DogDodger

The Marines had discovered the relatively intact Type 94 tankette on Namur in February 1944 and had decided to take it home as a trophy. According to Robert Neiman, CO of C Company, 4th Tank Battalion USMC, "...our maintenance people fixed it up on Maui and we ran around the tank training area in it and had a ball. We had to leave it behind when we went to Saipan, and never saw it again."

Enforcing the hell out of the UCMJ...

Pz.Kpfw.38 (t) mit Schwimmkörper. According to the English version of Spielberger's book on the 38 (t) and 35 (t): "During the preparations for Operation 'Sealion'...in 1940, not only diving tanks (Panzer III and IV) but also Panzer II tanks were made amphibious. A similar order was also issued to the Bohemian-Moravian Machine Factory to make the Panzer 38 (t) tank amphibious. The order was carried out, resulting in the so-called Swim Body AP I. Via the side shafts and steering gears, two driveshafts were driven that ran parallel to the tank through the amphibious body to the rear screw propellers. In the water, a top speed of 8 kph was achieved. Series production was not begun."

Pz.Kpfw.38 (t) mit Schwimmkörper. According to the English version of Spielberger's book on the 38 (t) and 35 (t): "During the preparations for Operation 'Sealion'...in 1940, not only diving tanks (Panzer III and IV) but also Panzer II tanks were made amphibious. A similar order was also issued to the Bohemian-Moravian Machine Factory to make the Panzer 38 (t) tank amphibious. The order was carried out, resulting in the so-called Swim Body AP I. Via the side shafts and steering gears, two driveshafts were driven that ran parallel to the tank through the amphibious body to the rear screw propellers. In the water, a top speed of 8 kph was achieved. Series production was not begun."

So I picked this up for Christmas with a gift card, got it used so it was cheap. 

 
It had a lot of promise, claiming the 781 was assigned to Fort Knox to be the AFB test battalion.  THe book covers something called the million dollar tank test,  where the 781st, took ten tanks with each engine type and ran them for 4000 miles or 400 hours, to see what engine worked the best and improve the engines in general. The book only covers this interesting subject in a very shallow way, just going over a few interesting failures, trash talks the A57, then later mentions after improvements became supper reliable, but was still a dud. He states the US dumped them on the British who didn't want the A4s, and got the total made wrong, and then when the talks about its use as a firefly, he propagates "the it had a  new turret myth", and totally glosses over the 17 pounder used in the Sherman was a new gun,  and had to be manufactured a specific way for use in a Sherman firefly. 
 
He then shit talks the Sherman and castigates it, for get this BS, having a to small a turret ring! He then further attacks the sherman for not being able to mount a 90mm gun! He then goes through the typical slander fest of the Sherman costing the lives of a lot of allied crews because the M26 was delayed by the evil McNair, and does not cover any of the statistics about the Sherman actually being a pretty safe tank even before the ammo rack changes. He also implies TIgers and Panthers were super common and glosses over the losses to antitank guns.  Of course Death Traps is in the bibliography. 
 
I hope it will get better once they talk about the actual combat the 781 saw, but there is so much that's just not right, who knows what you can trust?

The Soviets were good enough to import some of Belgium's snow so their American friends wouldn't be so cold during the Battle of the Bulge.

Armor protection of the tanks of the second postwar generation T-64 (T-64A), Chieftain Mk5P and M60
 
Technical data on soviet 1-st post WW2 generation of tanks, Like T-54, T-55 and T-62 are well known and well described in literature. But what if Soviet “premium” tanks of 70-s era were engaged into real combat against western tanks in Europre.
This article provides description of "Object 432" (T-64) and T-64A tank combined protection (composite armor, anti radiation and chemical protection) in comparison to western designed tanks – “Chieftain” Mk5P and M60A1. Information on T-64 protection includes technical project (presentation) dated 1961 and technical drawings from various periods. Information on “Chieftain” Mk5P and M60A1 tanks is a result of study of captured tanks delivered to USSR in 1970s and beginning of 1980-s, published in technical reports of that period. The importance of information is the common testing criteria based on Soviet approach to tanks testing and protection design. This article contains mostly direct citations of facts and numbers published in reports with some comments.
 
