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DogDodger

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Everything posted by DogDodger

  1. The Marines had discovered the relatively intact Type 94 tankette on Namur in February 1944 and had decided to take it home as a trophy. According to Robert Neiman, CO of C Company, 4th Tank Battalion USMC, "...our maintenance people fixed it up on Maui and we ran around the tank training area in it and had a ball. We had to leave it behind when we went to Saipan, and never saw it again."
  2. Pz.Kpfw.38 (t) mit Schwimmkörper. According to the English version of Spielberger's book on the 38 (t) and 35 (t): "During the preparations for Operation 'Sealion'...in 1940, not only diving tanks (Panzer III and IV) but also Panzer II tanks were made amphibious. A similar order was also issued to the Bohemian-Moravian Machine Factory to make the Panzer 38 (t) tank amphibious. The order was carried out, resulting in the so-called Swim Body AP I. Via the side shafts and steering gears, two driveshafts were driven that ran parallel to the tank through the amphibious body to the rear screw propellers. In the water, a top speed of 8 kph was achieved. Series production was not begun."
  3. That was some Top Gear-quality cinematography. Any info on the target slabs?
  4. The Soviets were good enough to import some of Belgium's snow so their American friends wouldn't be so cold during the Battle of the Bulge.
  5. Got done with AFVs in Irish Service since 1922 by Ralph Riccio. I had previously read and enjoyed his book on WW2 Italian vehicles, and also wasn't disappointed with this work. The book has a historical review of the use of AFVs in Ireland, beginning with the appropriated Guinness delivery trucks that were fitted with locomotive boilers during the Easter uprising, then machines used by both sides the civil war, organization during and after WW2, and on the use of AFVs during various UN missions. The bulk of the book is devoted to monographs of the machines themselves, including vehicles loaned to Ireland by the UN or other countries during deployments. He even manages to nail down surviving vehicles and the national registration plate numbers for the Irish vehicles from the first Rolls-Royce armored cars. My only regret upon reading the book is realizing that, when we visited Howth on a whim on the last day of our trip to Ireland in December 2010, that we didn't know the city was home to the National Transport Museum, which has a number of armored cars in its collection. Now to check out Nicholas Moran's video on Irish AFVs...
  6. It's not valid as far as steering is concerned, but it nevertheless seems to a pretty widely held thought. In his book on the Pz.Kpfw.III, Spielberger cites as a disadvantage of the rear-drive setup that "Long transmission lines were necessary for the steering system." This doesn't necessarily imply fatigue, of course: longer, more complex linkages may have been thought to be a pain in themselves. Also, beginning at ~0:50 in his video on the Grant, Fletcher asserts that the front-mounted transmission made driving easier, but doesn't elaborate on how. The most consistent arguments for a front sprocket seem to be the cleaning action of the top run of the track, and weight distribution has been cited in the case of the GMC M18.
  7. Wow, awesome that you got an interview! Insightful questions, as always. Still consider this book shallow and error-riddled, but thumbs-up for the interview.
  8. Too true. Simpkin says that under 12% of Panzergrenadier battalions rode in the Sd.Kfz.251 even when these vehicles were at their most prevalent. Did Zaloga have any thoughts on mounted-versus-dismounted differences?
  9. NBC protection was definitely another factor in the proliferation of infantry fighting vehicles. But while the US had a history of bussing infantry to an attack position where they dismounted for action, the Germans had already been historically fighting mounted from machines that were either open-topped (e.g., Sd.Kfz.251) or lacked firing ports, necessitating using large roof hatches (e.g., HS.30), so the basic premise behind the use of mechanized infantry in the two countries seems to have differed even before concerns about contaminated battlefields arose.
  10. It certainly is interesting. Postwar, the USSR and Germany reversed their places in the friend and enemy categories, and the Germans' reports of their experience against the USSR was perhaps lauded without critical analysis. Also, there seems to have been a deeper resonance for some US officers. Back to GEN DePuy, since he was after all the first commander of TRADOC and very heavily influential in the Army's 1976 doctrinal revision: he fought with the 90th Infantry Division in WW2, which was a bit of a problem unit upon deployment, and the deficiencies he perceived in the training and early leadership of his unit was almost traumatizing. Quoting Herbert again: "German tactical techniques also influenced DePuy, so much that he integrated some of their ideas into his battalion's procedures. He was especially impressed by their ability to organize terrain for the defense, using its every fold to site their weapons along probable enemy approaches with little regard for a neat, linear pattern. Also, DePuy admired their ability to camouflage and conceal their positions, as well as their ability to integrate combat vehicles with their infantry, either as roving guns in the defense or as direct-fire support platforms in the attack. The Germans also excelled at what DePuy later called 'suppression.' This was their generation of a superior volume of fire against an enemy position, forcing that enemy to take cover so he could not return fire accurately and thus making him vulnerable to assault." In his biography of DePuy, Gole quotes DePuy on pursuit operations: "...we just ran into little groups that were pretty much incoherent insofar as a general defense was concerned. But, being good German soldiers, they fought well. So, we would run into a company here, a Kampfgruppe there, a couple of tanks here, an assault gun or two there...the thing that impressed everybody at the time was how a handful of Germans could hold up a regiment by [siting] their weapons properly." When DePuy was in command of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division in 1954-5, he taught his soldiers to dig foxholes staggered in depth, which contrasted to the contemporary US Army method. Later, while J-3 of MACV, he proposed a counterambush scheme using a 3-platoon company totally armed with automatic weapons so that the ambushers could be suppressed by "a withering barrage of fire" and friendly forces could regain the initiative and ability to maneuver. So apart from a growing familiarity and friendship between the US and Germany engendered after WW2 and the union against a common foe in the USSR, it seems for better or for worse some important US Army decision-makers harbored deep-seated experiential motives for pushing for the widespread adoption "Germanic" concepts like the operational level of war (also used by the Soviets, of course), mission-type orders (which had also been common in Patton's Third Army), and Panzergrenadier tactics.
