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18 hours ago, SH_MM said:


That is a very emotional response to the topic. You cannot call bullshit without knowing the Austrian requirements and test conditions. Maybe the Austrian military used smaller targets, wanted an acceptable hit probability while firing on the move, wanted to engage targets at longer ranges or where expecting firing performance closer to the Leopard 2 or M1A1D/M1A2?


That the fire control system of the M60A3 wasn't on par with the newer tanks is well known. In CAT it managed to get a third, an eight and a ninth place...



It isn't really a matter of interpretation. The NP105 APFSDS wasn't tested with one single gun, it already was accepted for service in 1985 after demonstrating its ability to defeat the required targets (including an arrangement of three spaced steel plates). The complaints about the unsatisfactory dispersion with the NP105 lead to the investigations criticized by the Rechnungshof.


The waffenseitiger Fehler either refers to  all M68A1s being faulty or all M60A3s being considered faulty in regards to meeting the Austrian requirements. Not the single (?) M68/M60A3s in the trials, as otherwise the common soldiers would never have complained about the lack of accuracy in 1989 and 1990.


My response wasn't "emotional" at all...it was simply a reply to some BS that was posted regarding the performance of a tank that I know by personal experience, is a high performer. By the way, how much personal experience do you have on the M60A3...or any tank for that matter? Just curious...    


Clearly, the Austrians conducting the live-fire test knew the capabilities of the tanks firing the NP105 rounds...if the parameters were set above the capabilities of the tanks being used, the tests were bogus anyway. In other words, if they were "expecting firing performance closer to the Leopard 2 or M1A1D/M1A2" as you offered above, why use the M60A3? Maybe it was the only tank available...or maybe the round just wasn't performing as expected. The generalized observation, "i.e. this paragraph mentions that the accuracy of the M60A3 was bad and some people blamed the new Austrian APFSDS for this, but after various investigations that lasted until July 1991, it was proven to be a fault of the M60A3 and not of the NP 105 APFSDS round," sounds much more political than the actual failure of the tank doing the shooting.


Finally, saying that the "fire control system of the M60A3 wasn't on par with the newer tanks is well known," is obvious and naive...it was the tank the Austrians used. If they wanted a more modern tank with more sophisticated fire control, they should have used one. It looks like the tank was the "fall-guy" for expensive rounds that under-performed.            

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   Interesting article about T-64 turrets by Andrey




   The idea of using ceramics as a material for protection against HEAT shells first arose in the mid-1950s at the Physicotechnical Institute (now the Ioffe Physical-Technical Institute). Studies have established that in terms of depth of penetration of a HEAT jet, high hardness ceramic materials are close to armor-grade steel, although their density is much lower. In 1958, the specialists of the Physicotechnical Institute and VNII-100 thoroughly examined the possible results of using the research for anti-HEAT protection of tanks. From that moment, the development of combined armor with ceramic filler for tanks began. The center of research in that field became VNII-100, supervised by V.S. Starovoitov.


   Both with the protection of the hull and the turret there were problems requiring serious efforts and time to solve them. In addition, the situation was aggravated by internal competition in the industry, examples of which will be given below.



   In a technical project (April 1961), a two-part hull protection design was proposed - 80 mm steel + 140 mm fiberglass (steklotextolit). This design leads its development from the design of the hull of "Izdelie 432", 1960. As on Object 430, the upper frontal part of the hull consisted of three parts, the central and lateral “cheekbones”. The solution was quite rational for protection against armor-piercing and sub-caliber armor-piercing shells, but for layered armor with anti-HEAT material, this design turned out to be irrational.

   In addition, the very idea of 2 layer armor (80 mm steel + 140 mm fiberglass), originally proposed for the T-64, was replaced by a design with a 20 mm back plate (back support) while reducing the thickness of the fiberglass to 105 mm. This scheme (80 mm steel + 105 mm fiberglass + 20 mm steel) was chosen as the main one for the further production of the T-64, as well as for the T-64A, as well as the vehicles developed on its basis - T-72 and T-80.



   For the Object 432 turret (1961), two filler options were considered:

  • steel armor casting with "ultra-porcelain" inserts with an initial base horizontal thickness of 420 mm with equivalent anti-HEAT protection of 450 m
  • cast turret, consisting of a steel armor base, aluminum anti-HEAT "shirt" (poured after casting a steel body) and an external steel armor and aluminum. The total maximum wall thickness of this tower is ~ 500 mm and is equivalent to ~ 460 mm anti-HEAT protection.

Both types of turrets yielded more than a ton of weight savings compared to an all-steel turret of equal protection level.



   Turret with with ultraforcelain inserts (cylinders) from the technical project of “Izdelie 432”, 1961. They returned to this idea in 1968, but the final version was corundum balls KVP-98, which were produced by a ceramic factory in Slavyansk (assembly of inserts with balls). The very development of the turret from the project to the adoption in 1973 took 12 years.