 
Well, suppose this is a useless task.

Prepared a first article in English, but translating this materials is very complex task in question of terms.

Will be grateful is anybody assist in corrections of this material (terms and so on).


 
 

 



 
http://btvt.info/3attackdefensemobility/432armor_eng.htm  

Here ya go.
A Military, Political and Global History of Armoured Warfare: An Interview with Alaric Searle
 
 

It certainly is interesting. Postwar, the USSR and Germany reversed their places in the friend and enemy categories, and the Germans' reports of their experience against the USSR was perhaps lauded without critical analysis. Also, there seems to have been a deeper resonance for some US officers. Back to GEN DePuy, since he was after all the first commander of TRADOC and very heavily influential in the Army's 1976 doctrinal revision: he fought with the 90th Infantry Division in WW2, which was a bit of a problem unit upon deployment, and the deficiencies he perceived in the training and early leadership of his unit was almost traumatizing. Quoting Herbert again: "German tactical techniques also influenced DePuy, so much that he integrated some of their ideas into his battalion's procedures. He was especially impressed by their ability to organize terrain for the defense, using its every fold to site their weapons along probable enemy approaches with little regard for a neat, linear pattern. Also, DePuy admired their ability to camouflage and conceal their positions, as well as their ability to integrate combat vehicles with their infantry, either as roving guns in the defense or as direct-fire support platforms in the attack. The Germans also excelled at what DePuy later called 'suppression.' This was their generation of a superior volume of fire against an enemy position, forcing that enemy to take cover so he could not return fire accurately and thus making him vulnerable to assault."
In his biography of DePuy, Gole quotes DePuy on pursuit operations: "...we just ran into little groups that were pretty much incoherent insofar as a general defense was concerned. But, being good German soldiers, they fought well. So, we would run into a company here, a Kampfgruppe there, a couple of tanks here, an assault gun or two there...the thing that impressed everybody at the time was how a handful of Germans could hold up a regiment by [siting] their weapons properly."

When DePuy was in command of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division in 1954-5, he taught his soldiers to dig foxholes staggered in depth, which contrasted to the contemporary US Army method. Later, while J-3 of MACV, he proposed a counterambush scheme using a 3-platoon company totally armed with automatic weapons so that the ambushers could be suppressed by "a withering barrage of fire" and friendly forces could regain the initiative and ability to maneuver. So apart from a growing familiarity and friendship between the US and Germany engendered after WW2 and the union against a common foe in the USSR, it seems for better or for worse some important US Army decision-makers harbored deep-seated experiential motives for pushing for the widespread adoption "Germanic" concepts like the operational level of war (also used by the Soviets, of course), mission-type orders (which had also been common in Patton's Third Army), and Panzergrenadier tactics.

It seems the Germans expected to fight mounted for as much as possible and then use their vehicles in direct support, which contrasts to the prescription laid out by FM 17-42, for example. I don't have actual German manuals to quote, but Culver and Feist in Schützenpanzer say, "It took several years of trial-and-error combat experience for the Germans to realize that the armored personnel carrier was the weapon, and that the infantry should be trained to serve that weapon...The most important aspect of the new training, aside from instructing the Panzergrenadiers to fight from the vehicle as much as possible,was the proper training of drivers. The unique role and unusual driving characteristics of the Sd.Kfz.251 made the driver's task critical for proper handling of the vehicle...Training for the Panzergrenadiers themselves covered a number of areas, all of which had been learned - at not small cost - on the battlefield. Platoon and section leaders had to be trained in new combat tactics for the SPWs, and all the enlisted men also were trained in fighting from the vehicle, or in support of it."

