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XhaxhiEnver

Scrublord
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Everything posted by XhaxhiEnver

  1. The cost of a series production, is calculated on procurement prices. Unless you pay for them prior and use a layered contract. Which them would indeed make no difference. The US did not. It paid for tranches through yearly procurement programs. This meant that the inflation would affect both orders YoY and cost YoY. Furthermore Inflation doesn't do wonders. It is predictable post-hoc. So basically you can retrace how much the Inflation affected the unit price. This is simply not true. Ammo, fuel, spares do not go in the unit procurement. They are procured separately because tanks don't break down only once. That's why they enter the cost of use, not the cost of acquisition. Again, the added cost for tooling as calculated in 1982 was roughly 10% added on the Hardware (200K USD). Again, the cost per hour or the M1 ended up being 3/4 times superior to the M60. This isn't due to inflation alone. It is also due to how the tank works. Last but not least, the 4.2 billion USD FY72 is for 4800 tanks, which still falls short of the 7K target. So...
  2. ... Wow, is this an elaborate joke? Those are procurement numbers. It's how much money is being procured to produce n-many tanks. As it stands the First run of only 4800 tanks used the equivalent FY72 budget of 4.2 billion. Only by 1982 the US armed forces were still busy pretending they were paying 600K FY82 USD for 7000 tanks. It's on your own quotes of my own materials. 8K tanks built in what timespan and what cost? This is rather ironical that you are simply counting the numbers built, but in the mean time you are not giving the procurement details for those numbers? How come. Would that be conflating costs as well? You actually never been "OVER THIS". You simply do not have the numbers. I do and instead of just letting it go, you are going in these weird rants when you say, that constant prices are a good way to count current day costs...Are you well? How do you pay when you go to the shop? With prices of 20 years ago? Constant prices is a ridiculous manner to hide costs. The "Lessons Learned" source expressedly underscores the lack of sense of that way of counting. But even then when we take account of the inflation you can see that the cost is NOWHERE near the prediction in FY72 dollars. You still keep thise insane logic while I'm giving you total numbers and break downs. Theoretically the last M1A1 was built in 1997. That's almost 20 years of production. On top of that about 1.2K of those tanks in that timespan were built for foreign customers (700 for KSA and about 550 for Egypt). But what about the cost? Shall I pull out more numbers for Procurement post 1988? How am I not accepting the US army numbers for hardware, these are the Procurement numbers. Let's check the for instance procurement numbers for 1988 as budgeted. On a budget of 1.57 billion USD for the year itself and 243 million previously budget from previous years (FY87 deferral from Bradley program) 600 tanks were planned. The break down in price was: 778 million USD were spent on the basic vehicle (structural hull+turret). Engine+Transmission 301million USD. FCS 105 million. Wiring 98 million So far we have a roughly 1.3 billion cost for 600 tanks which aren't nothing else but Hull, Engine, Transmission and FCS (1.3billions spent don't even afford any guns). Guns come at 50 million USD. I am not adding transport and other fees. Nope I'm just factoring cost for Paperweight Abrams. That cost is basically 2.25 million just to have 90% of the tank .Is this a "program cost" or a "hardware cost"? We can also make the same query for 1984 and with the exception of the gun, all these costs are on the same line. the cheapest hardware cost would be in 1984 with a hardware cost of 1.9million USD per hardware and 837 M1's produced and 2.2 million of cost for the procurement. It's becoming a Thanos meme. You can try hard and spin this as much as you can. But you are wrong. The cost regarding procurement is largely material and totally relevant to the unit itself. Therefore it is the price to pay for 1 tank. Costs do never fall because the "skilled" workers (skilled workers are going to cost more over time), the main cause for price reduction is simplification and serializing which means that you can pay less per task (this is Industrialization 101 btw). This never happened with the Abrams. The M1 production numbers of the first run (79/87) never met the upper production rate of 90 tanks per month that would have lowered the cost. The M1 as it stood was incomparable with the rate of the USSR for instance. Soviets on many cases were putting out twice the 60/month rate and were still behind schedule and had cost issues (despite MASS serialization). So workers were doing less for the same hours worked. And part of the cost increase during