   A turret with aluminum filler was installed on the T-64 production tanks - however, in comparison with the technical design, the turret’s dimensions increased by more than 100 mm, and the mass accordingly increased. Along with this, the working space for crew was reduced; in addition, the turret blocked the opening of the driver’s hatch in a certain range of angles of rotation of the gun, which made it impossible to use the hatch to exit it if it was impossible to rotate the turret to the angle necessary for this.


the designers conducted further searches to eliminate the aforementioned shortcomings, associated primarily with the dimensions of the frontal armor of the turret.



   T-64 production model turret with aluminum filler



   T-64 production model turret with aluminum filler, overall sections. When fired, the turret with combined armor provided full protection against 85-mm and 100-mm HEAT shells (similar to 105-mm cumulative shells of NATO countries), 100-mm armor-piercing blunt-headed shells with in arc of ± 35 °



In a book describing the official history of the Steel Research Institute [NII Stali], these developments are described as follows:


   “The task was set to eliminate this drawback, without increasing the distance between the axis of rotation of the turret and the location of the hatch. To do this, the thickness of the turret had to be reduced in comparison with the steel-aluminum-steel turret by almost 200 mm (from 600 to 410 mm). The decision to change the thickness of the turret while maintaining its anti-HEAT and ballistic resistance within the specified requirements was proposed by V.V. Jerusalemskiy. He proposed to do this by using high-hard steel inserts for the turret, thermally treated by the differential isothermal quenching method, to obtain a particularly hard core and a relatively less hard, but more plastic outer surface.


   The protection result was quite decent - better than on the experimental turrets with ceramic balls, which VNII Transmash was engaged in, and which had a greater total thickness in comparison with turrets with high-hardness steel inserts. The disadvantage of a turret with high-hardness steel inserts was the lack of survivability of the welded joint between the retaining sheet and the base of the turret, which, upon impact of an armor-piercing projectile, was destroyed without penetration.


   In connection with the obtained results, it was decided to start the production of a batch of turrets with high-hardness inserts with preliminary measures to strengthen welded joints. But here the irreparable happened - on the manufactured batch of inserts it was not possible to provide the minimum necessary toughness, and those inserts during shelling gave increased brittle fracture and penetration. ”



   The T-64 tank with a turret with aluminum filler and a upper frontal hull plate with "cheekbones".



   T-64 tank with a turret with aluminum filler and a straight upper frontal part of the hull, 1967



   The story [in the book] is described rather dryly and mundane, a common failure in development, but every lover of the history of tank building will certainly be interested in what was hidden behind it.


   In accordance with the decision of 12GU MOP and military unit 52682-III (NTK GBTU), back in 1966, the Zhdanov Heavy Machine Building Plant (ZhZTM) was allowed to cast the first 50 turrets with ceramic filler as part of the general annual production program. In September and November 1967, at the ZhZTM and military unit 68054 (NIIII BT), shelling tests were carried out at three turrets with spherical ceramic filler, made in different weights with turretss with high-strength steel inserts.


   During testing on these turret, a total of 105 shots were fired. Of them:

  • HEAT-fragmentation shell from "Rapier" with a standard speed, 38 shots;
  • with the same shell, but with a increased speed,18 rounds;
  • with a caliber projectile from the Molot gun - 9 shots;
  • an armor-piercing projectile of a caliber of 100 mm - 15 shots, while from all the test shots, these turrets were not penetrated.



From a letter by A.A. Morozov:


   The test results presented show that turrets with spherical fillers have a margin of anti-HEAT resistance compared to those specified in the requirements, and therefore there is a real possibility of some reduction in the weight of these turrets, while taking into account the results of preliminary work with modified forms of ceramic filler, there is reason to expect to further reduce the weight. In addition, as production experience has shown, ceramic-filled turrets have better manufacturability, less laboriousness, a shorter production cycle compared to other options, which is confirmed by the G-4448 enterprise (see Letter No. 00252), which, in in particular, indicates that the laboriousness of manufacturing the turrets of the 434 tank with ceramic filling is less than about 900 standard hours compared with turrets with high-hardness inserts.


   It should also be noted the ceramic fillers for turrets is cheaper material, and is not a strategic raw material.


   A number of the above essential qualities of ceramic-filled turrets give us reason to support the recommendation for further work on finalizing the design of such turrets and conducting final tests for their acceptance into mass production in the manner previously described in their letter No. 7889 of December 22, 67.

   In connection with the ongoing preparation of our factory for the production of 434 tanks, as well as the preparation of their production at other tank factories, we consider it necessary now to decide on the type of turrets for serial production of 434 tanks.


   Considering the above advantages of turrets with ceramic filler, we believe to conduct production preparation at the enterprise G-4448 of these turrets in parallel with their final development and testing.


   Before launching into serial production, pre-cast one turret to clarify the geometry and test it by shelling at the G-4448 factory no later than 05/15/1968.


