totallyaverage

The M109A7 with the ERCA and Auto-loader is to be designated XM1299:

https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2019/armament/Musgrave.pdf

BAE's MPF
 
-uses the same new hull seen above, but not the M8 turret
-improved underbelly and ballistic protection
-comparable protection to a Bradley
-MTU engine
-same overall dimensions as the M8 so it can fit in a C-130
-19 tons to 26 tons
 
I suspect their MPF includes components of the CV90 MkIV.

Oh it tried to embed it when I phoneposted.

@SH_MM If I had to guess, maybe it's kind of like why Uranium alloys won out in the US for penetrators? Abundance and ease of manufacturing. Staballoys are easier to extrude and turn on a lathe than Tungsten alloys, they can also be drawn and cold rolled with less difficulty. WC and WHAs are often both sintered into a near-net shape because of the difficulty of machining them. Comparing between Oak Ridge's guide to machining depleted uranium and Midwest Tungsten Service's machining guide for their MT series heavy alloys, with a density of 17 g/cm3, the tungsten alloy requires a higher spindle speed, a slower feed rate and a slightly shallower depth of cut on roughing. In the worst case for both metals (slowest spindle speed, slowest feed rate, shallowest cut depth), you can turn tungsten at about half the rate of Uranium on a lathe.
 
1" Uranium bar Roughing: 573 RPM, 0.012"/rev feed, 0.050" cut depth = 1.080 in3/min metal removal rate
 
1" WHA bar Roughing: 764 RPM, 0.008"/rev feed, 0.030" cut depth = 0.576 in3/min metal removal
 
WHA lets you go significantly faster than uranium on finishing however, again comparing the worst case scenarios for both metals we get
 
1" Uranium bar Finishing: 1050.423 RPM, 0.002"/rev feed, 0.002" cut depth=0.013 in3/min metal removal
 
1" WHA bar Finishing: 954.930 RPM, 0.004"/rev feed, 0.010" cut depth=0.120 in3/min metal removal
 
This is why WHA penetrators are manufactured as close to the finished shape as possible while Uranium penetrators can afford to be further off from the complete shape.
 
Tungsten Carbide is an absolute bitch to machine too, requiring specialized inserts like Polycrystalline Cubic Boron Nitride and cutting rates during roughing that approach the finishing speeds of Uranium
 
There is also another difference between the two materials that's worth noting, how they interact with the actual cutting tool. Uranium is frequently compared to austenitic steel in Oak Ridge's literature, described as being susceptible to work hardening and built up edges. Tungsten on the other hand varies between class 4 alloys which behave like a highly abrasive version of grey iron with a risk of chip hammering, to the less dense class 1 and class 2 alloys whose behavior is closer to Uranium.

The author could have used some fact checking:
There are 35 LCS planned, not 38. Hull numbers don't always accurately reflect fleet sizes. It is possible that Congress forces more LCS with the next budget, but as of today there are 35 authorized. All LCS are already due to receive NSM regardless of mission package (save perhaps the test ships). Comparing the LCS to the Type 054A or Gorshkov is absurd; they are nothing close to the same in role. LCS is more accurately compared to the Type 056 or Gremyashchiy-classes in role, even if the specifics differ and LCS is much more expensive. He also failed to mention that mission package development has been horribly underfunded by Congress since 2015 as a reason for the recent delays. Other problems with this article:
Canceling the ASW and MCM packages is a bad idea. Aside from the USN needing more numerous and advanced ASW capabilities, the package is developing new equipment that will be fitted onto FFG(X) and stands a chance of being backfitted onto other classes in the fleet (similarly, all LCS are due to receive the SLQ-62 lightweight towed array regardless of package). Cancelling development would serve less than no purpose, it would completely work against modernizing the fleet and cost more money in the long run. Similar case with the MCM package: even if it were decided not  to use it aboard LCS, that kit can be transplanted onto a new platform (for example, the Expeditionary Mobile Base, medium-large unmanned surface vessels, or a new, dedicated hull) rather easily. The SUW package is probably the least valuable of the three, with its usefulness largely limited to the Middle East. Not useless, but not worth dedicating the fleet over. Personally I would fit the majority of LCS with the ASW package, with a small number (8-12) with the SUW package. Also fit all LCS with SEWIP Light if they have the margin. Fully develop the MCM kit and fit it to a class of self-deployable MCM ships. Hey presto, we have a fleet of small ships that much better align with our needs.

A point of note: DDG-127 will be a Flight IIA TI ship, and will commission before the Flight IIIs. This is due to some rather complicated scheduling reasons (TL;DR: once the USN has assigned a hull number, they can't simply change them around).
 
Also, unless there is an (entirely possible) major issue with Large Surface Combatant, ships after DDG-138 are unlikely to be authorized. And it doesn't look like AMDR-X is going to happen anymore. DDGs will likely at some point start receiving the Next Generation Surface Search Radar that will go on FFG(X).