the first run, is that while the US didn't pay for the facilities (as it owned them) they were paying the contractors to run those facilities... The guy who says that the Abrams is insanely expensive, is right based on the money the US DOD requested to procure the said M1 tanks. We are at a point where you refuse hard evidence and just throw numbers with out context. It's funny that way. This is the other contention point. The MBT-70 might very well cost the same (hell on a projected price it is less expensive by 50K from the actual price per unit of the first series M1), but that WAS NOT THE DEBATE. The debate was that the US Army pretended (for a long time) that the tank is both more cost effective than the tank it replaced (It wasn't) and slightly more expensive than the tank IT REPLACED. The M1 was a conservative design supposed to both avoid the cost ballooning of the MBT-70 and reduce the operating cost from the M60 series. This, once we factor in all the available data is wrong on both counts. The M1 isn't marginally cheaper to operate than then M60. It is 3/4 times more expensive. It is also MORE expensive to procure by at least the same factors when the 1st batch was produced. With the second batch the gap with the M60 only widens. On the MBT-70 front, the wide price margin calculated (over 300K FY72) also isn't true. The M1 production from 79/87 is simply way above the 507K FY72 (it stands at little more than 900K). It gets only more expensive from there on. So the projections were wrong. Woulda, Coulda, Shoulda. No. We do not know. And we cannot speculate, because the MBT-70 never entered production. We cannot speculate on the M1 as well. Because we have the production numbers and procurement numbers. It's really simple. The M1 from inception to production went from a target of 507K to 2.16 on harware cost alone. The MBT when evaluated at 850K was at a wholly different stage. Maybe it would have been more expensive, maybe it would have been less expensive. Speculation isn't helping. Only nothing, literally from one program to the other was the same. And none happened. The US didn't cut back on "gizmos" it simply picked others and it didn't manage to control the cost. The Abrams FCS for instance, the Turbine were as much an issue as the 3-man turret of the MBT-70. On top of that, the MBT-70's 152mm gun and the L7/Rh120 that were subsequently chosen for the M1 had nothing in common. Furthermore the Successor of the MBT-70 was the XM-803 whose target price was taken into account to establish the Abrams cost. Again you are wrong, even on technicalities. I just proved you are wrong with a procurement break down. 1.35 billion for hardware alone. For 600 tanks. That's 2.25million a tank without the extras. It's clear cut. You are wrong on this matter. Actually this exactly why you use escalated dollars for projection, not constant value dollars. Because according to you, it isn't possible to both fly 300 hours a year per frame for the alleged 55 years. Yet just so we are sync, 20 hours of flight per month is the minimum for fighter pilots, this means that the threshold for maintaining proficiency and the projected fly hours per plane are very close. So which is it? Constant USD's cannot physically be sustainable if the 1.5 trillion is supposed to be belived. And the average hardware cost of 100 million means also refits, MLU etc). Or did you forget that you can actually repair and refit planes? Furthermore Constant USD's for 55 years in the future are simply uncalculable. So where's the catch? The catch is simple. The cost design here was for this program to spend 1.5 trillion USD AS A BASE. With an average of 100 million for hardware cost per unit we are looking at 250 billion USD's in hardware alone. A collective flying hour for the 2500 planes on today's cost is 75 million USD. For a 300 hours a year you are looking at 22.5 billion on flight hours yearly. This on this year's prices. If the inflation is about 2% accrued cost within ten years is simply beyond the 1.5 trillion projection (ergo it becomes VERY difficult to limit the cost to 1.5 trillion in 55 years). This is why I consider that the 1.5 trillion indication is that of the cost that should be considered spent IF the procurement program is done. Being a shitter? Haha. Are you really sure you want to go there? Because when I look at the score, and despite you gesticulating we have already established that . The M1 production did not went to its designed end within the decade (as planned). The M1 production did not met its constant price bracket (as planned). The M1 cost when factored for inflation from its initial 10 year run ended up being MORE expensive than the program it was supposed to replace (XM-803) and the previous one as well (MBT-70). The M1 cost wasn't limited by penny pinching but by conservative design choices and a reversal of priorities (the M1 was more heavily armored than the XM-803 by a large margin). These are facts.
