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" Zwar OT, aber vielleicht von Interesse: M.W. war man relativ überrascht, dass das Turmdach der T72 durch unsere PAL 2000 (die schwedische RBS 56 "BILL") nicht durchschlagen werden konnte. Gleichzeitig stellte man fest, dass es große Unterschiede zwischen den ungarischen und russischen T72 gab. Die Ungarn wurden als nicht so zuverlässige Genossen eingeschätzt und bekam daher T72 die nicht die selbe Panzerungstechnik hatten wie die russischen."


maybe somebody have more info on T-72 trials in Austria ? or more photos?


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3 minutes ago, Karamazov said:

As far as I know, Hungary has a T-72A, but this is a T-72M. May be they got this T-72 from Poland with Hungary transit. idk.


No, IMO Hungary had T-72M and some M1. Most of them were sold or donated to Iraq few years back. 

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10 hours ago, Beer said:

No, IMO Hungary had T-72M and some M1. Most of them were sold or donated to Iraq few years back. 

Not so simple. 

First we bought 30 or 31 T-72 from SU in 1978. In the early 80s, T-72M began to arrive from Poland and Czechslovakia, and a second batch some time after 1985. T-72M1 appeared only in small numbers, in the late 80s (from Poland). Total number: 138

And now comes the crazy part, where most of the confusion originates. In 1996, we bought another 100 tanks, from Belarus. 96 T-72A and 4 AV. And for some stupid reason, these are also called T-72M1 here! 


Now the fate of these tanks:

T-72: all destroyed and/or used for parts, except one or two in museums in extremely bad condition.

T-72M and the few M1: In 2004, the liberal regime in power back then donated 77 of these to iraq, for free. (a huge crime against the country, since our economy was about to collapse. What is even worse, that the regime do not only donated these tanks, they even refurbished them to perfect condition)

T-72A: In 2014, government sold 58+22 tanks to Czech republic (to the firm "Excalibur Army"). Most were T-72As, + the remaining few Ms

In the army we still have about 80 tanks, but only 25-30 of them are combat ready. The rest were cannibalized for parts. 

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After some digging in the subject, a little update to my last post here about hungarian T-72s. The small numbers of T-72M1 actually means only 5 tanks. 3 T-72M1 and 2 T-72M1K command variants, they all came from Czechslovakia, not Poland. 4 of these went back to Czech republic, 1 remains here, in unknown condition.



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7 minutes ago, heretic88 said:

After some digging in the subject, a little update to my last post here about hungarian T-72s. The small numbers of T-72M1 actually means only 5 tanks. 3 T-72M1 and 2 T-72M1K command variants, they all came from Czechslovakia, not Poland. 4 of these went back to Czech republic, 1 remains here, in unknown condition.


I think that all tanks which were bought by Excalibur were intended for sale to Iraq. 

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   Yuri Pasholok's article about some of myths about Soviet armor (1943-1944).


   1. Turret ring diamter increase problems


   One of the very often mentioned myths associated with the production of Soviet armored vehicles during the Great Fatherland War is the alleged impossibility of producing tanks with extended turret rings. First of all, this applies to the T-34-85. Allegedly, the first tanks for this reason had a turret ring with a width of 1420 mm, because there were no necessary machines to cut such holes, and they appeared thanks to Lend-Lease. This myth is actively inflated, including in military-historical literature, while the authors usually do not even try to check what actually happened - first of all, with regard to machine tools.



    Translation of text:

   Is there an ability to increase turret ring of T-34 tank? Yes, they are. According to preliminary assesment ring can be made wider by 200mm.

   Is it possible for production to make it? Yes, Mariupol factory doesn't have any problems with it, factory N183 also have necessary machinery



^   From a memo from engineer-colonel Panov dedicated to the future T-34M, December 1940. As you can see, the possibilities for producing turret rings with a diameter of 1600 mm were already then



   In itself, the inability of Soviet industry to produce tanks with a turret ring with diameter of more than 1,500 mm causes a smile. When this topic is once again raised, the leading question arises - what was the diameter of the turret rings of the T-28 and T-35? Immediately give a hint - a little more. Next, a no less interesting question arises as to what type of ring diameter the KV and KV-1s (1590 mm) tanks had. There is nothing to talk about IS-1 and the subsequent IS-2 - there the diameter was 1800 mm. And this is just the beginning. In 1937, the Krasnodar Machine-Tool Plant named after Sedin began production of a model 152 single-column lathe and rotary machine. Before the capture of Krasnodar by the Germans, more than a thousand such machines were produced there. For reference, the maximum processing diameter was 2000 mm. No, these machines were by no means designed to make tank turret rings alone. Those machine tools had enough work without it - these are rings for excavators, and locomotive wheels, and much more.



   T-34-85 with 1600mm turret ring instead of 1430 during testing.



   Another fact is more interesting. A turet ring with a diameter of 1600 mm was given in 1941 for plant No. 183, as well as STZ, and was intended for the T-34M tank. If you carefully read the correspondence, you can see anything except complaints about the lack of necessary machines. Just because they existed, and not only in 1941, but in 1940. Moreover, the first T-43 sample had a ring diameter of 1420 mm, not at all because it was not possible to make it wider. Everything is more prosaic: it follows from the correspondence that the T-43 turret was wanted to be unified with the T-34 in order to put it on both tanks. When the GBTU RA demanded to expand ring, there were also no complaints about this. Finally, the tales of the first T-34-85 with a 1420 mm turret ring are a blatant lie. The tanks of factory No. 112 in their original configuration had a two-seat turret, but the ring already was expanded to 1600 mm.



