Mighty_Zuk

Oh no.

Also, this:

I know what you're thinking, lads. But stop drooling over Mr. Tal. I need to know what's the meaning of this picture. What are we seeing there? Whose armor it is, is unknown. Date is unknown. What holed it is unknown. It's no APFSDS nor HEAT.

12 minutes ago, Ramlaen said:

-snip-

Which one of them is it?

For anything related to ammunition I highly recommend this forum:

https://forum.cartridgecollectors.org/

Israel's artillery-oriented magazine shared an interesting article by Lt Col Rafi Almagor that shares insights from the past development of the Sholef, that could be implemented in the development of the new, yet-unnamed howitzer in development.

Lt Col Rafi Almagor was one of the heads of the Sholef program.

The article is in Hebrew and translated to English by me:

How are those wheels holding it up?

Stryker? Yes. What configuration? Unknown.

2 hours ago, Xlucine said:

You wouldn't put it there for no reason, since it'd take a fair bit of expensive verification testing to prove that the fabric wasn't strong enough to initiate the fuse on an RPG.

TIL if you throw a shirt at a Mohammed right before he pulls the trigger you get easy points. 

21 minutes ago, Scolopax said:

I'd say to try and hide the fact that it's there or make it seem as if there's more armor

That's probably not it. It still leaves the issue of the high profile. 

IDF infantrymen have something called Mitznefet:

What it does is it breaks the shape of the helmet. Reshapes it from a round distinct shape, to a rock-like, natural shape.

If that was it, it's not the best implementation. I guess it has more to do with being preparatory means for actual camouflage covers, and may double as a protective means to hide sharp edges that can injure soldiers walking by.

Try to put camouflage cover on slat and you'll probably entangle it or even rip it (which is difficult to repair). I also assume this one increases the friction to allow for easy installation.

1 hour ago, Collimatrix said:

 

I agree.  Fin-stabilized ammunition fired out of rifled guns has slip rings to keep the projectile from spinning.  A rifled gun firing anything with fins is very close to smoothbore.

Slip rings may negate the loss of accuracy, but they take away some of the initial velocity which is also bad. 

1 hour ago, Karamazov said:

Can somebody tell me about rifled tank guns? What is the accuracy in comparison with smooth-bore guns? For example Challenger 2 L30E4 and Leopard 2 Rh120 L55

I don't have any numbers, but the general rule of thumb is that when you use fin stabilized ammunition, you're going to get better accuracy from smoothbore guns than you would from rifled guns. 

So that means APFSDS, HEAT-MP, HE-MP, and practically anything that isn't HESH. And HESH loses out to HE-MP in every parameter.

Basically you want to use smoothbore guns.

12 hours ago, Laviduce said:

we need more !!!!! We need ....https://media.giphy.com/media/wLXo0vTZSM7GU/giphy.gif  !!!!!!!

 

 

Ayy sorry mate, that's all I could find. It was from an article on the life work of a deceased personality in MANTAK (Tank administration) and RAPAT (Tank development authority). No other photos than some of the more well known photos of the Sholef. 

I would like to add, however, that according to MANTAK, the Merkava 4 was the first tank without any limitations or compromises, specifically when talking about armor protection. It was talked a while ago, and still talked about, that the Merkava's front mounted engine limits the quality of armor protection of the hull front section, and while it's true for the Mark 1-3 tanks, it's no longer true for the Mark 4. So that explains that MANTAK has viewed that specific armor profile as ideal for Israel's needs - unprotected LFP, no overlapping of UFP protection with LFP, but very good protection of the low-mid to higher section of the UFP. 

It's quite interesting, considering how different many armor profile concepts are in different countries.  US prefers a heavily protected and very large LFP but well angled, thin, and very small UFP. Leo goes for a similar design but with an arrow shape. T-tanks armor the entire UFP very well but keep a poorly armored LFP. Chally goes for a Merkava-like concept but its UFP overlaps with the LFP, and same can be said for the Leclerc.

By the one, one of the guys in the picture is an MTU representative, probably there to see which powerpack can be fitted there and how, to achieve the desired armor profile.

Mockup of the Merkava 4 hull:

44 minutes ago, Serge said:

The problem with M60 is the turret size. It’s so large, it’s heavy to improve its protection. So, Sabra is not the choice. 

It's not about improvement of the armor. They just left the bottom part of the turret very exposed. It's not as bad as many other tanks suffered, but they could do better. 

They could literally just steal the tech from the Sabra's armor and copy and paste it on the regular M60A3. But no, they just had to find a way to actually reduce the armor coverage AND make it ugly.