  11. It seems the Germans expected to fight mounted for as much as possible and then use their vehicles in direct support, which contrasts to the prescription laid out by FM 17-42, for example. I don't have actual German manuals to quote, but Culver and Feist in Schützenpanzer say, "It took several years of trial-and-error combat experience for the Germans to realize that the armored personnel carrier was the weapon, and that the infantry should be trained to serve that weapon...The most important aspect of the new training, aside from instructing the Panzergrenadiers to fight from the vehicle as much as possible,was the proper training of drivers. The unique role and unusual driving characteristics of the Sd.Kfz.251 made the driver's task critical for proper handling of the vehicle...Training for the Panzergrenadiers themselves covered a number of areas, all of which had been learned - at not small cost - on the battlefield. Platoon and section leaders had to be trained in new combat tactics for the SPWs, and all the enlisted men also were trained in fighting from the vehicle, or in support of it."
  12. Observant point that the two countries viewed their half-tracks in markedly different ways; this would continue after the war as well. The Germans were known to use theirs as fighting vehicles, and the US Army did essentially view theirs as trucks. In Deciding What Has to Be Done, MAJ Paul Herbert notes that although the US used tactics similar to Germany's for its WWII armored infantry, "the adoption of enclosed armored personnel carriers in the late 1950s, the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) reorganization of 1963, the separation of doctrinal proponency between Forts Benning (for infantry) and Knox (for armor), and especially the war in Vietnam all conspired to dilute American understanding of the essence of Panzergrenadier tactics, which had been the union of tanks and armored infantry in a single concept of mobile warfare." (However, his assertion that the US used tactics similar to Germany's in WW2 isn't supported by the November 1944 edition of FM 17-42, which says, "Armored infantry usually fights dismounted. Under favorable conditions vehicular armament either mounted or dismounted is used to support the attack." And later: "The armored infantry battalion uses its transportation to move quickly to initial attack positions where the infantry dismounts to fight on foot. Vehicles, except those used for fire support, are then withdrawn to the best available concealed and protected positions.") Germany's aggressive use of their half-tracks during the war, and similar use of the HS.30 postwar, was a factor in finally prodding the US Army to change its armored infantry doctrine: General William DePuy had admired the Germans as soldiers since fighting them in World War II, and in the mid-70s he became enamored with their Panzergrenadier tactics to the point that he started using the term to describe what he had in mind for new American armored infantry tactics; DePuy even invited General Fritz Birnstiel, the German Army staff chief of combat arms, to lecture US Army combat branch schools on the German tactics in late 1974. The new version of FM 100-5, partly written by DePuy himself, was released a couple of years later.