   2. SU-76M is bad



   According to the results of the war, the SU-76M (SU-15M), developed by the Design Bureau of Plant No. 38 under the leadership of M.N. Schukin, was most produced SPG. Already in the autumn of 1943, the production of this machine was mastered at three plants, while in 1944 the peak of production was 7154 self-propelled guns. The total count of produced SPGs amounted to a little more than 13,500 units - this is the second most produced combat vehicle of the Red Army after the T-34 family. At the same time, it is customary to criticize the SU-76M for thin armor, insufficient armament and a gasoline engine, and also for the fact that the driver was located between the fuel tanks and the engine. As a result, the SU-76M acquired a halo of almost unsuccessful self-propelled guns, which, to put it mildly, does not quite correspond to reality.



   Manual river crossing of the ZIS-3 cannon. Those wishing to tell that the SU-76M was a bad self-propelled gun can mentally send themselves to the place of one of the numbers of this crew



   To begin with, it is worth deciding what SU-76M is. The imagination of self-propelled guns is often presented as something like a “Ferdinand”, fully and heavily armor and with a cannon that strikes everything in the radius of view. The truth is that the direct analogue of the SU-76M was military vehicles like Marder III, which did not at all surpass it in armor protection (and even were somewhat inferior), had a higher silhouette, but very similar tasks. The appearance of such vehicles in itself dictated the need to increase the mobility of divisional and anti-tank artillery on the battlefield. It is no secret that by 1942 anti-tank guns (and the ZIS-3, although a divisional weapon, but in the early years of production went mainly to anti-tank units) confidently crossed the mark of one ton of mass. That is what required mechanization, and its best means were the chassis of light tanks, which by that time had become hopelessly outdated. And so the concept of a fairly light combat vehicle, actually a tracked "wagon" for an anti-tank gun or for a howitzer, appeared. By the way, the idea of installing the M-30 howitzer on the SU-76M chassis was worked out in 1944, but due to the dispatch of Plant No. 38 to Kharkov, the design got stuck at the paper projects design level. Some people recall the Jagdpanzer 38, hinting at thick armor, but in reality this car is actually an "ersatz version" of the Jagdpanzer IV with rather fragile armor and a fighting compartment even smaller than Marder III (better not to even mention visibility from it).





   Now let’s imagine that those who like to expose the SU-76M on the pages of books and magazines are gathered together and forcibly “attached” to the “more successful alternative” - the ZIS-3 cannon. Optimists say that four people are enough to work with this tool, but it would be interesting to look at how they move it even on asphalt. Even the six of us can get tired pretty quickly, and towing along a sagging field is a "indescribable charge of optimism." The author of this article had enough personal experience towing the ZIS-3 just within museums. But no gasoline engine and tanks - ecologists are delighted. By the way, and no ammunition - he is either nearby on the ground or in the truck. The “bad” SU-76M had 60 rounds of ammunition for the gun. Some say that the SU-76M is noticeably higher than the ZIS-3, so the gun is definitely better. It is unlikely that a 4-mm gun shield can be clearly better than a 25-mm self-propelled gun’s shield. And also the SU-76M is put into a combat mode for a long time in case of a sudden meeting with the enemy on the march. It is necessary to remove the stopper and turn in the direction of the enemy, and also charge the gun. Whether it’s the ZIS-3 business - to jump head over heels out of the truck, detach the cannon, drag it out, deploy it, unhook, and put them in a fighting position, drag the ammo boxes, load ... At this time, the enemy will stand and patiently wait for you to do all this in front of his eyes.

   You can continue to describe all the "advantages" of the ZIS-3, but without that, everything is clear. This is the question of what the SU-76M is. Well, that this machine was used as tanks - this is the fate of almost any self-propelled guns. For example, the Germans often used the Hummel as a support tank, and the American GMC M12 in critical situations became an anti-tank self-propelled gun. All this only says that these machines were used for other purposes.



   3. About ISU-122 existance: myth and reality.


   One of the combat vehicles, the creation of which is often claimed to be almost as a result of production problems, is the ISU-122, the most produced heavy tank destroyer in history. Allegedly, the ISU-152 chassis numbers turned out to be higher than the 152-mm ML-20 howitzers, so they quickly launched the production of vehicles equipped with 122-mm A-19 guns. This version of events is now considered almost canonical, although it is enough to know the facts a little to be in a state of slight perplexity from such conclusions. Such a theory could only be born in the heads of people who do not know the real situation at all.



   The main reason for the appearance of the A-19 as a weapon for tanks and self-propelled guns. The demolished Tiger turret is the result of an A-19 armor-piercing shell hit from a 1.5 km



   The 122-mm corps. gun of the 1931/37 model, even at the peak of production, did not reach half the volume of its "sister" - the ML-20. If the ML-20 back in 1938 reached a production volume of 500 pieces and quickly overcame it, then for the A-19 (in towed form) this bar remained unattainable. Only at the very end of the production of the duplex A-19 was more, and that was because most of the ML-20 went to the production of ISU-152 (it was produced until 1947 inclusive), and the production of ISU-122 was stopped in the autumn of 1945. Secondly, they thought about installing the A-19 on a self-propelled chassis in the spring of 1943. The fact is that this weapon turned out to be the most effective means of fighting the new German tank - Pz.Kpfw.Tiger Ausf.E. The hit of the armor-piercing projectile A-19 for the German "predator" ended with a displaced turret.