Elbit will be participating in the US Army's NGCV tender as a key systems supplier, for systems it develops for the Carmel, some of which are supposed to enter service in 2020 and were already tested, and some still under development.

It also touches on the Iron Fist in a very general way, but I included it because it's important to note that under Elbit, the acquisition process for the US could be hastened and overall improved, as it will handle with a larger company that is better able to respond to issues or qualms that may arise.

Here's the link:

http://www.israeldefense.co.il/he/node/33537

It's in Hebrew so I'll translate:

Define mountainous. Because it is possible to say that for the last 20-30 years any Israeli AFV of the types we discuss on this forum, was built for such places. Not for the ease of transport but for protection while driving in valleys surrounded by hills that are typical for the south lebanon region.

Other than that, probably not much. Though I guess the US M8 (or anything that wins the MPF but we all know it's going to be the M8) will be the first candidate to go to such places if required, and Russia recently put out a series of AFVs designed for the arctic climate that may be suitable for mountainous areas because of suitability for lower oxygen density environments (or so I've heard) and the mobility requirements that are probably harsher in the arctic environment. Light weight and great off road, all terrain mobility makes arctic vehicles suitable for mountainous areas. Now here's where I may be wrong, but the Armata family was or is planned to have arctic derivatives.

15 minutes ago, Laviduce said:

Thank you ! But is block A a fuel tank or a special armor block. I treated it as a special armor block(s).

There is no way this isn't a fuel tank. Considering its odd shape.

Also, fuel tanks are usually placed in the front because they're a great extra layer of protection.

6 hours ago, Priory_of_Sion said:

UN-white Leclercs just look off

IIRC one of the veteran writers in a military forum who is very familiar with this incident and those involved, said there's quite a lot of misinformation there. I'll try to investigate. 

If anyone's interested, it's supposedly about a bunch of Spike missiles left in Lebanese territory that the IDF wanted to retrieve. The French didn't know why Israeli tanks were entering the territory, but then they backed off and announced that they will not interfere with a tech retrieval mission. 

56 minutes ago, Jeeps_Guns_Tanks said:

Sure, I mean I didn't know you had any, and if you did, like any dude, would try and hide, it, but sure man, in a non gay way, I could, ....

 

Ok, I can't talk about feelings anymore, I feel like a pansy. 

It's ok so long as we wear socks.

3 hours ago, Jeeps_Guns_Tanks said:

fuck about your feelings

Do you care about my feelings? 

Zuk needs some lovin'. 

https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/03/16/first-next-gen-combat-vehicle-and-robotic-wingman-prototypes-to-emerge-in-2020/

NGCV prototypes in 2020, 2022, and 2024.

Okay, I got a little request here:

1) @LoooSeR , some of these videos are reposted in Otvaga. I usually post them here first, so they also get reposted here numerous times. 

2) @asaf , the THOR system is an old one that was likely only activated because it was nearby. It did not enter service in large numbers, and it's unknown whether it will continue operating for long.

3) Please don't link news articles in Hebrew. Try finding its equivalent in English, but if you don't find one then at least translate it for the others.

Since it was already posted, I will do the translation if anyone is interested:

Crusher of the Dahieh

Saturday eve, July 2014. The ground maneuver phase of Operation Protective Edge commences, and with it one of the most complex battles the Golani had seen in the last 20 years. 

Notes: Dahieh is a quarter in Beirut, likely mentioned because the new howitzer has sufficient range to hit it from Israeli territory. Golani is a frontline mechanized infantry brigade.

After days of warnings, where leaflets written in Arabic were dispersed, radio and TV messages on Palestinian channels, and phone calls to civilians, and smoke shells were fired into village surroundings, began the "softening" phase for the artillery, who fired up to the first line of houses. At its end, Isaac Turgeman, commander of the 36th division gave the green light for the 4 brigades under his command to move deep into Palestinian territory.

Golani fighters made their way into the heart of the Shujaiya neighborhood in the Gaza strip to locate attack tunnels that were dug under the cover of Palestinian houses. The tunnel array was defended by the elite Shujaiya battalion of Hamas, which included 860 veteran warriors that prepared for years for an IDF ground maneuver. The "reception", some would call it a well planned ambush, included advanced AT, mortars, snipers, IEDs, and defensive tunnels dug under the houses to help the terrorists fire and vanish under the ground.

The night began with the injury of an armor officer, and the friction further increased. A Golani APC was hit and caught fire without being able to extinguish it, and 7 warriors died. 

