.
 
  Next is this paragraph from Waffentrager’s article:
 

 
Fig.7: Weighing 35 tons
 
  From the archive above(important Fig.5) we can learn from the second large column”研究要項(Research items)” that Ho-Ri was only PLANNED to be 35 tons, and maximum armour thickness was PLANNED to be 120mm, not was. Waffentrager is lying, he used the PLANNED data as the BUILT data. I will post out the correct data below later to see what Ho-Ri is really like when its design was finished.
 

 
Fig.8: 全備重量-約三五屯(Combat weight-app.35t), 装甲(最厚部)-約一二〇粍(Armour, thickest part-app.120mm)
 
  At this time, some of the people might inquire me that:”Maybe the Type 5 gun tanks were really finished! You just don’t know!” Well, I will use the archives and books to tell these guys that they are totally wrong. None of the Type 5 gun tank was finished.
  Always let’s look at Waffentrager’s article first. He said that a total of 5 Ho-Ri were completed.
 

 
Fig.9: Waffentrager said 5 Ho-Ri were completed.
 
 He also put an original Japanese archive(C13120839500) to “enhance” his “facts”.
 

 
Fig.10: Waffentrager’s archive
 
  Everyone can see the”ホリ車,1-3-1” in the document, and someone might actually believe that 5 Ho-Ri were actually built. But they are wrong! Waffentrager is cheating you with “only a part of the original document”! Here is what the original archive really looks like:
 

 
Important Fig.11: Archive code C13120839500, Item 7
 
  “整備計画” is “Maintenance plan” in English, again it was PLAN! The whole plan was made in 1944-12-26. I don’t actually know how Waffentrager can misunderstand this, maybe he doesn’t even know Japanese or Chinese!
 

 
Important Fig.12: The cover of the same archive, “昭和十九年十二月二十六日” is 1944-12-26” in English.
 
I have other archives to prove that Ho-Ri were not finished as well:
 


 
Important Fig. 13 and 14: Mitsubishi’s tank production chart made by the American survey team after the war ends.
 
  From the chart you can only find out Type 4 and Type 5 medium tanks’ record. There is no existence of Type 5 gun tank Ho-Ri, or the”M-5 Gun Tank” in the chart’s way.
 
  Except for the archives, many books written by Japanese also mentioned that Type 5 gun tank were not finished:
 

 
Fig.15: Kunimoto’s record.
 
  “二〇年五月完成予定の五両の終戦時の工程進捗度は、やっと五〇パーセントであり、完成車両出せずに終戦となった。” In English it’s: “When the war ended, the five Ho-Ri planned to be finished in 1945-5 had finally reached 50% completion. No completed vehicle were made when the war ended.”
 
  Here is another book written by Japanese with the help of former IJA tank designer, Tomio Hara:
 

 
Important Fig.16: Tomio Hara’s book
 
“完成をみるには至らなかった” Again he emphasized that the tank was not finished. Also when Ho-Ri’s design was finished its combat weight was raised to 40 tons, not the planned 35 tons. It was only powered by one “Modified BMW watercooled V12 gasoline engine”, rated 550hp/1500rpm. In Waffentrager’s article he said later a Kawasaki 1100hp engine were installed, but obviously that’s none sense. There was really existed a Kawasaki 1100hp engine but that is the two BMW V12 engine(Same engine on Type 5 gun tank or Type 5 medium tank) combined together for Japanese super-heavy tank O-I use. It will take much more room which Ho-Ri do not have.
 

 
Fig.17: O-I’s engine compartment arrangement. There’s no such room in Ho-Ri for this engine set.
 
  And last here are the other questions I asked
 

 
Fig.18: Other questions I asked
 
  I have already talked about the questions regarding C13120839500 and the engine. As for the gun with 1005m/s muzzle velocity, the Japanese never planned to make the 105mm gun achieve such a high velocity because they don’t have the enough tech back then. Also from the archive C14011075200(important fig.4) the 105mm gun was designed only to reach about 900m/s.
 
  So, after all these, how did Waffentrager replied? I will post out the replies from my E-mail(because he deleted my replies on his blog).
 