   For this reason, on May 5, 1943, Stalin signed the decree of GKO No. 3290 "On the restoration of the production of 122-mm corps. guns of the 1931/37 model and the manufacture of prototypes of light corps. guns." At the same time, work was launched on new guns of calibers of 100 and 122 mm - lighter and oriented for anti-tank functions as well. The main "exhaust" of these works was the 100-mm field gun S-3, it is BS-3, and the "side branch" - 100-mm tank / self-propelled guns S-34 and D-10. As for the A-19, in the spring of 1943 it was considered as the armament of the SU-152, but for various reasons the gun never got onto this SPG. But in December 1943 the gun was installed on a prototype of Object 241, renaming it Object 242.





   The self-propelled gun was successfully tested, showing a higher rate of fire, and the accuracy of the A-19 was higher than that of the ML-20. Why did ISU-122 not be adopted by the Red Army at the beginning of 1944, delaying this process until March 12? The answer is prosaic: the military were waiting for the A-19 with a wedge breech, in addition, work was started on more powerful guns, and their design began in 1943. In fact, the initiator of the launch of the ISU-122 in the series was Stalin, who personally made changes to the decree of GKO No. 5387ss “On increasing the production of heavy tanks, artillery self-propelled guns IS, powerful tank guns and 122-152 mm shells” dated March 12, 1944. And the point here is not at all the mythical "drawdown" of the production of the ML-20. The same A-19s for 1943 were made only 129 more than in 1942 - the plan for the decree of GKO No. 3290 was not completed. ML-20 only in towed form delivered 1002 pieces, this is not counting those 704 guns that were put on the SU-152 and ISU-152.



   Thanks to the ISU-122s, it was possible to reduce the requirements for the production of A-19 for self-propelled guns to 100 pieces per month. Nevertheless, the cases when the plant No. 172 did not keep up with the orders are not rare.



   The reasons for launching the ISU-122 series are simple: in contrast to the ISU-152, which was, first of all, an assault self-propelled guns, the new SPG was designed to fight against enemy tanks and self-propelled guns with thick armor. The rate of fire of the gun was higher, and the ammunition load was greater. Moreover, the supporters of the theory “not enough of ML-20” should get acquainted with how the ISU-122 was developing. Already in the second month of ISU-122 production, the first interruptions occurred with the A-19. As a result, 90 were handed over instead of 100 vehicles, and ISU-152 handed over 135 pieces instead of 125. And this happened more than once, not two, or three - each time ChKZ "paid" by increasing the ISU-152 output. This is partly why, from August 1944, the ISU-122s equipped with the D-25s gun was launched into the series. This gun had a higher rate of fire, and better armor protection system, and in addition, took up less space in the fighting compartment. The most important thing is that the manufacturer D-25s was not factory number 172, but factory number 9. Each month 100 ISU-122 and 50 ISU-122s were put out of the factories. The military would be happy to completely switch to the more successful ISU-122s, however, there were production limits. The same gun went to the IS-2, and the capabilities of the plant number 9 were not unlimited.



   4. About IS tanks


   A much larger halo of various fabrications and distortions of facts surrounds another brainchild of the ChKZ - the heavy tank IS-2. What they write about him - it was intended to storm the enemy fortifications, it was sent to a clean field, and there it allegedly lost the Tiger, then it has weak armor. It's time to clarify some points regarding this tank.



   To the question of when the D-25 was created. The middle of July 1943, and there is already a project of Object 240. The fighting on the Kursk Bulge is still ongoing



   Where did the theory that the IS-2 was intended to deal with enemy defense lines come from? The answer is simple - the author of this theory looked at the gun, and not with a very healthy look. And now let's get back to why, in the Object 237 turret, instead of the 85-mm D-5T gun, a gun with the ballistics of the A-19 gun suddenly appeared. The fact is that the A-19 was the most effective weapon against the new German heavy tanks. Moreover, the stories that the idea of D-25 appeared on the basis of the Kursk Bulge does not hold water. Work on the tank version of the hull gun D-2 KB of plant No. 9 under the leadership of F.F. Petrov began back in May 1943, and there were no significant problems in this matter. The fact is that during the development of the D-5 Petrov took as a basis the installation of the 122-mm self-propelled howitzer D-11, which was intended for the SU-122M. The very concept of D-5 involved the use of barrels of four systems: an 85-mm gun with 52-K anti-aircraft guns ballistics, 122-mm howitzers with M-30 ballistic, 122-mm guns with A-19 ballistic and 152-mm howitzers with ballistics of M-10. The project of the future D-25 was ready as early as July 17 (the first date on the sketch was July 14).



   Distance - 2000m. R50 (half of shots) - 72sm, R100 - 130 sm. "+" is point of aim, central part of the group is 10 sm above and 100sm to the right from point of aim.

   To the question of the accuracy of the D-25T. And such accuracy was achieved during standard warranty tests.



   Knowing a little about what D-25T is, you can only laugh at the stories about its shortcomings. In fact, this gun has only one drawback - low rate of fire. Part of the problem was solved already in February 1944, by launching the D-25T series with a wedge breech machanism. As a result, the rate of fire increased from 1.5 to 2.5 rounds per minute. Not too much, but the results of combat use show that this was enough for an effective fight against German tanks. Further - even more interesting. By the power of the projectile, the D-25T was unparalleled among the tank systems that were used on tanks during the Second World War. Even if this shell did not penetrate the armor, it inflicted significant damage, most often leading to the failure of the tank. For example, when Pz.Kpfw.Tiger Ausf.B gets hit in UFP, cracking of the welds begins, and the impact force breaks the transmission elements. The next is accuracy. According to this indicator, the A-19 and D-25T were equal to the German 88-mm gun Pak 43 L/71 and its tank version. Therefore, theories of inaccurate "logs launcher" are just the fruits of the sick imagination of their authors. Soviet sights were no worse than German sights, especially for the TSh-17, which they began to be installed in May 1944.