   If the test results are positive and clarifications are made, start serial production of the turrets, and the two units from the first batch of cast towers are subjected to control tests of military unit G-68054 or at the G-4448 enterprise under the direction of military unit G-68054 .


The necessary possible refinements based on the results of these tests should be made in the process of mass production. ”





   It would seem that the issue with the T-64A turret, replacing the T-64 in serial production, has been resolved.

   According to plans of the period T-64A, production was also planned to be started at the plants of Nizhny Tagil, Omsk, Leningrad and Chelyabinsk. But with the opinion of the developers of the turret with ceramic balls - VNII-100 and the manufacturer ZhZTM did not agree with the developers of the competing turret with steel inserts - VNII Stali. A letter from the director of this organization A.T. Larin dated 01/18/68 on the manufacture of an installation batch of turrets with ceramic filler caused a stir among the designers of the KhKBM and in the ministry, since it completely contradicted the results obtained by the developers and the customer. Below is its text:



   “As a result of research and experimental work carried out by the A-7701 (VNII Transmash) in 1967, three experimental turrets with ceramic filler K22, K23 and K24 were tested.


   Based on the test results, the A-3530 enterprise in its letter No. 7852ss dated December 22-19-1967, in 1968, proposes to manufacture an installation batch of turrets with ceramic filler for the 434 tank - 5 units and for the T-64 tank - 50 units.


   On this proposal, we consider it necessary to inform the following comments:


1) None of the tested turrets K22, K23 and K24 was brought to the weight specified by the chief designer,, the internal volume and radius of the sweeping were not maintained.

This data is not in the report No. 005105 from 20-10-67 on the testing of turrets K22, K23 and K24 at KhZTM.

   Available data on the layout of the K23 towers tested in military unit 68054 show that the towers were manufactured with an overweight of 200 kg (according to the conditions for the height dimension of 548 mm +6, as is customary for the manufacturing technology of T-64 and "434" turrets) .

   According to our measurements, the radius of overcasting towers K22, K23 and K24 exceeds the target by 10-20 mm. All this does not allow us to judge the level of protective characteristics and survivability of turrets with ceramics if, subjected to the specified weight and overall dimensions.


2) Despite the overweight of the turrets, their survivability cannot be considered satisfactory. For example, the penetration of a 100 mm armor-piercing projectile into the lower part of the K-24 turret in the vicinity of belts I-II (shot No. 17) caused the formation of a through gap along the lower end 370 mm long with a shift of metal along the crack by 30-40 mm.

Such damagedisables the turret completely.

   No such damage was observed on turrets with aluminum filler and inserts made of high-strength steel. On K22 and K23 there were  tears of the outer layer of armor.

   For example, on the K23 turret, when a 100-mm armor-piercing projectile hit, an armor piece of 300 × 300 × 120 mm in size was obtained in the form of a piece flying off from the turret. Such damage was not observed even on turrets with aluminum filler.


   When tested at the Pavlograd test site of turret number K16 / 17 with ceramic filler 100 mm with subcaliber shells with a tungsten carbide core from the D10T gun, extremely low protection was obtained (report No. 28 dated 25 / 12-67). With 7 hits in all areas of the turret with Vsp = 1400-1430 m / s with a heading angle of ± 35 °, 7 penetrations were obtained with an exit diameter of 70-80 mm. Penetrations were also obtained in those areas of the turret in which the weight of the armor with ceramics in the direction of the sections was equal to the weight of the armor of the K23, K24.


   Our tests of armor samples show that protection against the indicated type of sub-projectile at Vud = 1400-1450 m / s. it is provided when using armor with aluminum filler, fiberglass and inserts made of high-strength steel in thicknesses made on the hulls and turrets of the T-64 and 434 tanks.


   New domestic 100 and 122 mm APS shells with a tungsten carbide core are the same as APDS 105 mm APG shells of the main tanks of the NATO countries - M60A1 and Leopard, and in our opinion, the protection of T-64 and 434 tanks from 105 mm APS shell - a tungsten core is required at firing ranges of up to 1000 m, specified by the tactical-technical requirements of the T-64 and 434 tanks for protection against sub-caliber shells. According to our calculated and other data at a range of 1000 m at Vud. = 1360 m / s. The English APDS shell at 0-35 ° meeting angles pierces up to 350 mm of medium-hard rolled armor and slightly exceeds 100 and 122 domestic sub-caliber shells of this type in armor-piercing ability with equal impact speed.


   Based on the foregoing, the V-2652 considers that the proposal to manufacture 55 turrets with ceramic filler for the T-64 and 434 tanks, put forward by the Malyshev plant and the A-3530, is premature, as it is not supported by the required volume by the corresponding positive test results.


In our opinion, at the moment, with a turret with a ceramic filler it is necessary:

1) determine their compliance with the specified requirements for protection with full compliance of the turrets  with the specified overall parameters, height dimensions and the weight specified in the drawing.

