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Sturgeon's House

The "General Purpose Cartridge" Debate


Sturgeon

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Holy fuck, look at that "lethal impact velocity range" graph. That has made my day

 

Whoever made that poster needs remedial English lessons, that's for sure. I tried for a while to determine what that could possibly mean, and came up with nothing.

Also, either their 6.5mm is hilariously powerful (and thus unsuited to a carbine) or their graphs are just flat out wrong. I can't think of how they could be getting those kinds of figures in... Anything. Even accounting for the nonsense labels.

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OK, I don't get the joke.

 

If the gun's caliber is between 5.5 and 7, then arbitrarily halve the velocity considered lethal. And voila, look at how long a range the round is lethal at compared to competitors!

 

Also I'm really really tired and didn't do 5.6 like I meant to.

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If the gun's caliber is between 5.5 and 7, then arbitrarily halve the velocity considered lethal. And voila, look at how long a range the round is lethal at compared to competitors!

 

Also I'm really really tired and didn't do 5.6 like I meant to.

 

I think I just didn't parse the structure. Is the equals sign supposed to be there?

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I have just figured out we are getting this all wrong.  The 6.8mm and others are part of a move for General Purpose bullets.  How many will we have to buy to make that market happy?  50-60 rifles at most, and probably no MGs..  By definition everyone at the rank of Colonel or lower will not get one of these weapons.  

 

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  • 1 year later...

I want to take some time to counter the worst parts of this article by Jim Schatz. I should note that although I think this article is a giant wreck, I still have a lot of respect for Jim. Anyway, on to the fisking:
 

 

 

Fast forward to July 13, 2008 during the Battle of Wanat in Afghanistan, Combat Outpost Kahler, manned by the troops of U.S. Army’s C Company, 2-503rd Infantry, 173rd Brigade Combat Team. In this horrific infantry battle nine U.S. troops were killed with another twenty seven injured in what arguably was a failure of U.S. small arms to keep up with Russian weapons designed decades earlier. Numerous M4 Carbines, M249 Squad Automatic Weapons and MK19 AGL’s stopped firing as they overheated in the 173rd’s valiant attempt to repel the superior numbers of determined insurgent fighters armed with AK-47s and RPGs. In the case of the M4 Carbine, the U.S. Army Material Command tests as early as 1990 revealed that the M4’s maximum safe sustained fire rate was 90 rounds per minute, and that under excessive sustained fire rates as described above, the barrel would overheat causing the weapon to fail. This shortcoming was documented again in 2001 in a U.S. Special Operations Command report on the M4. It was well known in 1990 that the AK-47’s sustained fire rate was 120 rounds per minute, 150 for the newer AKM model seen at Wanat. No one needs a calculator to see how badly this ends for the good guys.

 

The solution is clearly for the US Army to adopt a much larger caliber with a much higher propellant to bore area ratio, you see the much greater heat flux of an overbore 6.5mm Gerrperrscherr will re-heat-treat the barrels in combat, thus prolonging their lifespans.

His argument follows common sense, however, as the AK has a reputation for being durable and soldier-proof, and the AR-15 has a reputation for being fragile and easily pushed beyond its limits. In that framework, we don't really think about the numbers he's quoting, we just hear "the M4 failed at Wanat, and AKs handle heat better than AR-15s". Well, the problem is that this common sense is wrong, and the numbers he's quoting for sustained fire rate are neither valid, nor applicable to what happened at Wanat. I've talked before about how DI actually handles heat pretty well, and we've seen before what the failure point and mode for thin-barreled AK variants like the AKM is, so the idea that the AK even in the cooler-running 7.62x39 has a 67% higher heat limit in sustained fire is demonstrably false. In fact, the operating rod design of the AK is a detriment to its heat resistance in the thin-barreled AKM, as when the barrel droops under a thermal load, the piston cannot mate up with the gas cup and the gun stops functioning.

At Wanat, having the soldiers equipped with AKs instead of M4s would have made no difference, as well. The rifles that failed at Wanat were being pushed so far past their limits - past the limits of any individual weapon that exists today - that even if Jim's numbers were accurate, the AKs still would have failed. Performing desperate mag dump after desperate mag dump in an attempt to push an enemy out of a valley that your CO foolishly decided was a great spot for an outpost is not something any assault rifle is designed to do, because it's impossible with today's technology to make a lightweight individual weapon that can be pushed past that limit.
 

