Mighty_Zuk

If it was really something they wanted to keep secret, the least they could do is put some coating on it. 

Dude what the fuck

User named Irina on Otvaga forum, where Looser is our messenger, has posted several images from which we could calculate that the thickness of the composite armor block in front of the driver on the Mark 3 is 140mm, which is 540mm after accounting for a 75° angle from vertical.
 
 
The nose area and the section in front of the engine should he half the thickness and at smaller angle, so we might as well just disregard it. However it is backed by a fuel tank, a thin layer of armor, and then the powerpack, followed by another thin layer of armor.
 
This already means that the diagram showing 55mm on the flat area is just wrong. 
 
What's interesting is that the composite block painted in green in Serge's post (one above mine) might be thicker than the rest of the hull front, while at the same time being angled to roughly 83° before going completely horizontal. So the Merkava 3 could still peek and show a certain portion of its hull and still be impervious to a lot of stuff.
 
Now we go to measure the UFP on the Mark 4:
 
EDIT: added pics, finished calculating with proper measurement tools the UFP of the Mark 4.
 
 
Took the width of the hull, which is 3720mm, measured with ruler to get 4.3cm on my screen in full size photo, measured UFP height for 0.4cm. The ratio of the hull's length to UFP's height is 10.75. Divided hull length by the ratio and got 346mm. The angle of the photo doesn't really matter because the deviation due to the angle applies to all values here, so it cancels out. Now we look at the 2nd photo (in the spoiler) and see that the 'face' of the plate is not representative of the thickness of the plate so I measured the ratio between the thickness of the actual plate and the thickness seen on the front of it for proper results. The ratio I got is 0.8 so the real thickness is 277mm. Round it up or down to account for any form of deviation for 270mm-280mm
 
Sources I've found a long time ago say it's angled at 75° so it's close to 1044-1082mm in LoS. We'll take something in the middle, on the lower end, for 1050mm.
 
Took another reference photo to see if all that armor actually fits and wasn't cut midway, so we could know if all that LoS is utilized or not:
 
Note: The calculation involved only measuring up to the air vents, where the armor becomes completely horizontal.
I got 1134mm, round it up and down to 1130-1140mm and we can see that the entire armor LoS fits in well. 
 
Next we'll measure the engine access plate with the same principle and we get 201mm, so let's round it down to 200mm. Because it has the same type of 'bending' with its 'face' so that both plates could slide in and click better, we apply the same ratio of 0.8 so we get 160mm there. 
 
With a 75° angle we get 620mm LoS. Now we'll measure to see if it all fits, as we did earlier. We get 680mm so it all fits.
 
Next we go for the very first plate of the UFP which is the thinnest.
 
Ran the same procedure, only with some clearer and larger scale photos and got a thickness of 66mm. Could round it up or down to 60-70mm. It gives us a LoS of 232mm-270mm.
 
 
Basically what we get for the Mark 4 is:
 
LFP = *76mm (RHA or steel composite).
UFP section A: ~250mm (composite).
UFP section B: 620mm (composite).
UFP section C: 1050mm (composite).
 
*Based on common perception.
 
Now, one reason why the upper sections are generally thicker in the Merkava series is because anything coming from an angle that is above the horizontal, will be able to substantially decrease the effect that the armor's angle gives, so to negate that the armor itself must have a certain thickness. And if the lower sections of the armor are pierced in this manner, only the engine will be hit. If the upper section will be hit, the engine will not be in the way and the crew compartment will be breached, and there will be casualties. The same appears on the Mark 3 where the hull composite armor module shown below in green is of the same thickness as the yellow and red modules (when they're combined with the base armor), which was calculated earlier to be 140mm.
 
 

Is that like an aura effect for Indian modes of transport, or are they intentionally trying to boost some stats on the Arjun?

First of Israel's Sa'ar 6 ships laid, pending a ceremony. 
By end of 2019 it should arrive in Israel, where it will undergo a refitting process of approximately 1 year.
A total of 4 ships are planned.
 
They're not big and bad. Their *armament is modest. But they'll serve well.
 

 
 
*armament: 
16x unspecified anti-ship missile.
32x Barak 8 SAM.
40x C-Dome SAM.
1x 76mm gun.
 

@Ronny Ramlaen has somewhat touched on that issue but didnt explain it so I will.
 