  3. The Program is advertized as costing 1.5 trillion over its lifespan. To me this is conducive of an already accepted reality, and this is cost that is expected to be spent in 55 years. Then let's calculate. 1.5 trillion USD/2500 planes = 600 million per plane. Let's say that the average hardware price is 100 million then the flying costs are 500 million per 55 years. Or a bit over 9 million/year per plane. With the current 30K/hour that means 300hours a year. That means that this plane is not exactly cost factored for much action. When you know that active rotations will clock MORE on the planes than that. This while keeping the PFH at 30K for 55 years. The 1.5trillion of cost is barely adequate for current prices.
  4. This makes me laugh. Mostly because you are jumping the shark. Be patient.
  5. The 595K (FY72) was factored for 7000+ tanks produced within the program time-span. But This was again hypothetical and a highly creative and controversial tactic to HIDE the real cost. It cannot have been for the unit. Why? Because we have procurement numbers. From 1979 to 1987 11.25 Billion USD have been spent on the M1 procurement program. For a total of under 4800 tanks. 7000+ tanks at 600K that's 4.2 billion on 1982's cash. The unit rate went down thanks to some tricks that the US DOD did (like procurement deferrals, paying tanks with funds appropriated for other items), but the first series established a unit price of 2.4 million USD. So 4.2 billion were predicted to be budgeted in FY82 USD's (according to you, although I say it was for FY72 and I'm going to prove you why) for over 7K tanks. But in reality the cost was 11.2 billion for little under 4800 tanks. Now where the US Army was clever was to always confuse FY72 USD with current USD. Why? Because the 11.2 billion USD over 1987 are exactly the 4.2 billion on FY72 once the inflation is taken to account. Again, this doesn't take into account the little cheating done on the numbers by the DOD or the fact that 33% of the tanks weren't procured yet. Once factored the price per unit is 2.4 million in average and with inflation that's just under 910K in FY72 when converted from FY87. From 1988 the procurement price would start to rise ABOVE 3.3million/unit. That is the SECOND Procurement timeline. That's for the next rant. This means that the tank isn't impacted on hourly cost. The cost per hour is higher. For various reasons that are self-explanatory when the ammo cost case is raised. A difference in cost of roughly 10 times for ammo. It is sunk cost in the sense that's what they pretend it is going to cost over 55 years. They do not know the real cost (as seen with the M1) and given the current PFH (30K USD) the projected Airforce jets alone will be sinking a Trillion for 250/300 hours yearly. As in the case of the Abrams, the hourly cost will go up (inflation alone will insure that). Also, again, you strike me as someone who doesn't do his homework and expect to get out of trouble by pure sophistry. LRIP is indicative of the cost as the hardware never becomes cheaper, it can be dipped for a while by economies of scale, but the slightest upgrade makes it usually go back up. Case in point M1A1... They don't...the Army says so. But even then they are forced to reckon the issue. The US army doesn't disagree with me, because the numbers I have are ... from their Procurement. Yes. They failed to meet the 7K goal and they failed to make it at 4.2billion of FY82 USD. It's you who IGNORE the reality. And this is the beauty of this. You don't know about this. So far you have provided ZERO evidence that the M1 did cost less than the projected MBT-70. As a matter of fact a serial production M1 from the first run cost in average 900+K in FY72 dollars. About 50K more than the MBT. No it really wasn't. It was a far more conservative tank on its design. The choice of the Chrysler variant made sure of what ever was remaining of the MBT-70 went largely to the trash-bin. You sure have been insulting for a moderator. Must be cool to bend the rules. However, YOU. ARE. STILL. WRONG.
  6. Because that's exactly what it is. It's preset sheets of armored steel cut in a way to maximize protection and cost reduction. The issue is due to the highly irregular surfaces of the BRDM-2. To properly up-armor the hull needs to get totally reworked (Kaiman) or transformed in such a way that the vehicle loses an already average mobility.