It certainly is interesting. Postwar, the USSR and Germany reversed their places in the friend and enemy categories, and the Germans' reports of their experience against the USSR was perhaps lauded without critical analysis. Also, there seems to have been a deeper resonance for some US officers. Back to GEN DePuy, since he was after all the first commander of TRADOC and very heavily influential in the Army's 1976 doctrinal revision: he fought with the 90th Infantry Division in WW2, which was a bit of a problem unit upon deployment, and the deficiencies he perceived in the training and early leadership of his unit was almost traumatizing. Quoting Herbert again: "German tactical techniques also influenced DePuy, so much that he integrated some of their ideas into his battalion's procedures. He was especially impressed by their ability to organize terrain for the defense, using its every fold to site their weapons along probable enemy approaches with little regard for a neat, linear pattern. Also, DePuy admired their ability to camouflage and conceal their positions, as well as their ability to integrate combat vehicles with their infantry, either as roving guns in the defense or as direct-fire support platforms in the attack. The Germans also excelled at what DePuy later called 'suppression.' This was their generation of a superior volume of fire against an enemy position, forcing that enemy to take cover so he could not return fire accurately and thus making him vulnerable to assault."
In his biography of DePuy, Gole quotes DePuy on pursuit operations: "...we just ran into little groups that were pretty much incoherent insofar as a general defense was concerned. But, being good German soldiers, they fought well. So, we would run into a company here, a Kampfgruppe there, a couple of tanks here, an assault gun or two there...the thing that impressed everybody at the time was how a handful of Germans could hold up a regiment by [siting] their weapons properly."

When DePuy was in command of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division in 1954-5, he taught his soldiers to dig foxholes staggered in depth, which contrasted to the contemporary US Army method. Later, while J-3 of MACV, he proposed a counterambush scheme using a 3-platoon company totally armed with automatic weapons so that the ambushers could be suppressed by "a withering barrage of fire" and friendly forces could regain the initiative and ability to maneuver. So apart from a growing familiarity and friendship between the US and Germany engendered after WW2 and the union against a common foe in the USSR, it seems for better or for worse some important US Army decision-makers harbored deep-seated experiential motives for pushing for the widespread adoption "Germanic" concepts like the operational level of war (also used by the Soviets, of course), mission-type orders (which had also been common in Patton's Third Army), and Panzergrenadier tactics.

"How do we make ZSU vismod Sensei?" 
"Get that tall table from the lobby."

It certainly is interesting. Postwar, the USSR and Germany reversed their places in the friend and enemy categories, and the Germans' reports of their experience against the USSR was perhaps lauded without critical analysis. Also, there seems to have been a deeper resonance for some US officers. Back to GEN DePuy, since he was after all the first commander of TRADOC and very heavily influential in the Army's 1976 doctrinal revision: he fought with the 90th Infantry Division in WW2, which was a bit of a problem unit upon deployment, and the deficiencies he perceived in the training and early leadership of his unit was almost traumatizing. Quoting Herbert again: "German tactical techniques also influenced DePuy, so much that he integrated some of their ideas into his battalion's procedures. He was especially impressed by their ability to organize terrain for the defense, using its every fold to site their weapons along probable enemy approaches with little regard for a neat, linear pattern. Also, DePuy admired their ability to camouflage and conceal their positions, as well as their ability to integrate combat vehicles with their infantry, either as roving guns in the defense or as direct-fire support platforms in the attack. The Germans also excelled at what DePuy later called 'suppression.' This was their generation of a superior volume of fire against an enemy position, forcing that enemy to take cover so he could not return fire accurately and thus making him vulnerable to assault."
In his biography of DePuy, Gole quotes DePuy on pursuit operations: "...we just ran into little groups that were pretty much incoherent insofar as a general defense was concerned. But, being good German soldiers, they fought well. So, we would run into a company here, a Kampfgruppe there, a couple of tanks here, an assault gun or two there...the thing that impressed everybody at the time was how a handful of Germans could hold up a regiment by [siting] their weapons properly."

