The Armored Combat Vehicle Puma started as a privat-venture betwen Krauss-Maffei and Diehl in 1983. The two first prototypes were ready first in spring 1986 with a Kuka 20mm two men turret and second in autumn with a Diehl 120mm mortar turret.
ACV-Puma was intented as an export armored vehicle of the 16-28 t class.
By 1983 original concept, it was offered with two engine options (400/600hp) to cope with the level of armor protection asked.
The running gear was a mixt of both Leopard-1 and 2 components :
- Leo-1 : road wheels, track support rollers, torsion bars and even the driver's seat ;
- Leo-2 : track adjuster, cooling system components and sproket hub.
It was possible to run the engine outside of its compartment.
In 1988, the concept was improved further :
- the class range reached 38t ;
- the engines offer was 440 or 750hp strong ;
- the chassis was now available in two length (5/6 road wheels) and hight/low profil hull (20cm).
The ACV-Puma was a contender at the Norwegian IFV programme from 1991 and the Turkish 1987 relaunched TIFV programme.
Norway chose CV-90 and Turkey, the AIFV.
(If anyone have information about how it was a serious contender, I'm interested)
It was also evaluated by the Swiss army in 1991. I don't know if it took part to the Char de grenadiers 2000 programme.
In 1983´s concept, the difference betwen the low profil hull and the 20cm higher hight profil hull was obtained by a "box shape vertical raised" rear compartment. With the 1988's design, the front slop is now different to achieve a better ballistic protection.
When considering documentations of this period, it's important to note the mine/IED protection was not a priority like today.
I'll post soon a scan showing general layout of the troop compartment. It's a Marder/BMP old fashion one with soldiers facing outside.
Even if it was not a success at exportation, I think ACV-Puma must be known because of both :
- the outdated combat beliefs of the 80's (still vigourous today) ;
- and advanced proposal such as the differential hull length from the drawing board.
I have a question :
Does anyone known if a 6 road wheels chassis was ever built ?
I realized we don't have a topic for a proper discussion of what future AFVs should look like, in the style of a general AFVs discussion rather than country-specific threads.
I spotted a revived potential need for future MBTs - a coaxial autocannon to replace the coaxial MG. The reason? An APS neutralizer.
Here's my short post on why I think it should happen:
I didn't add it there, but I see lasers as a potential alternative. However, I don't think they're viable because of the power required to properly neutralize an APS's components, especially if these components are dispersed, or worse yet, effectively camouflaged. An autocannon will be able to disable not only the APS but other external components all at once.
Similar to the engagement method showcased by Russia where they fired 2 Kornet missiles (almost) simultaneously to defeat an APS, a hypothetical mode of operation could include firing a burst of 2 KETF shells at a target prior to firing a main gun shell.
An additional alternative could be to use a single main gun ABM shell that would initiate outside the scope of the APS's engagement range (e.g engagement range is 30m so it initiates at 50m), but it would have 2 main issues that are a longer time to kill a target and a greater consumption of ammunition (up to a 3rd of ammo would have to be allocated to ABM munitions strictly for anti-armor operations).
The following is derived from various wanderings, discussions, & tyre kicking, and covers an opinion on the forthcoming Land 400 Phase 3 Request for Tender, and is as per June 2018.
General: Phase 2 will significantly shape participation in Phase 3. Costs for the two bidders that weren’t short listed for the Risk Mitigation Activity (GDLS & Elbit Systems) ran into the tens of millions of dollars. Costs for the losing BAE bid could rightly be assessed as double that. Combined with Rheinmetall’s Phase 2-driven “perceived incumbency”, nobody wants to waste money to be a stalking horse on the Commonwealth’s behalf. There is a plausible risk that only Rheinmetall will bid.
Reorganisation of infantry sections: When Land 400 was conceived, Australian infantry sections consisted of two fire teams of four. This drove the initial “eight dismounts” requirement that has subsequently been relaxed. Now comprising three fire times of three, one of those teams will be the vehicle crew, the other two will dismount, for a total of six dismounts. Recent operational experience has highlighted the need for temporary attachment of specialist personnel, so a platform that has some spare seating could still count for it.
GFE Turrets: One possible tactic that the Commonwealth may seek to use is that of mandating that the Lance Turret, as used on the Phase 2 Boxer CRV, be used as Government Furnished Equipment (that is, purchased from Rheinmetall and provided to suitably configured hulls by competitors). This would simplify the turret training and offer spares commonality across both phases. Perceived savings for “buying in bulk” were (apparently) unable to be realised as Rheinmetall was reluctant to discount its turret. Costs aside, if an offerer has a GFE turret, who owns the systems integration risk? Who does the customer turn to solve potential issues between the turret and the hull when they, the customer, has mandated that particular turret? Commercially, this is a high risk proposition.
Unmanned turrets: Only GDLS offered an unmanned/remote turret for Phase 2, the Kongsberg MCT-30, as has been adopted in small numbers (81) by the US Army to meet an immediate operational need. A bias against unmanned turrets is unlikely to manifest itself in Phase 3 due to the likely presence of the PSM Puma IFV. Of course, that’ll likely to open the door to GDLS bidding the ASCOD fitted with Elbit’s optionally manned/unmanned MT-30 turret....should they decide to bid at all.
Likely bidders: This brings us to the inevitable list of potential bidders and their platforms.
BAE: Unlikely to bid. If they win SEA 5000, that may get them off the bench, as would a requirements set that looks a lot like CV90. In the event that they do bid, the CV90 Mk4 is the most likely platform.
GDLS: More likely to bid than BAE, but still waiting to see what the RFT looks like. (Tellingly?) Their ASCODs at Eurosatory we’re painted for upcoming European opportunities, not in the distinctive Australian disruptive pattern.
Rheinmetall: likely to offer the Lynx and maybe also the Puma. With the reorganisation of Australian infantry sections (see above) the eight dismounts of the KF41 version of the Lynx are less relevant. Still, the modularity of the KF41 demonstrated at Eurosatory 18 definitely left an impression.
PSM: As a JV between KMW & Rheinmetall, Puma may be offered separately (unlikely if the Boxer =\= ARTEC in Australia model is followed). In the event that it is offered separately, its high unit cost, without the associated modularity of Boxer, may be a disadvantage. Also, PSM has no experience with industrial partnerships in Australia: a significant disadvantage.
Hanwha Defense Systems: Korea has been a bit “off” Australian defence opportunities, largely due to the cack-handed way in which the cancellation of the K-9/AS-9 was handled in 2012. The AS-9 was viewed as a loss-leader, primarily as Australia has a reputation of being a discerning (aka difficult) customer. If Hanwha bids their K21, it’ll be interesting to watch.
Whilst no means exhaustive, the above outlines some less-obvious factors currently at play for the 450-vehicle opportunity that is Land 400 Phase 3.