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N-L-M

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  1. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from That_Baka in French flair   
    For those keeping track at home, the D9 for example has a lot of rollers (good MMP), deep grousers for excellent traction in soft soil, and oil coolers for the torque converter. Unlike armored vehicles in which the torque converter is intended to lock up quickly and therefore not get very hot, the torque converter in the D9 is designed to work in slippage at all times. This results in a lot of power being turned into heat in the oil, which then needs to be cooled to prevent the seals from dying. You could run a tank in 1st gear and 100% slip on the torque converter and get pretty good tractive effort, but not for any length of time. The D9 is a very well designed tool.
  2. Tank You
    N-L-M reacted to Beer in Czechoslovak interwar bits   
    Let's continue about the artillery. Now about the field guns of the pre-WW2 Czechoslovak army. 
     
    7,5 cm light gun vz.1897. This legendary French gun was still in reserve by the fall of 1938 (38 pieces). They were bought in 1919 as a stop-gap during the war with Hungarian Soviet Republic. I think that this gun was on display in the military museum in Prague Vítkov but I'm not sure (the museum is closed now due to ongoing reconstruction). 

     
    8 cm ligh gun vz.5/8. These Škoda guns fired the first salvos of the WW1. First series still had brass barrel, later production after 1916 was all steel already. Most of the guns in Czechoslovak army was of post war production, but not all. Even though the gun was old in 1938 it was very light and used in higly mobile cavalry units and on armoured trains. 86 pieces were in service in 1938 (part in reserve). You can see it in Lešany museum. There is one peculiar thing about this gun. Small number of them was converted into anti-aircraft guns and a battery of four guns was still in service in Prague in 1938.   

     
    8 cm light gun vz.17. Another škoda gun which was used in the late months of the WW1 on the Italian front. The Czechoslovak guns were from post-war production running till 1937 (the first series was actually originally ordered by Austro-Hungarian army before the end of war). The army had nearly 300 of these guns and despite many discussions about replacing the 76,5 mm barrels by 83,5 mm it was never realized because the army decided that in the future it's wise to replace the light guns with howitzers. The interesting thing about this gun is it's transport. Originally it was towed by horses but later it was being carried on the truck (not behind because its chassis could not cope with speed higher than 10 km/h). 

     
    8 cm light gun vz.30. This gun was a bit of cat-dog design. It had a light barrel but a heavy over-dimensioned support from the howitzer vz.30 which allowed high elevation (80°) for anti-aircraft fire (that was later found not very usable). Nevertheless it had a pretty good 13 km range for its time. Part of the 202 guns in the army was used in motorized units, part with horse traction. Wehrmacht completely missed this category of guns by 1938 and took around 120 pieces. The strange thing about that is that the guns were officially sold to Germany 4 days before the occupation on 11th March 1939 (Germany never paid of course). The government was trying to sell large parts of the military equipment after the Münich. The war preparations hit the economy hard because the army was absolutely enormous compared to the country's size (imagine that a country of 15 million managed to mobilize more than 1 million soldiers and give them equipment in September 1938) and after the Münich it was clear that no fight is possible on the rest of the country (for many reasons which may be discussed later). 

     
    7,5 cm mountain light gun vz.15. This is maybe the most legendary weapon of Škoda production ever. Very widely used in the WW1 and after by many countries. The gun was very easy to transport disassembled to six pieces with weight of 150 kg. It was capable of fire to 7 km distance and its crews were even trained to fight tanks. This gun was used by Czechoslovakia in the short war with Poland in 1919 and Hungarian Soviet Republic in the same year. Overall Czechoslovakia had some 235 pieces and sometimes in very unusual installations (in armoured trains, on Danube boats or as provisional equipment of the artillery blockhouses of the border fortifications). Wehrmacht took them and some other from other states and used them through the whole was especially in Italy and Balcan. This gun is on display in Prague Vítkov muzeum. Muzeum in Lešany has a more modern variant for Yugoslavia from late 20'.   

     
    10,5 cm heavy gun vz.13. This French gun was used after the creation of Czechoslovkia but none was in service in the fall of 1938. As other French weapons 13 pieces were bought during the war with Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919. One piece is on display in Lešany. 

     
    10,5 cm heavy gun vz.35. This Škoda piece was for sure the most modern gun in the army inventory and one of the most modern guns in the world of its time. It was capable to deliver 18 kg round to 18 km with its own weight just 4,2 tons. It was also designed to directly engage tanks if needed (that was of course a total overkill against Pz.I and II in 1938 but very useful in the future). The army managed to get 106 pieces before Münich. There was a lot of interest in the gun from abroad but due to the political situation most of the export orders were taken by Wehrmacht (Yugoslavia, Latvia, Netherlands). Even USSR decided to buy this weapon but the agreement was never signed due to the post-Münich situation. Wehrmacht used some 140 pieces, the rest was used by Slovakia. One of these guns is preserved in Lešany museum. 

     
    Next time anti-tank guns. 
     
     
  3. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from Xlucine in United States Military Vehicle General: Guns, G*vins, and Gas Turbines   
    I did read the document, and your conclusions from it are so off-base that I'm not sure you read it.
    Consider, for example, the closing remarks, on page III of the document (page 6 of the PDF):

    "small real cost growth" is not at all the situation you describe.