When DePuy was in command of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division in 1954-5, he taught his soldiers to dig foxholes staggered in depth, which contrasted to the contemporary US Army method. Later, while J-3 of MACV, he proposed a counterambush scheme using a 3-platoon company totally armed with automatic weapons so that the ambushers could be suppressed by "a withering barrage of fire" and friendly forces could regain the initiative and ability to maneuver. So apart from a growing familiarity and friendship between the US and Germany engendered after WW2 and the union against a common foe in the USSR, it seems for better or for worse some important US Army decision-makers harbored deep-seated experiential motives for pushing for the widespread adoption "Germanic" concepts like the operational level of war (also used by the Soviets, of course), mission-type orders (which had also been common in Patton's Third Army), and Panzergrenadier tactics.

I thought part of the reason for fighting from infantry vehicles was the notion that the next war in Europe would involve at least limited use of nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons. So it behooved troops to be able to be able to fight from a more mobile platform which would either shield them or at least let them avoid contaminated areas.

My thoughts exactly.  The US basically built a an armored 4x4 truck that happened to have tracks in the rear instead of wheels.  The Germans built a light armored tracked AFV that happened to have a couple wheels in the front.  
 

I had heard of the Czech clones.  Didn't realize they were disliked.  What was wrong with 'em?
 
My objection to the SdKfz 251 is that it basically defeats the purpose of a half-track.  Since a half-track has wheels that it can turn in the front, it is possible to dispense with the complicated steering system while still having some of the lower ground pressure of a tracked vehicle.

Except that they didn't do that.  They just had to put a Cletrac controlled differential steering system in, which is a more advanced steering system than most of their tanks had!  On top of that they had interleved road wheels, torsion bar suspension and the lubricated tracks (which the Czechs sensibly dropped).  At that point they might as well have made it full tracked.

It certainly is interesting. Postwar, the USSR and Germany reversed their places in the friend and enemy categories, and the Germans' reports of their experience against the USSR was perhaps lauded without critical analysis. Also, there seems to have been a deeper resonance for some US officers. Back to GEN DePuy, since he was after all the first commander of TRADOC and very heavily influential in the Army's 1976 doctrinal revision: he fought with the 90th Infantry Division in WW2, which was a bit of a problem unit upon deployment, and the deficiencies he perceived in the training and early leadership of his unit was almost traumatizing. Quoting Herbert again: "German tactical techniques also influenced DePuy, so much that he integrated some of their ideas into his battalion's procedures. He was especially impressed by their ability to organize terrain for the defense, using its every fold to site their weapons along probable enemy approaches with little regard for a neat, linear pattern. Also, DePuy admired their ability to camouflage and conceal their positions, as well as their ability to integrate combat vehicles with their infantry, either as roving guns in the defense or as direct-fire support platforms in the attack. The Germans also excelled at what DePuy later called 'suppression.' This was their generation of a superior volume of fire against an enemy position, forcing that enemy to take cover so he could not return fire accurately and thus making him vulnerable to assault."
In his biography of DePuy, Gole quotes DePuy on pursuit operations: "...we just ran into little groups that were pretty much incoherent insofar as a general defense was concerned. But, being good German soldiers, they fought well. So, we would run into a company here, a Kampfgruppe there, a couple of tanks here, an assault gun or two there...the thing that impressed everybody at the time was how a handful of Germans could hold up a regiment by [siting] their weapons properly."

When DePuy was in command of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division in 1954-5, he taught his soldiers to dig foxholes staggered in depth, which contrasted to the contemporary US Army method. Later, while J-3 of MACV, he proposed a counterambush scheme using a 3-platoon company totally armed with automatic weapons so that the ambushers could be suppressed by "a withering barrage of fire" and friendly forces could regain the initiative and ability to maneuver. So apart from a growing familiarity and friendship between the US and Germany engendered after WW2 and the union against a common foe in the USSR, it seems for better or for worse some important US Army decision-makers harbored deep-seated experiential motives for pushing for the widespread adoption "Germanic" concepts like the operational level of war (also used by the Soviets, of course), mission-type orders (which had also been common in Patton's Third Army), and Panzergrenadier tactics.