   One of the tanks that participated in the battle of Ternopol. The vehicle was hit, but, as you can see, served in the Red and Soviet armies for more than a decade



   It is worth saying a few words about “fighting in the open field”. Even if the IS-2 of the very first release enters the field on the one hand, and the Tiger on the other, the crew of the latter, who are at a distance of 1.5 km and further, can be advised one thing: “Run.” At a distance of 800 m and even defective frontal armor IS-2 of the first releases (as well as IS-85) withstood the hit of 88-mm shells, and at a distance of 1200-1400 m and further the fixed armor of the gun mask could not be penetrated by 88mm.


   For the Tiger, however, a hit from Soviet 122-mm armor-piercing projectile is fatal, and at almost any combat distance. As for the rate of fire, a bit more. The first meeting in the field of IS-2 and the Tiger happened near Ternopol, and for the Germans it ended in the most sad way. According to the results of the battles of April 16-17, 1944, the tankers of the 11th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment chalked up 36 German tanks, mainly the Tigers and Panthers. The German side confirms the attack of these very tanks. Losses of the Soviet side - 7 IS-2, of which 3 are irretrievable. By the way, one of the wrecked tanks of the regiment now stands in the Patriot park - this is the same IS-2M, which is in running condition.



   In August 1944, the mass production of the IS-2 began with a straightened frontal part of the hull, which was significantly stronger than the original design



   In the end, it is worth noting that the very first IS-2s operated near Ternopol, even with guns that had a piston breechlock. Each month of production of the IS-2 meant an improvement in the design of the tank. Already in March 1944, the production of tanks with cast parts from 70L steel began, which significantly reduced the penetration distance. Since May, new sights have been set, and in August the first tanks appeared with a straightened frontal part of the hull, which the Tiger and Panther guns could not penetrate from any distance.



   6. Optics


   One of the points by which the apologists of German tank building are constantly trying to prove the superiority of German armor is visibility. Indeed, at the beginning of the Great Fatherland War with observation devices (but not with sights), things in the USSR were not in the best way. This concerned both the quality of the observation devices themselves and visibility in general. Another question is that Soviet tank building did not stand still - this is especially evident in the state of observation devices and sights of the Red Army armored vehicles for 1944. If in 1941 the T-34 had, in addition to telescopic and periscopic sights, side observation devices with “mirrors”, then in 1944 the range of observation devices was much wider. The T-34-85 was equipped with the TSh-16 articulated sight, which, similarly to the TSH-17 mentioned, was placed more conveniently than the TMFD-7 - this improved the working conditions of the gunner. The gunner also had the MK-IV periscope viewing device, which first appeared on Soviet tanks in 1943. Its designation indicates that the design was borrowed from the British tank MK-IV, that is, Churchill. At first, these devices had problems with prisms, but by the spring of 1944 they were eliminated. The MKIV's advantages were the possibility of all-round visibility, as well as the quick replacement of the upper prism without getting out of the tank. A similar observation device was at the loader, as well as in the flap of the hatch of the commander’s turret. Thus, all turret crew had observation devices providing a good observation.


   A similar system was adopted for the heavy tank IS-2. Self-propelled guns of the ISU family had turrets for the commander and gunner, MK-IV devices were in the hatch flaps. Another such device was in the flap of the loader's hatch. The visibility of the SU-85 was slightly worse, since the commander did not have a turret, but a cap in which there were several viewing devices. At the SU-100, visibility problems were eliminated, especially with regard to the commander’s position. The main problem remained visibility from the driver's seat, which was clearly lacking in its devices. /.../



   Visibility from T-34-85. During the war years, Soviet observation devices and sights made a big step forward



   But what about the Germans? It sounds paradoxical, but with visibility, things went getting worse and worse. This was especially true of the fighting compartment. Judge for yourself: even on Pz.Kpfw.IV, which initially had a lot of viewing devices, by 1944 there was only a commander’s turret was avaliable for viewing of the flanks. Loader became completely blind, and the gunner looked only forward. On the Panther, the loader was also blind from the start, and later received a periscope device, looking forward and slightly to the right. The gunner had only a telescopic sight. On the Tiger, the situation was slightly better, since there were viewing gaps in the sides of the turret. At the same time, only the loader had a periscopic viewing device, and even that one did not rotate. Pz.Kpfw.Tiger Ausf.B did not have side viewing devices, so in terms of “blindness” it was equivalent to “Panther”. As for self-propelled artillery mountings, Jagdpanther and StuG 40 Ausf.G. were more or less normal there. Nevertheless, they did not exceed Soviet self-propelled analogues. At the same time, the Soviet self-propelled guns used telescopic sights that were more convenient for work, and the panoramic sights Sfl.Zf.IA.



   For comparison, the visibility from the Panther. Loader is blind, the gunner looks only forward, only the commander can look on the sides. For this reason, defeats on the sides were a frequent result of the combat use of new generation of German tanks.



   By 1944, the Germans were no longer superior, but inferior to Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns, and problems were identified as early as the summer of 1943. The same "Panthers" from the very beginning of application often fell victim to flanking fire. German heavy tanks also suffered from flanking fire - for example, at the Sandomierz bridgehead, most of the casualties occurred precisely from fire against the sides of the Pz.Kpfw.Tiger Ausf.B. It would seem that in such a situation it would be logical to introduce instruments of the MK-IV type, but the Germans did not even make such attempts (something similar can only be found on some self-propelled guns). Amazing shortsightedness on the part of those who at the beginning of the war had tanks with the best visibility.


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Yuri Pasholok has many good articles, but I think this isnt one of them. 