    A growth of 19%, mostly because extra features were added in? say it ain't so!


    And again, 19% growth for features, mainly the strengthened powertrain, is literal taxpayer rape. wew.
    Also, the 507k is hardware costs for a single vehicle. Doubling the order for what is pretty much the same hardware cost per unit does not mean that the hardware cost per unit has doubled, and indeed the paper only talks about an estimated price increase if 19%. I really don't know how you could even reach that interpretation.
    You know, that's a fascinating source, but once again your source does not say what you claim it does.
    To wit, the Army's response to that claim:

    Page 89 of the very PDF you posted. If you're gonna cherry pick quotes from sources, at least bother to read your entire source. Cause it firmly disagrees with the conclusion you are trying to draw from it.

    Fun for the whole family!
    And a bit more, just to get the point across:


    Oh no muh poor taxpayer getting ripped off for squillions of dollars oh no
    It's almost as if getting sent to an active war zone in the sandbox leads to greater wear and therefore need for spare parts, as well as high fuel consumption, while the M60A3s are left at home or in Europe, who'd a-thunk it?
    The cost of the M1 exceeding the M1A1 is interesting, wonder what led to that.
    You do have a legit point that in practice it appears that the M1 has turned out to be expensive to operate, but that's a far cry from it being a case of the US MIC "raping the taxpayer".

    1-800-come-on-now
    Ah, a clear sign that you indeed don't know what you're talking about, thanks for playing.
    for reference, the 1.5 trillion is a lifecycle cost for the entire fucking fleet. Not a sunk cost. And that's a really shitty way to dodge the point, which was that early LRIP costs are not indicative of full scale production.
    All the congressional testimony you've posted says otherwise, the design to cost was largely successful and the tank was delivered on time and mostly on budget, a great achievement for any development program, let alone one run by the US Army.
    It was absolutely the successor program to the failed MBT-70, what are you on to?
    So the US Army disagrees with you on the cost issue, and by all accounts the Abrams program has been a resounding success. You don't scale up a 3300 tank buy to 7000 if the cost balloons out of control, and sufficient evidence has been posted in this thread (ironically, by you) to disprove that notion.
    Inflation is a hell of a drug, and the extras in the TTS don't help.
     
    But anyway, TL;DR there's plenty of evidence that the Design-To-Cost of the M1 Abrams was by and large successful, and that it was successfully limited to a unit hardware cost significantly below that of the MBT-70, thus backing up the claim that started this whole discussion, ie that the Abrams was a budget tank born from the failure of the MBT-70 project.
    Not really no. What is however ironic is that you're calling out Ram despite you being the one who's incredibly wrong about this. The F-35 cost issue is prime bait and you took it like a champ. Thanks for playing.
  4. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from Xlucine in United States Military Vehicle General: Guns, G*vins, and Gas Turbines   
    It has to do with the Abrams development mostly evolving from a cut down MBT-70. Ending up more expensive than the M-60 is mostly irrelevant because by that time the M60 was entirely obsolete, and therefore could not fill the role required, nor could any vehicle of equivalent cost. For the defined role, the Abrams as designed was a very austere design with few exceptions, and if you think for some reason that the Abrams wasn't designed under some pretty strict cost limits you are sorely mistaken and are more than invited to re-read Hunnicutt.
    Also penny pinching in general is a figure of speech for cost cutting, not only the cost cutting associated with small low value details. But choosing a 1-axis gunner's sight stab over 2-axis because it's $3000 cheaper is indeed penny pinching when it comes to a tank.
    Not than the MBT-70, to which the comparison must be made.
    Yes, also killed were the FCS, GCV, and some other programs which were supposed to replace the Abrams with an autoloaded vehicle. The fact that these projects all got cut and ate up most of the budget, leaving fuckall for Abrams upgrades, is a separate issue.
    Also talking facts here, bucko. Compare the estimated price of the MBT-70, M60A1 and M60A3 to that of the Abrams in then year dollars.
    Had you bothered to open a copy of Hunnicutt, you'd see that he provides the following numbers in equivalent 1972 dollars:
    $422k final Chrysler proposal
    $507k RFP design goal
     
    $526k XM-1 1978 estimate (including GFE) (from here)
    $339k M60A1
    $432k M60A3
    $611k XM803 (MBT-70)
     
    So yeah, Definitely a budget conscious development.
    (now if you're going "wait those numbers can't be right how come it's so much cheaper than the design goal", the answer is "competition". Chrysler's bid was $196M to GM's $232M).
  5. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from Lord_James in United States Military Vehicle General: Guns, G*vins, and Gas Turbines   
    I did read the document, and your conclusions from it are so off-base that I'm not sure you read it.
    Consider, for example, the closing remarks, on page III of the document (page 6 of the PDF):

    "small real cost growth" is not at all the situation you describe.

    A growth of 19%, mostly because extra features were added in? say it ain't so!


    And again, 19% growth for features, mainly the strengthened powertrain, is literal taxpayer rape. wew.
    Also, the 507k is hardware costs for a single vehicle. Doubling the order for what is pretty much the same hardware cost per unit does not mean that the hardware cost per unit has doubled, and indeed the paper only talks about an estimated price increase if 19%. I really don't know how you could even reach that interpretation.
    You know, that's a fascinating source, but once again your source does not say what you claim it does.
    To wit, the Army's response to that claim:

    Page 89 of the very PDF you posted. If you're gonna cherry pick quotes from sources, at least bother to read your entire source. Cause it firmly disagrees with the conclusion you are trying to draw from it.

