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Duncan

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  1. Duncan

    Combat Footage

    The original video I saw didn't cut out until they assaulted around that big rock where there were three Turks were taking cover, who all got smoked from about 5 feet away with a mag of AK.
  2. Duncan

    Combat Footage

    The Kurds were clearly using armor piercing XM1158 ammo, or how else did they kill those soldiers wearing body armor?
  3. Duncan

    Combat Footage

    Moving through walls using various breaching equipment (mechanical or explosive being the most common) has been a stable of urban combat since WW2. Streets are death traps. ISIS also heavily tunneled under buildings and streets, allowing fighters to move between blocks without crossing streets, shuffle personnel, move supplies, counterattack, etc. Also, not new.
  4. It doesn't even take a normal platoon to maneuver on 2-4 structures, doesn't need super platoon. Why is the platoon even assaulting something that can be easily destroyed by CAS or precision tube or rocket arty? If there are No, as a platoon leader I'd not want to have to ask for everything. But at the same time I don't want more assets than I need, let alone control. Its overkill. Very few missions need every platoon to have large numbers of CG and MG assets. When they do, almost never does every platoon need to be individually plus'd up, that's not how operations work, where often one platoon is the main effort, others are supporting efforts. Task allocating weapons at the company level, like how the Marine Corps does with a Weapons Platoon, or how the Army does with Mortars and snipers, allowing the company commander to dictate where they go based on his needs, is far cheaper and easier to control than trying to build those same assets into every platoon. And at the end of the day, every single extra infantryman has to come from somewhere. Meaning either Congress approves a larger force structure, or else those bodies are removed from some place else they are currently. That was the problem the Marine Corps had. They didn't want to shrink their fire teams, but it was either go to three man, or else lose a fire team and thus the SL loses a maneuver element, or don't get the drone operator (which they want and know will be a major force multiplier). So for your 60 man platoon, where do they come from?
  5. The platoon often doesn't need a dedicated CG and mortar teams, if it needs them they can grab them for the mission (or leave them back), or they can get teams attached. You're creating more billets that for many operations infantry conducts just aren't necessary. If the idea is to not overload the squads, you're just overloading the platoons even worse. and overloading companies, they will become so bloated even company commanders will have trouble maneuvering them. I really can't think of any mission I ever went on in 11 years in the infantry where 60 men could accomplish it better than what our smaller platoon could. Just the chaos of moving that monstrosity in vehicles of whichever kind, would have been a nightmare. So I ask, what mission is the 60 man infantry platoon supposed to excel at? Is there anything from the GWOT or even before that you can use as an example? Larger platoons were historically done with assault companies for specific regiments, in specific campaigns. They were very task organized to a specific mission, with very varied teams and squads, and much more varied weaponry, that were designed for very specific tasks and conditions, often being to maneuver on highly defended defensive positions while taking heavy losses. If we were planning something like the Iraqis just did, spending months clearing Mosul, task organizing infantry platoons differently, and making them much larger, could work out very well. Other times, it would be horrible. The standard MTOE is supposed to be a jack of all trades type organization. My biggest gripe is the modern Army and Marine Corps unwillingness to task organize as the situation dictates, as if should they deviate from standard MTOE for any reason, and operate outside basic doctrine, its considered blasphemy.
  6. 60 man platoons? Great if they are assault platoons expected to storm Okinawa and expecting to get whittled down quickly through attrition. But think about it this way. A platoon leader, a 22 year old whose only command training comes from schools, will be in command, his only help being one senior NCO. Commanding half a modern company is going to be outside his ability. Besides that, it would completely change the dynamics of any operation. Rarely does any mission require a minimum of 60 men to accomplish it. Often times its a struggle to find work for even the full platoon. Many of recent wars, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, are squad leader wars. Think of the headache of arranging a platoon patrol with vehicles when 60 men need to be moved. Logistics would be harder. With modern force multipliers, things need to get smaller, not bigger. In WW1 and even WW2, platoons were generally thought to be the smallest realistic tactical unit capable of operating independently. Later, squads started doing it. Now we have fire teams separated from one another in squads by sometimes hundreds of meters. We can get away with this because we're not fighting near peer, not taking massive casualties, but more so because we're decentralizing command and control to lower levels, because we have better comms and navigational aids, and because weapons are deadlier now than ever before, more accurate, more responsive, so greater force multipliers. Like the new USMC squad. I doubt they wanted to go to three 3 man teams, but they didn't have a choice if they wanted to add drone operators and an assistant squad leader to the squad without going to Congress to try to beg for more manpower. Three small teams is still more maneuver than two big ones, it still allows the SL to spread out his squad and still maintain control through NCO team leaders. And with a 12 man squad, they can still change it up and go with two 5 man fire teams plus SL plus drone operator, and two five man teams is what most studies since WW2 have recommended anyway. Add in the increased lethality from new weapons, new tactics, and new tech (comms for everyone, UAV in every squad), they can lose a little in manpower while still remaining capable.
  7. Supplying tiny company, sometimes company (-) COPs in the middle of nowhere Afghanistan with helicopter air lift on a weekly basis is about the very worst supply situation the US military could find itself in. If it can do it there, keep the myriad of company level weaponry supplied with ammo, then it can do it in other conditions. If you want to state otherwise, provide an example of what you're talking about. MCO against Russia in the Baltics? Fighting Chinese in Taiwan? What and where?