You can take it as a rule of thumb that the faster these missiles are in the first stages, they farther and higher they need to get. I repeat, farther and higher they NEED to get.
The PRS-1M is a great example, much like the Sprint, as they both have a ridiculous first stage speed.
 
This speed creates an extremely high temperature around the missile while it's in the atmosphere. This causes disturbances that make these missiles practically blind not only to external sensors and C2 systems, but also their own onboard active sensors. 
 
Current ABMs (counter medium range to ICBMs) deploy the final stage outside the atmosphere. Only there they no longer have disturbances, and communication with ground control is enabled. At the same time they are also finally able to activate their own seeking sensors.
 
So unless the aircraft you are talking about are outside the atmosphere, an ABM can't do anything against them. All they have to do to counter an ABM is make a slight turn or slight change is speed, and that's it.
That is, if the search radar doesn't automatically filter them out in the first place to save processing power.
 
Only ABM that are built to defeat ballistic missiles in the terminal stage, have an anti-aircraft capability.
This includes but is not limited to:
S-300/400
PAC-2/3/4
David's Sling
MEADS
Arrow 2
 

You haven't contributed anything to this thread. Even if his posting is "bad" (IMO, it's not. He doesn't know how to take in the replies he gets, but makes generally interesting questions), that doesnt change the fact that in this thread your SNR is also 0.

Several pics related to AS21 Redback have appeared on twitter and elsewhere over the last couple of days
from latest DTR 2019-07  http://defencetechnologyreview.realviewdigital.com/#folio=50
- and also from EOS pdf presentation - photos of mockup (mockups?) - or whatever that is - of EOS T2000 turret:

 

 
and also more pics of unfinished hull (next to that turret or outside) - from DTR twitter https://twitter.com/DTRmag/status/1146928739671928832 (originally from Hanwha facebook page) and from one of bemil.chosun.com blogs (although it seems to me that some of the latter were originally posted on instagram):

 
 

What I could find: 
Jacketed Long-Rod Penetrators: Problems and Perspectives
 
 
Though that is about Jacketed Penetrators, it seems it may still apply to regular APFSDS.  Given it cites Rosenberg and Deckel you might look at their work 'Terminal Ballistics' for more information. 
 
Possibly more useful is this: 
 
The Effect of Nose Shape on Depleted Uranium (DU) Long-Rod Penetrators
 
I apologize for not quoting any of this, but its a 66 page non searchable PDF, and I'm not sure that you can just select parts without reading the whole thing for context since it's specifically about LRP and nose shape for DU rounds (some tungsten is mentioned.) 
 
Also of possible interest are these reddit posts.  I'm not sure how 'good' it is since we're talking War Thunder (I'm as wary of that as I am of WoT based research) but I figure I'd include it for completeness sake and potential for discussion: 
 
APFSDS the Science of Ricochets
 
How tip shapes affect APFSDS performance on sloped armour
 
I also believe that most APFSDS don't operate fully in the eroding (hydrodynamic) regime and would slow down on impact anyhow.  So rigid penetration effects may apply (nose shape does matter quite a bit there).
 
Lastly because it may be of interest to someone materials which may be of interest but may not be relevant to the discussion:
 
Penetrator strength effect in long-rod critical ricochet angle
 
Interaction between High-velocity Penetrators and Moving Armour Components
 
PENETRATION OF METALLIC PLATES BY KINETIC ENERGY PROJECTILES
 
The Relation Between Initial Yaw and Long Rod Projectile Shape after Penetrating an Oblique Thin Plate

2S18 Pat-S, an experimental precursor to the 2S31.  Armament was a SA61 152mm howitzer.
 

 

Heh, here is official numbers for T-14:
https://rg.ru/2019/06/28/ves-tanka-i-bmp-na-platforme-armata-rassekretili-na-armii-2019.html

IDF is getting a new personal sight for commanders down to platoon level, coupled with augmented reality, day and night vision modes (higher latency in day mode for some reason), and a BMS interface that will allow the users to see friendly and enemy forces, call for fire support on specific targets, and even chat with other users.
 
This seems to be a variant of Rafael's Fire Weaver which works by the same concept of fire requests rather than simple designation, and an AR-based interface.
 
Tanks have their own derivative system, which also shows the tanks' vital data like available ammunition, or maintenance issues, to determine which tank is ready or not ready for maneuver and which tank can fulfill a firing mission at the moment.
 
The whole system weighs 6kg, with most of the weight owed to the batteries.