It seems the Germans expected to fight mounted for as much as possible and then use their vehicles in direct support, which contrasts to the prescription laid out by FM 17-42, for example. I don't have actual German manuals to quote, but Culver and Feist in Schützenpanzer say, "It took several years of trial-and-error combat experience for the Germans to realize that the armored personnel carrier was the weapon, and that the infantry should be trained to serve that weapon...The most important aspect of the new training, aside from instructing the Panzergrenadiers to fight from the vehicle as much as possible,was the proper training of drivers. The unique role and unusual driving characteristics of the Sd.Kfz.251 made the driver's task critical for proper handling of the vehicle...Training for the Panzergrenadiers themselves covered a number of areas, all of which had been learned - at not small cost - on the battlefield. Platoon and section leaders had to be trained in new combat tactics for the SPWs, and all the enlisted men also were trained in fighting from the vehicle, or in support of it."

Observant point that the two countries viewed their half-tracks in markedly different ways; this would continue after the war as well. The Germans were known to use theirs as fighting vehicles, and the US Army did essentially view theirs as trucks. In Deciding What Has to Be Done, MAJ Paul Herbert notes that although the US used tactics similar to Germany's for its WWII armored infantry, "the adoption of enclosed armored personnel carriers in the late 1950s, the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) reorganization of 1963, the separation of doctrinal proponency between Forts Benning (for infantry) and Knox (for armor), and especially the war in Vietnam all conspired to dilute American understanding of the essence of Panzergrenadier tactics, which had been the union of tanks and armored infantry in a single concept of mobile warfare." (However, his assertion that the US used tactics similar to Germany's in WW2 isn't supported by the November 1944 edition of FM 17-42, which says, "Armored infantry usually fights dismounted. Under favorable conditions vehicular armament either mounted or dismounted is used to support the attack." And later: "The armored infantry battalion uses its transportation to move quickly to initial attack positions where the infantry dismounts to fight on foot. Vehicles, except those used for fire support, are then withdrawn to the best available concealed and protected positions.")
Germany's aggressive use of their half-tracks during the war, and similar use of the HS.30 postwar, was a factor in finally prodding the US Army to change its armored infantry doctrine: General William DePuy had admired the Germans as soldiers since fighting them in World War II, and in the mid-70s he became enamored with their Panzergrenadier tactics to the point that he started using the term to describe what he had in mind for new American armored infantry tactics; DePuy even invited General Fritz Birnstiel, the German Army staff chief of combat arms, to lecture US Army combat branch schools on the German tactics in late 1974. The new version of FM 100-5, partly written by DePuy himself, was released a couple of years later.

Observant point that the two countries viewed their half-tracks in markedly different ways; this would continue after the war as well. The Germans were known to use theirs as fighting vehicles, and the US Army did essentially view theirs as trucks. In Deciding What Has to Be Done, MAJ Paul Herbert notes that although the US used tactics similar to Germany's for its WWII armored infantry, "the adoption of enclosed armored personnel carriers in the late 1950s, the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) reorganization of 1963, the separation of doctrinal proponency between Forts Benning (for infantry) and Knox (for armor), and especially the war in Vietnam all conspired to dilute American understanding of the essence of Panzergrenadier tactics, which had been the union of tanks and armored infantry in a single concept of mobile warfare." (However, his assertion that the US used tactics similar to Germany's in WW2 isn't supported by the November 1944 edition of FM 17-42, which says, "Armored infantry usually fights dismounted. Under favorable conditions vehicular armament either mounted or dismounted is used to support the attack." And later: "The armored infantry battalion uses its transportation to move quickly to initial attack positions where the infantry dismounts to fight on foot. Vehicles, except those used for fire support, are then withdrawn to the best available concealed and protected positions.")
Germany's aggressive use of their half-tracks during the war, and similar use of the HS.30 postwar, was a factor in finally prodding the US Army to change its armored infantry doctrine: General William DePuy had admired the Germans as soldiers since fighting them in World War II, and in the mid-70s he became enamored with their Panzergrenadier tactics to the point that he started using the term to describe what he had in mind for new American armored infantry tactics; DePuy even invited General Fritz Birnstiel, the German Army staff chief of combat arms, to lecture US Army combat branch schools on the German tactics in late 1974. The new version of FM 100-5, partly written by DePuy himself, was released a couple of years later.