  7. I have never said the contrary. My whole point was to deny that the "Abrams" was a cost conservative program. It was a different program that had to adress issues with then "current threats" and "shortcomings". That means, the M1 was tank that would fall in line with the M60. It wasn't supposed to replace or one-up the MBT-70/XM-803. Those two programs were still going to get used as templates (the GM XM-1 used large component design from the XM-803 and tried to adapt them for the wholly different approach required fr the XM-1). However the comparison, was made by both the US military itself and another poster. The US military maintained this delirious illusion until it was both too late and self-defeating. The issue with the cost comparison, especially in a fully market driven global economy, is also not that interesting. For instance the alleged cost of the T-14 (Hardware cost of 3.7 million) is still a pittance compared to the converted cost of a LRIP Abrams in 1980 3.39 million as a Mission Capable Unit (that would be around 9 million USD FY2018). This is due to the discrepancy in labor cost, currency convertibility, export convertibility and tigher/conservative spending policy on the Russian side. All these have reasons, that do NOT denote a BETTER procurement system, just a different situation. The comparison regards the average price calculated for the M60 series (which went from as low a 178K USD for the first series to 1 million USD for newly built TTS delivered last in 1982). I don't want to discuss the average price of an M1, that sits around 4.7 million USD (thanks ironically to the first dip in production). These are also unfair to the M60A3 TTS that is MCU/PCU counted, while the Abrams isn't. For reasons I have pointed out earlier (running costs for the M1 would explode as much as the production costs). In ANY case, the M1 wasn't economical, cheaper or a budget tank. It was a more CONSERVATIVE DESIGN, not a more COST CONSCIOUS DESIGN. As facts show... This is Irony 101.
  8. Oh boy. Even with Inflation at 300% the cost would have been roughly 1.6 million. It wasn't. With real inflation the cost should have been about 1.2 million, it was almost twice that. If you had read the actual "Lessons Learned" source you would have seen that the Cost factoring in constant FY72 Dollars had jumped from 507K for 3000+ tanks to 595K (always in FY72 Dollars) for...7000+ units (which meant that the initial unit price in Constant dollars factored for the budget was TWICE the 507K FY72; The Extras are factored in at 440K/unit. However that's chump change to the 2.5 million dollars per M1 in 1981. https://www.jec.senate.gov/reports/97th Congress/The M-1 Tank and NATO Readiness (1179).pdf Have you read the title of the source? Focus on the date. Check exactly when those hearings were held. Let me help you. That's 1976. The cost of operating an Abrams was ... purely hypothetical. However thanks to the wonders of Internet, you can see what it looked like IRL. https://www.gao.gov/assets/220/213784.pdf Date 1991. However the program itself chewed through a supplemental 1billion USD on 1 year alone just to keep with LRIP https://books.google.be/books?id=WdhLAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA1415&lpg=PA1415&dq=M1+Abrams+price+1981&source=bl&ots=MVJTBwifwV&sig=ACfU3U29bAc8q6nVW5xk0PgJQXAhcBKp0w&hl=nl&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjD55rvluDjAhVCK1AKHWBxBoA4ChDoATALegQICBAB#v=onepage&q=M1 Abrams price 1981&f=false F-35 really? With the 1.5 trillion sunk costs? What is this?
  9. The Chrysler Abrams was a "clean sheet" tank when it came to the core. The one that you're looking for, was the GM X-1 that kept elements of the MBT-70/XM803 program. That one was declined. Now again this "don't you belive me, read Hunnicutt" non-sense. Why would I read Hunnicutt when I can read the damn source. Let's start. " In 1963, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (GE) entered into an agreement for the joint development of a main battle tank (the MBT-70). This new tank was envisioned to be a highly mobile, heavily armored vehicle with substantial protection against nuclear radiation. In December 1969, after six years of effort, the joint program was terminated due to the extremely high unit hardware cost of the system, then estimated at $850,000 (in FY 69 dollars). At the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF), the Army proceeded with development of the XM-803, an "austere" version of the MBT-70, which would not exceed a unit hardware cost of $600,000. In December 1971, Congress terminated the XM-803 program because the tank was still considered to be unnecessarily complex, excessively sophisticated, and too expensive. However, Congress also proposed that the Army use 20 million dollars to initiate conceptual studies for a New Main Battle Tank (NMBT)." I would like to extend the audience that the XM-803 was scrapped because its cost was predicted to soar at roughly 650K USD/unit by 1975. Directly after the canceling of the 803 the 815 program starts. This is the cost factored, derivative of the XM-803 ballooning. "On 18 January, the DCP was signed by the DEPSECDEF. The DCP did not establish performance thresholds but did establish a Design to Unit Hardware Cost (DTUHC) of $507,790 FY72$ based on a procurement quantity of 3,312 tanks produced at the rate of 30 per month." The total program cost was evaluated at just under 5 billion for 3300+ units. Then... https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA135524/page/n67 The Hardware cost for the LRIP was 2.16 million. PAC/Mission Capable cost was almost 2.8 million. And as for your Rand paper...it wasn't even up to date when it was produced as by 1976 the Unit Cost had been already risen to 700K+ FY 75 (Inflation of 20% from 72 to 75, leads to 615K theoretically, while the calculated cost soars to over 40% ). https://books.google.be/books?id=ZQI-AQAAIAAJ&pg=PA1766&dq=XM-1+tank+1976&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=snippet&q=XM1 cost&f=false The US designed a tank that was to replace the M60. It was conservative in many aspects but not in price. Price wise the XM-1 program is one of the first in a series of the US MIC absolutely raping the US taxpayer.