2) It is necessary to determine the level of ballistic protection of turrets with ceramics when fired by subcaliber shells with a tungsten carbide core, since when testing the K16 / 17 turret, the level of protection against these shells was extremely low.

3) It is necessary to carry out work to improve the survivability of turrets with ceramics when firing 100 mm in the lower zone in the zone of belts I-II.

Thus, the proposal for the manufacture of 55 turrets with a ceramic filler can be considered when resolving these issues with a positive result. "



   Ceramic ball with diameter of 70 mm



   In response to this letter A. A. Morozov addressed his deputies E. A. Morozov and N.I. Veselovsky: “What is your opinion? Butov R.I. continues to report good resluts of firing tests. ZhZTM also speaks same. Sort it out and report. "


   Letter written by the director of the All-Russian Research Institute of Steel, it became an occasion for further work to improve the design of the turret, even despite penetration of turret with ceramic filler with one shell, and even as indicated in the letter of the director of the Research Institute of Transmash V. Starovoitov to the site at heading angles greater than 35 °, the original design was far from ideal.


   In the transition from model to full-scale studies, significant problems arose, such as:

  • ensuring the structural strength and survivability of armor, consisting of fragile materials;
  • providing, along with anti-HEAT resistance, protection against kinetic weapons, in particular, against sub-caliber shells with a tungsten core;
  • development of technology for the serial production of combined armor;
  • development of the ceramic filler itself, which meets protection requirements.



   T-64A turret with ceramics



   The first full-scale tests showed that the ceramic filler in the form of cylinders or prisms has a required specific anti-HEAT resistance, however, the structural strength and survivability of the combined armor were insufficient. It also turned out that the rear steel part of the armor plays a significant role in providing protection not only against HEAT, but also against sub-caliber weapons. A cipher telegram was sent from the customer's side to the ZhZTM to prohibit the presentation for test turrets with ceramic filler before making changes to the drawings on the turret.



   Serial T-64A turret, sections



In turret of subsequent manufacture, changes were made characterizing the minimum distance from the outer and inner surfaces of the ceramic filler, eliminating the disadvantages described during the tests. Also, the turret were significantly strengthened by the thickness of the back layer - 200 ÷ 220 instead of 170, rational placement of ceramic balls was ensured. Regarding the current situation, A. A. Morozov wrote: “When will all this end. Is there any way to test another turret, who will pay for it? ”


   At the same time, the chief designer received letters about the positive test results and the compliance of the tested turret with specified requirements, which contradicted the letter of A.T. Larin. All this conflicting information from competing organizations required additional costs of both time and money.

   Answer of the director of VNIITransmash V.S. Starovoitov of February 26, 1968 to the letter of A.T. Larin was quite sharp:



   “We became aware of a letter from the director of the enterprise V-2652, comrade Larin A.T., in which, without any reason, it points out three shortcomings of a turret with ceramic filler for Object 434.


   In this regard, we consider it necessary to state the following:

1. The K-23 turret with ceramic filler is made according to the drawing of R.165-2012-10 of the chief designer and adopted VP No. 333 MO at the heavy factory. The weight of the K-23 part is equal to the weight of the S-10 part with solid inserts, and the sweeping radius and height are in the dimensions of the drawing, as there is an entry in the measurement map.

2. The survivability of the turret, according to the conclusion of the commission that conducted the tests, as well as military unit 68054 and military unit 52682-III, is quite satisfactory (report of military unit 68054 inv. No. 3438 and letter of military unit 52682-6 original no. K / 855668 dated January 12, 1968).

3. A turret of a different design was subjected to shelling with subcaliber carbide-tungsten shells in Pavlograd and, moreover, at course angles greater than 35 °.

Thus, the letter of the enterprise 2652 does not contain a single element of truth, and its purpose is incomprehensible. ”



   View of IVth belt of the serial-production turret 



   Against the background of no less problems with the turret with steel inserts developed at the Research Institute of Steel, the situation looked quite alarming and could lead to a disruption in the production of tanks. According to the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the plant named after Malyshev was supposed to release the pre-mass production batch of the T-64A in 1968, and in 1969 to begin mass production. It was decided to manufacture, test, and accept the cast towers of the T-64A tank under temporary technical conditions. Additional tests of the K-35 turret were also carried out, which provided the level of resistance set by the VTU-4334-68.


   In 1973, a turret with ceramics was adopted for the T-64A. Serial production of those turrets for the T-64A and T-64B tanks continued for 15 years - until December 27, 1987, when the last T-64BV left the assembly line. Nevertheless, the turets with ceramic balls of the T-64A type on tanks of other developers did not take root. The rationale for this was as follows:

  • for the manufacture of turrets according to the type seen on the T-64A tank, it is necessary to create new production facilities for the production of lined corundum balls and baskets for their installation in the mold;
  • the technology for producing turrets with the necessary durability and survivability, the lack of the required margin of increase of durability and survivability of turrets with ceramic elements subjected to softening when pouring molten liquid steel, even in the presence of thermally insulating coating layers, have not been developed.