    Fun for the whole family!
    And a bit more, just to get the point across:


    Oh no muh poor taxpayer getting ripped off for squillions of dollars oh no
    It's almost as if getting sent to an active war zone in the sandbox leads to greater wear and therefore need for spare parts, as well as high fuel consumption, while the M60A3s are left at home or in Europe, who'd a-thunk it?
    The cost of the M1 exceeding the M1A1 is interesting, wonder what led to that.
    You do have a legit point that in practice it appears that the M1 has turned out to be expensive to operate, but that's a far cry from it being a case of the US MIC "raping the taxpayer".

    1-800-come-on-now
    Ah, a clear sign that you indeed don't know what you're talking about, thanks for playing.
    for reference, the 1.5 trillion is a lifecycle cost for the entire fucking fleet. Not a sunk cost. And that's a really shitty way to dodge the point, which was that early LRIP costs are not indicative of full scale production.
    All the congressional testimony you've posted says otherwise, the design to cost was largely successful and the tank was delivered on time and mostly on budget, a great achievement for any development program, let alone one run by the US Army.
    It was absolutely the successor program to the failed MBT-70, what are you on to?
    So the US Army disagrees with you on the cost issue, and by all accounts the Abrams program has been a resounding success. You don't scale up a 3300 tank buy to 7000 if the cost balloons out of control, and sufficient evidence has been posted in this thread (ironically, by you) to disprove that notion.
    Inflation is a hell of a drug, and the extras in the TTS don't help.
     
    But anyway, TL;DR there's plenty of evidence that the Design-To-Cost of the M1 Abrams was by and large successful, and that it was successfully limited to a unit hardware cost significantly below that of the MBT-70, thus backing up the claim that started this whole discussion, ie that the Abrams was a budget tank born from the failure of the MBT-70 project.
    Not really no. What is however ironic is that you're calling out Ram despite you being the one who's incredibly wrong about this. The F-35 cost issue is prime bait and you took it like a champ. Thanks for playing.
  6. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from LostCosmonaut in United States Military Vehicle General: Guns, G*vins, and Gas Turbines   
    I did read the document, and your conclusions from it are so off-base that I'm not sure you read it.
    Consider, for example, the closing remarks, on page III of the document (page 6 of the PDF):

    "small real cost growth" is not at all the situation you describe.

    A growth of 19%, mostly because extra features were added in? say it ain't so!


    And again, 19% growth for features, mainly the strengthened powertrain, is literal taxpayer rape. wew.
    Also, the 507k is hardware costs for a single vehicle. Doubling the order for what is pretty much the same hardware cost per unit does not mean that the hardware cost per unit has doubled, and indeed the paper only talks about an estimated price increase if 19%. I really don't know how you could even reach that interpretation.
    You know, that's a fascinating source, but once again your source does not say what you claim it does.
    To wit, the Army's response to that claim:

    Page 89 of the very PDF you posted. If you're gonna cherry pick quotes from sources, at least bother to read your entire source. Cause it firmly disagrees with the conclusion you are trying to draw from it.

    Fun for the whole family!
    And a bit more, just to get the point across:


    Oh no muh poor taxpayer getting ripped off for squillions of dollars oh no
    It's almost as if getting sent to an active war zone in the sandbox leads to greater wear and therefore need for spare parts, as well as high fuel consumption, while the M60A3s are left at home or in Europe, who'd a-thunk it?
    The cost of the M1 exceeding the M1A1 is interesting, wonder what led to that.
    You do have a legit point that in practice it appears that the M1 has turned out to be expensive to operate, but that's a far cry from it being a case of the US MIC "raping the taxpayer".

    1-800-come-on-now
    Ah, a clear sign that you indeed don't know what you're talking about, thanks for playing.
    for reference, the 1.5 trillion is a lifecycle cost for the entire fucking fleet. Not a sunk cost. And that's a really shitty way to dodge the point, which was that early LRIP costs are not indicative of full scale production.
    All the congressional testimony you've posted says otherwise, the design to cost was largely successful and the tank was delivered on time and mostly on budget, a great achievement for any development program, let alone one run by the US Army.
    It was absolutely the successor program to the failed MBT-70, what are you on to?
    So the US Army disagrees with you on the cost issue, and by all accounts the Abrams program has been a resounding success. You don't scale up a 3300 tank buy to 7000 if the cost balloons out of control, and sufficient evidence has been posted in this thread (ironically, by you) to disprove that notion.
    Inflation is a hell of a drug, and the extras in the TTS don't help.
     
    But anyway, TL;DR there's plenty of evidence that the Design-To-Cost of the M1 Abrams was by and large successful, and that it was successfully limited to a unit hardware cost significantly below that of the MBT-70, thus backing up the claim that started this whole discussion, ie that the Abrams was a budget tank born from the failure of the MBT-70 project.
    Not really no. What is however ironic is that you're calling out Ram despite you being the one who's incredibly wrong about this. The F-35 cost issue is prime bait and you took it like a champ. Thanks for playing.
  7. Tank You
    N-L-M reacted to Militarysta in ATGMs and RPGs for infantry - a thread for rebels around the world to choose their ATGM supplier.   
    My article in english version Frag Out! Magazine:
    https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1150145-frag-out-magazine-25/69?
     