  10. I don't know what all this has to do with "penny pinching". Penny pinching can regard the T-80's details(T-80U's pintle mounts for the Utyos is penny pinching), but producing a tank that costs 6 times the price of the M60 in its mission capable form, is not. Take the dozer blade cost that started as a simple sub 15K equipment piece and ended up costing upwards 70K. These are cost elements on the M1 that simply reflect a cost overshot because of how the XM-1 was created. That wasn't out of penny pinching but due to the US government letting the development entirely on the contractor. Nevermind what they were not happy with, they ended up funding a MORE expensive program. You are arguing about intention, I'm talking about facts. I think Chrysler would have happily obliged with a system if that was desired. We are contending that the US wanted an AL but was pressed by time, yet the very initial price of the M1 has now doubled (at a minimum) and the US STILL doesn't have an auto-loader. The US has killed a plethora of systems that "lost usefulness" post CW (VIDS for instance) but in the mean time only few attempts have been made to get the M1 to have an AL.
  11. First, the M60 had no Thermal sight designed until 1977. Then it was fielded starting 1978. That was the M60A3 (TTS). This goes against everything that has been said, under oath, about the TTS vs the Hughues. Capabilities of both systems were equivalent (with a higher margin for the Hughues) this coupled with a digital computer, Yag laser and the initial CRT display (vs fishbowl) just made the Hughues the better sight. Shall I post Congressional hearings now?
  12. I want to reply to this, but the condescending tone is a bone breaker. I hope you are being facetious. 30/40% of the cost was the engine and transmission. However the intial cost bracket per unit was calculated as a little more than 500K USD. Even in constant USD, the price implosion was above the inflation rate (120%) at over 2.1 million USD. And that wasn't a Mission capable unit. Thermal sights and FCS cost almost as much as a the initial M60.
  13. He should have been more thorough. The refusal to mount an auto-loader to an actual service vehicle (MBT other tans) was backed by the idea that AL's would increase the complexity of the tank and malfunction at some point. This is not "moving the goalposts", it's why the US is still fielding a 4-men crew tank. There will be exceptions that will simply confirm this viewpoint. For anyone pointing the Stryker MGS... that's quite the resounding success.
  14. Mix of ordnance, few PG, most are bombs. The SVP-24 is showing its accuracy (not to shabby for a glorified ballistic calculator).
  15. It isn't about "sanction relief". It is about the P3 holding its part of the bargain, which they(UK/France/Germany) claim is possible. While in reality, on this issue, Europe is showing to be beyond powerless and in the case of the UK complicit to further deteriorating the situation for Iran. The tanker situation has nothing to do with the JCPOA though. It is an IRGC classic. This is just to show they mean business. Tit for Tat. Grace 1 was detained for its alleged future violation of the Syrian Sanctions, not the JCPOA. It's one of the very convoluted and borderline/illegal actions that are flying around these days.