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   BRDM-2MB "Bekas", modernisation of BRDM-2.















   In the Ruzsky district of the Moscow region, the B-ARMS LLC presented a deeply modernized version of the BRDM-2 - a BRDM-2MB Bekas armored reconnaissance and patrol vehicle, work on which began in 2016, said project chief designer Alexei Butrimov.


   “Today we present the modernization of the BRDM-2MB Bekas, which we started back in 2016. The first BRDM-2MS Strizh (Swift) was made, which you could see at the parade in Laos, in Kyrgyzstan and in other countries when transferring cars. In the process of manufacturing the first kits, we made the second modernization, ” TASS reports him.


   He noted that this version is distinguished by improved characteristics, additional armor, an anti-mine protection measures, and is also equipped with a new air conditioning system. Improved performance of the brake and fuel system.


   According to the chief designer, the machine is designed for security, border service and for those law enforcement agencies that need a quick and compact response. BRDM-2MB "Bekas" is well suited for the city and rough terrain. A 136 horsepower diesel engine allows vehicle to easily accelerate to 100 kilometers per hour.

Photo: Andrey Zinchuk / “Equipment and armament, Sergey Bulkin















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Featuring strangely saggy Typhoon suspension. 









Left out the Armata variants because they have their own thread. Video is right there. Its crazy how big the Boomerang is especially driving behind a BTR-82



Moscow V Day parade rehearsal streetside video 



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   Looks like Vikings used by TsSN FSB units will be shown at a parade as SSO vehicles, for some reason.








   Berezhok combat module details. Automatic grenade launcher in the back is removed, but mount and feed sleeve is visible.







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16 hours ago, LoooSeR said:


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Pitty they didn't restore the Czechoslovak /Laos tanks to the WW2 state but I guess 99% of the audience would not find the difference anyway. Seeing sooo many T-34 at once in 2020 must be something. For me it would be probably bigger thing that to watch the T-14... 


T-34 destroying the street... 



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On 6/19/2020 at 7:02 PM, Beer said:

Pitty they didn't restore the Czechoslovak /Laos tanks to the WW2 state but I guess 99% of the audience would not find the difference anyway.

Pity they even wasted time and money on these tanks. They have more than enough T-34s anyway. It would be so much better to see IS-2, ISU-152/122, SU-76/85/100/122, these all contributed greatly to victory, but no, only stupid T-34... :( 

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20 minutes ago, heretic88 said:

Pity they even wasted time and money on these tanks. They have more than enough T-34s anyway. It would be so much better to see IS-2, ISU-152/122, SU-76/85/100/122, these all contributed greatly to victory, but no, only stupid T-34... :( 


Don't they have those as well when even here in Czechia we have at least 3-4 IS-2 (out of which one is in running condition), at least two ISU-152 and one SU-100 (one in running condition)?  

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21 hours ago, Beer said:

Don't they have those as well when even here in Czechia we have at least 3-4 IS-2 (out of which one is in running condition), at least two ISU-152 and one SU-100 (one in running condition)?  

They have some, but who knows in what condition. Some museums certainly have running IS-2, ISU, etc. but they appear only on some events. Really, I dont know why they prefer T-34s on parade. Sure, it was the most produced tank of the red army, that may be a reason. Also the undeserved "legendary" status of the 34. But whatever is the real cause, it seems that restoration of T-34s is always the no1 priority over anything. Sad. Especially when other, far more interesting vehicles just rot away in outside exhibits. Like the KV-2... 

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9 minutes ago, heretic88 said:

They have some, but who knows in what condition. Some museums certainly have running IS-2, ISU, etc. but they appear only on some events. Really, I dont know why they prefer T-34s on parade. Sure, it was the most produced tank of the red army, that may be a reason. Also the undeserved "legendary" status of the 34. But whatever is the real cause, it seems that restoration of T-34s is always the no1 priority over anything. Sad. Especially when other, far more interesting vehicles just rot away in outside exhibits. Like the KV-2... 


IMHO it's simple and understandable. It's victory parade and the T-34 is a symbol of the victory. In the end it's not wrong at all because only the T-34 fought all Red Army battles through the war and bore the main burden of fighting. Those veteran tankers who still live also served mainly with T-34 and not with IS or KV. 


By the way an off topic and unrelated question... Do you have any Turán preserved in Hungary? 