  13. "...We had to say farewell to the Emchas. It would be a sad moment. We had wished it would be otherwise. A funeral parting, a great pain. "Finally, an order arrived. But with other, stunning contents, that sent chills running up and down our spines: 'Remove the turrets and hull machine guns from the Shermans. Warehouse them. Deliver the armored hulls--as tractors--to civilian enterprises.' We had to report compliance with this order within five days. "Why, for what reason, from where did such an abrupt change in the subsequent fate of the foreign tanks come? What forced Moscow to take such a final ['murderous' in the original text] decision? "For days after the receipt of the 'death certificate' [as the tankers nicknamed the order], work proceeded on a broad front. All the brigade, corps, and army maintenance units were thrown into the demilitarization of the tanks, making 'tractors' out of them. "I cannot forget the total dejection of the crews as they stood on the sidelines with heads bowed. The death of each tank showed on their faces. At one time the Emchisti had signed hand receipts for the tanks from the brigade command. We all were heavy-hearted. Many choked back tears, and some, not holding back, cried bitterly. How could this be? How much effort and energy had been given to them--the Shermans--there in the dry Mongolian steppe, in the silent desert sands of the Gobi, in the rugged southern reaches of the Grand Khingan? And how many obstacles had been overcome on the cenrtal Manchurian plain? These men had cared for them, cared for them like the apple of their eye. And now this final humiliation. Farewell, Emcha! Each inomarochnik will have good memories of you for the rest of his life. "An epitaph came out of these mournful days (how could it not): 'Yesterday it was a menacing tank, and now, by order--they took off the turret--it has become a tractor. Front-line comrade, how painful to witness the death of the Emcha. Try not to cry!'" Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks, Dmitriy Loza, trans. James F. Gebhardt
  14. Speaking of Centurions in Vietnam, another one you might be interested in is Jungle Tracks; finished it this weekend. Unlike Canister! On! Fire!, its main focus is on the crewmen themselves; interviews make up a huge portion of the text. So it doesn't have the high-level history and background of Hopkins's book or the detail of the operations of Canister! On! Fire!, but the crewmen interviews are so informal and conversational that the book is a real page-turner. They discuss the machines they used, the enemy they fought, the allies with whom they worked, and the mood back home when they left and returned. Not all the opinions agree, of course, and that's probably one of the strengths of the book. I found this one to be very readable and interesting, and to be honest I also had a hard time not imagining the veterans' anecdotes in an Australian accent when they're talking about certain operations being a ripper or lamenting that the trickle replacement policy meant you couldn't even exchange a g'day with the guy going home in your stead.
  15. Sent another email last night about not getting the download link for this; they apologized and replied with the link today. It's an 8-page pdf (including the front and rear covers) with a comic book-style SU-152 crewwoman talking head giving some facts on the machine and its introduction and organization. Ten speech bubbles are provided, and three of these relate to WoT. But hey, it's free.
  16. Cool, looking forward to your thoughts. Maybe your opinion will be higher. Amazon et al send me books all the time.
  17. At least a couple times in WW1, German infantry tried grabbing the guns of ditched or broken tanks to prevent them from being effectively used.
  18. Finished Alaric Searle's Armoured Warfare: A Military, Political and Global History tonight. From the title, I expected something interesting and unorthodox in the vein of Patrick Wright's Tank, but alas it turns out to be mostly a shallow history of armored battles throughout history that is laden with small errors. In the preface Searle notes that he's a college professor who teaches a class on the history of armored warfare (whatever level 5 means), and felt that he could not recommend to his students a reputable single-volume text on the subject that covered multiple timeframes and countries. Hence, this book. The "global" part comes from the fact that, besides the usual topics like the World Wars and Desert Storm, he talks (sometimes quite briefly) about other conflicts like the Iran-Iraq war and French experience in Indochina. The "political" aspect of the subtitle, and the main reason I ordered the book, is limited to a 15-page chapter penultimate to the conclusion. There are numerous small errors throughout, e.g., gun caliber, introduction dates, confusing the T-64 and the T-62, etc., and for what is described in the preface as a book for teaching, he often throws around names of vehicles with no description of their form or purpose. E.g., when talking about the formation of the Bundeswehr: "The first American AFVs the Germans received in 1956 were 1,110 M47s, 152 M41s, 100 M39s, and 300 M74s." The only machine in the list he had previously discussed was the M47, and the only one to be mentioned later in the text is the M41. I suppose students are expected to look up on their own what their textbook does not define. Or maybe Armoured Warfare (level 5) students are expected to know. Anyway, bottom line is that I anticipated some unconventional analysis, but ended up with a short, meh attempt at an overall history. I do like the mustache on the cover, though.
  19. I feel your pain, Meplat. The location and angle of the oil filter on the Mk.1 Audi TT with the 1.8T is virtually guaranteed to have you spill oil all over the place, and replacing the Haldex fluid filter, which is buried deep within the rear suspension components, requires a bespoke wrench that allows you to turn the filter about 2 degrees before you hit some part of the car. The B7 RS 4 required the removal of 22 fasteners, 2 covers, and a bracket before the oil change could even be begun. An oil change on the Mk.2 TT RS requires the removal of both a plastic undertray attached with with 13 T25 torx screws AND an aluminum undertray attached with 8 T30 torx screws and a single XZN8, just for spite. Frustratingly, due to its location between the fuel filler neck and the rear subframe (see image), replacement of the TT RS's right rear brake line with a braided line required having another person hold a long socket extension against the securing clip while I whacked at said extension with a hammer, since there was no room to get any momentum with any tools near the attachment. My girlfriend had an R56 Mini Cooper that was a nightmare to work on as well, although to be fair the oil changes were easier than on the Audis.
  20. No, this is perfect, and I appreciate the link; I wouldn't be able to read the originals anyway. Very interesting comparison, and a nice validation of the marine Estes quoted.
  21. Intriguing data. Are these reports available online anywhere? Thanks!
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