Turret ring diamter increase problems

This is OK

SU-76M is bad

SU-76M wasnt bad but wasnt good either. Yes, it is true that the SU-76 was a huge improvement over the towed ZIS-3, the importance of added mobility is especially true. But the problem with this vehicle was that it was designed as a light assault gun, so it suffered greatly thanks to its thin armor. Comparing it to the Marder III, and especially the Jadgdpazer 38t doesnt make sense. These are tank destroyers, not assault guns.

About ISU-122 existance: myth and reality.

OK, although it is a fact that the ISU-122 was still a stopgap vehicle. The ISU-152 had a long career after WW2, even received two serious modernization packages. The 122 was neglected, didnt receive any modernization, its chassis was rebuilt as ARVs and missile launcher platforms.
About IS tanks

IS tanks were built for a breakthrough role. No doubt the 122mm gun was very useful against german tanks, and it played a role in its adopting. But its power against fortifications was also a key factor. Also it looks like the author tries to marginalize the low rate of fire. It was a BIG disadvantage! First shot kills were exceedingly rare in WW2. You needed to fire several shells to destroy an enemy tank, there were lots of causes, wrong range estimation, stress, not perfectly zeroed sights, etc. This applies to any tank of WW2, IS-2 is not an exception. MHV made a good video about this:

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zpe7qhWu76c  According to original german documents, rate of fire was 6-10 for KwK43. Even in the worst case, its more than double rate of fire compared to IS-2. Massive advantage. 

Then the author compares the ISU-122 to the Jagdpanther. Again, a mistake. Apples to oranges. The ISU-122 was an assault gun, the Jagdpanther a tank destroyer.


Yes, it is a trend to bash german tanks for their alleged "visibility problems"... "even on Pz.Kpfw.IV, which initially had a lot of viewing devices, by 1944 there was only a commander’s turret was avaliable for viewing of the flanks. Loader became completely blind, and the gunner looked only forward. " Hmmm... Isnt it the case with almost every cold war, or even modern tank? I think this alone defeats this "german tanks blind" myth. The M-60, probably the best tank of the early 60s is now suddenly bad, because the loader is completely blind and the gunner can only look forward...

And finally:

" By 1944, the Germans were no longer superior, but inferior to Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns, and problems were identified as early as the summer of 1943. The same "Panthers" from the very beginning of application often fell victim to flanking fire. German heavy tanks also suffered from flanking fire - for example, at the Sandomierz bridgehead, most of the casualties occurred precisely from fire against the sides of the Pz.Kpfw.Tiger Ausf.B. It would seem that in such a situation it would be logical to introduce instruments of the MK-IV type, but the Germans did not even make such attempts (something similar can only be found on some self-propelled guns). Amazing shortsightedness on the part of those who at the beginning of the war had tanks with the best visibility."

This is nothing more than propaganda. I could also tell stories when soviet tanks, with "superior visibility" fell victim en masse to german tanks. And this is from 1944, so nobody can play the "poorly trained soviets" card. 


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Well, the standard ammo provision of the IS-2 was 18-20 HE and 8-10 AP rounds (20/8 more often I think). For sure it was not designed as a purely anti-tank vehicle. I would say only T-34-57 was like that from all Soviet WW2 tanks. Pz.V, VI, IVB were definitely more anti-tank vehicles than the IS tanks (ammo loadout around 50/50 with much less powerfull HE).  


Anyway I feel always amazed by the amount of energy spent into comparing vehicles which very rarely fought each other (IS-2 vs. Pz.VI or Pz.VIB). While it is intereting these encounters played completely marginal role in the war. For me this is one of the strange phenomenas - to choose a sexy comparison of something which was of very low relevance in the actual war. 


Also the bad situation awareness of the Panther and Königstiger is true and combined with relatively thin side armor, sponsons full of ammo (Panther especially) and very slow turret traverse these tanks were indeed very vulnerable from side attacks. Due to the nature of the late war they however often fought from prepared defence positions where it was not such a big issue. Their offensive record is pretty bad nevertheless (also due to low availability, reliability issues and terrible strategic mobility). 