Since U.S. operations in Somalia during the “Battle of the Black Sea” operation in Mogadishu in 1993, also known in the media as “Black Hawk Down,” dozens of U.S. and NATO programs have been conducted to improve or replace the 5.56x45mm NATO cartridge first developed and fielded in the early 1960s for the AR-15, America’s first true assault rifle. Developed by industry to replace U.S. M1 and M2 Carbines carried by U.S. Air Force security policeman, the 5.56mm round was a modification of the commercial .222 Remington Magnum cartridge designed for use on small varmints out to 250 yards. The AR-15’s designer, the world renowned Eugene Stoner, created what would become the 5.56x45mm or .223 Remington round, selected primarily for its light recoil, to be used in the lightweight AR-15 and later M16 rifle platform. For that intended role it was a perfect choice.

Ugh. No. 5.56mm and the AR-15 were not developed in the early 1960s to replace the M1 and M2 Carbine, they were developed at the express request of CONARC in the late 1950s for a new lightweight SCHV infantry weapon. Also, the 5.56mm is not a modification of the .222 Remington Magnum, it's a modification of the .222 Remington, although the confusion there is understandable. Further, 5.56mm NATO only refers to the ammunition standardized by NATO in the 1980s, not the 5.56mm caliber as a whole. So M193 is not "5.56mm NATO". This is a bit pedantic, but it's yet another error in this paragraph.

Speaking of errors, Eugene Stoner didn't design the AR-15, he led the design team on the AR-10. Jim Sullivan and the oft-forgotten Robert Fremont designed the AR-15.
 

However decades later the original M193 Ball round and its 1980s replacement the green-tipped M855 “Penetrator” round, developed primarily for steel helmet penetration and intended for use in light machine guns, would be fully replaced in the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command after having failed repeatedly on the modern battlefield.

 

 

It was replaced by... Improved 5.56mm loads! Here's a secret: Sometimes bullets don't stop the bad guys. Yes, M855 has lethality problems, hence the new developments. Also, 7.62mm has lethality problems, too, hence new developments in that caliber as well.
 

One must ask, and many are, have our troops lost their ability to win and survive in a small arms encounter against a determined enemy armed with basically WWII-era technology?

 

 

What, you mean like Wanat? The battle you talked about above that the Coalition won? Or do you mean Kamdesh, which the US also won?

In fact, what battles has the US actually lost in Afghanistan and Iraq? While there have been a handful of cases where the US didn't achieve their goals, at no point so far as I know were US forces actually defeated in battle. A brief look into the subject only turns up a handful of examples of stalemates or indecisive results, and a whole heck of a lot of US victories.

So this question seems disingenuous and leading. It's purpose appears to be to get the reader to believe there is a crisis, and that the US is outgunned and unable to achieve victory when facing opponents armed with Soviet hardware, but this is far from true!

 

 

Are we being overmatched at ranges outside those of U.S. and NATO 5.56mm weapons by the enemy’s use and outright exploitation of SVD rifles and PKM and now PKP light machine guns firing the nearly 100 year old .30 caliber 7.62x54mm rimmed Russian cartridge?

 

Regardless of what the next ammunition configuration should look like, here's a clue: Entrenched, prepared enemies, especially ones at higher elevation, have a distinct advantage over mobile patrolling forces. That's why the US Army infantry platoon comes equipped with a weapons squad and a mortar team.
 

 

Few foes on the planet could hope to dominate America in an air, tank or naval battle yet every bad actor with an AK or PKM takes on American ground forces in a small arms fight because we are no longer appropriately armed and thus not respected in that battle space.

 

 

I find it interesting that Taliban harassing tactics are often framed this way. Far from taking on US forces in a straight fight, Mujahideen are heavily restricted in their tactics. They can only harass US forces at the very most extreme range of their automatic weapons because doing anything else is suicide. This is also why, when US forces close in, the Taliban retreat. There's nothing else they can do.

So does it make sense to completely re-imagine the current small arms suite over this? Maybe, but let's not get dramatic.
 

Have we allowed our rifles and ammunition capabilities to decay chasing after the 100% solution, the better idea, the so-called “leap-ahead” technology that never materializes?

 

 

"Decay" is an interesting word to use here, considering that he's talking about enemies using weapons that are just as old, if not older, than the weapons currently being used by NATO. I think his point is close to a very good one, though, one which was brought up by Edward Ezell in his book The Great Rifle Controversy, which was that the Army wastes a tremendous amount of money chasing the shiny, when they really should be making more incremental improvements and more consistently funding reserch. Two things should be noted, however: First, the Army is still much better at this than other militaries, like the French Army for example. Second, the Army has gotten a lot better at this in recent years, leading to real incremental improvements like the M4A1, M855A1, and the newest possibility of a lightweight cased ammunition design.

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Why are America’s top tier special operations units not using Army standard-issue handguns, carbines and grenade machine guns and instead fight with superior (in terms of safety, reliability, accuracy and service-life) cost comparable commercial alternatives?