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      B.      Requirements definitions:
      The requirements in each field are given in 3 levels- Threshold, Objective, and Ideal.
      Threshold is the minimum requirement to be met; failure to reach this standard may greatly disadvantage any proposal.
      Objective is the threshold to be aspired to; it reflects the desires of the People’s Auditory Forces Armored Branch, which would prefer to see all of them met. At least 70% must be met, with bonus points for any more beyond that.
      Ideal specifications are the maximum of which the armored forces dare not even dream. Bonus points will be given to any design meeting or exceeding these specifications.
      C.      All proposals must accommodate the average 1.7m high Californian recruit.
      D.      The order of priorities for the DPRC is as follows:
      a.      Vehicle recoverability.
      b.      Continued fightability.
      c.       Crew survival.
      E.      Permissible weights:
      a.      No individual field-level removable or installable component may exceed 5 tons.
      b.      Despite the best efforts of the Agriculture Command, Californian recruits cannot be expected to lift weights in excess of 25 kg at any time.
      c.       Total vehicle weight must remain within MLC 120 all-up for transport.
      F.      Overall dimensions:
      a.      Length- essentially unrestricted.
      b.      Width- 4m transport width.
                                                                    i.     No more than 4 components requiring a crane may be removed to meet this requirement.
                                                                   ii.     Any removed components must be stowable on top of the vehicle.
      c.       Height- The vehicle must not exceed 3.5m in height overall.
      G.     Technology available:
      a.      Armor:
      The following armor materials are in full production and available for use. Use of a non-standard armor material requires permission from a SEA ORG judge.
      Structural materials:
                                                                    i.     RHA/CHA
      Basic steel armor, 250 BHN. The reference for all weapon penetration figures, good impact properties, fully weldable. Available in thicknesses up to 150mm (RHA) or 300mm (CHA).
      Density- 7.8 g/cm^3.
                                                                   ii.     Aluminum 5083
      More expensive to work with than RHA per weight, middling impact properties, low thermal limits. Excellent stiffness.
       Fully weldable. Available in thicknesses up to 100mm.
      Mass efficiency vs RHA of 1 vs CE, 0.9 vs KE.
      Thickness efficiency vs RHA of 0.33 vs CE, 0.3 vs KE.
      Density- 2.7 g/cm^3 (approx. 1/3 of steel).
      For structural integrity, the following guidelines are recommended:
      For light vehicles (less than 40 tons), not less than 25mm RHA/45mm Aluminum base structure
      For heavy vehicles (70 tons and above), not less than 45mm RHA/80mm Aluminum base structure.
      Intermediate values for intermediate vehicles may be chosen as seen fit.
      Non-structural passive materials:
                                                                  iii.     HHA
      Steel, approximately 500 BHN through-hardened. Approximately twice as effective as RHA against KE and HEAT on a per-weight basis. Not weldable, middling shock properties. Available in thicknesses up to 25mm.
      Density- 7.8g/cm^3.
                                                                  iv.     Glass textolite
      Mass efficiency vs RHA of 2.2 vs CE, 1.64 vs KE.
      Thickness efficiency vs RHA of 0.52 vs CE, 0.39 vs KE.
      Density- 1.85 g/cm^3 (approximately ¼ of steel).
                                                                   v.     Fused silica
      Mass efficiency vs RHA of 3.5 vs CE, 1 vs KE.
      Thickness efficiency vs RHA of 1 vs CE, 0.28 vs KE.
      Density-2.2g/cm^3 (approximately 1/3.5 of steel).
      Non-structural, requires confinement (being in a metal box) to work.
                                                                  vi.     Fuel
      Mass efficiency vs RHA of 1.3 vs CE, 1 vs KE.
      Thickness efficiency vs RHA of 0.14 vs CE, 0.1 vs KE.
                                                                vii.     Assorted stowage/systems
      Mass efficiency vs RHA- 1 vs CE, 0.8 vs KE.
                                                               viii.     Spaced armor
      Requires a face of at least 25mm LOS vs CE, and at least 50mm LOS vs KE.
      Reduces penetration by a factor of 1.1 vs CE or 1.05 vs KE for every 10 cm air gap.
      Spaced armor rules only apply after any standoff surplus to the requirements of a reactive cassette.
      Reactive armor materials:
                                                                  ix.     ERA-light
      A sandwich of 3mm/3mm/3mm steel-explodium-steel.
      Requires mounting brackets of approximately 10-30% cassette weight.
      Must be spaced at least 3 sandwich thicknesses away from any other armor elements to allow full functionality. 81% coverage (edge effects).
                                                                   x.     ERA-heavy
      A sandwich of 15mm steel/3mm explodium/9mm steel.
      Requires mounting brackets of approximately 10-30% cassette weight.
      Must be spaced at least 3 sandwich thicknesses away from any other armor elements to allow full functionality. 81% coverage (edge effects).
                                                                  xi.     NERA-light
      A sandwich of 6mm steel/6mm rubber/ 6mm steel.
      Requires mounting brackets of approximately 10-30% cassette weight.
      Must be spaced at least 1 sandwich thickness away from any other armor elements to allow full functionality. 95% coverage.
                                                                 xii.     NERA-heavy
      A sandwich of 30mm steel/6m rubber/18mm steel.
      Requires mounting brackets of approximately 10-30% cassette weight.
      Must be spaced at least 1 sandwich thickness away from any other armor elements to allow full functionality. 95% coverage.
      The details of how to calculate armor effectiveness will be detailed in Appendix 1.
      b.      Firepower
                                                                    i.     2A46 equivalent tech- pressure limits, semi-combustible cases, recoil mechanisms and so on are at an equivalent level to that of the USSR in the year 1960.
                                                                   ii.     Limited APFSDS (L:D 15:1)- Spindle sabots or bourelleted sabots, see for example the Soviet BM-20 100mm APFSDS.
                                                                  iii.     Limited tungsten (no more than 100g per shot)
                                                                  iv.     Californian shaped charge technology- 5 CD penetration for high-pressure resistant HEAT, 6 CD for low pressure/ precision formed HEAT.
                                                                   v.     The general issue GPMG for the People’s Auditory Forces is the PKM. The standard HMG is the DShK.
      c.       Mobility
                                                                    i.     Engines tech level:
      1.      MB 838 (830 HP)
      2.      AVDS-1790-5A (908 HP)
      3.      Kharkov 5TD (600 HP)
                                                                   ii.     Power density should be based on the above engines. Dimensions are available online, pay attention to cooling of 1 and 3 (water cooled).
                                                                  iii.     Power output broadly scales with volume, as does weight. Trying to extract more power from the same size may come at the cost of reliability (and in the case of the 5TD, it isn’t all that reliable in the first place).
                                                                  iv.     There is nothing inherently wrong with opposed piston or 2-stroke engines if done right.
      d.      Electronics
                                                                    i.     LRFs- unavailable
                                                                   ii.     Thermals-unavailable
                                                                  iii.     I^2- limited
      3.      Operational Requirements.
      The requirements are detailed in the appended spreadsheet.
      4.      Submission protocols.
      Submission protocols and methods will be established in a follow-on post, nearer to the relevant time.
      Appendix 1- armor calculation
      Appendix 2- operational requirements
      Addendum 1 - more armor details
      Good luck, and may Hubbard guide your way to enlightenment!
    • By N-L-M
      detailed below is the expected format of the final submission.
      The date is set as Wednesday the 19th of June at 23:59 GMT.
      Again, incomplete designs may be submitted as they are and will be judged as seen fit.
      Vehicle Designation and name