Note: It was an M113 APC that wasn't even supposed to be used there.

Later it was discovered by the high echelon that Oron Shaul's body was kidnapped using a nearby tunnel. 

The Shujaiya battalion's fire intensified, and the brown brigade (Golani) paid their price.

The then-Golani-commander Rasan Elian was injured and had to evacuate, and later 3 battalion commanders, including one of the recon battalion, were injured and also had to evacuate. The command chain was shaken and disturbed, and the 36th division commander received an ever elongating list of killed and injured men. The ground forces tried to suppress the fire sources and direct aerial firepower, but stumbled upon effective "firewalls" every time they tried to get out of the line of houses to evacuate injured or to move to safer areas. The effort of the Golanis had shown acts of heroism, but was insufficient.

It was dawn. The top artillery officer commanded in those frustrating hours on the fire center in the division command center, and received from the Golani support unit commander, info on what's happening on the field and the situation of the enemy. He devised a plan that was not implemented since the 1982 Lebanon war - firing masses of artillery shells on Hamas fighters operating just 100-150 meters from the Golani troops, while heavily risking IDF soldiers as well.

The firing plan had to be based on quality and effective intel, and the division intel officer helped create a very clear picture of the enemy location. At 09:00 the artillery officer realized the brigade firing plan had to be converted to divisional firepower - and he relayed to the 3 artillery battalions of the division that they're under his command.

In parallel, a building collapses on a Golani force, and the intel officer draws on a digital map the layer of information that is required to hit concentrations of the enemy. He also assembled a rescue plan for the injured.

The artillery officer then explains to the division commander why this extraordinary action is required, and stresses "If we don't do this we won't evacuate the injured. There will be none else to help the Golani". Turgeman approves the plan but under one condition: The Golani troops will withdraw to a pre-determined line and enter the Namer APCs, a condition that was based on the assumption that these vehicles will withstand the attack despite the great security risk.

After thorough analysis and corrections, the firing plan was approved. Every battalion was asked to prepare 200 artillery shells, and fire them to the pre-determined areas. The fire rate and accuracy were critical. It was clear to everyone that some of the fire would go right above the heads of the soldiers on the ground, and some of it would be fired to just 100-150m from them - far below the pre-set safety bar.

In parallel, the artillery officer gave the air force officer an urgent firing procedure that focused on several high rise buildings.

The action was set for 10:00, amid heroic efforts by the Golani fighters to evacuate the injured under fire, but not everything went smoothly. An operational dialogue between the battalion commanders to the fire center commander, centered around the plan and focused on the fact that it has crossed the safety lines on which they trained from the very beginning. The fear that the shells - weighing 43kg - would hit the ground troops was very much real.

The dialogue was professional and to the point, and ended with the support of all commanders for this plan. "I trust you", he stressed.

Later, the artillery officer explained to the cadets of the IDF national security academy, that what gave him the great confidence to pull off this plan was understanding of the artillery profession, understanding the doctrine, his personal acquaintance with the battalion commanders' and understanding their quality, understanding their high level of professionalism, and understanding the tools (howitzers) in the batteries.

At 10:10 the command was given, and for 45 minutes 600 shells were rained on the battle zones of the Shujaiya neighborhood. The Golani fighters told "The ground shook like jelly, we've never experienced such thing". Some of the commanders yelled on the comms: "Stop the fire, it's hitting us", and the firing center had to cope with the urgent calls. Aircraft flying over the area provided a live feed of the situation to the computer screens in the Golani brigade command room, headed by Yoeli Or, and in the division fire center headed by the officer.

At 11:00 the last howitzer went quiet. The Palestinian territory was silent. Shortly afterwards, an urgent request came from Hamas, through international aid organizations, to declare a humanitarian ceasefire. The Hamas forces did not regain operational capability for the next 24 hours. Golani troops evacuated the injured and prepared anew for an attack.

The fire support of the artillerymen lasted throughout the whole 51 days of the operation, and only by the end of it, the scope of the achievement of the artillery and intel in the division was realized: 81 terrorists were killed in the attack, among them more than 10 chief Hamas commanders. 

The said combat legacy - that underlines the importance of heavy statistical fire, alongside the precise guided rockets and missiles - explains clearly why the security cabinet approved last week the new howitzer for the corp. It is one of the most central projects for the ground arm for the next couple of years, and the delay in its implementation was the result of budgetary difficulties. Some of the cannons that rained fire on Shujaiya were over 40 years - an outdated system with a limited range, whose operation requires a crew of at least 10 men. The new cannon, made by Elbit, will save more than 50% of the manpower as it is semi-automatic, will greatly increase the operational range and rate of fire, and will dramatically improve the accuracy and lethality.