Depends. Rafael is still, after all, a government owned company. And they do what the government tells them to do. Israel may still prefer not filing a lawsuit to avoid hurting the carefully built relations.
 
India is also known for pulling this shit off, for example when they cancelled a massive standard rifles purchase from IWI and going as far as blacklisting them and their parent company IMI, only to delist them about a decade later after no evidence was found.
IMI was also involved, by the way, in the Arjun project, adding 13 unspecified improvements (albeit minor), which only shows the great lengths India can go only to shoot themselves in the foot.
 
 

Wonder if the Ajax with all its recon capabilities could detect its existence, and inform the MoD.

Trump's gonna anger a lot of people if he does it.
It became widespread "knowledge" that the ME allies were against all deals with Iran, when in fact most if not all would have wanted the deal to be expanded to include ballistic missiles, not outright cancelled.

Sorry for being almost a day late with it. This is the I-Dome. A completely independent and mobile Iron Dome system with 10 interceptors.
 
Together with the Drone Dome, this system will become known as the Gideon's Shield (because it was devised under the Gideon multi year plan), and will enter service in the IDF soon. Its structure is not yet revealed - whether it will be deployed in numbers per battalion, or as an element within a specific battalion per brigade, is unknown.
 
 
Also said in the video that the US is interested in this version as well, and not only the static version.

Kollsman Inc. is a wholy-owned subsidiary of Elbit Systems.
 
https://elbitsystems.com/corporate-overview-major-subsidiaries/

JLTV with Spike LR ATGMs, mounted on a Samson RCWS.

JLTV with Spike LR ATGMs, mounted on a Samson RCWS.

https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/saf-unveils-hunter-armys-first-fully-digital-armoured-fighting-vehicle
http://kementah.blogspot.com/2019/06/defence-minister-dr-ng-eng-hen.html
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/new-saf-hunter-armoured-fighting-vehicle-commissioned-as-armour-formation-turns-50
 
Hunter AFV - NGAVF w/ Samson 30 rcws

 

 
 
 
 
 
 

3/4 of warheads were neutralized. Rafael claims 50% rate IIRC, while IMI's fragment-free grenade offers 90% rate. 

The range of HE is lower than that of APFSDS, in a consideration of only the flight characteristics of the projectile.
However, what limits APFSDS range is not really how long it can fly. It can go for tens of kilometers with ease. It just won't retain the necessary velocity to penetrate a target. 
A specific APFSDS could be effective to 3km for one target, 1.5km for another more armored target, and completely ineffective to another even more armored target.
HE is not range-limited, and with fin stabilizers could fly out to a pretty good range. Russia (UVZ) claims the T-90 can fire its HE shell out to 12km.
 
It's physically possible, but the bottleneck would be the sights that probably won't even recognize the pixel they're looking at, at that range.
 
So if you can see a target 6km away, you can be sure lobbing HE shells is possible. In the IDF it's fairly routine to practice firing them out to 5km, and that's not really an exceptional feat in the west or anywhere.
 
2)That would never be necessary. 60's era tanks with 105mm guns, with APDS/APFSDS are abundant on the market right now. Even the poorest countries have these.
If munitions are still an issue then worry not. A 105mm will do a crap ton of external damage as well, but with a much better RoF and actually existent munition stockpiles.
 
And if it comes down to fighting against a more technologically capable enemy, then tanks are actually a liability. Guerilla warfare becomes key.
 

Those aren't stupid questions. Unfortunately some people here are too conservative and early to bark at people for raising questions for which the answers only seem obvious to them.
 
1)The question of ERA versus NERA is a matter of design philosophies, and wargame analysis.
In absolute terms, neither ERA nor NERA are more effective from one another.
 
They both have a linear tradeoff of capabilities. It is a function of single-hit protection, i.e how effective would one type be against only 1 shot, and the total number of shots that armor can take. 
In a very rough comparison, an ERA can interact with 1 projectile resulting in X penetration reduction. And a NERA armor would defend from 2 projectiles, with only X/2 penetration reduction at a time.
On average, they are mathematically equal. On the battlefield, certain scenarios will show the superiority of one over the other.
 
To better understand the situation, you must first understand that actually both western and eastern tanks use NERA of some form, as the key component of their armor. Only for a short time was ERA ever dominant over NERA, and that was at the time of tanks like Leopard 1, AMX-30, and M48/60, because proper composite armor did not exist yet with the quality needed to defeat HEAT or APFSDS.
 