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      As part of the War of 2248 against the Perfidious Cascadians, great deficiencies were discovered in the Heavy tank DF-1. As detailed in report [REDACTED], the DF-1 was quite simply no match for the advanced weaponry developed in secret by the Cascadian entity. Likewise, the DF-1 has fared poorly in the fighting against the heretical Mormonhideen, who have developed many improvised weapons capable of defeating the armor on this vehicle, as detailed in report [REDACTED]. The Extended War on the Eastern Front has stalled for want of sufficient survivable firepower to push back the Mormon menace beyond the Colorado River south of the Vegas Crater.
      The design team responsible for the abject failure that was the DF-1 have been liquidated, which however has not solved the deficiencies of the existing vehicle in service. Therefore, a new vehicle is required, to meet the requirements of the People’s Auditory Forces to keep the dream of our lord and prophet alive.
      Over the past decade, the following threats have presented themselves:
      A.      The Cascadian M-2239 “Norman” MBT and M-8 light tank
      Despite being approximately the same size, these 2 vehicles seem to share no common components, not even the primary armament! Curiously, it appears that the lone 120mm SPG specimen recovered shares design features with the M-8, despite being made out of steel and not aluminum like the light tank. (based on captured specimens from the battle of Crater Lake, detailed in report [REDACTED]).
      Both tanks are armed with high velocity guns.
      B.      The Cascadian BGM-1A/1B/1C/1D ATGM
      Fitted on a limited number of tank destroyers, several attack helicopters, and (to an extent) man-portable, this missile system is the primary Cascadian anti-armor weapon other than their armored forces. Intelligence suggests that a SACLOS version (BGM-1C) is in LRIP, with rumors of a beam-riding version (BGM-1D) being developed.
      Both warheads penetrate approximately 6 cone diameters.
      C.      Deseret tandem ATR-4 series
      Inspired by the Soviet 60/105mm tandem warhead system from the late 80s, the Mormon nation has manufactured a family of 2”/4” tandem HEAT warheads, launched from expendable short-range tube launchers, dedicated AT RRs, and even used as the payload of the JS-1 MCLOS vehicle/man-portable ATGM.
      Both warheads penetrate approximately 5 cone diameters.
      D.      Cascadian HEDP 90mm rocket
      While not a particularly impressive AT weapon, being of only middling diameter and a single shaped charge, the sheer proliferation of this device has rendered it a major threat to tanks, as well as lighter vehicles. This weapon is available in large numbers in Cascadian infantry squads as “pocket artillery”, and there are reports of captured stocks being used by the Mormonhideen.
      Warhead penetrates approximately 4 cone diameters.
      E.      Deseret 40mm AC/ Cascadian 35mm AC
      These autocannon share broadly similar AP performance, and are considered a likely threat for the foreseeable future, on Deseret armored cars, Cascadian tank destroyers, and likely also future IFVs.
      F.      IEDs
      In light of the known resistance of tanks to standard 10kg anti-tank mines, both the Perfidious Cascadians and the Mormonhideen have taken to burying larger anti-tank A2AD weaponry. The Cascadians have doubled up some mines, and the Mormons have regularly buried AT mines 3, 4, and even 5 deep.
      2.      General guidelines:
      A.      Solicitation outline:
      In light of the differing requirements for the 2 theaters of war in which the new vehicle is expected to operate, proposals in the form of a field-replaceable A-kit/B-kit solution will be accepted.
      B.      Requirements definitions:
      The requirements in each field are given in 3 levels- Threshold, Objective, and Ideal.
      Threshold is the minimum requirement to be met; failure to reach this standard may greatly disadvantage any proposal.
      Objective is the threshold to be aspired to; it reflects the desires of the People’s Auditory Forces Armored Branch, which would prefer to see all of them met. At least 70% must be met, with bonus points for any more beyond that.
      Ideal specifications are the maximum of which the armored forces dare not even dream. Bonus points will be given to any design meeting or exceeding these specifications.
      C.      All proposals must accommodate the average 1.7m high Californian recruit.
      D.      The order of priorities for the DPRC is as follows:
      a.      Vehicle recoverability.
      b.      Continued fightability.
      c.       Crew survival.
      E.      Permissible weights:
      a.      No individual field-level removable or installable component may exceed 5 tons.
      b.      Despite the best efforts of the Agriculture Command, Californian recruits cannot be expected to lift weights in excess of 25 kg at any time.
      c.       Total vehicle weight must remain within MLC 120 all-up for transport.
      F.      Overall dimensions:
      a.      Length- essentially unrestricted.
      b.      Width- 4m transport width.
                                                                    i.     No more than 4 components requiring a crane may be removed to meet this requirement.
                                                                   ii.     Any removed components must be stowable on top of the vehicle.
      c.       Height- The vehicle must not exceed 3.5m in height overall.
      G.     Technology available:
      a.      Armor:
      The following armor materials are in full production and available for use. Use of a non-standard armor material requires permission from a SEA ORG judge.
      Structural materials:
                                                                    i.     RHA/CHA
      Basic steel armor, 250 BHN. The reference for all weapon penetration figures, good impact properties, fully weldable. Available in thicknesses up to 150mm (RHA) or 300mm (CHA).
      Density- 7.8 g/cm^3.
                                                                   ii.     Aluminum 5083
      More expensive to work with than RHA per weight, middling impact properties, low thermal limits. Excellent stiffness.
       Fully weldable. Available in thicknesses up to 100mm.
      Mass efficiency vs RHA of 1 vs CE, 0.9 vs KE.
      Thickness efficiency vs RHA of 0.33 vs CE, 0.3 vs KE.
      Density- 2.7 g/cm^3 (approx. 1/3 of steel).
      For structural integrity, the following guidelines are recommended:
      For light vehicles (less than 40 tons), not less than 25mm RHA/45mm Aluminum base structure
      For heavy vehicles (70 tons and above), not less than 45mm RHA/80mm Aluminum base structure.
      Intermediate values for intermediate vehicles may be chosen as seen fit.
      Non-structural passive materials:
                                                                  iii.     HHA
      Steel, approximately 500 BHN through-hardened. Approximately twice as effective as RHA against KE and HEAT on a per-weight basis. Not weldable, middling shock properties. Available in thicknesses up to 25mm.
      Density- 7.8g/cm^3.
                                                                  iv.     Glass textolite
      Mass efficiency vs RHA of 2.2 vs CE, 1.64 vs KE.
      Thickness efficiency vs RHA of 0.52 vs CE, 0.39 vs KE.
      Density- 1.85 g/cm^3 (approximately ¼ of steel).
                                                                   v.     Fused silica
      Mass efficiency vs RHA of 3.5 vs CE, 1 vs KE.
      Thickness efficiency vs RHA of 1 vs CE, 0.28 vs KE.
      Density-2.2g/cm^3 (approximately 1/3.5 of steel).
      Non-structural, requires confinement (being in a metal box) to work.
                                                                  vi.     Fuel
      Mass efficiency vs RHA of 1.3 vs CE, 1 vs KE.
      Thickness efficiency vs RHA of 0.14 vs CE, 0.1 vs KE.
                                                                vii.     Assorted stowage/systems
      Mass efficiency vs RHA- 1 vs CE, 0.8 vs KE.
                                                               viii.     Spaced armor
      Requires a face of at least 25mm LOS vs CE, and at least 50mm LOS vs KE.
      Reduces penetration by a factor of 1.1 vs CE or 1.05 vs KE for every 10 cm air gap.
      Spaced armor rules only apply after any standoff surplus to the requirements of a reactive cassette.
      Reactive armor materials:
                                                                  ix.     ERA-light
      A sandwich of 3mm/3mm/3mm steel-explodium-steel.
      Requires mounting brackets of approximately 10-30% cassette weight.
      Must be spaced at least 3 sandwich thicknesses away from any other armor elements to allow full functionality. 81% coverage (edge effects).
                                                                   x.     ERA-heavy
      A sandwich of 15mm steel/3mm explodium/9mm steel.
      Requires mounting brackets of approximately 10-30% cassette weight.
      Must be spaced at least 3 sandwich thicknesses away from any other armor elements to allow full functionality. 81% coverage (edge effects).
                                                                  xi.     NERA-light
      A sandwich of 6mm steel/6mm rubber/ 6mm steel.
      Requires mounting brackets of approximately 10-30% cassette weight.
      Must be spaced at least 1 sandwich thickness away from any other armor elements to allow full functionality. 95% coverage.
                                                                 xii.     NERA-heavy
      A sandwich of 30mm steel/6m rubber/18mm steel.
      Requires mounting brackets of approximately 10-30% cassette weight.
      Must be spaced at least 1 sandwich thickness away from any other armor elements to allow full functionality. 95% coverage.
      The details of how to calculate armor effectiveness will be detailed in Appendix 1.
      b.      Firepower
                                                                    i.     2A46 equivalent tech- pressure limits, semi-combustible cases, recoil mechanisms and so on are at an equivalent level to that of the USSR in the year 1960.
                                                                   ii.     Limited APFSDS (L:D 15:1)- Spindle sabots or bourelleted sabots, see for example the Soviet BM-20 100mm APFSDS.
                                                                  iii.     Limited tungsten (no more than 100g per shot)
                                                                  iv.     Californian shaped charge technology- 5 CD penetration for high-pressure resistant HEAT, 6 CD for low pressure/ precision formed HEAT.
                                                                   v.     The general issue GPMG for the People’s Auditory Forces is the PKM. The standard HMG is the DShK.
      c.       Mobility
                                                                    i.     Engines tech level:
      1.      MB 838 (830 HP)
      2.      AVDS-1790-5A (908 HP)
      3.      Kharkov 5TD (600 HP)
                                                                   ii.     Power density should be based on the above engines. Dimensions are available online, pay attention to cooling of 1 and 3 (water cooled).
                                                                  iii.     Power output broadly scales with volume, as does weight. Trying to extract more power from the same size may come at the cost of reliability (and in the case of the 5TD, it isn’t all that reliable in the first place).
                                                                  iv.     There is nothing inherently wrong with opposed piston or 2-stroke engines if done right.
      d.      Electronics
                                                                    i.     LRFs- unavailable
                                                                   ii.     Thermals-unavailable
                                                                  iii.     I^2- limited
      3.      Operational Requirements.
      The requirements are detailed in the appended spreadsheet.
      4.      Submission protocols.
      Submission protocols and methods will be established in a follow-on post, nearer to the relevant time.
      Appendix 1- armor calculation
      Appendix 2- operational requirements
      Addendum 1 - more armor details
      Good luck, and may Hubbard guide your way to enlightenment!
    • By N-L-M
      detailed below is the expected format of the final submission.
      The date is set as Wednesday the 19th of June at 23:59 GMT.
      Again, incomplete designs may be submitted as they are and will be judged as seen fit.
      Vehicle Designation and name