 
Fig.19: Waffentrager’s first reply
 
He kept saying that my archive is not the same as his and he is using his own documents. I didn’t believe in these shit and I replied:
 

 
Fig.20: My reply
 
  Last sentence, the Ho-Ri III he was talking about is fake. There are only Ho-Ri I(The one resembles the Ferdinand tank destroyer) and Ho-Ri II(The another one resembles the Jagdtiger tank destroyer). He even photoshoped a picture:
 

 
Fig.21: Waffentrager’s fake Ho-Ri III
 

 
Fig.22: The real Ho-Ri I and the base picture of Waffentrager’s photoshoped Ho-Ri III in Tomio Hara’s book. Many same details can be seen in Waffentrager's fake Ho-Ri III
 
  The 4 variants of up-armoured Type 3 Chi-Nu medium tank is also fake, I will post his original article and the confirmed facts I got from Mr.Taki by E-mail.
 

 
Fig.23: 4 models of up-armoured Chi-Nu by Waffentrager
 

 
Fig.24: Mr.Taki’s reply
 
  Waffentrager used every excuses he could get to refuse giving out the references, and finally he deleted my comments. What an asshole!
 

 
Fig.25: Our last “conversation”
 

 
Fig.26 He deleted my comment.
 
  So, as you can see, Waffentrager is really a dick. He is cheating everybody because he think that we can’t read Japanese. Anyway I still hope he could release his reference and documents to prove me wrong. After all, I’m not here to scold or argue with somebody, but to learn new things. Also if you guys have any questions about WWII(IJA) Japanese tanks, feel free to ask me, I’m happy to help.

More info to come soon.
 
EDIT: Just posted it without reading so I don't get ninja'd. This appears to be a demonstrator turret for the automatic loading system.

More info to come soon.
 
EDIT: Just posted it without reading so I don't get ninja'd. This appears to be a demonstrator turret for the automatic loading system.

More info to come soon.
 
EDIT: Just posted it without reading so I don't get ninja'd. This appears to be a demonstrator turret for the automatic loading system.

More info to come soon.
 
EDIT: Just posted it without reading so I don't get ninja'd. This appears to be a demonstrator turret for the automatic loading system.

It's less about 'why not' than it is about 'why'. Why would the IDF just publish documents it has on the Merkava 1? 
And unless none asked the IDF to publish it, it would probably still be classified simply because the expiration date hasn't passed. Though it's probably not hard for some fanboy to go to the Czech Republic with some special gear and measure the armor all around.

The cabinet approved this evening (11.03.18) an MoD and IDF plan for strengthening the ground arm, which includes 2 main projects that were decided in the Gideon multi-year plan (2015-2020): The purchase of 'hundreds' of Eitan combat vehicles, and the development of a new self propelled howitzer.
 
Eitan
On the Eitan, it was said it would enter service with the Nahal light infantry brigade in 2019, and will steadily start replacing M113 in 2020. Nahal was chosen to lead the Eitan project by being the first to test it. 
MANTAK say the Eitan will be the world's most advanced and protected wheeled combat vehicle, basing itself on technologies developed for the Merkava and Namer, and being designed with an open architecture to allow easy integration of upgrades in the future.
And its main advantage over the Namer would be its rapid rate of production.
 
MoD and IDF refrained from telling how many vehicles exactly will they need, which may be due to the fact that they have yet to see how much the budget allows them. Ideally, it would replace the M113 in as many roles as possible, while in some roles a light armored vehicle, preferably the JLTV, would replace the M113. 
 
The plan spans a decade, so even if the production rate of the Eitan is similar to the Namer, we can expect at least 300 vehicles. But it won't be, and will likely be twice as fast, which could mean north of 600 vehicles. Of course, many of them will not be frontline vehicles. 
 
MoD's contract with RAFAEL includes ~1,000 Trophy systems, of which ~90 will go to Merkava 3 tanks, ~600 will be evenly split between Merkava 4 and Namer vehicles, which leaves ~300 for the Eitan over the course of a decade. 
Admittedly, the IDF was only supposed to present its recommendations for an APS (Iron Fist or Trophy) in January 2018, which is long after the contract with RAFAEL was signed, so it remains until the 2018 fiscal report to understand how many more Trophy-equipped Eitans will we see.
 
SPH
MoD approves the continued project to develop and produce the next generation howitzer for the IDF, and promises that within the following decade, the IDF ground arm will undergo a revolution. 
Indeed, the howitzers are long overdue, and should have been produced and enter service over a decade ago! But budget cuts happened. Thankfully, the Gideon plan seems to be on track from start to end.
 