Next comes the impact probability analysis.
If a certain area is considered likely to be hit multiple times in tight groupings, over the course of a single engagement, then NERA is the preferred solution, even though again the Soviet tanks used NERA as much as western tanks.
If a certain area is only likely to be hit once in a single engagement, then ERA is preferred.
 
This is why on most western AFVs, the first type of applique to appear for side protection was ERA, and only after certain advancements, it moved on to NxRA (will get into that later).
 
And finally is the system's longevity analysis. Or basically how long the tank is expected to survive in either case.
 
Soviet tanks were considered more disposable than NATO tanks. Although fiercely competing with the west to create the higher quality tank, part of the philosophy was that even an advanced tank won't survive for very long on the battlefield. Minutes at best.
Thus ERA, being more effective for a single hit, would basically double the number of shots required to take out the tank, in some of the more likely scenarios.
And when you double some capability, for seemingly no cost at all, that's something worth doing, and is no longer an incremental upgrade.
 
In the west, tanks were expected to be more survivable, hence for example the human loader that was more of a spare than an actual necessity for normal operation of the tank.
With a focus on higher overall longevity of the platform on the battlefield, the ERA would not be more than a minor addition over potent NERA. It would be a single use item in an environment in which designers believed a tank needs to be able to sustain many hits, even if only for the sake of recovery.
Plus, it would encourage a bad culture of crewmembers' false reliance on a single use item, perhaps not fully understanding the extent of the danger in such belief.
 
But wherever sufficient NERA was not possible, western philosophy did not exclude ERA at all, and you can see the Bradley for example entirely covered in ERA. 
 
2)Depends who you're looking at.
 
USA - Wanted Trophy more than a decade ago but Raytheon lobbied hard enough to delay its acquisition until it can complete its own system, which it eventually never has. 
Reallocation of funds was also time consuming. Army doesn't always get what it wants, and almost never on time, unless Congress is especially generous.
 
Rest of NATO - For three reasons mainly.
First, they are very much disconnected from their MIC and will more often try to subvert the MIC than help it, because of a perceived sense of security.
 
Second, rest of NATO are being led, not leading new technological trends. Their innovators are their MIC which they don't do nearly enough to support.
 
Third, the acquisition of arms in Europe is done with the intent of deterrence, not the actual usage of said equipment in combat. Hence why you can still see Leopard 2A4 as the main MBTs of certain countries.
I've explained a long while ago, in depth, the economical effects of an APS. One of the conclusions was that it is economically unviable to buy AFVs without APS, if the AFVs are to be used during their lifetimes at least once in a medium to high intensity combat scenario. Most combat today is hybrid warfare, which is medium intensity. So basically for most of the combat we see globally, an APS is a must.
It is only viable to buy a tank without an APS if the tank is not expected to see combat.
 
That is why countries like the US, Israel, Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey, are seen investing in APS. Even poor Syria does. 
 
A Leopard 2A7V, and its ancestor the Leo 2, form a lineage of 40 years of service in Germany. At no point were they used in serious combat by the Bundeswehr. Only the VJTF is supposed to be deployed abroad and expected to see combat on short notice, which is why the VJTF tanks will receive an APS. It just didn't get much publicity.
 
Of course, there are some within NATO who see the importance of capability maintenance and building regardless of the probability of war, and are investing in APS as well. The Netherlands for example are probably going to be the first in Europe to use an APS, on their CV90.
 
3)Russian ATGMs are not really a good comparison. They simply were never really effective weapons. Only effective within a small range of conditions.
 
A proper GLATGM would be something like a Spike downsized to 120mm, but today it's hardly necessary. There are two main considerations to this - tools, and tactics.
 
Tools - a tank battalion never drives alone. It will have infantry support. Infantry on the battalion level will always have an AT element capable of launching ATGMs at standoff ranges, and their vehicles have ATGMs as well, to multiply the output. Other than that, available tools include artillery, that in the modern day use long range guided missiles (+20km range), guided rockets, and guided/unguided shells.
 