 

 

I don't understand this. First, why even bother mentioning handguns? We could be issuing Walther PPKs for all they matter (not saying we should, but this is seriously splitting hairs). Second, what carbines? The handful of HK416s that SOCOM has in inventory, which are dwarfed by the number of Mk. 18s and M4s the Command has? The Mk. 17 CQC, which fills a role that doesn't really exist in the regular Army? And grenade machine guns... Does he mean the Mk. 47, which far from being a COTS development was designed at Crane?
 

Why do we simply not provide these combat proven superior SOF weapons to at least the approximately 140,000 front line combatants in our close combat units who are tasked with finding, fixing and finishing determined and ruthless opponents with small arms?

 

 

Of course he's talking about HK here. Jim Schatz will always be a company man. Later in the article, he talks about how we need a 6.5mm wunderkart, which makes me curious: What COTS military rifles even exist in a 6.5mm cartridge? I can't even think of an off-the-shelf military rifle in 6.5 Grendel, much less something like the .264 USA. 
 

Do conventional forces not deserve the same superior weapons with which to survive, win and return safely from the battlefield?

 

No, we're not going to buy the HK416 Jim, be quiet.
 

 

One need only read the books Misfire, The Black Rifle or more recently The Gun to understand the ups and downs of U.S. ordnance successes and failures.

 

 

The errors in the M16 and 5.56mm's development timeline in one of his earlier paragraphs really makes me wonder if Jim has actually read The Black Rifle. As for the other two, Hallahan's and Chivers' books are deeply flawed, at best. I wouldn't bother reading them.

 


This history is full of a “deeply engrained organizational resistance to change” and the endless but failed concept of “good enough.” Clinging to single-shot breech-loading rifles decades after reliable repeating rifles were available.

 

 

You ever tried to use an early lever action while lying prone in the mud, Jim? 
 

Entering the 20th century without the Maxim machine gun (first offered to the U.S. in 1888) only to have it used with devastating effect against U.S. troops in the First World War or waiting a full 27 years to field America’s first true assault rifle, two decades after the AK-47 was first fielded.

 

 

Um, what? The AK was first fielded in 1949, and that began slowly. The AR-15 was first fielded in 1961. So... Twelve years.

Yeah, in retrospect Ordnance's dismissal of the assault rifle concept was not the greatest decision ever, but they were far from the only people skeptical of the idea. One notes that almost every nation that eventually fielded an assault rifle also had a program for some kind of selfloader, in the event that this assault rifle thing didn't work out.
 

Sadly this is an incomplete list. Too often and especially in the last half century America has delayed serious and obtainable “evolutionary” improvements to small arms capabilities while investing heavily to the tune of billions of dollars in the seemingly endless search for the imaginary small arms Holy Grail.

 

 

Correct. Really, though, this is such a melodramatic way to say it.
 

The concept of the true assault rifle originated during WWII in the fertile creative minds of German developers engaged in a world war on many fronts and against opponents with limitless resources. 

 

 

No it didn't. It originated almost simultaneously in the fertile and creative minds of a bunch of different untermensch like Col. Fedorov once the Great War had carried on for about a year or two.
 

Always looking not to place their troops in a fair fight the German war machine of that era developed many revolutionary weapons like the general-purpose machine gun, the ballistic missile, even the atomic bomb was well within their reach; all German-born inventions that remain state-of-the-science in concept and practice still today.

 

Holy shit gag me with a stick. The A-Bomb is a German invention? What the fuck Jim.

 

Firing a cartridge in length and power between a submachine gun and full-caliber battle rifle, possessing a straight-line stock design, a detachable large-capacity magazine and controllable select-fire capability proved to be a winning combination of core attributes with which all other assault rifles share their lineage. The Russians were quick to closely copy the cartridge and weapon design and as a result developed the most widely made and distributed small arm in history with easily more than 90 million AK rifles and endless variants produced since 1949.

 

 

What's the purpose of this? Just to pump up Germany, or what? The article is supposed to be about the future of the assault rifle.

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The advent of the pivotal work of lead American designer Eugene Stoner in the development of the AR-15 employed new materials and design concepts to create an evolutionary step forward in rifle configuration and production materials. Produced from lightweight aluminum forgings and early polymer components, the AR-15 became the direct competitor to counter the AK-47 on the world stage in countless wars, regional armed conflicts and terrorist engagements. Gene Stoner, however, took a different approach on the most important component of an individual weapon that being the killing instrument, the projectile and the cartridge to launch it. We tend to focus too much attention on the weapon when in fact the projectile and cartridge contribute most to the overall effectiveness of the entire weapon’s system. Stoner went the way of a small-caliber high-velocity (SCHV) cartridge to save weight and reduce recoil in a handy relatively short-range weapon to meet the needs of USAF General LeMay. At its start, little consideration was given to the employment of the rifle beyond the needs of the air force security guards or beyond the engagement ranges for which it was intended, that being 300 yards. Thus the 5+ decade marriage of the AR-15/M16 platform and 5.56x45mm cartridge began with the first AR-15 fielding in Vietnam in January 1962 on little more than a handshake deal with a U.S. Air Force general. Hardly an inspiring first step.

