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  1. The original video I saw didn't cut out until they assaulted around that big rock where there were three Turks were taking cover, who all got smoked from about 5 feet away with a mag of AK.
  2. The Kurds were clearly using armor piercing XM1158 ammo, or how else did they kill those soldiers wearing body armor?
  3. Moving through walls using various breaching equipment (mechanical or explosive being the most common) has been a stable of urban combat since WW2. Streets are death traps. ISIS also heavily tunneled under buildings and streets, allowing fighters to move between blocks without crossing streets, shuffle personnel, move supplies, counterattack, etc. Also, not new.
  4. It doesn't even take a normal platoon to maneuver on 2-4 structures, doesn't need super platoon. Why is the platoon even assaulting something that can be easily destroyed by CAS or precision tube or rocket arty? If there are No, as a platoon leader I'd not want to have to ask for everything. But at the same time I don't want more assets than I need, let alone control. Its overkill. Very few missions need every platoon to have large numbers of CG and MG assets. When they do, almost never does every platoon need to be individually plus'd up, that's not how operations work, where oft
  5. The platoon often doesn't need a dedicated CG and mortar teams, if it needs them they can grab them for the mission (or leave them back), or they can get teams attached. You're creating more billets that for many operations infantry conducts just aren't necessary. If the idea is to not overload the squads, you're just overloading the platoons even worse. and overloading companies, they will become so bloated even company commanders will have trouble maneuvering them. I really can't think of any mission I ever went on in 11 years in the infantry where 60 men could accomplish it bet
  6. 60 man platoons? Great if they are assault platoons expected to storm Okinawa and expecting to get whittled down quickly through attrition. But think about it this way. A platoon leader, a 22 year old whose only command training comes from schools, will be in command, his only help being one senior NCO. Commanding half a modern company is going to be outside his ability. Besides that, it would completely change the dynamics of any operation. Rarely does any mission require a minimum of 60 men to accomplish it. Often times its a struggle to find work for even the full platoon. Many of recent wa
  7. Supplying tiny company, sometimes company (-) COPs in the middle of nowhere Afghanistan with helicopter air lift on a weekly basis is about the very worst supply situation the US military could find itself in. If it can do it there, keep the myriad of company level weaponry supplied with ammo, then it can do it in other conditions. If you want to state otherwise, provide an example of what you're talking about. MCO against Russia in the Baltics? Fighting Chinese in Taiwan? What and where?
  8. As it is, the Grenadier, an 11B or 0311, will have numerous weapons they must be trained on. And what do you mean about logistics? Are you referring to an MCO type conflict against Russia where Class V gets pushed down? Every other type of conflict, like the GWOT, it gets pulled. You need specific ammo, request it and it gets delivered (in theory). And all that stuff, 5.56 ball, 5.56 linked, 7.62 linked, 7.62 match (for DMR and snipers), 40mm GL, 40mm HVGL, .50 cal, 60mm mortar, 84mm Carl Gustaf rounds, etc., all of that was already successfully delivered before to middle-of-nowhe
  9. At Wanat, most of the MGs, including all of the M249s, stopped working. Which was why M4s were being used as SAWs, because the SAWs had died already (because they're beat up weapons). The manner in which the SAW is used, it will not be able to duplicate an M240 anyway. On its best day, its not as reliable. SAW gunners don't carry enough ammo, rarely a spare barrel. They rarely have the support of an AG to assist them. If a squad's fight comes down to the SAW and no other platoon or company enablers, the M249 will not rescue them, the GWOT proved that pretty well.
  10. I didn't mean those specific guns, but the engineering as a whole. Let's say a closed bolt automatic rifle that doesn't have a barrel change option. Likely they'd go with a heavy barrel on it for heat mitigation, but would it be better served to be fluted? And if so, are radial flutes the most effective type? Is it just really hard to do, adding much more work and cost?
  11. What is the benefit of radial fluting over fluting down the length of the barrel? Is it just harder to mill out the material?
  12. The acoustics of it aren't truly what instills fear. Like the artillery. If you kept hearing arty incoming and it sounded like a massive rail gun but exploded like a piddly WW1 75mm round, rather quickly the fear of the sound would evaporate. No more suppression effect. That acoustical sounds need to correspond to increased deadliness. Either in accuracy (sniper), or volume (machine gun), penetrative qualities (AP ammo), or destructive abilities (HE). Any change in small arms for the purpose of increasing suppression effect must be done under the context of getting inside the enemy's head to f
  13. M855A1 definitely seems the game changer, much better than most what was previously issued. But new M80A1 does better at barrier penetration than M80 or M855A1. Not by much, but a little. I don't think enough to necessitate pulling a US Army move and trying to go straight 7.62 NATO for rifles and SAWs. Do you have external ballistics data for M855A1 showing velocities at longer ranges? What is BC and muzzle velocity for 14.5"?
  14. I generally agree but there are some added suppression effects between 5.56 up to 7.62 NATO. First, the snap is different. Second, 6.5-7.62 will go transonic well past 5.56, so better long range performance. Third, the latter has much better barrier penetration abilities, there are things that are cover against 5.56 that wont stop 7.62 and people getting shot at start noticing this stuff. "Is what I'm using for cover actually going to stop the round they're shooting at me?" Overall, I think the problems with suppression are more of not having a clue at all where the enemy is, and n
  15. Suppression is definitely critical. Most infantry small arms fire is to suppress an enemy force. You're hitting them when you can, but most times its fire directed to either pin an enemy in place, or else to get them to stop shooting at you. And yes, caliber is a factor in suppression. .22 LR would be less suppressive than 5.56, which is less than 7.62 NATO, which is less than 338 Norma Mag, which is less than .50 Cal, etc. Penetrative abilities against cover, the accuracy potential of weapons, the fear of automatic weapons fire (volume), the knowledge that heavy weapons focused o
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