Oddly, as opposed to other programs in the IDF, the new howitzer entered prototype stage a while ago and begun test firing as well, without the public knowing the Hebrew name of the system, or seeing a prototype. The Eitan, Namer, Carmel, and Barak, were all named at the very early stages of their program and prototypes/concepts were shown very early on as well.
The fact that the IDF has only very recently concluded it would be best for it to make a first batch of wheeled howitzers shows the development program is still lagging behind, and Elbit's promises to get the system ready within half a year to one and a half years (in the worst case), were broken.
 
It is however important to understand that Elbit is now tasked with 2 development programs - 1 for a wheeled howitzer, 1 for a tracked howitzer. 
 
The news here, are that the project can now proceed as planned. It was previously stalled as the MoD had to review it for fears of corruption, and due to a new law that calls for routine program reviews for deals worth 100 million NIS and 400 million NIS, each with different parameters set for the reviews.
 
Now, considering the fact that they claim a decade will be needed for the full (?) transition, and the facts that today there are ~300 howitzers in service, of which 100 will be cut as the new ones will be able to more than compensate for the lower numbers, we're looking at a production rate of roughly 20 units per year. A more precise figure would likely be 24 howitzers, which would equate to 2 battalions per year, or if there are any plans to produce new dedicated ammo carriers, then 12 howitzers and 6-12 carriers which would equate to 1 battalion.
 
Source:
https://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/368213

Yep, it's Trophy alright. 
 

 
Looking good!
 
Note: The smoke grenade launcher was removed and the gap that was usually taken by it was filled with armor. 
Notice the gap:

 
Shame they didn't take the opportunity to make a more serious overhaul. The Mark 3 could probably use a little rearrangement in its frontal section, some weight reduction wherever possible, and an improved frontal armor on the hull. I know it's more needed on the sides, but it can't be very economical to have the engine frequently damaged.

The articles are surely interesting to read, but they do not say that armour was not tested in the United States. The actual tanks did not have armor, but the documents also mention that Germany delivered a ballistic turret (steel shell with armor modules) and a ballistic hulll (steel shell with armor modules) to the United States for testing:
 


 
The tanks also weren't x-rayed:

 
But the statement regarding the XM1 being better protected than the Leopard 2AV also should be taken catiously. According to the document, the protection was not solely limited to an analysis of the armor, but also included stuff like ammo storage (where the Chrysler XM1 is better) and other factors:

 
The only odd statement is the following:

"The Leopard has 87 percent less special armor protection than the XM1". That would mean - if this was a statement regarding the quality of the armor - that the Leopard 2AV's protection would be worse than the Leopard 1's (!). 13 percent of 350 to 400 mm is less than 60 mm. Therefore we can say: this value does not relate to actual armor protection.
Instead it seems to be related to armor coverage:

The Leopard 2AV did not have special armor skirts (only the same skirts as the Leopard 1), it doesn't have composite armor at the turret bustle (only simple spaced solution also used on the Leopard 2) and it's hull armor had reduced special armor thickness (because it incorporated a fuel tank following a suggestion from the United States, that this would be an efficient armor layout). So IMO the XM1 was found to have much more surface covered by special armor:

 
The document "Department Of Defense Consideration Of West Germany's Leopard As The Army's New Main Battle Tank" seems to support this suggestion and is a lot more balanced (it criticizes the fact that biased people like Gen. Robert Baer, the XM1's project manager, were part of the "judges" overseeing the tests). It states the following regarding the armor:


"... special armor protects a larger area of the XM-1 than the present Leopard ..." - no surprise, it has heavy ballistic skirts, turret bustle armor and probably also more special armor in the hull. "... and that the XM-1 is currently capable of sustaining more types of hits without serious damage." - well, the Leopard 2AV would probably fail to stop a 81 mm HEAT round (Carl Gustav warhead) at the turret bustle... just like the Leopard 2A4 or Leopard 2A5... Reason for the different protection levels provided by the armor are attributed to "Differences in how the two countries perceive the threat." -  IMO this means, that Germany focused more on protection against KE threats (i.e. APFSDS ammo and artillery fragments) rather than shaped charges. This would fit the graphic posted earlier. "The protection offered by the present-generation German chobham armor is not [...] equal to that of the XM-1." - it was apparently also optimized to defeat other threats. Furthermore the hull armor (incorporating a fuel tank) was extremely inefficient! According to German documents, redesigning the hull with a single array of NERA (rather than two separate ones?) allowed to free 700 kilograms of weight without reducing the armor protection:
 