 

 

Really, did he read TBR? He doesn't even get the Air Force's range requirement right, it was 500 yards, not 300.
 

The introduction of the short 14.5 inch barreled M4 carbine with collapsible stock, originally intended for commanders and special operators, is currently in full “pure-fleeting” in most U.S. Army combat and combat support units. It’s shorter barrel and collapsible stock makes the carbine easier to carry and transport but the loss of 5½ inches of barrel length over that of the M16 reduced the effective range with the unaltered M855 round and ultimately reduced the terminal effects to ranges well under 100 meters.

 

I have addressed this before:

 

The response to this is very nuanced and complex, and thus wholly unsuitable for the type of soundbyte-based debate that occurs on internet forums. While the fragmentation of small arms projectiles does change with the velocity at which they impact, use of the term "fragmentation threshold" can be misleading. If a projectile is fired at just below the fragmentation threshold, it performs much the same as if it is fired just above. The fragmentation threshold thus does not denote a drastic transition in performance of conventional jacketed small arms projectiles at a certain impact velocity. It is useful only in eyeballing how the projectile performs at different speeds, as at speeds below the threshold, no fragmentation occurs, while at speeds above it, fragmentation occurs in progressively more severe fashions. Only at very high velocities (typically over 2,900 ft/s, depending on jacket construction) does the familiar "confetti" fragmentation pattern occur. The reader should also keep in mind that fragmentation depends on many factors, the most important of which, besides impact velocity, is the construction of the bullet. Some materials fragment at very low velocities, while others may fragment only at velocities above that which is practical for nitrocellulose propellants. The figures used here are a "rule of thumb" for jacketed, lead-cored bullets, but even within that scope they can differ significantly from reality.

I am going to try to make this as brief as I can, but this section of my response is fairly technical and involved, as it covers a "worst case" scenario for velocity at range for the M4 Carbine in some detail. A military barrel is considered to be worn out if it experiences a velocity loss of 200 ft/s or more vs. a new barrel. The standard set in MIL-C-63989C defines the average velocity of M855 from the M16A2 to be 3,000 ft/s (+/-40) at 78 feet from the rifle, which equals an average muzzle velocity of 3,081 ft/s. From the 14.5" barrel of the M4 Carbine, we can expect no more than a 9.6% reduction in velocity,* for an average muzzle velocity of 2,811 ft/s. That gives us a muzzle velocity from our unserviceable barrel of 2,611 ft/s.

Now, we can plug this figure into a ballistic calculator and see if our commenter is right. I am using the above velocity (2,611 ft/s), a ballistic coefficient for M855 of .151, a zero range of 25m, a maximum range of 500m, a range increment of 1m, and a minimum fragmentation velocity of 2,140 ft/s.** The result is that the bullet reaches minimum fragmentation velocity at 154 meters. If a threshold of 2,300 ft/s is used (which I've seen quoted a few times), then it reaches that velocity at 101 meters. Only if a threshold of 2,500 ft/s is used does the fragmentation range drop below 50 m. This is not the minimum threshold of fragmentation, but the upper bound minimum velocity at which the jacket may split along the cannelure.

Keep in mind, an M4 that clocks velocities this low is considered unserviceable and should be removed from service and fitted for a new barrel. If a more reasonable velocity of 2,970 ft/s* is used, the M4 Carbine stays above the 2,140 ft/s until 260 m, and above 2,300 ft/s until 207 m. Even if a threshold of 2,500 ft/s is used, a muzzle velocity of 2,970 ft/s gives a fragmentation range for the M4 of 143 m.

*I don't think SADEF's figures are representative enough to be used outside of the scope of their experiment. The test was interesting, but I don't really think 9.6% velocity reduction is an accurate figure for the velocity loss going from 20" to 14.5" barrels (it results in approximately 50 ft/s lost per inch!). However, I'm using it here as a "worst case" example. Field Manual 3-22.9 provides a more reasonable muzzle velocity figure for the M4 of 2,970 ft/s, which is a loss of about 25 ft/s per inch from the M16's nominal muzzle velocity of 3,100 ft/s.

**I use a minimum fragmentation velocity of 2,140 ft/s, which is close to the lowest velocity at which fragments will come off of the bullet (usually shed from the lead core). The picture used as an example of this is of M193, but M855 performs basically the same way at comparable velocities, having the same jacket thickness.