      [insert 3-projection (front, top, side) and isometric render of vehicle here)

      Table of basic statistics:



      Mass, combat

      Length, combat (transport)

      Width, combat (transport)

      Height, combat (transport)

      Ground Pressure, MMP (nominal)

      Estimated Speed

      Estimated range

      Crew, number (roles)

      Main armament, caliber (ammo count ready/stowed)

      Secondary armament, caliber (ammo count ready/stowed)


      Vehicle designer’s notes: explain the thought process behind the design of the vehicle, ideas, and the development process from the designer’s point of view.

      Vehicle feature list:

      1.     Link to Appendix 1- RFP spreadsheet, colored to reflect achieved performance.

      2.     Engine- type, displacement, rated power, cooling, neat features.

      3.     Transmission- type, arrangement, neat features.

      4.     Fuel- Type, volume available, stowage location, estimated range, neat features.

      5.     Other neat features in the engine bay.

      6.     Suspension- Type, Travel, ground clearance, neat features.


      1.     Link to Appendix 1 - RFP spreadsheet, colored to reflect achieved performance.

      2.     Link to Appendix 2- armor array details.

      3.     Non-specified survivability features and other neat tricks- low profile, gun depression, instant smoke, cunning internal arrangement, and the like.


      A.    Weapons:

      1.     Link to Appendix 1- RFP spreadsheet, colored to reflect achieved performance.

      2.     Main Weapon-

      a.      Type

      b.      Caliber

      c.      ammunition types and performance (short)

      d.     Ammo stowage arrangement- numbers ready and total, features.

      e.      FCS- relevant systems, relevant sights for operating the weapon and so on.

      f.      Neat features.