 
 
Well, there are three facts to remember:
 
1. The Leopard 2A4's turret armor was tested with a physical thickness of 800-860 mm against the LKE1 APFSDS, so it simulated a direct hit from the front. The M1A2 armor scheme shows only the guaranteed protection along the frontal ± 30°. So the 600 mm RHAe value might be 650-700 mm  RHAe when hit from the front (0° from the turret centerline). The 350 mm hull armor however should be corresponding to 0° impact angle, because the effective armor thickness increases at other angles.
2. The T-80U's turret in Sweden was claimed to provide protection equal to roughly 600 mm RHAe vs KE (without Kontakt-5 ERA)
3. Leopard 2A5 was considered to be better protected than the M1A2, Leclerc and T-80U in Sweden and in Greece.
 

Maybe, maybe not. There might be aswell an American XM711. Don't forget that the designation "M426" exists in the US inventory (105 mm HEAT-FS round) and the Israeli inventory (105 mm APFSDS-T round, also known as 105 mm DM63); it would be quite a coincidence, but there also might be an American XM711 round. Maybe the M711 was developed as a joint-venture with US companies or based on a contract of the US Army?
 
___
 
Enough of the "heavy" discussions, time to lighten up the mood. French armor protection (some of the other forum users with better French skills should try to fact-check my translation):
 

AMX-32:
frontal armor consists of spaced armor, the outer layer is a dual-hardness steel plate; spaced armor is also used on the turret sides designed to resist 57 mm AP (from the ASU-57) and 75 mm APCBC ammo (from the AMX-13/75) - penetration should be 100-170 at 1,000 m distance a lot better protected than the AMX-30, which was designed to stop 20 mm ammo only roof armor is designed to provide protection against bomblets with 30° impact angle (?)
AMX-40:
frontal arc is protected by composite armor, which is resistant to 76 mm AP ammo - only the PT-76 and M41 Walker Bulldog used this calibre - and the RPG-7 side armor of the turret is spaced and  provides protection against 23 mm AP AMX E4  (modified AMX-40 design offered to Egypt, weight increased from 43.7 metric tons to 50 metric tons):
completely redesigned (composite) armor, offers protection against 105 mm HEAT and APFSDS ammo at the frontal arc heavier versions (53 metric tons) of this design were supposed to have armor protection comparable the Leopard 2(A4)
AMX Leclerc:
unlike Chobham, the Leclerc's armor was always designed to provide higher efficiency against both KE and CE threats (early Chobham was optimized against hollow charge ammunition only) the Leclec has the same weight as the Leopard 2A4, but is 850 mm shorter (hull length). This allows the implementation of a higher protection level. However instead of focusing all armor on the frontal arc (like the Leopard 2), the weight was used to increase protection along a greater area: the heavy ballistic skirts are thicker and cover more surface, while the turret side (and bustle) armor is designed to protect against RPGs.