Note: There are a lot of different figures thrown around for the muzzle velocity of the M4, both in this section of this post and elsewhere on the Internet. While it may be desirable to keep a nominal muzzle velocity figure for a given rifle and ammunition on hand, one must remember that many factors affect the muzzle velocity of a rifle, beyond the type of ammunition fired and the barrel length of the gun. Such factors include - but are not limited to - the temperature of the ammunition just before firing, the profile and contour of the bullet, the shape and dimensions of the rifling, and the wear on the barrel. I took considerable effort to use the lowest velocity figures that seemed reasonable to me in every instance, to try to weigh the examination in favor of the idea that the M4 has a critically short fragmentation range. For example, FM 3-22.9 gives the muzzle velocity of the M16A2 as being 3,100 ft/s, not 3,081 ft/s (calculated from the specification in MIL-C-63989C). Even so, I was only able to achieve a fragmentation range of 50m by using a very high fragmentation "threshold" of 2,500 ft/s.

 

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Moving on:

 

Issues were discovered with “fleet yaw” of the M855 projectile fired from various issue rifles and thus unpredictable effects on personnel targets, both unprotected and those behind assorted barriers and others of a malnourished stature as found in military actions in the Middle East and Africa.

 

 

Why bother mentioning that fleet yaw was also expressed in every caliber and load the Army tested, when you've got a point to drive home?
 

The M855 round was simply not effective at the slower velocities when fired from the M4 carbine.

 

This wording of "not effective" gets thrown around a lot, I guess because it elicits visual images of video game mechanics where one kind of attack is ineffective and does nothing to the enemy.

In reality, while M855 left a lot to be desired in the terminal effects department, getting shot with it is still not fun. Especially if it tumbles and fragments.
 

All of this ironically came to a head at nearly the same time we began to send U.S. troops to Afghanistan in 2001 to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom. Historically well known for its long-range warfare and competent long-range enemy riflemen, the mountains of Afghanistan give advantage to the “stand-off shooter” who positions himself beyond the effective range of U.S. and NATO 5.56mm weapons.

 

 

Which is why we suffered all those costly defeats, right? Wait, no, that didn't happen.
 

These enemy gunners rain .30 caliber projectiles from 800 meters and beyond upon nine of the ten squad members who cannot hope to respond with accurate, effective fire as they are armed with 5.56mm weapons with their maximum effective range of 500 meters tops, and far less with the commonly issued short-range red dot reflex sights.

 

Sir Wilfred Stokes has a solution.

 

The Soviets learned this lesson the hard way when they armed their troops with the 5.45x39mm AK-74 rifle during the early years of their failed occupation in Afghanistan that ended in the retreat in 1989.

 

 

Which is why they continue to use that caliber to this day, I guess?

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Apparently the U.S. and NATO did not consider this lesson going into Afghanistan. 

 

Wait, what? Is he arguing that after September 11th, NATO should have immediately gone "shit, we've got to invade Afghanistan, quickly, we need Tony Williams to invent a Gerrperrscherr for us and completely change all ammunition production!"
 

The well-researched and prepared 2009 monograph entitled Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan; Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer (http://defensetech.org/2010/03/01/taking-back-the-infantry-half-kilometer/) by U.S. Army Major Thomas Ehrhart looks closely at this issue and provides reasonable and actionable steps to address this issue in the near term, not in 2025 as is currently planned.

 

 

Kind of a bait-and-switch here, as Ehrhart's paper addresses improving effectiveness to 500m, not 800m.
 

Current U.S. statistics reveal that 21% of small arms KIA’s and WIA’s in Afghanistan are from 7.62x54R caliber weapons.

Right, because when they try to fight US forces with anything else, they get mauled.
 

Imagery from Russian operations in the Crimea reveal conventional Russian infantry squads armed with up to four 7.62x54R rifles and light machines gun per squad.

 

 

I think he probably means that some Russian special forces teams are equipping themselves with Pechenegs. Either that, or he seriously thinks the average Russian soldier is a seven-foot-tall ubermensch who can carry around thousands of rounds of belted 7.62x54R.

Which isn't to say that the Russians aren't moving to 7.62x54R squad automatics, they evidently are.
 

Insurgents in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan are deploying more and more SVDs and PKMs and the newer PKP light machine guns as well as bolt-action rifles in calibers .300 Winchester, .300 WinMag and .338 Magnum. Do they know something we don’t?

 

 

Insurgents deploy whatever they have.

 

Have they turned the U.S. advantage of long-range precision rifle fire employed with great effect by U.S. and NATO snipers in Iraq and Afghanistan around and now are exploiting this capability against us?

 

 

Whenever somebody talks like this, I always get this weird feeling like they live in an alternate universe where the M240 and M110 SASS don't exist.