      3.     Secondary weapon- Similar format to primary. Tertiary and further weapons- likewise.

      4.     Link to Appendix 3- Weapon system magic. This is where you explain how all the special tricks related to the armament that aren’t obviously available using Soviet 1961 tech work, and expand to your heart’s content on extimated performance and how these estimates were reached.

      B.    Optics:

      1.     Primary gunsight- type, associated trickery.

      2.     Likewise for any and all other optics systems installed, in no particular order.

      C.    FCS:

      1.     List of component systems, their purpose and the basic system architecture.

      2.     Link to Appendix 3- weapon system magic, if you have long explanations about the workings of the system.


      1.     List vehicle features which improve its fightability and useability.

      Additonal Features:

      Feel free to list more features as you see fit, in more categories.

      Free expression zone: Let out your inner Thetan to fully impress the world with the fruit of your labor. Kindly spoiler this section if it’s very long.

       Example for filling in Appendix 1
    • By Collimatrix
      Shortly after Jeeps_Guns_Tanks started his substantial foray into documenting the development and variants of the M4, I joked on teamspeak with Wargaming's The_Warhawk that the next thing he ought to do was a similar post on the T-72.
      Haha.  I joke.  I am funny man.
      The production history of the T-72 is enormously complicated.  Tens of thousands were produced; it is probably the fourth most produced tank ever after the T-54/55, T-34 and M4 sherman.
      For being such an ubiquitous vehicle, it's frustrating to find information in English-language sources on the T-72.  Part of this is residual bad information from the Cold War era when all NATO had to go on were blurry photos from May Day parades:

      As with Soviet aircraft, NATO could only assign designations to obviously externally different versions of the vehicle.  However, they were not necessarily aware of internal changes, nor were they aware which changes were post-production modifications and which ones were new factory variants of the vehicle.  The NATO designations do not, therefore, necessarily line up with the Soviet designations.  Between different models of T-72 there are large differences in armor protection and fire control systems.  This is why anyone arguing T-72 vs. X has completely missed the point; you need to specify which variant of T-72.  There are large differences between them!
      Another issue, and one which remains contentious to this day, is the relation between the T-64, T-72 and T-80 in the Soviet Army lineup.  This article helps explain the political wrangling which led to the logistically bizarre situation of three very similar tanks being in frontline service simultaneously, but the article is extremely biased as it comes from a high-ranking member of the Ural plant that designed and built the T-72.  Soviet tank experts still disagree on this; read this if you have some popcorn handy.  Talking points from the Kharkov side seem to be that T-64 was a more refined, advanced design and that T-72 was cheap filler, while Ural fans tend to hold that T-64 was an unreliable mechanical prima donna and T-72 a mechanically sound, mass-producible design.
      So, if anyone would like to help make sense of this vehicle, feel free to post away.  I am particularly interested in:
      -What armor arrays the different T-72 variants use.  Diagrams, dates of introduction, and whether the array is factory-produced or a field upgrade of existing armor are pertinent questions.
      -Details of the fire control system.  One of the Kharkov talking points is that for most of the time in service, T-64 had a more advanced fire control system than contemporary T-72 variants.  Is this true?  What were the various fire control systems in the T-64 and T-72, and what were there dates of introduction?  I am particularly curious when Soviet tanks got gun-follows-sight FCS.
      -Export variants and variants produced outside the Soviet Union.  How do they stack up?  Exactly what variant(s) of T-72 were the Iraqis using in 1991?

      -WTF is up with the T-72's transmission?  How does it steer and why is its reverse speed so pathetically low?
    • By LoooSeR
      Hello, my friends and Kharkovites, take a sit and be ready for your brains to start to work - we are going to tell you a terrible secret of how to tell apart Soviet tanks that actually works like GLORIOUS T-80 and The Mighty T-72 from Kharkovites attempt to make a tank - the T-64. Many of capitalists Westerners have hard time understanding what tank is in front of them, even when they know smart words like "Kontakt-5" ERA. Ignoramus westerners!
         Because you are all were raised in several hundreds years old capitalism system all of you are blind consumer dummies, that need big noisy labels and shiny colorful things to be attached to product X to be sold to your ignorant heads and wallets, thats why we will need to start with basics. BASICS, DA? First - how to identify to which tank "family" particular MBT belongs to - to T-64 tree, or T-72 line, or Superior T-80 development project, vehicles that don't have big APPLE logo on them for you to understand what is in front of you. And how you can do it in your home without access to your local commie tank nerd? 
         Easy! Use this Putin approved guide "How to tell appart different families of Soviet and Russian tanks from each other using simple and easy to spot external features in 4 steps: a guide for ignorant western journalists and chairborn generals to not suck in their in-depth discussions on the Internet".
      Chapter 1: Where to look, what to see.
      T-64 - The Ugly Kharkovite tank that doesn't work 
         We will begin with T-64, a Kharkovite attempt to make a tank, which was so successful that Ural started to work on their replacement for T-64 known as T-72. Forget about different models of T-64, let's see what is similar between all of them.

      T-72 - the Mighty weapon of Workers and Peasants to smash westerners
         Unlike tank look-alike, made by Kharkovites mad mans, T-72 is true combat tank to fight with forces of evil like radical moderate barbarians and westerners. Thats why we need to learn how identify it from T-64 and you should remember it's frightening lines!

      The GLORIOUS T-80 - a Weapon to Destroy and Conquer bourgeois countries and shatter westerners army
         And now we are looking at the Pride of Party and Soviet army, a true tank to spearhead attacks on decadent westerners, a tank that will destroy countries by sucking their military budgets and dispersing their armies in vortex of air, left from high-speed charge by the GLORIOUS T-80!

      The T-80 shooting down jets by hitting them behind the horizont 
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