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2805662

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2805662 last won the day on June 12

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  1. 2805662

    Land 400 Phase 3: Australian IFV

    But having two German vehicles (Lynx & Puma) in the race would confuse the black hats that simply *know* German engineering is superior to all others.
  2. 2805662

    Land 400 Phase 3: Australian IFV

    “Defence’s selection will also be informed by the opportunities to reduce whole of life costs by means of commonality of sub-systems, consumables and training across Phases 2 and 3 of the LAND 400 Program. Accordingly, the RFT will require tenderer responses on specific elements of commonality with the Phase 2 fleet and will seek options for further commonality, but it will also allow responses on alternative sub-systems, consumables and training if they represent better value for money and provide through-life cost savings. This includes the possibility of retrofitting of the Phase 2 fleet with items from the Phase 3 system.” Could a Phase 3 turret be dropped on a Phase 2 Hull? Seems unlikely.
  3. 2805662

    Land 400 Phase 3: Australian IFV

    Im going to pull apart the draft requirements today #goodtimes Looks like Land 400 Phase 3 is continuing Phase 2’s complete lack of specificity. As per my first post, Defence’s attempts to get Rheinmetall to discount the Lance turret so that it could be used as GFE was unsuccessful. Plus there’s the question of who would own the technical risk for the integration of a third-party platform onto a hull. We know (discussions with bidders) as part of the Phase 2 negotiations/BAFO that both competitors were asked to price their Phase 2 vehicles in a configuration that would meet Phase 3 requirements, mainly the number of dismounts. So, despite having pricing for a 100% 8x8 fleet, common to both phases, the Commonwealth wanted to explore additional (presumably tracked) options. Also, as the Commonwealth wanted a signed contract for Phase 2 prior to release of the Phase 3 RFT (actual, not draft), we can expect a Phase 2 contract signature announcement soonish, I guess.
  4. 2805662

    General AFV Thread

    An early version of the SEOSS sight?
  5. 2805662

    General AFV Thread

    The sight appears to be on a hinged base, presumably to allow it to elevate with the gun.
  6. 2805662

    General AFV Thread

    I would love something like that for the Lance turret.
  7. 2805662

    Israeli AFVs

    Regarding Eitan: is there any feedback on how the one-soldier-wide exit is considered by the users?
  8. 2805662

    Land 400 Phase 3: Australian IFV

    Doesn’t seem to be on the radar, now. Seems Phase 2 burned some fingers. The UK MoD experience bringing the Bronco/Warthog into service - and promptly retiring them - may also affect the confidence ADF has in ST Kinetics’ platforms? (100% speculation on my behalf)
  9. 2805662

    Land 400 Phase 3: Australian IFV

    Indeed. The Commonwealth (“CoA”) divides its tender evaluation group into Tender Evaluation Working Groups (TEWG) - technical, engineering, commercial, project management, financial/cost - that report to the Tender Evaluation Board. As these TEWGs work independently from each other, measuring the aggregation of risks should be covered by the TEB....but this isn’t always captured. Capability risks are also difficult to quantify. Thankfully, there’s increasing consideration of manufacturing readiness level (MRL) as a measure of maturity. This is assessed in conjunction with technical readiness level (TRL). So, is an off-the-shelf product “low risk” (delivered on time/on budget) if it doesn’t deliver the necessary capability?
  10. 2805662

    Israeli AFVs

    I like when they substitute millimeters for calibre. “Corporal Old Mate mans a 50mm machine gun...” Ugh.
  11. 2805662

    Land 400 Phase 3: Australian IFV

    Australian procurement is funny like that. Must be “low risk” (is that developmental risk? Technical risk? Manufacturing risk? That’s never stated).....unless it’s submarines (google “SEA 1000” - it’s unbelievable), or aircraft (launch customer for the E-7 Wedgetail, for example). Maybe the land systems procurement guys just aren’t cluey enough to buy anything that’s not off-the-shelf.
  12. 2805662

    Land 400 Phase 3: Australian IFV

    GDLS (who has brand recognition in Australia thanks mainly due to ASLAV, GDELS won’t appear on literature in Australia) if they bid at all, has the benefit of a more mature turret. Certainly, it’s more mature than Lance 2.0. My distrust comment is on the back of discussions with several discussions with participants. Not stated openly, but the inference I drew. Considering that both entities are possible competitors globally, I can understand the reluctance to share information. At the time of the Phase 2 tender close, Australian manufacturing was less of a factor than it has become. The emphasis for Phase 2 was “off the shelf” and ready to go, due to perceived urgency of replacing the ASLAV. The message (at the time) from mating the turret with the hull in Tasmania was “immature, unproven, high risk, and poor partners. Rightly or wrongly.
  13. 2805662

