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Posted

"One peculiarity of the U.S. forces is that the orders of the higher commanders are passed down in minute detail and leave little room for initiative by subordinates."

 

It's always good for an army to have Lieutenants and Captains countermanding general orders.

 

"Again, because the character of the American is simple and lacking in tenacity, they also lack tenacity in their tactics and battle leadership; and if they meet with one setback, they have a tendency to abandon one plan for another."

 

Maybe the fourth or fifth uncoordinated Banzai charge with no mortar or artillery support or even covering fire from machine guns will take that hill!

Posted

 

"However, their antitank measures, on the whole, are crude and if we use our tanks well, we may crush the enemy line or break through without much difficulty."

 

Man but US tank tactics suck. And those horned helmets... for shame, USA. For shame.

Posted

I sometimes wonder how much Japanese tactical development was retarded by the fact that they missed out on WW1 when everyone in Europe figured out that elan and fighting spirit was not much good against concentrated firepower.  

Not for want of info, as they had scads of observers.

One of my grandfathers mentioned a Japanese student in his Allison class in 1938~39.

He mentioned that he was "a nice enough fellow" but "needed to stick to radials, as the V1710 seemed to confuse him".

Posted

And stick to radials they did

They did make some reasonably mediocre inlines, but their radials were able to make the most of the shitastic fuel they fed them.

Posted

They had aircooled diesels in their tanks, that was pretty creative for the 1930's.

Sadly they did not apply that to aircraft.  Aviation Diesels are a still mostly forgotten field.

Posted

This line caught my attention:

 

 

Insofar as night fighting is concerned, the Americans are unlike our troops, who can attack at night and bring about decisive results; instead, they simply use the night hours to better their preparations.

 

 

 

Are there any instances of the IJA making a decisive, large-scale night attack?  I had thought that prior to the invention of night vision those basically didn't work.

Posted

Most of their night actions did  more to cause psychological stress among American troops than they resulted in any real tactical victories.  

 

Like the Tenaru night time frontal assault that got ~775 of the 900 soldiers that participated killed. 

Posted

This line caught my attention:

Are there any instances of the IJA making a decisive, large-scale night attack? I had thought that prior to the invention of night vision those basically didn't work.

My best bet will be the earlywar success in SE asia and China

Posted

"One peculiarity of the U.S. forces is that the orders of the higher commanders are passed down in minute detail and leave little room for initiative by subordinates."

 

It's always good for an army to have Lieutenants and Captains countermanding general orders.

 

Wasn't it always Ambrose who liked to jerk off about the sons of democracy innovating ways to achieve orders?

Posted

Wasn't it always Ambrose who liked to jerk off about the sons of democracy innovating ways to achieve orders?

He's not the only historian although - yes - Ambrose never missed a chance to rub one out over this. To me there's a big difference in American junior officers and NCO's taking the initiative to reach or hold an objective at Normandy or the Bulge versus Japanese junior officers starting wars, trying to prolong a war, assassinating other officers or disobeying orders to stay on the defense instead of launching another futile banzai charge into the teeth of a Marine battalion's defensive lines.

Posted

 

 

Maybe the fourth or fifth uncoordinated Banzai charge with no mortar or artillery support or even covering fire from machine guns will take that hill!

 

 

Donward making understatement of the year

 

Reading about Jap land tactics, a common running theme in books is their infantry attacks being uncoordinated as shit

 

Even when successful (hey, who knew crack Jap paratroopers could route a company of cooks, most of whom were asleep) they never seem to be capitalized on because their reinforcements arrived 3 hours late, or 3 hours early, or had no idea one unit was already committed to an attack, or still existed

Pretty much the only times where their infantry attacks were overwhelmingly successful were against opponents who were even more disorganized than they were (British early war, Chinese) 

 

Alot of army's could make up for a sub-par officer core and lack of any reliable communication and coordination by flattening whatever they are attacking to the ground, or having the armor and numbers to make tactics obsolete temporarily

 

But the Nips had non of those

 

and what little they had in the way of tanks and artillery were so mismanaged and obsolete its laughable.

 

Im by no means an expert on the Pacific war, but it fails to surprise me when after bombing an ilse in the Marina's for days on end snf setting up a very large amphibious operation the Japs lose a huge amount of their forces going in to a 57mm AT gun battery or something 

 

After 1943 you can count on pretty much any Japanese infantry attack where the opponents dont throw down their arms and run away to be a failure in the short term, or fail long term because no one besides the guys that actually toke the objective had any idea that it was successful 

Posted

He's not the only historian although - yes - Ambrose never missed a chance to rub one out over this. To me there's a big difference in American junior officers and NCO's taking the initiative to reach or hold an objective at Normandy or the Bulge versus Japanese junior officers starting wars, trying to prolong a war, assassinating other officers or disobeying orders to stay on the defense instead of launching another futile banzai charge into the teeth of a Marine battalion's defensive lines.

 

especially when the Japs happened to occupy some of the most defensible rock formations in the history of warfare

 

small arms, food, sanity, and moral limitations aside there is only so much artillery will do to volcanic rock formations

 

Especially ones that are also narrow enough to invalidate tank and air support 

 

and then theres the whole psychotic like distrust between the Navy and Army 

 

really the more i read about Japan during world war 2, the more i am convinced half of its army was run by autisitc schoolgirls and the other half were ran but rabid possums on their period's 

Posted

They were not as robust as the US troops either, and the food they got wasn't as good.  During the Solomons campaign, the environment was almost as bad as the enemy, being tropical jungle.  The Japs had no reliable way to control malaria either. 

Posted

"In a war to the death, the imitator is bound to lose, for he will never have a chance to copy the last great weapon that strikes him down."

Heh.

 

True in one particular case, not so true in number of others...

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