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The Chinese too are making purposeful advances forward to overmatch the 5.56mm NATO weapons in U.S. and NATO hands to include U.S. M855A1 EPR. Their 5.8x42mm cartridge and Type 95 family of bull-pup weapons are being improved to provide a full 600 meter maximum effective range and are now issuing variable magnification optical sights to regular PLA soldiers intended for effective use at that range – 100 to 200 meters beyond what a U.S. trooper armed with an M4 and ACOG sight are effective at. 

 

 

Not sure what there is to be afraid of here, exactly. The 5.8mm can't penetrate ESAPI and it by Chinese source's admission has shitty tissue destruction capability. So it might have "600m" range, but not against a US infantryman.
 

They have also fielded and exported one-man portable 35mm shoulder-fired grenade launchers with an effective range of 600 meters against point targets, 1,000 meters on area targets, well beyond the 5.56mm rifle range of all members of the American infantry squad, save the one armed with the 7.62mm M14 EBR Squad Designated Marksman Rifle (SDMR).

 

 

Are we worried that the QLZ-87 is going to be a squad level weapon? I'd be surprised if that were the case...

 

It is reported that the Russians, at the direction Vladimir Putin himself and with the top-down formation of “Concern Kalashnikov,” is developing a replacement to the AK family of weapons and may be dusting off the 6mm Unified intermediate cartridge for chambering in the innovative AK-107 assault rifle with its “shifted-balance” hyper burst capability.

 

According to Maxim Popenker, this is weapons-grade BS.
 

America has invested heavily in countless small arms Science and Technology (S&T) programs to improve the combat capability of the rifleman. Conservative estimates place the cost of these failed R&D initiatives at well over a billion dollars since the 1960s with not a single enemy soldier killed as a result.

 

 

Well, except for enemies killed with M79s, XM148s, M203s, and rifles equipped with rails and ACOGs. Except for those.


Four attempts to field a modern replacement to the M4 Carbine have failed just since 2004 to include the latest effort known as Individual Carbine. In this test seven commercial off-the-shelf 5.56mm NATO carbines were tested alongside the current issue U.S. M4 Carbine as baseline. All candidates failed to meet the Phase II reliability requirements with the new U.S. Army M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round (EPR). 

 

 

Yes, Tim Coburn is persistent, and annoying.

 

The M855A1 EPR round is plagued with countless unresolved technical problems being down-played by U.S. Army developers, problems related to chamber pressures in excess of 60,000 psi, severe damage to the M4 Carbine caused by the exposed hardened penetrator projectile tip and fouling generated at twice that of the M855 round it replaced. An appreciable mismatch of the round’s flight trajectory with the sights fielded with the M4 and M16 causes mean point-of-impact (MPI) shifts of 5 to 14 inches at 600 meters, easily enough to cause a clean miss even when the rifleman does his part in its correct launch. As a result, the U.S. Marine Corps and Special Operations Command have refused to field the M855A1 EPR round. Three plus iterations, 15 years and more than $150 million dollars spent and serious problems still remain in the U.S. Army’s primary 5.56mm rifle combat round.

 

Most of these claims are oft-repeated but unsubstantiated. The ones that are actually true are the MPI shift and the feedramp erosion issue. MPI shift is something that would happen with any significant cartridge change (so there's literally no way to avoid this), and it's easily solve through re-zeroing. The feedramp issue has been solved through new magazines that present the rounds at a different angle and are much more reliable anyway.
 

So one must ask the question: Where to now? With the existing and emerging small arms overmatch capabilities from Russia and China, how does America spend its diminishing defense dollars to regain its footing? Members of the U.S. Congress have been engaged in this issue since 2009 when the Army planned to purchase endless quantities of M4 Carbines being built to aged technical specifications at unit prices 40% higher even as far greater quantities were being ordered during wartime. Senator Coburn – Republican from Oklahoma and others have pressured the U.S. Army to consider weapons beyond just the M4 and ammunition better than the 5.56mm NATO round to keep up with threat developments. Their efforts have been met with some success.

 

 

Speak of the devil!

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As any experienced hunter knows, the working end of a hunting rifle is not the rifle itself but the cartridge; in particular the caliber and more specifically the projectile. Seasoned dangerous game hunters do not first select a rifle for an important hunting trip for its portability or for its light weight and handy nature but for the on-target effects required to dispatch the animal effectively.

 

Ah yes, the "wars are fought against deer" fallacy.

 

Any consideration of a future weapon system must begin with an assessment and selection of the correct and optimal caliber, projectile, and then finally the cartridge and its capacity for enough propellant sufficient to do the work to meet existing and future threats.