Tactics - when spotting a tank formation of any size, 6-8km away, other options are preferred. Ambush with short range engagement from prepared positions is ideal.
The next best alternative is actually calling artillery or aviation, because the effects of a sudden barrage are going to be far greater, as opposed to an ATGM volley that would have the core of the formation maneuver away and screening their maneuver, when they see the first missile flying.
The third best option would be to lob HE shells, not ATGMs, at enemy tanks too far away.
The reason is that HE can do a lot of damage to the optics, gun, stabilizers, and other external equipment that is key for the effective use of the tank. It could even outright disable tanks by hitting the tracks or the UFP close to the driver's hatch.
ATGMs pack an HE payload as well, but are far less versatile and substantially more expensive, to the point where it's worth asking whether allocating vital space for them inside the ammo rack is even worth sacrificing other ammo types. HE-MP is just too versatile to not want it in greater numbers.
 
4)Basically all current MBTs can take a hit from a 152mm howitzer. That is, the crew will live, but the tank will be disabled.
 
This question is perhaps irrelevant, because howitzers on the battlefield are used in direct mode only rarely and in emergencies.
 
 
BONUS: Today there is something called NxRA. It differs from NERA and is somewhat of a replacement to it, rather than a competitor.
 
Anyone can feel free to correct me if I'm wrong, but basically:
NERA - Non Energetic Reactive Armor. It does not produce any energy on its own. It relies on the energy produced by the projectile and impacts the projectile with proportionately produced energy.
It's reactive, but more often than not regarded as passive because of its lack of independently energetic components.
 
NxRA - Non eXplosive Reactive Armor. Much like ERA, and unlike NERA it produces its own energy. However, it's not the blast you'll see with an ERA. It's more tame.
And the results are an armor that is as survivable as the NERA, but quite substantially more effective per shot than it. Not as effective per shot as ERA or SLERA (self limiting ERA), but it's somewhere close.
 
Because of this, NxRA is considered more effective than the NERA and ERA, because its per-shot-effectiveness to survivability ratio, is higher than both of them.
 
You can even see that the NxRA is gaining traction, and is now armoring tanks like the Merkava 4 entirely (or almost entirely), is offered for advanced variants of the Leopard 2, and armors the UAE's Leclerc. 
It's also used on a plethora of medium AFVs like the CV90, Ajax and ASCOD, etc.
 
It's just not going to replace ERA everywhere because of a not too good volume efficiency that could make certain vehicles too large.
 
 
It really was one of the dumbest arguments I've ever heard when rationalizing combat capability degradation programs.
Basically every army that saw actual combat, decided the potential risks posed by ERA to infantry are greatly outweighed by the risk reductions it offers.
 
When APS became operational, only then has this idea become a frequent talking point. But APS is far less dangerous than ERA because it neutralizes the projectile's warhead without initiating it.
All because Raytheon couldn't deal with their loss.
 
 
LAHAT is only a shitshow if you insist on analyzing its capabilities OUTSIDE of its historical background.
It was devised for the Merkava 2 tank, long before the Spike even had half the capabilities it has today.
 
At the time, you needed LoS to the target to fire off a Spike, while the LAHAT allowed you to fire it off without LoS.
 
Another point you've forgotten is that a helicopter is not required for remote designation. It can be done via infantry. In any event of invasion into Israel, the first line of troops will be border brigades, not equipped with tanks and heavy weapons, but with a great deal of observation and intelligence capabilities. They, and the spearhead units', have plenty of infantry they would allocate to target spotting and designation either for artillery, AF, and whatever. They can easily designate targets for MBTs or helicopters using LAHAT. And they themselves would have a low combat signature.
Caliber is of course a non-factor because of top attack, hence why Spike missiles (except for SR) always had a relatively weak warhead compared with contemporary designs, even other similar sized missiles developed by the same company.
 
Only today are LAHAT missiles irrelevant, hence their withdrawal from service a long time ago, and their marketing to non modern armies.
 
It's not very accurate. The Namer and Merkava 3 and 4 may have ERA in some places.
It's not confirmed but the Mark 4 has armor plates with the inscription "explosive", and the Mark 3 and Namer have armor modlues with box shapes, suspiciously ERA-like. 
Besides, certain Nagmachon variants can still be seen with the old Blazer ERA.

Those aren't stupid questions. Unfortunately some people here are too conservative and early to bark at people for raising questions for which the answers only seem obvious to them.
 
1)The question of ERA versus NERA is a matter of design philosophies, and wargame analysis.
In absolute terms, neither ERA nor NERA are more effective from one another.
 
They both have a linear tradeoff of capabilities. It is a function of single-hit protection, i.e how effective would one type be against only 1 shot, and the total number of shots that armor can take. 
In a very rough comparison, an ERA can interact with 1 projectile resulting in X penetration reduction. And a NERA armor would defend from 2 projectiles, with only X/2 penetration reduction at a time.
On average, they are mathematically equal. On the battlefield, certain scenarios will show the superiority of one over the other.
 