@SH_MM: haven't gone over the stats sheet, but here's the translation for the articles you just posted. Still a bit sleepy, so please cut me some slack if some sentences appear a bit awkward. *yawn*
    The AMX32's protection
The use of dual hardness steel plates particularly efficient against kinetic projectiles allowed the AMX32 to be protected from the front against high-caliber armor piercing ammunition such as the tungsten-cored 75mm PCOT and the 57mm AP fired by the guns of the Soviet paratroopers' ASU assault vehicles. These plates formed the external part of the armor compartments, creating a ballistic space, such as the gun mantlet or the hull's fore end. Likewise, the turret sides used the same spaced armor principles to provide protection against medium caliber armor-piercing ammunition.
The particularly thick turret roof protected the crew against shells fired by fighter-bombers at an angle of 30°.
Compared to the AMX30, which is protected against 20mm shells, the AMX32 represented a tangible improvement of tank protection for this era, without noticeably increasing vehicle mass/volume.     --------------- Note: obus =/= bomblet. It refers to a cannon shell.       The Leclerc's armors:   Given that the Chobham Armory imparted its name to the first British composite armor, History could have christened "Satory" the armor of the Leclerc tank. It's indeed in the weapons department AMX-APX built on the Versailles plateau that were carried out all of the configuration and integration studies for the new ballistic protection concepts. AMX-APX took full advantage of the fundamental research studies carried out by the ETBS from Bourges and the Central Technical Establishment of Armament in Arcueil.   During the Sixties, the first tests on ceramics integration et the behavior of various materials (glasses, special steels, lightweight alloys among others) during penetration, were carried out. As an anecdote, some natural materials such as granite were also tested.   The Seventies witnessed the development of the first multipurpose composite armors. While the British Chobham protecting the Challenger was optimized against shaped charges, the efficiency of the French armors against shaped charges and arrow-type penetrators was demonstrated from the get-go.   In the following decade, the headway that was made in the field of materials and research on the optimization of geometrical configurations, allowed the creation of armor solutions that could be integrated into the Leclerc. However, a decisive step was to be made with the completion of the first add-on/applique armors. The latter ones would allow the Leclerc to regenerate its protection, in relation to technological developments and threat nature.   Protection level was achieved through the compactness of the tank and weight reduction. Indeed, the Leclerc and Leopard 2A4 have the same mass, around 56 tons. Yet, the Leclerc is 850mm shorter, which translates to a mass of 4 tons (850mm of structure and skirts, those suspension elements, two roller wheels and four times 850mm' worth of tracks). Compared to the German tank, the recovered mass allowed the increase of protection over the frontal arc, the protection of the turret sides against infantry-carried antitank weaponry and the increase of protection over the hull sides, thanks to external/precursor (applique?) armor covering a widened frontal arc.
The Leclerc therefore offers a more balanced protection that no longers exclusively concentrates the armor on the tank's front.
As such, the third-generation French tank boasts applique armor that is evolving, multipurpose, compact, lightweight and industrially reproducible (easily and economically). This technological and industrial mastery has made it possible to keep the Leclerc's mass well below the levels of foreign tanks (Leopard 2, M1A2, Challenger II), whose significant weights (around 63t) are disadvantageous for repair operations (recovery, towing and turret removal become true "combined operations") and for the sappers/engineers who have to deploy technical assets that are expensive and complex.
Maintaining a relatively low mass is an essentially criterion in the eyes of the French Army, whose modes of engagement favor agility and tactical deployment speed.
The Satory teams continue their research and are already proposing armors designed to counter future threats. Thanks to the modularity of its protection, the Leclerc Series 2+ is ready to receive them.       Text on the lower left, under the picture:   One of the numerous armor testing caissons after a live fire session. The fore plate shows three entry holes: in the middle, an arrow, recognizable thanks to the white, star-shaped mark left by the penetrator's aluminum fins that desintegrated upon impact; on the left and right, two high-caliber shaped charges easily identifiable thanks to their red color, typical of the copper deposits left by the perforating jets. The aft plate is slightly deformed as the caisson was installed without a rear support. When integrated into a tank's front armor compartement, this caisson would keep its geometrical integrity.         EDIT: godd*****. I must be doing something wrong with the code, because my perfectly separate quotes always result in nested quotes, like a frickin' matriochka. Will leave formatting as is, for now.

The M711 is not American, and I'm pretty sure it was never named "XM711". 
 
Here's the brochure on it:
http://www.imisystems.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/125mm-M7118-MK-2-APFSDS-T-Cartridge-1.pdf

This is a long one so I'll do the recap:
 
1)Its Kornet missiles have an extended range of 6.5km.
2)Shitty joke about Bumerangs going into combat and returning.
3)Afghanit gives it a full peripheral protection. Almost complete reliance on APS. Anti-mine/IED system included as well.
4)More than one kit exists for the Bumerang. One for amphibious operations, which is the lightest, and another heavier one for combat.
5)Base armor protects against sniper fire, MGs, and basically all sorts of small arms fire.
6)Plans exist for a "wheeled tank" on the basis of the Bumerang, but without reducing the internal volume of the vehicle. i.e fully overhead high caliber weapon system.
7)Production series vehicles will be more spacious.
8)User Interface (UI) allows easy access and view of the vehicle's full diagnostics data.
9)Weight of the vehicle can exceed 30 tons, which may refer to its heavier armor package, although for this brakes testing they used special weights placed on top of the vehicle.
10)Bumerang is built to accommodate even exceptionally large individuals.
 