  16. The weight of the missile is similar. The Fagot and Faktoria are at 12kg. The 77A variant is 10.7kg. Metis at 6.5 kg. You understand that the Mulat 115 is 5kg. Half the weight of the TAS-5. You also understand that the Metis was introduced 3 years after the Dragon was introduced and that the TAS-5 FAR WORSE than the Mulat. You do also understand that if you wanted to stabilize the launcher you had to ad a 17 kg tripod (M175 Lafett) which meant that the damn thing was as heavy as the Fagot...while having a third of the EFR (and I'm being generous). The system remains something different indeed. Looser, this is the last post about this subject with this gentleman. If he replies I will address the issue to the appropriate thread.
  17. Missile Mass RTF. The M47 is about 11kg. It has a 1000m EFR with an official first hit probability or .8 and MV of about 112m/s. M77 is from 13 to 15 kg and its EFR is 1500m while the MV is a whooping 130m/s. Ironically a good chunk of 9P135's weight is the casing and the metal tripod (tripod being 4kg). The whole system for the M47 is 15.5 kg (with the SU36). If you want to operate by night then we get into fun territory. The TAS-5 adds another 10 KG. In layman's terms both missiles will expose their operators for 10 seconds at maximum range. While the rest of the world disposed of portable missiles going twice that speed and usually at least twice the range. What's with this selective reading.
  18. Actually both the M47 and M77. While the M47 real counterpart was the Metis, the weight of the system put it right on Fagot/Faktoria territory. The M77 on the other part, from A to D is firmly into Konkurs territory (from 13 to 15 kg) was still limited to 1500m EFR. When the 77D was introduced, the Soviets had already desiged the basis of what would become the Kornet.
  19. I just explained you that the graphic scaling is wrong. It gives a .3m in height and a whole meter in length over the real world specs.
  20. The 2.3m is based on the scale model provided. As said. The scale model makes it look larger and higher than it actually is.
  21. The graphic I provided had one issue. It tried to convey the general gun mount geometry. As such it was wrong even though the idea was sound. The actual size comparisons were not that much off. 1.88 is correct. For the 120mm M1A1. For the M1 initial prod or IP the height should be around 1.75m. So...we have a 10+cm discrepancy on that aspect alone. In order for the Armata to have a 2.1 m 0deg. The vehicle should be roughly 2.6. Roughly. On your image it is 2.94m tall. I redid my calculus on a 7cm conversion (5mm wheel) which gives a full 9.8m hull. I think that the blue print is off by more than "2 track pads". Following up we also have little problem. The front section (imaginary line over the lights) sits at 1.62m height. With the sketch again we have a minimum of 1.8m at the "beak". That's not possible. That photo while not aiming at 0deg, clearly shows that the "beak" isn't a 1.8 and the gun is going to come slightly over the serviceman's head. Unless that man is 2m tall, I can't really understand how that "sketch" corresponds to reality. Nevermind the swap for a M1 early run. If the gun is aimed at 2.1m then the roof isn't at .3m, but half a meter above. Which gives ample room to aim lower (even with a bigger breech). With the recalculus, at best I find out a 7.76m hull from your image; about .2 m shorter than most sources. The T-14 is about 3.3 with the TCIV. It is about 8.7m long in hull. And it is about 2.6m tall. This gives it both better depression than previous Soviet/Russian designs while having a typical central location on the hull contrarily to the M1.
  22. Illustrate what? You took out a M1A1 tank, replaced it with a M1 but forgot a couple of things. First if your M1 is aiming at 0deg at 1,88m. Second the short turret you provided (because why not try that) and the badly drawn TCIV on the T-14 ( it’s 70cm tall) means that the Armata roof sits at 2,6m (Abrams at 2,37/2,44 depending the source) and aims at 0 deg at 2.3m ; this impossible as pictures have shown T-14 guns aimed at 0 deg slightly over servicemen’s head. Then the wheel spacing. The Real life Armata has the five rear wheels separated by the distance of one track « thread » while in your picture there are two. While the front two have 2 threads while in your picture almost three. Reporting the distance we find on these images the Abrams results 2,3m high at roof and Armata at 2,7m high. While again according to your own images the hull length for the Abrams is 8,3m (converted)...While according to all sources it doesn’t get past 8. I could discuss this further but as a person I don’t like being taken for a ride. You should be more « careful » when you try such things. Not every one is gullible.
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