To better understand the situation, you must first understand that actually both western and eastern tanks use NERA of some form, as the key component of their armor. Only for a short time was ERA ever dominant over NERA, and that was at the time of tanks like Leopard 1, AMX-30, and M48/60, because proper composite armor did not exist yet with the quality needed to defeat HEAT or APFSDS.
 
Next comes the impact probability analysis.
If a certain area is considered likely to be hit multiple times in tight groupings, over the course of a single engagement, then NERA is the preferred solution, even though again the Soviet tanks used NERA as much as western tanks.
If a certain area is only likely to be hit once in a single engagement, then ERA is preferred.
 
This is why on most western AFVs, the first type of applique to appear for side protection was ERA, and only after certain advancements, it moved on to NxRA (will get into that later).
 
And finally is the system's longevity analysis. Or basically how long the tank is expected to survive in either case.
 
Soviet tanks were considered more disposable than NATO tanks. Although fiercely competing with the west to create the higher quality tank, part of the philosophy was that even an advanced tank won't survive for very long on the battlefield. Minutes at best.
Thus ERA, being more effective for a single hit, would basically double the number of shots required to take out the tank, in some of the more likely scenarios.
And when you double some capability, for seemingly no cost at all, that's something worth doing, and is no longer an incremental upgrade.
 
In the west, tanks were expected to be more survivable, hence for example the human loader that was more of a spare than an actual necessity for normal operation of the tank.
With a focus on higher overall longevity of the platform on the battlefield, the ERA would not be more than a minor addition over potent NERA. It would be a single use item in an environment in which designers believed a tank needs to be able to sustain many hits, even if only for the sake of recovery.
Plus, it would encourage a bad culture of crewmembers' false reliance on a single use item, perhaps not fully understanding the extent of the danger in such belief.
 
But wherever sufficient NERA was not possible, western philosophy did not exclude ERA at all, and you can see the Bradley for example entirely covered in ERA. 
 
2)Depends who you're looking at.
 
USA - Wanted Trophy more than a decade ago but Raytheon lobbied hard enough to delay its acquisition until it can complete its own system, which it eventually never has. 
Reallocation of funds was also time consuming. Army doesn't always get what it wants, and almost never on time, unless Congress is especially generous.
 
Rest of NATO - For three reasons mainly.
First, they are very much disconnected from their MIC and will more often try to subvert the MIC than help it, because of a perceived sense of security.
 
Second, rest of NATO are being led, not leading new technological trends. Their innovators are their MIC which they don't do nearly enough to support.
 
Third, the acquisition of arms in Europe is done with the intent of deterrence, not the actual usage of said equipment in combat. Hence why you can still see Leopard 2A4 as the main MBTs of certain countries.
I've explained a long while ago, in depth, the economical effects of an APS. One of the conclusions was that it is economically unviable to buy AFVs without APS, if the AFVs are to be used during their lifetimes at least once in a medium to high intensity combat scenario. Most combat today is hybrid warfare, which is medium intensity. So basically for most of the combat we see globally, an APS is a must.
It is only viable to buy a tank without an APS if the tank is not expected to see combat.
 
That is why countries like the US, Israel, Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey, are seen investing in APS. Even poor Syria does. 
 
A Leopard 2A7V, and its ancestor the Leo 2, form a lineage of 40 years of service in Germany. At no point were they used in serious combat by the Bundeswehr. Only the VJTF is supposed to be deployed abroad and expected to see combat on short notice, which is why the VJTF tanks will receive an APS. It just didn't get much publicity.
 
Of course, there are some within NATO who see the importance of capability maintenance and building regardless of the probability of war, and are investing in APS as well. The Netherlands for example are probably going to be the first in Europe to use an APS, on their CV90.
 
3)Russian ATGMs are not really a good comparison. They simply were never really effective weapons. Only effective within a small range of conditions.
 
A proper GLATGM would be something like a Spike downsized to 120mm, but today it's hardly necessary. There are two main considerations to this - tools, and tactics.
 
Tools - a tank battalion never drives alone. It will have infantry support. Infantry on the battalion level will always have an AT element capable of launching ATGMs at standoff ranges, and their vehicles have ATGMs as well, to multiply the output. Other than that, available tools include artillery, that in the modern day use long range guided missiles (+20km range), guided rockets, and guided/unguided shells.
 