There was a big demonstration of all sorts of technologies today to the IDF, of tech that will soon enter service (not just experimental stuff). As usual, the new artillery piece was not shown, because Elbit are still keeping it under covers, but they chose to give us, the peasants, some news:
 
The new howitzer will be built in an initial batch of 100 vehicles and will be based on a wheeled chassis. Follow-on howitzers may be based on tracked vehicles. 
Now, I don't quite remember the exact numbers, but if I'm not wrong, there are, in the IDF:
4 artillery brigades - 2 active, 2 reserve.
Each brigade consists of 4 battalion of howitzers each.
The 2 active brigades are both split with 2 active battalions and 2 reserve battalions in each of them.
This puts us at 4 active battalions, and 12 reserve battalions.
 
So there are:
Active - 72 howitzers.
Reserve - 216 howitzers.
 
Each howitzer will be manned by a yet undetermined number of crewmen ranging from 3 to 5, and an overall reduction of 25% to 40% is envisioned, though yet unclear whether it refers to manpower, vehicles, or both. 
My assumption is that each vehicle will be manned by 3 men, while another 2 (for a total of 5) will be in the ammo carrier vehicle. This is because it's normal to say the M109 has a crew of 9 to 11 (9 in the vehicle, and 2 in the resupply vehicle).
 
It is assumed that the typical battalion will reduce to 12 vehicles from 18, so a batch of 100 vehicles will be enough to fully equip 8 battalions, which are 2 whole brigades. And another 4 vehicles will be left for testing and demonstrations. 
 
And of course, it's likely the 2nd batch of 100 vehicles, which will complete the transition of the artillery corps to a new howitzer, will be based on a tracked platform. If that will be the case, the wheeled platforms will be transferred to the reservists, and the tracked platforms will take their place in the active brigades.
 
This is a good move for 2 main reasons:
1)Tracked howitzers are only needed for maneuver combat. With a total of 192 howitzers (after the transition), hardly half will be required to maneuver anywhere. So it would be ideal if the reservists will have a system that will be easier and cheaper to maintain. A wheeled platform cuts down expenses tremendously.
2)Wheeled platforms are easier and faster to make, not only cheaper. So it would allow the IDF to re-equip its artillery forces before the M109 turn into rust buckets. I mean, they already are. 
 
And because this has been an unpleasant wall of text, have some pictures:
 
Bunch of Namers amid a Golani brigade exercise along with the 188th armored brigade, in which a Mark 3 tank with a Trophy system was also showcased for the first time.

 
Eitan, of course. Just an optical illusion though. It's not really that big.

 
Namer with its new turret with 30mm gun, 2 Spike LR2 missiles, a 60mm mortar, a Trophy APS, and a damn good look.

 
120mm low recoil mortar on a light 4x4 platform:

 

Already did, sweet.

A bit more historically themed - a Magach (6?) Of the 46th battalion during the 1982 Lebanon war sporting dual coax 50 cals

 

Changed domain. Hopefully this time it works.

Changed domain. Hopefully this time it works.

Yep, it's Trophy alright. 
 

 
Looking good!
 
Note: The smoke grenade launcher was removed and the gap that was usually taken by it was filled with armor. 
Notice the gap:

 
Shame they didn't take the opportunity to make a more serious overhaul. The Mark 3 could probably use a little rearrangement in its frontal section, some weight reduction wherever possible, and an improved frontal armor on the hull. I know it's more needed on the sides, but it can't be very economical to have the engine frequently damaged.

Yep, it's Trophy alright. 
 

 
Looking good!
 
Note: The smoke grenade launcher was removed and the gap that was usually taken by it was filled with armor. 
Notice the gap:

 
Shame they didn't take the opportunity to make a more serious overhaul. The Mark 3 could probably use a little rearrangement in its frontal section, some weight reduction wherever possible, and an improved frontal armor on the hull. I know it's more needed on the sides, but it can't be very economical to have the engine frequently damaged.

Test series of Koalitsiya

Graduation video:
 
 

 

 
Part of a recent propaganda series to educate people on the role of the armored corps due to its decline in recent years. This time they show a live operational firing on 3 targets in a Hamas outpost. 
You can see them exiting the tank after firing and celebrating with the bunch, but that's just editing for the sake of smooth transitioning.
 
https://he-il.facebook.com/2055812101320752/videos/2085466998355262/