    This time about Panzerfaust 3 and RGW90 familiy. For user here may be interesting part about PzF-3T/IT test in Poland vs ERA.
     
     
  8. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from Pascal in United States Military Vehicle General: Guns, G*vins, and Gas Turbines   
    And yet the RFP it was designed to meet was a cut down MBT-70 spec, and the design incorporated a lot of lessons learned from the MBT-70. The main difference was a flexible spec with Design-To-Cost as part of the RFP, allowing the active trading of performance requirements for cost reduction. Because the Army was really not happy with the cost of the MBT-70 and was out of both time and budget.
     
    Yes. For  LRIP. In 1983 dollars. The very paper you quote mentions that inflation in that interval is nearly 300%, (239% according to this), which is the most significant chunk of that, and LRIP lots are always more expensive than mass production lots- for reference, the LRIP lot 1 F-35A was approx $200M a pop, and LRIP lot 11 is down to $89M per.

    So yeah, LRIP costs are not entirely indicative of mass production costs, which is what 3000 units most definitely is.
    Also you should be comparing apples to apples, that is hardware costs. Comparing hardware costs of the M60 to total costs of the M1 is disingenuous, as the M60 also needs those extras you are not factoring in.
    Same source, page 3217:

    Your own sources disagree with your opinion, the Abrams is not "the MIC raping the taxpayer".
    Another interesting snippet from page 1882:

    Seems like the Abrams is actually really close to the M60A3 in costs despite being a much better platform. If that's a sign of "raping the taxpayer", what would you consider a reasonable price to be, for that performance?

    And again, page 1910.
    This source you posted does not in any way support your claim that the M1 project ended up, and I quote, " producing a tank that costs 6 times the price of the M60 in its mission capable form ". Much the opposite, in fact.
    The M1 was extremely cheap compared to the M60 for what it was, and was the result of an extremely cost-conscious development, having learned the lesson of the failed MBT-70.
  9. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from Pascal in United States Military Vehicle General: Guns, G*vins, and Gas Turbines   
    I did read the document, and your conclusions from it are so off-base that I'm not sure you read it.
    Consider, for example, the closing remarks, on page III of the document (page 6 of the PDF):

    "small real cost growth" is not at all the situation you describe.

    A growth of 19%, mostly because extra features were added in? say it ain't so!


    And again, 19% growth for features, mainly the strengthened powertrain, is literal taxpayer rape. wew.
    Also, the 507k is hardware costs for a single vehicle. Doubling the order for what is pretty much the same hardware cost per unit does not mean that the hardware cost per unit has doubled, and indeed the paper only talks about an estimated price increase if 19%. I really don't know how you could even reach that interpretation.
    You know, that's a fascinating source, but once again your source does not say what you claim it does.
    To wit, the Army's response to that claim:

    Page 89 of the very PDF you posted. If you're gonna cherry pick quotes from sources, at least bother to read your entire source. Cause it firmly disagrees with the conclusion you are trying to draw from it.

    Fun for the whole family!
    And a bit more, just to get the point across:


    Oh no muh poor taxpayer getting ripped off for squillions of dollars oh no
    It's almost as if getting sent to an active war zone in the sandbox leads to greater wear and therefore need for spare parts, as well as high fuel consumption, while the M60A3s are left at home or in Europe, who'd a-thunk it?
    The cost of the M1 exceeding the M1A1 is interesting, wonder what led to that.
    You do have a legit point that in practice it appears that the M1 has turned out to be expensive to operate, but that's a far cry from it being a case of the US MIC "raping the taxpayer".

    1-800-come-on-now
    Ah, a clear sign that you indeed don't know what you're talking about, thanks for playing.
    for reference, the 1.5 trillion is a lifecycle cost for the entire fucking fleet. Not a sunk cost. And that's a really shitty way to dodge the point, which was that early LRIP costs are not indicative of full scale production.
    All the congressional testimony you've posted says otherwise, the design to cost was largely successful and the tank was delivered on time and mostly on budget, a great achievement for any development program, let alone one run by the US Army.
    It was absolutely the successor program to the failed MBT-70, what are you on to?
    So the US Army disagrees with you on the cost issue, and by all accounts the Abrams program has been a resounding success. You don't scale up a 3300 tank buy to 7000 if the cost balloons out of control, and sufficient evidence has been posted in this thread (ironically, by you) to disprove that notion.
    Inflation is a hell of a drug, and the extras in the TTS don't help.
     
    But anyway, TL;DR there's plenty of evidence that the Design-To-Cost of the M1 Abrams was by and large successful, and that it was successfully limited to a unit hardware cost significantly below that of the MBT-70, thus backing up the claim that started this whole discussion, ie that the Abrams was a budget tank born from the failure of the MBT-70 project.
    Not really no. What is however ironic is that you're calling out Ram despite you being the one who's incredibly wrong about this. The F-35 cost issue is prime bait and you took it like a champ. Thanks for playing.
  10. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from Clan_Ghost_Bear in United States Military Vehicle General: Guns, G*vins, and Gas Turbines   
    I did read the document, and your conclusions from it are so off-base that I'm not sure you read it.
    Consider, for example, the closing remarks, on page III of the document (page 6 of the PDF):

    "small real cost growth" is not at all the situation you describe.