Tactics - when spotting a tank formation of any size, 6-8km away, other options are preferred. Ambush with short range engagement from prepared positions is ideal.
The next best alternative is actually calling artillery or aviation, because the effects of a sudden barrage are going to be far greater, as opposed to an ATGM volley that would have the core of the formation maneuver away and screening their maneuver, when they see the first missile flying.
The third best option would be to lob HE shells, not ATGMs, at enemy tanks too far away.
The reason is that HE can do a lot of damage to the optics, gun, stabilizers, and other external equipment that is key for the effective use of the tank. It could even outright disable tanks by hitting the tracks or the UFP close to the driver's hatch.
ATGMs pack an HE payload as well, but are far less versatile and substantially more expensive, to the point where it's worth asking whether allocating vital space for them inside the ammo rack is even worth sacrificing other ammo types. HE-MP is just too versatile to not want it in greater numbers.
 
4)Basically all current MBTs can take a hit from a 152mm howitzer. That is, the crew will live, but the tank will be disabled.
 
This question is perhaps irrelevant, because howitzers on the battlefield are used in direct mode only rarely and in emergencies.
 
 
BONUS: Today there is something called NxRA. It differs from NERA and is somewhat of a replacement to it, rather than a competitor.
 
Anyone can feel free to correct me if I'm wrong, but basically:
NERA - Non Energetic Reactive Armor. It does not produce any energy on its own. It relies on the energy produced by the projectile and impacts the projectile with proportionately produced energy.
It's reactive, but more often than not regarded as passive because of its lack of independently energetic components.
 
NxRA - Non eXplosive Reactive Armor. Much like ERA, and unlike NERA it produces its own energy. However, it's not the blast you'll see with an ERA. It's more tame.
And the results are an armor that is as survivable as the NERA, but quite substantially more effective per shot than it. Not as effective per shot as ERA or SLERA (self limiting ERA), but it's somewhere close.
 
Because of this, NxRA is considered more effective than the NERA and ERA, because its per-shot-effectiveness to survivability ratio, is higher than both of them.
 
You can even see that the NxRA is gaining traction, and is now armoring tanks like the Merkava 4 entirely (or almost entirely), is offered for advanced variants of the Leopard 2, and armors the UAE's Leclerc. 
It's also used on a plethora of medium AFVs like the CV90, Ajax and ASCOD, etc.
 
It's just not going to replace ERA everywhere because of a not too good volume efficiency that could make certain vehicles too large.
 
 
It really was one of the dumbest arguments I've ever heard when rationalizing combat capability degradation programs.
Basically every army that saw actual combat, decided the potential risks posed by ERA to infantry are greatly outweighed by the risk reductions it offers.
 
When APS became operational, only then has this idea become a frequent talking point. But APS is far less dangerous than ERA because it neutralizes the projectile's warhead without initiating it.
All because Raytheon couldn't deal with their loss.
 
 
LAHAT is only a shitshow if you insist on analyzing its capabilities OUTSIDE of its historical background.
It was devised for the Merkava 2 tank, long before the Spike even had half the capabilities it has today.
 
At the time, you needed LoS to the target to fire off a Spike, while the LAHAT allowed you to fire it off without LoS.
 
Another point you've forgotten is that a helicopter is not required for remote designation. It can be done via infantry. In any event of invasion into Israel, the first line of troops will be border brigades, not equipped with tanks and heavy weapons, but with a great deal of observation and intelligence capabilities. They, and the spearhead units', have plenty of infantry they would allocate to target spotting and designation either for artillery, AF, and whatever. They can easily designate targets for MBTs or helicopters using LAHAT. And they themselves would have a low combat signature.
Caliber is of course a non-factor because of top attack, hence why Spike missiles (except for SR) always had a relatively weak warhead compared with contemporary designs, even other similar sized missiles developed by the same company.
 
Only today are LAHAT missiles irrelevant, hence their withdrawal from service a long time ago, and their marketing to non modern armies.
 
It's not very accurate. The Namer and Merkava 3 and 4 may have ERA in some places.
It's not confirmed but the Mark 4 has armor plates with the inscription "explosive", and the Mark 3 and Namer have armor modlues with box shapes, suspiciously ERA-like. 
Besides, certain Nagmachon variants can still be seen with the old Blazer ERA.