 

 

While important, logistical and cost considerations must take a back seat to target effects, stand-off range and terminal effects on the complete threat target set.

 

 

Isn't there an adage about this?

 

"Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."
- Gen. Robert H. Barrow, USMC (Commandant of the Marine Corps) noted in 1980

 

Sadly, and much to the dismay of the small arms industry, this common sense approach of selecting the optimum caliber and cartridge to address current and future target sets and threats, before soliciting industry for proposals, is not being applied in the current search for the next U.S. armed services handgun. The U.S. Army is telling gun makers what color they want the new “Modular Handgun System” (MHS) to be delivered in but not which caliber. The phrase “predictable failure” comes to mind when one considers this illogical approach to systems performance that must begin with clearly defined target effects that come from the projectile, cartridge and caliber.

 

 

Cry me a river, I guess? This is like arguing about the best bayonet.

 

Those opposed to change, the “good enoughers,” usually those who have never fired a rifle in combat or know little about weapons other than the Government-issue models, say it is simply impossible, too costly to switch rifle calibers, yet we have done that many times recently in far less critical and less commonly issued weapons.

 

 

They may also be people who own a reloading scale and have read a certain CDEC report.

 

 

We now field .300WinMag and .338 Lapua Magnum sniper rifles, .40 S&W handguns in the U.S. Coast Guard and select SOF units, plan to field 25mm grenades by way of the XM25 yet will not apply that efficient and effective intermediate caliber solution to the most important, most numerous and most deployed weapon in the infantry squad; the rifle or carbine. Why?

 

 

Because weight matters, Jim.

 

Because too often the actual end users of that equipment are not directly involved in the decision making process.

 

 

Oh, I stand corrected. It's actually because grunts who don't know anything about ballistics and who will willingly carry 40 extra pounds of useless crap they bought in a Ramadi market aren't involved in the decision process.

 

Acquisition Officers, Program Managers, General Officers and “Policy Wonks” make the final call and the end user gets what he or she is given be it good, bad or ugly.

 

 

Yeah! Damn the fact that Program Managers have the power to actually manage their programs!

 

This is not the way things happen in America’s top tier SOF units, which is why their suite of small arms are vastly superior and overall less expensive to procure, field and sustain then USGI equivalents.

 

I am not a Special Operations character, but I suspect that if I were one, this sentence would make me erupt into laughter.

 

 

 

The rifle used to kill Osama bin Laden, the HK416, was developed with no U.S. R&D dollars spent and it remains today the most capable carbine of its type ten years after its debut on the battlefield in 2004.

 

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The fifty million dollars spent on the failed U.S. Army XM8 rifle program could have fielded almost 50,000 HK416s in 2005. For less than what has been invested to date in the XM25 development program alone, HK416s could have been purchased for every one of the 140,000 front line American combatants, with tens of millions to spare.

 

 

This is a really strange pair of sentences. Jim appears to be arguing that funds that were spent beginning in 2000 somehow could have been used to procure HK416s five years later. Then he basically repeats the error, but this time with a weapon that fills a completely different role.

What's weirder is that he's for some reason shifted gears from "the US Army needs to adopt a new caliber to replace 5.56mm" to "the US Army should have bought 5.56mm HK416s". Wait, I thought the caliber was part of the problem? So wouldn't buying HK416s be a mistake?

 

A common perceived obstacle to a new rifle caliber has been cost. It has been said many times that it is simply too expensive to change calibers.

 

 

By POGs like this guy, right?

 

However, new developments in cartridge case technology provides us with a historic opportunity to reduce ammunition combat load weights by up to 40%

 

 

...Apparently by adopting a cartridge that is 28% heavier.

 

A 2012 Battelle Study for the U.S. Army looked at the projected cost to change out production machinery at Lake City Army Ammunition Plant to switch from brass-cased ammunition to polymer-cased telescoped ammunition offering up to a 40% weight savings. The study’s author confirmed that there would be no additional cost in the purchase of the new production tooling to assemble a 6.5mm to 7mm polymer cartridge on the new machinery compared to a polymer-cased 5.56mm round of the same design. 

 

 

Yes, there's no additional cost in the purchase of tooling; that does not mean that adopting a 6.5mm wunderkart would be just as cheap as what we're doing now, or adopting lightweight cased 5.56mm and 7.62mm rounds.

 

Fortunately there are more than a half dozen weapon platforms and sighting devices and accessories in these intermediate calibers that can exploit the advantages of these emerging lightweight cartridges and many more that would be developed as a new requirement becomes available.

 

There may literally be half a dozen individual weapons chambered for telescoping ammunition in the world; there are not half a dozen different kinds of weapons chambered for them!