    A growth of 19%, mostly because extra features were added in? say it ain't so!


    And again, 19% growth for features, mainly the strengthened powertrain, is literal taxpayer rape. wew.
    Also, the 507k is hardware costs for a single vehicle. Doubling the order for what is pretty much the same hardware cost per unit does not mean that the hardware cost per unit has doubled, and indeed the paper only talks about an estimated price increase if 19%. I really don't know how you could even reach that interpretation.
    You know, that's a fascinating source, but once again your source does not say what you claim it does.
    To wit, the Army's response to that claim:

    Page 89 of the very PDF you posted. If you're gonna cherry pick quotes from sources, at least bother to read your entire source. Cause it firmly disagrees with the conclusion you are trying to draw from it.

    Fun for the whole family!
    And a bit more, just to get the point across:


    Oh no muh poor taxpayer getting ripped off for squillions of dollars oh no
    It's almost as if getting sent to an active war zone in the sandbox leads to greater wear and therefore need for spare parts, as well as high fuel consumption, while the M60A3s are left at home or in Europe, who'd a-thunk it?
    The cost of the M1 exceeding the M1A1 is interesting, wonder what led to that.
    You do have a legit point that in practice it appears that the M1 has turned out to be expensive to operate, but that's a far cry from it being a case of the US MIC "raping the taxpayer".

    1-800-come-on-now
    Ah, a clear sign that you indeed don't know what you're talking about, thanks for playing.
    for reference, the 1.5 trillion is a lifecycle cost for the entire fucking fleet. Not a sunk cost. And that's a really shitty way to dodge the point, which was that early LRIP costs are not indicative of full scale production.
    All the congressional testimony you've posted says otherwise, the design to cost was largely successful and the tank was delivered on time and mostly on budget, a great achievement for any development program, let alone one run by the US Army.
    It was absolutely the successor program to the failed MBT-70, what are you on to?
    So the US Army disagrees with you on the cost issue, and by all accounts the Abrams program has been a resounding success. You don't scale up a 3300 tank buy to 7000 if the cost balloons out of control, and sufficient evidence has been posted in this thread (ironically, by you) to disprove that notion.
    Inflation is a hell of a drug, and the extras in the TTS don't help.
     
    But anyway, TL;DR there's plenty of evidence that the Design-To-Cost of the M1 Abrams was by and large successful, and that it was successfully limited to a unit hardware cost significantly below that of the MBT-70, thus backing up the claim that started this whole discussion, ie that the Abrams was a budget tank born from the failure of the MBT-70 project.
    Not really no. What is however ironic is that you're calling out Ram despite you being the one who's incredibly wrong about this. The F-35 cost issue is prime bait and you took it like a champ. Thanks for playing.
  11. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from Lord_James in French flair   
    For those keeping track at home, the D9 for example has a lot of rollers (good MMP), deep grousers for excellent traction in soft soil, and oil coolers for the torque converter. Unlike armored vehicles in which the torque converter is intended to lock up quickly and therefore not get very hot, the torque converter in the D9 is designed to work in slippage at all times. This results in a lot of power being turned into heat in the oil, which then needs to be cooled to prevent the seals from dying. You could run a tank in 1st gear and 100% slip on the torque converter and get pretty good tractive effort, but not for any length of time. The D9 is a very well designed tool.
  12. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from Serge in French flair   
    For those keeping track at home, the D9 for example has a lot of rollers (good MMP), deep grousers for excellent traction in soft soil, and oil coolers for the torque converter. Unlike armored vehicles in which the torque converter is intended to lock up quickly and therefore not get very hot, the torque converter in the D9 is designed to work in slippage at all times. This results in a lot of power being turned into heat in the oil, which then needs to be cooled to prevent the seals from dying. You could run a tank in 1st gear and 100% slip on the torque converter and get pretty good tractive effort, but not for any length of time. The D9 is a very well designed tool.
  13. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from Lord_James in United States Military Vehicle General: Guns, G*vins, and Gas Turbines   
    It has to do with the Abrams development mostly evolving from a cut down MBT-70. Ending up more expensive than the M-60 is mostly irrelevant because by that time the M60 was entirely obsolete, and therefore could not fill the role required, nor could any vehicle of equivalent cost. For the defined role, the Abrams as designed was a very austere design with few exceptions, and if you think for some reason that the Abrams wasn't designed under some pretty strict cost limits you are sorely mistaken and are more than invited to re-read Hunnicutt.
    Also penny pinching in general is a figure of speech for cost cutting, not only the cost cutting associated with small low value details. But choosing a 1-axis gunner's sight stab over 2-axis because it's $3000 cheaper is indeed penny pinching when it comes to a tank.
    Not than the MBT-70, to which the comparison must be made.
    Yes, also killed were the FCS, GCV, and some other programs which were supposed to replace the Abrams with an autoloaded vehicle. The fact that these projects all got cut and ate up most of the budget, leaving fuckall for Abrams upgrades, is a separate issue.
    Also talking facts here, bucko. Compare the estimated price of the MBT-70, M60A1 and M60A3 to that of the Abrams in then year dollars.
    Had you bothered to open a copy of Hunnicutt, you'd see that he provides the following numbers in equivalent 1972 dollars:
    $422k final Chrysler proposal
    $507k RFP design goal
     