  8. As it is, the Grenadier, an 11B or 0311, will have numerous weapons they must be trained on. And what do you mean about logistics? Are you referring to an MCO type conflict against Russia where Class V gets pushed down? Every other type of conflict, like the GWOT, it gets pulled. You need specific ammo, request it and it gets delivered (in theory). And all that stuff, 5.56 ball, 5.56 linked, 7.62 linked, 7.62 match (for DMR and snipers), 40mm GL, 40mm HVGL, .50 cal, 60mm mortar, 84mm Carl Gustaf rounds, etc., all of that was already successfully delivered before to middle-of-nowhere COPs in A-Stan, in the sort of deployments that truly tested the logistical system. Going to IAR actually means streamlining it more, getting rid of 5.56 Linked, which frees up space for other stuff (like Carl Gustaf rounds).
  9. At Wanat, most of the MGs, including all of the M249s, stopped working. Which was why M4s were being used as SAWs, because the SAWs had died already (because they're beat up weapons). The manner in which the SAW is used, it will not be able to duplicate an M240 anyway. On its best day, its not as reliable. SAW gunners don't carry enough ammo, rarely a spare barrel. They rarely have the support of an AG to assist them. If a squad's fight comes down to the SAW and no other platoon or company enablers, the M249 will not rescue them, the GWOT proved that pretty well.
  10. I didn't mean those specific guns, but the engineering as a whole. Let's say a closed bolt automatic rifle that doesn't have a barrel change option. Likely they'd go with a heavy barrel on it for heat mitigation, but would it be better served to be fluted? And if so, are radial flutes the most effective type? Is it just really hard to do, adding much more work and cost?
  11. What is the benefit of radial fluting over fluting down the length of the barrel? Is it just harder to mill out the material?
  12. The acoustics of it aren't truly what instills fear. Like the artillery. If you kept hearing arty incoming and it sounded like a massive rail gun but exploded like a piddly WW1 75mm round, rather quickly the fear of the sound would evaporate. No more suppression effect. That acoustical sounds need to correspond to increased deadliness. Either in accuracy (sniper), or volume (machine gun), penetrative qualities (AP ammo), or destructive abilities (HE). Any change in small arms for the purpose of increasing suppression effect must be done under the context of getting inside the enemy's head to figure out not only what he fears but why. Not an easy thing, since an Afghan Taliban at 800 meters shooting a PKM through a loophole originally constructed in 1982 to kill Soviet troops is going to be different than a Chinese conscript PLA private, or an ISIS insurgent in Mosul, or an African insurgent in Niger. At this point, by and large, I'd disregard most of what the Big Army is doing. They want to re-play the 80s, they're actively attempting to completely rearm the Army to fight Russia conventionally, desiring to not only replace squad level small arms for very specific task of penetrating Russian body armor but more so are trying to make the case to get the funding to replace all of the Big Five (M1 tank, Bradley, Black Hawk, Apache, Patriot). I guess the Big Army, once again, self declared that its done fighting small wars, like it did after Korea, then after Vietnam, and only exists now to fight a nuclear power without nukes. So whatever happens with them, the Big Army will likely not be leading the way into the future of how to better fight infantry centric small arms engagements, because those fights can only really happen in small wars when more advanced fire support (mortars, arty, air strikes) are either unavailable or denied.
  13. M855A1 definitely seems the game changer, much better than most what was previously issued. But new M80A1 does better at barrier penetration than M80 or M855A1. Not by much, but a little. I don't think enough to necessitate pulling a US Army move and trying to go straight 7.62 NATO for rifles and SAWs. Do you have external ballistics data for M855A1 showing velocities at longer ranges? What is BC and muzzle velocity for 14.5"?
  14. I generally agree but there are some added suppression effects between 5.56 up to 7.62 NATO. First, the snap is different. Second, 6.5-7.62 will go transonic well past 5.56, so better long range performance. Third, the latter has much better barrier penetration abilities, there are things that are cover against 5.56 that wont stop 7.62 and people getting shot at start noticing this stuff. "Is what I'm using for cover actually going to stop the round they're shooting at me?" Overall, I think the problems with suppression are more of not having a clue at all where the enemy is, and not knowing where to deliver any fire. So the solution isn't caliber, new weapons, its things like squad or platoon drones, thermal sights, magnified optics on every weapon with BDC reticle, more binos for leaders, better squad comms for better communication, greater emphasis on fire discipline and fire control measures that have seemingly been abandoned in the last couple decades. Software, not hardware.
  15. Suppression is definitely critical. Most infantry small arms fire is to suppress an enemy force. You're hitting them when you can, but most times its fire directed to either pin an enemy in place, or else to get them to stop shooting at you. And yes, caliber is a factor in suppression. .22 LR would be less suppressive than 5.56, which is less than 7.62 NATO, which is less than 338 Norma Mag, which is less than .50 Cal, etc. Penetrative abilities against cover, the accuracy potential of weapons, the fear of automatic weapons fire (volume), the knowledge that heavy weapons focused on your position means bad things, all are incentives to increase caliber to benefit suppression. But there is a con to that. Increasing round size in width and case length increases weight and bulk, the result is either carrying less or carrying same amount of lighter ammo at heavier cost. Another factor is recoil. Unless massively braked, Williams 7mm GPC is going to have much higher felt recoil and muzzle rise than something in 5.56, so its going to be harder to control on full auto. So play pro and con game. In the end, the reality is that 5.56 is good enough considering most bullets under 338 Norma Mag aren't really deadly or accurate enough to do a fantastic job at suppression. But like you wrote, HE does the best job. So the smart play is to add more HE deliverable weapons, large frag footprints, airbursting if possible. But even that has some major cons. The most obvious are ROE concerns where new infantry doctrine is to sling HE rounds everywhere, commanders are simply not going to like that. The fratricide issue will be a problem. Range time with HE is exponentially harder to do because of UXO problems and safety concerns. Cost is a huge dilemma, Carl Gustaf and other similar weapons, those rounds aren't cheap.
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