 

In fact, AAI Corporation, now Textron Systems, has been working on the LSAT (Lightweight Small Arms Technology) program with the U.S. Army for some years now focused on a light weight belt-fed light machinegun firing a polymer-cased telescoped cartridge offering impressive weight savings for the war fighter, but no increase in downrange performance being limited to 5.56mm. Recently Textron Systems announced the results of an internal caliber study that resulted in an Intermediate Caliber Cased Telescoped belt-fed light machine gun design firing a .264 caliber (6.5mm) cartridge with terminal effects equal to 7.62mm NATO out to 1,200 meters. Weighing 43% (21 pounds) less than a 7.62mm M240B medium machine gun with 400 rounds of M80 Ball ammunition, 10% (5 pounds) lighter than a 5.56mm M249 SAW with 1,000 rounds of M855 Ball ammunition, the Textron weapon would be 2.75 inches shorter than the M4 Carbine with the butt stock collapsed. That is a significant increase at overmatch levels in downrange performance with a comparable huge reduction in system weight, size and portability.

 

 

But it's in the early stages of development, and weapons always get heavier as they mature. Plus, it's still much heavier than the 5.56mm LSAT weapon.

Also, I guess we're just not going to mention the 9.6lb 6.5mm CTSAS carbine...

I am done for now.

 

As any experienced hunter knows, the working end of a hunting rifle is not the rifle itself but the cartridge; in particular the caliber and more specifically the projectile. Seasoned dangerous game hunters do not first select a rifle for an important hunting trip for its portability or for its light weight and handy nature but for the on-target effects required to dispatch the animal effectively.

 

Ah yes, the "wars are fought against deer" fallacy.

 

Any consideration of a future weapon system must begin with an assessment and selection of the correct and optimal caliber, projectile, and then finally the cartridge and its capacity for enough propellant sufficient to do the work to meet existing and future threats.

 

 

While important, logistical and cost considerations must take a back seat to target effects, stand-off range and terminal effects on the complete threat target set.

 

 

Isn't there an adage about this?

 

"Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."
- Gen. Robert H. Barrow, USMC (Commandant of the Marine Corps) noted in 1980

 

Sadly, and much to the dismay of the small arms industry, this common sense approach of selecting the optimum caliber and cartridge to address current and future target sets and threats, before soliciting industry for proposals, is not being applied in the current search for the next U.S. armed services handgun. The U.S. Army is telling gun makers what color they want the new “Modular Handgun System” (MHS) to be delivered in but not which caliber. The phrase “predictable failure” comes to mind when one considers this illogical approach to systems performance that must begin with clearly defined target effects that come from the projectile, cartridge and caliber.

 

 

Cry me a river, I guess? This is like arguing about the best bayonet.

 

Those opposed to change, the “good enoughers,” usually those who have never fired a rifle in combat or know little about weapons other than the Government-issue models, say it is simply impossible, too costly to switch rifle calibers, yet we have done that many times recently in far less critical and less commonly issued weapons.

 

 

They may also be people who own a reloading scale and have read a certain CDEC report.

 

 

We now field .300WinMag and .338 Lapua Magnum sniper rifles, .40 S&W handguns in the U.S. Coast Guard and select SOF units, plan to field 25mm grenades by way of the XM25 yet will not apply that efficient and effective intermediate caliber solution to the most important, most numerous and most deployed weapon in the infantry squad; the rifle or carbine. Why?

 

 

Because weight matters, Jim.

 

Because too often the actual end users of that equipment are not directly involved in the decision making process.

 

 

Oh, I stand corrected. It's actually because grunts who don't know anything about ballistics and who will willingly carry 40 extra pounds of useless crap they bought in a Ramadi market aren't involved in the decision process.

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To be fair, the QLZ87 and, more commonly the QLB06 are quite often deplayed at squad level (though it's usually a few at platoon level for the former.) but he still doesn't know what he's talking about.

 

Also, this guy is a fucking Pierre Sprey grade reformist dipshit, how has he eluded me for so long?

 

Oh, and yes, there actually are retards who legitimately think Germany tested an Atomic bomb in 1944 "but it just fizzled! Geiger counter sweeps over the sight prove it! [Citation Needed]" .....which doesn't actually prove anything.

 

Oh and that the US somehow found out about this, "ripped it off" and were suddenly finally able to make their "own" A-Bomb after this!

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Something I wonder about whenever this comes up: when I put on my terrorist/freedom fighter hat my first concern when dealing with the US is the obscene overmatch that they have in terms of long range weaponry (artillery, rockets, missiles and bombs). The sensible thing to do when you have only light infantry/ad hoc mechanised forces in play is thus to close in as rapidly as possible to US forces in order to nullify that advantage.

The fact that nobody fighting US forces is doing that right now speaks volumes about the effectiveness of US small arms and doctrine as a whole.

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