    $526k XM-1 1978 estimate (including GFE) (from here)
    $339k M60A1
    $432k M60A3
    $611k XM803 (MBT-70)
     
    So yeah, Definitely a budget conscious development.
    (now if you're going "wait those numbers can't be right how come it's so much cheaper than the design goal", the answer is "competition". Chrysler's bid was $196M to GM's $232M).
  14. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from Lord_James in United States Military Vehicle General: Guns, G*vins, and Gas Turbines   
    So, seeing as some people need a refresher:
    You really should read Hunnicutt's Abrams book, but the 10 minute version of the story is as follows:
    MBT-70 was going to be the best tank that anyone had ever made. Ever. It was going to have all the bells, a double serving of whistles, and bully the hell out of any Soviet tank in every respect. At least, that was the idea. The MBT-70 proved to be a very problematic beast and got stuck in development hell for the better part of a decade, and by the time it was cancelled there was very little time and even less budget to get a working tank into service, and Congress was not happy with funding another ambitious development project. The Abrams was therefore most definitely a budget option compared to the state of the art at the time, though it was designed with some inherent growth features built in for later upgrades (notably, the CITV on the M1A2 was planned for pretty much from the get-go).
    The US was fully willing to have an autoloader in their fancy tank, and by all accounts the autoloader on the MBT-70 worked just fine; but it was not easily adaptable to the Abrams, and there was no time or budget to mature a new one- the Abrams was almost criminally late to the field as it was! All Abrams variants prior to the M1A2 are in one way or another budget versions, and only in the A2 did the US Army really get all the features they initially wanted (plus a bunch more that had cropped up and matured in the mean time).
    The US has designed several vehicles with autoloaders and even type-classified quite a few, with the Stryker MGS actually seeing service. Other than memes which as far as I can tell derive from wikipedia- tier sour grapes, there's no actual evidence that the US Army does not like the idea of autoloaders, much the opposite.
  15. Tank You
    N-L-M reacted to skylancer-3441 in United States Military Vehicle General: Guns, G*vins, and Gas Turbines   
    article on CATTB from IDR 1990-12

     
    and also clippings
    from IDR 1989-12 on MTAS
     
    and from IDR 1990-05 on 140mm gun 

    and render of CATTB from US Army's Weapon Systems Handbook of 1992:

     
    and pic from Soldat und Technik 1992-01:

     
    and pic of testbed w/XM291 gun - also from SuT 1992-01:

  16. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from Clan_Ghost_Bear in United States Military Vehicle General: Guns, G*vins, and Gas Turbines   
    So, seeing as some people need a refresher:
    You really should read Hunnicutt's Abrams book, but the 10 minute version of the story is as follows:
    MBT-70 was going to be the best tank that anyone had ever made. Ever. It was going to have all the bells, a double serving of whistles, and bully the hell out of any Soviet tank in every respect. At least, that was the idea. The MBT-70 proved to be a very problematic beast and got stuck in development hell for the better part of a decade, and by the time it was cancelled there was very little time and even less budget to get a working tank into service, and Congress was not happy with funding another ambitious development project. The Abrams was therefore most definitely a budget option compared to the state of the art at the time, though it was designed with some inherent growth features built in for later upgrades (notably, the CITV on the M1A2 was planned for pretty much from the get-go).
    The US was fully willing to have an autoloader in their fancy tank, and by all accounts the autoloader on the MBT-70 worked just fine; but it was not easily adaptable to the Abrams, and there was no time or budget to mature a new one- the Abrams was almost criminally late to the field as it was! All Abrams variants prior to the M1A2 are in one way or another budget versions, and only in the A2 did the US Army really get all the features they initially wanted (plus a bunch more that had cropped up and matured in the mean time).
    The US has designed several vehicles with autoloaders and even type-classified quite a few, with the Stryker MGS actually seeing service. Other than memes which as far as I can tell derive from wikipedia- tier sour grapes, there's no actual evidence that the US Army does not like the idea of autoloaders, much the opposite.
  17. Metal
    N-L-M reacted to Beer in Czechoslovak interwar bits   
    A bit about the God of War. With Czechoslovak artillery it was exactly opposite than with the airforce. The artillery was very strong and had many very potent weapons, nearly all of them were local design and production. The guns were also widely exported. The field army had some 80 artillery regiments with over 2200 pieces (not counting any fortification guns or auxilliary units). As with most of other weapons large part of them (plus huge ammo stocks - and actually also hundreds of thousands Sudeten Deutsche soldaten) sadly presented a massive gift for the Wehrmacht. A bitter aftermath of Münich. 
     
    10 cm Light howitzer vz.14/19 (towed by horses). Very well known weapon used by nearly everyone in the central Europe and during WW2 by Wehrmacht and Italy. In 1938 Czechoslovakia had around 600 pieces. Wehrmacht got 400+, Slovakia 180+. Together with Polish and Austrian ones Wehrmacht later had around 1000 pieces. 

     
    10 cm light howitzer vz.30 (for motorized units and so called fast divisions). Very modern weapon for its time based on export Yugoslav model but widely modified for domestic use (not always in the better way due to various compromises such as necessity to allow use of older ammo for vz.14/19). 160+ guns were available in 1938. It was later successfully used by Wehrmacht and Slovakia. The only preserved piece is in USA.  