    Land 400 Phase 3: Australian IFV

    The level of distrust between the consortium partners for Sentinel meant that the first time that the hull was mated to the turret was in Tasmania! It was, both technically & commercially, extremely risky. Thankfully, the Commonwealth had experience with Elbit low-balling a technically-risky bid to win business 😂 Participation expenses were partly paid for the Risk Mitigation Activity participants....but they had to get there first.
  14. The following is derived from various wanderings, discussions, & tyre kicking, and covers an opinion on the forthcoming Land 400 Phase 3 Request for Tender, and is as per June 2018. General: Phase 2 will significantly shape participation in Phase 3. Costs for the two bidders that weren’t short listed for the Risk Mitigation Activity (GDLS & Elbit Systems) ran into the tens of millions of dollars. Costs for the losing BAE bid could rightly be assessed as double that. Combined with Rheinmetall’s Phase 2-driven “perceived incumbency”, nobody wants to waste money to be a stalking horse on the Commonwealth’s behalf. There is a plausible risk that only Rheinmetall will bid. Reorganisation of infantry sections: When Land 400 was conceived, Australian infantry sections consisted of two fire teams of four. This drove the initial “eight dismounts” requirement that has subsequently been relaxed. Now comprising three fire teams of three, one of those teams will be the vehicle crew, the other two will dismount, for a total of six dismounts. Recent operational experience has highlighted the need for temporary attachment of specialist personnel, so a platform that has some spare seating could still count for it. GFE Turrets: One possible tactic that the Commonwealth may seek to use is that of mandating that the Lance Turret, as used on the Phase 2 Boxer CRV, be used as Government Furnished Equipment (that is, purchased from Rheinmetall and provided to suitably configured hulls by competitors). This would simplify the turret training and offer spares commonality across both phases. Perceived savings for “buying in bulk” were (apparently) unable to be realised as Rheinmetall was reluctant to discount its turret. Costs aside, if an offerer has a GFE turret, who owns the systems integration risk? Who does the customer turn to solve potential issues between the turret and hull when they, the customer, has mandated that particular turret? Commercially, this is a high risk proposition. Unmanned turrets: Only GDLS offered an unmanned/remote turret for Phase 2, the Kongsberg MCT-30, as has been adopted in small numbers (81) by the US Army to meet an immediate operational need. A bias against unmanned turrets is unlikely to manifest itself in Phase 3 due to the likely presence of the PSM Puma IFV. Of course, that’ll likely to open the door to GDLS bidding the ASCOD fitted with Elbit’s optionally manned/unmanned MT-30 turret....should they decide to bid at all. Likely bidders: This brings us to the inevitable list of potential bidders and their platforms. BAE: Unlikely to bid. If they win SEA 5000, that may get them off the bench, as would a requirements set that looks a lot like CV90. In the event that they do bid, the CV90 Mk4 is the most likely platform. GDLS: More likely to bid than BAE, but still waiting to see what the RFT looks like. (Tellingly?) Their ASCODs at Eurosatory were painted for upcoming European opportunities, not in the distinctive Australia disruptive pattern. Rheinmetall: likely to offer the Lynx and maybe also the Puma. With the reorganisation of Australian infantry sections (see above) the eight dismounts of the KF41 version of the Lynx are less relevant. Still, the modularity of the KF41 demonstrated at Eurosatory 18 definitely left an impression. PSM: As a JV between KMW & Rheinmetall, Puma may be offered separately (unlikely if the Boxer =\= ARTEC in Australia model is followed). In the event that is is offered separately, it’s high unit cost, without the associated modularity of Boxer, may be a disadvantage. Also, PSM has no experience with industrial partnerships in Australia: a significant disadvantage. Hanwha Defense Systems: Korea has been a bit “off” Australian defence opportunities, largely due to the cack-handed way in which the cancellation of the K-9/AS-9 was handled in 2012. The AS-9 was viewed as a loss leader, primarily as Australia has a reputation of being a discerning (aka difficult) customer. If Hanwha bids their K21, it’ll be interesting to watch. Whilst by no means exhaustive, the above outlines some less-obvious factors currently at play for the 450-vehicle opportunity that is Land 400 Phase 3.
  15. 2805662

    General AFV Thread

    120mm Centauro: https://imgur.com/gallery/ykUofCg
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