Every new cannon will replace an old battery, and will provide the corp with better flexibility for relocation, while its command and control systems will allow connectivity with the other corps.

In parallel, the ground arm will finalize by the end of this year a purchase of smart rounds, that will increase the quality of the existing howitzers.

Pics from article:

The artillery corps is going through, in the last years, more than just a face-lift. He's simply transforming. Aside from the howitzers, the rocket array (MLRS) that includes also a Romach battery that possesses the fire rate and capabilities to work against multiple targets simultaneously, the geolocation array, that said goodbye to the Nurit radar and accepted the Raz radar (Raz - Rav Zroyi - Multi-arm/branch, EL/M-2084). The IDF website also chose to highlight the Kelah David brigade, whose outstanding unit is the Rochev Shamaim, the one that uses small UAVs for the artillery corps.

One of the more classified units is Moran, that was established in 1982 and participated since - through using the Spike-NLOS missile - in many operational activities, including precision attacks and hunting rocket launching units.

The UAV unit of the ground arm in the artillery corp is a parallel unit to the air force's UAVs, but different in its missions, operational culture, and type of aircraft. Its primary destination is to support the ground maneuvering forces - something the chief of staff Major General Gadi Eizenkot constantly speaks of. These units, and the overall activity of the corp, leads to to one main question: Are the artillery commanders capable of turning it into the ground arm's air force?

Unlike in Operation Protective Edge, the next war will require the IDF to maneuver deeper and quicker. The threat on the forces will also be more complex, and will require complex artillery firepower: Warning fire to distance the population, deterring firepower, screening, evacuation, and hitting the centers of gravity of the enemy - command and control centers or concentrations of fighters.

Another change on which the corp's revolution is based on is the Hupat Atar system. Uploading the target to a force-wide net allows a wide range of attacking solutions - an especially critical advantage when the enemy against which the IDF deals with, hides most of the time, shows up for short periods of time, and avoids face to face combat, except for unusual raids. Hence, every second in the IDF's reaction time is critical.

The massive cuts in the reserve forces and shutting down of units did not go over this corp, and in the frame of re-organization it was decided that whoever stays in the corp will be better trained and better prepared than before. Additionally, the artillery school in Shivta was united with the reserve division - the 252nd division. 

14 hours ago, Xlucine said:

Turbines also have a neat trick for battlefield mobility, as the turbine generates the most torque when it's stalled. The power output from a turbine more closely approximates the output from a magic constant-power source, whereas a piston engine (petrol or diesel) approximates a magic constant torque source. This means that a turbine puts down a much greater fraction of the peak power at low RPM, which is useful for pulling away.

 

I wonder what the suspension comparison in the first page was to? 9g at half the speed compared to 1g in the merk is a big gulf. Maybe a sherman?

Either a Patton or Abrams. It's worth noting that the article was written AFTER the comparative trials between the M1A1 and Merkava 3, where both were tested in the north, where there is a nice range of terrain types - deep mud, hard soil, bazalt boulders, and all kinds of slopes. It's a perfect place to test an AFV for mobility in real conditions, and all IDF AFVs are built to cope with the northern terrain of the Golan area.

During those trials they concluded that the Abrams could only drive in certain routes - i.e avoid the bazalt fields, to avoid extensive damage and injuries, whereas a Merkava 3 tank could drive in relative safety in all areas of the Golan.

That's why when officials compare the mobility of the two, they say it's comparable to that of the Abrams, because they are familiar with it. They know how it handles in the Merkava's playfield. 

And you do touch a very important subject here. During Yehiam Herpez's last interview (he basically developed all the suspension types in MANTAK for a while, including the Mark 3's which was the most revolutionary of the series, and even a torsion bar suspension for a light tank), he said that while Merkava tanks are equipped with towing gear to rescue immobilized tanks, their engines don't actually allow it, therefore they use D9 for this. Hopefully that will change with the Barak, as it's supposed to get a new powerpack.

I don't know what this whole fiasco is about, because I followed none of it, but I really appreciate the fact that you made a very detailed, documented, and easy to read post on the subject. 

I don't know, but if any of them got advanced armaments from the USSR, it would be Syria, who even got their hands on T-72AV before anyone else could.

Even if the BK-15M were in that war (in 1982), the Syrians already had the AT-3 missiles in large numbers, and the Merkava 1 was more or less invulnerable to it.