     
    10 cm light howitzer vz.38 (for mechanized units). This modern weapon was never fielded despite it was addopted but too late - the complete order (260 pieces) was canceled after Münich. As with the previous gun it was again based on successful export models F and H (Yugoslavia, Romania, Iran, Latvia, Afghanistan). Germany took 84 guns made for Latvia and sold 57 to Romania and 27 to Finland. Those 27 Finnish guns officially fired 75 thousand rounds during the war and served successfully till 1970'. The prototype of the Czechoslovak version (H3) is on display in Lešany museum near Prague together with one Finnish piece (a place sure worth visiting). 

     
    15 cm heavy howitzer vz.15 (usually towed by heavy tractors). This gun was already rather obsolete by 1938 but 40+ pieces were still used. The guns were taken over by Wehrmacht and used on the western front and a half was later sold to Finland. It's on display in Lešany. 
     
     
    15 cm heavy howitzer vz.14/16 (for horse traction). Well known weapon of the WW1. Czechoslovakia used some 180 pieces built after WW1 and they were used till Münich. Hundreds of these guns were used by Italy, others by Austria, Romania, Greece etc. Wehrmacht took around 100 pieces and used most of them in Austrian units which were used to the same weapon. The gun is preserved in Lešany. 

     
    15 cm heavy howitzer vz.25 (for horse traction). Czechoslovak army had 340 pieces of this rather light and potent weapon (still pretty good by late 30'). Werhmacht and Slovakia successfully used them till the end of war. You can see this gun in Lešany as well. 

     
    155 mm heavy howitzer vz.15/17. This well known French gun was a stop-gap solution in 1919 when the army badly needed whatever it could get to fight the so-called Hungarian Soviet Republic (which was defeated by Romanian and Czechoslovak forces and ceased to exist the same year). Czechoslovakia had 50 pieces but all of them were retired by 1937. Maybe Wehrmacht got them from some storage but there is no record about that. Anyway it used plenty of these guns from French and Polish stocks. 

     
    15 cm heavy howitzer vz.37. This weapon was arguably the best of its class by late 30' but as with many other weapons of Czechoslovak production it was largely exported (series K) but not used by the Czechoslovak army itself. When the army decided to addopt this weapon used already by Turkey, Romania or Yugoslavia it was hesitating that long about its modifications (for example whether it prefers a variant for motorized or horse traction) that the first guns were delivered only after Münich. Wehrmacht took a whole batch of 110+ pieces and used them till the end of war. Some sources say that Germany originally signed an order for another production but a lobby from German companies led to its cancelation. The Czechoslovak variant of the gun is on display in Lešany museum.  

     
    10 cm mountain howitzer vz.16/19. This weapon was successfully used during the WW1 and extensively modernized by Czechoslovakia in 1920'. It was being transported disassembled into three pieces and with the overall weight 1350 kg it could fire to nearly 10 km distance (the modernized version). It was widely used by Italy, Austria (later Wehrmacht) and in small numbers also by Slovakia and Greece. Czechoslovakia had 66 pieces of which 44 were modernized and dislocated mostly in the mountains of Slovakia. This gun is on display in Lešany. 

     
    That's it for howitzers. I have omitted many prorotypes, some of which are on display in Lešany as well. Let's continue later with field guns. 
  18. Metal
    N-L-M reacted to Beer in Czechoslovak interwar bits   
    Let's move from the fortification system to the something a lot less bright... the airforce. The airforce was quite clearly the weakest point of the Czechoslovak army mostly due to the too conservative approach of the MOD. Nevertheless some interesting designs saw the daylight. Here are couple of those not very well known... 
     
    Aero A-102. This plane was originally a bi-plane similar to Polikarpov i-15 (top wings connected directly with the fuselage) and one of the competitors to the Avia B-34. It was never built and lost the bid already in paper phase. Nevertheless Aero redesigned the plane to a braced low-wing. It was year 1934 and the MOD was rather conservative and refused such design. A new itteration came in summer 1934 with a shoulder wing configuration similar to Polish PZL P.11 but more aerodynamically clean, better armed and with much stronger engine. Despite the plane had weaker engine than Avia B-534, it was much faster simply because it was no bi-plane. The top speed with locally produced 800 Hp Gnome Rhone Mistral Major 14 Kfs engine was 430 km/h (B-534 had locally produced 860 Hp Hispano Suiza 12Ybrs but the license owner Avia, part of Škoda company, was doing everything it could to prevent other companies to use it). The armament was made of four 7,92 mm MGs vz.30 in the wings and optionally with light bombs. The plane actually flew and went through extensive testing and showed very good haracteristics However in the end it was rejected due to too high landing speed because it had no flaps (140 km/h). That was a real pity because otherwise it was clearly superior design to bi-plane Avia B-534. 
     