      [insert 3-projection (front, top, side) and isometric render of vehicle here)

      Table of basic statistics:



      Mass, combat

      Length, combat (transport)

      Width, combat (transport)

      Height, combat (transport)

      Ground Pressure, MMP (nominal)

      Estimated Speed

      Estimated range

      Crew, number (roles)

      Main armament, caliber (ammo count ready/stowed)

      Secondary armament, caliber (ammo count ready/stowed)


      Vehicle designer’s notes: explain the thought process behind the design of the vehicle, ideas, and the development process from the designer’s point of view.

      Vehicle feature list:

      1.     Link to Appendix 1- RFP spreadsheet, colored to reflect achieved performance.

      2.     Engine- type, displacement, rated power, cooling, neat features.

      3.     Transmission- type, arrangement, neat features.

      4.     Fuel- Type, volume available, stowage location, estimated range, neat features.

      5.     Other neat features in the engine bay.

      6.     Suspension- Type, Travel, ground clearance, neat features.


      1.     Link to Appendix 1 - RFP spreadsheet, colored to reflect achieved performance.

      2.     Link to Appendix 2- armor array details.

      3.     Non-specified survivability features and other neat tricks- low profile, gun depression, instant smoke, cunning internal arrangement, and the like.


      A.    Weapons:

      1.     Link to Appendix 1- RFP spreadsheet, colored to reflect achieved performance.

      2.     Main Weapon-

      a.      Type

      b.      Caliber

      c.      ammunition types and performance (short)

      d.     Ammo stowage arrangement- numbers ready and total, features.

      e.      FCS- relevant systems, relevant sights for operating the weapon and so on.

      f.      Neat features.

      3.     Secondary weapon- Similar format to primary. Tertiary and further weapons- likewise.

      4.     Link to Appendix 3- Weapon system magic. This is where you explain how all the special tricks related to the armament that aren’t obviously available using Soviet 1961 tech work, and expand to your heart’s content on extimated performance and how these estimates were reached.

      B.    Optics:

      1.     Primary gunsight- type, associated trickery.

      2.     Likewise for any and all other optics systems installed, in no particular order.

      C.    FCS:

      1.     List of component systems, their purpose and the basic system architecture.

      2.     Link to Appendix 3- weapon system magic, if you have long explanations about the workings of the system.


      1.     List vehicle features which improve its fightability and useability.

      Additonal Features:

      Feel free to list more features as you see fit, in more categories.

      Free expression zone: Let out your inner Thetan to fully impress the world with the fruit of your labor. Kindly spoiler this section if it’s very long.