     
    Avia B-35. OK, not that unknown but neverthless interesting. Czechoslovakia found late that the speed will be crucial in the future air battles. It tried to obtain Hurricanes from GB but the negotiations were not successful. The prototyp of the modern B-35 first flew on 28th September 1938 which is basically all you need to know about the future fate of it. Aside of that the plane was up to date. It had an eliptic wing made of wooden structure with an "armoured plywood" panels (plywood with 0,2 mm aluminium layer). The fuselage was made of steel tubes covered by magnesium-aluminium alloy panels. The engine was supposed to be 1000 Hp Hispano Suiza 12Y-1000C, three-blade adjustable propeller, retractable gear and flaps. The armament was made of one 20 mm Hispano 404 canon and two 7,92 mm MGs vz.30. The theoretical top speed was around 570 km/h. However the first prototype had fixed gear, two-blade wooden propeler and 860 Hp 12Ydrs engine. Despite it had the same engine as the B-534 and not yet the retractable gear it was roughly 100 km/h faster than the B-534 (485 km/h was achieved already in the very first flights). After the occupation the development went pretty slow and in the end 12 B-135 planes were delivered to Bulgaria in 1942 when they were already obsolete. B-135 had the retractable gear but it still had the old 860 Hp engine and the wooden two blade propeler (it achieved 550 km/h with it), moreover the canon was never installed in them. Despite that there are records that on 30th March 1944 one B-135 shot down a Liberator during an atack on Ploesti. 

     
    Aero A-300. The funy thing about Czechoslovak air force is that in the fall of 1938 it was about to go in the war with Germany with its fastest planes being bombers. The airforce had roughly 60 fast Soviet Tupolev SB-2 bombers eqiped with Czech-made Hispano engines) and a licence production was just starting in the Avia factory with a name Avia B-71. Except that the rest of the bomber air force isn't worth talking about as it was hopelessly obsolete. The MOD knew that and tried to obtain a locally produced modern plane heavier than the Tupolev. The Aero A-300 first flew in spring 1938 but the testing was not finished until after Münich when it was officially adopted without the production ever started. It was a very fast (450-460 km/h) low-wing twin engine bomber with a capacity of up to 1000 kg of bombs. The crew of four had three 7,92 mm MGs (retractable dorsal,  and belly posts plus one in the glass front). The engines were 830 Hp Bristol Mercury IX with De Havilland-Hamilton adjustable three-blade propellers. The fuselage was made of steel tubes with aluminium and textile cover. The wings were wooden and the plane had retractable gear and flaps. 
     
     
     
    Letov Š-50. A recon and light bomber plane (with tasks similar to FW-189). Due to some issues in the development it first flew only in September 1938 and shortly after that the development was stopped. The plane had again tubular fuselage structure with aluminium cover but this time even thew wings were of steel tubular design. The engines were 420 Hp Avia Rk-17 equipped with two blade adjustable Hamilton propellers. The gear was fixed. The crew of three had three 7,92 mm vz.30 MGs (one in the Armstrong Withworth turret, one in the belly firing post and one forward firing in the wing). The plane could carry various photocameras, radio station and up to 600 kg of bombs. 

     
    Aero A-304. This plane was originally a passenger plane ordered by Czechoslovak Airlines but they didn't want to wait and bought Airspeed Envoy isntead. The airforce liked the plane and let it be modified to a recon/light bomber plane. Nineteen were ordered and few of them were probably delivered before Münich (only one confirmed). Luftwaffe used them later as training planes. The fuselage was made of steel tubes covered by plywood and textile. The wings were wooden with plywood cover. The engines 430 Hp Walter Super Castor worked with wooden two blade propellers and the plane could reach 325 km/h with them. The gear was retractable. The crew had three 7,92 mm vz.30 MGs (one in the dorsal turret, one in the belly and one in the frontal post). It could carry 300 kg of bombs. 

     
    One curiosity at the end. Have you known that interwar Czechoslovakia was using special fuel to decrease the dependence on oil import? It used a fuel called Bi-Bo-Li which had two variants - aviation and vehicle one. The aviation one was made of 44% ethanol, 44% benzene and 12% of kerossene. The vehicle one was made of 50% ethanol, 30% benzene and 20% petrol. The Czechoslovak army and the airforce collected rather large fuel and ammo supplies, in fact reasonably larger than Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe had in late 1938 (not in overall volume but in the time it could use them). 
  19. Tank You
    N-L-M reacted to SH_MM in The Leopard 2 Thread   
    Regarding weight reduction:


  20. Funny
    N-L-M reacted to Beer in Escapist art. Picture of things that don't exist, comrades.   
    Some weird thing I created 13 years a go when I was a student and had the time...

     
  21. Funny
  22. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from OnlySlightlyCrazy in Practicality of using ABM against fighters   
    Ok I see it's a two-for-the-price-of-one deal. Have fun on the Carl Sagan forums.
    Another protip for the masses: If your only defenses are "I haven't been banned for it yet" and "it's not illegal", perhaps you should keep that to yourself.
  23. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from Toxn in Competition Suggestions   
    The current direction on discord seems to be a Lone Free State of Texas Rooikat-equivalent, with 1930-1940 tech.
  24. Metal
    N-L-M got a reaction from Sturgeon in Competition Suggestions   
    The current direction on discord seems to be a Lone Free State of Texas Rooikat-equivalent, with 1930-1940 tech.
  25. Tank You
    N-L-M got a reaction from Beer in Czechoslovak interwar bits   
    Canister, or shrapnel if it's a time fuzed shell which ejects the balls after a short flight.
    Also I really appreciate this thread!
     
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