       Example for filling in Appendix 1
    • By Collimatrix
      Shortly after Jeeps_Guns_Tanks started his substantial foray into documenting the development and variants of the M4, I joked on teamspeak with Wargaming's The_Warhawk that the next thing he ought to do was a similar post on the T-72.
      Haha.  I joke.  I am funny man.
      The production history of the T-72 is enormously complicated.  Tens of thousands were produced; it is probably the fourth most produced tank ever after the T-54/55, T-34 and M4 sherman.
      For being such an ubiquitous vehicle, it's frustrating to find information in English-language sources on the T-72.  Part of this is residual bad information from the Cold War era when all NATO had to go on were blurry photos from May Day parades:

      As with Soviet aircraft, NATO could only assign designations to obviously externally different versions of the vehicle.  However, they were not necessarily aware of internal changes, nor were they aware which changes were post-production modifications and which ones were new factory variants of the vehicle.  The NATO designations do not, therefore, necessarily line up with the Soviet designations.  Between different models of T-72 there are large differences in armor protection and fire control systems.  This is why anyone arguing T-72 vs. X has completely missed the point; you need to specify which variant of T-72.  There are large differences between them!
      Another issue, and one which remains contentious to this day, is the relation between the T-64, T-72 and T-80 in the Soviet Army lineup.  This article helps explain the political wrangling which led to the logistically bizarre situation of three very similar tanks being in frontline service simultaneously, but the article is extremely biased as it comes from a high-ranking member of the Ural plant that designed and built the T-72.  Soviet tank experts still disagree on this; read this if you have some popcorn handy.  Talking points from the Kharkov side seem to be that T-64 was a more refined, advanced design and that T-72 was cheap filler, while Ural fans tend to hold that T-64 was an unreliable mechanical prima donna and T-72 a mechanically sound, mass-producible design.
      So, if anyone would like to help make sense of this vehicle, feel free to post away.  I am particularly interested in:
      -What armor arrays the different T-72 variants use.  Diagrams, dates of introduction, and whether the array is factory-produced or a field upgrade of existing armor are pertinent questions.
      -Details of the fire control system.  One of the Kharkov talking points is that for most of the time in service, T-64 had a more advanced fire control system than contemporary T-72 variants.  Is this true?  What were the various fire control systems in the T-64 and T-72, and what were there dates of introduction?  I am particularly curious when Soviet tanks got gun-follows-sight FCS.
      -Export variants and variants produced outside the Soviet Union.  How do they stack up?  Exactly what variant(s) of T-72 were the Iraqis using in 1991?

      -WTF is up with the T-72's transmission?  How does it steer and why is its reverse speed so pathetically low?
    • By LoooSeR
      Hello, my friends and Kharkovites, take a sit and be ready for your brains to start to work - we are going to tell you a terrible secret of how to tell apart Soviet tanks that actually works like GLORIOUS T-80 and The Mighty T-72 from Kharkovites attempt to make a tank - the T-64. Many of capitalists Westerners have hard time understanding what tank is in front of them, even when they know smart words like "Kontakt-5" ERA. Ignoramus westerners!
         Because you are all were raised in several hundreds years old capitalism system all of you are blind consumer dummies, that need big noisy labels and shiny colorful things to be attached to product X to be sold to your ignorant heads and wallets, thats why we will need to start with basics. BASICS, DA? First - how to identify to which tank "family" particular MBT belongs to - to T-64 tree, or T-72 line, or Superior T-80 development project, vehicles that don't have big APPLE logo on them for you to understand what is in front of you. And how you can do it in your home without access to your local commie tank nerd? 
         Easy! Use this Putin approved guide "How to tell appart different families of Soviet and Russian tanks from each other using simple and easy to spot external features in 4 steps: a guide for ignorant western journalists and chairborn generals to not suck in their in-depth discussions on the Internet".
      Chapter 1: Where to look, what to see.
      T-64 - The Ugly Kharkovite tank that doesn't work 
         We will begin with T-64, a Kharkovite attempt to make a tank, which was so successful that Ural started to work on their replacement for T-64 known as T-72. Forget about different models of T-64, let's see what is similar between all of them.

      T-72 - the Mighty weapon of Workers and Peasants to smash westerners
         Unlike tank look-alike, made by Kharkovites mad mans, T-72 is true combat tank to fight with forces of evil like radical moderate barbarians and westerners. Thats why we need to learn how identify it from T-64 and you should remember it's frightening lines!

      The GLORIOUS T-80 - a Weapon to Destroy and Conquer bourgeois countries and shatter westerners army
         And now we are looking at the Pride of Party and Soviet army, a true tank to spearhead attacks on decadent westerners, a tank that will destroy countries by sucking their military budgets and dispersing their armies in vortex of air, left from high-speed charge by the GLORIOUS T-80!

      The T-80 shooting down jets by hitting them behind the horizont 
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