It seems the Germans expected to fight mounted for as much as possible and then use their vehicles in direct support, which contrasts to the prescription laid out by FM 17-42, for example. I don't have actual German manuals to quote, but Culver and Feist in Schützenpanzer say, "It took several years of trial-and-error combat experience for the Germans to realize that the armored personnel carrier was the weapon, and that the infantry should be trained to serve that weapon...The most important aspect of the new training, aside from instructing the Panzergrenadiers to fight from the vehicle as much as possible,was the proper training of drivers. The unique role and unusual driving characteristics of the Sd.Kfz.251 made the driver's task critical for proper handling of the vehicle...Training for the Panzergrenadiers themselves covered a number of areas, all of which had been learned - at not small cost - on the battlefield. Platoon and section leaders had to be trained in new combat tactics for the SPWs, and all the enlisted men also were trained in fighting from the vehicle, or in support of it."

Observant point that the two countries viewed their half-tracks in markedly different ways; this would continue after the war as well. The Germans were known to use theirs as fighting vehicles, and the US Army did essentially view theirs as trucks. In Deciding What Has to Be Done, MAJ Paul Herbert notes that although the US used tactics similar to Germany's for its WWII armored infantry, "the adoption of enclosed armored personnel carriers in the late 1950s, the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) reorganization of 1963, the separation of doctrinal proponency between Forts Benning (for infantry) and Knox (for armor), and especially the war in Vietnam all conspired to dilute American understanding of the essence of Panzergrenadier tactics, which had been the union of tanks and armored infantry in a single concept of mobile warfare." (However, his assertion that the US used tactics similar to Germany's in WW2 isn't supported by the November 1944 edition of FM 17-42, which says, "Armored infantry usually fights dismounted. Under favorable conditions vehicular armament either mounted or dismounted is used to support the attack." And later: "The armored infantry battalion uses its transportation to move quickly to initial attack positions where the infantry dismounts to fight on foot. Vehicles, except those used for fire support, are then withdrawn to the best available concealed and protected positions.")
Germany's aggressive use of their half-tracks during the war, and similar use of the HS.30 postwar, was a factor in finally prodding the US Army to change its armored infantry doctrine: General William DePuy had admired the Germans as soldiers since fighting them in World War II, and in the mid-70s he became enamored with their Panzergrenadier tactics to the point that he started using the term to describe what he had in mind for new American armored infantry tactics; DePuy even invited General Fritz Birnstiel, the German Army staff chief of combat arms, to lecture US Army combat branch schools on the German tactics in late 1974. The new version of FM 100-5, partly written by DePuy himself, was released a couple of years later.

Observant point that the two countries viewed their half-tracks in markedly different ways; this would continue after the war as well. The Germans were known to use theirs as fighting vehicles, and the US Army did essentially view theirs as trucks. In Deciding What Has to Be Done, MAJ Paul Herbert notes that although the US used tactics similar to Germany's for its WWII armored infantry, "the adoption of enclosed armored personnel carriers in the late 1950s, the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) reorganization of 1963, the separation of doctrinal proponency between Forts Benning (for infantry) and Knox (for armor), and especially the war in Vietnam all conspired to dilute American understanding of the essence of Panzergrenadier tactics, which had been the union of tanks and armored infantry in a single concept of mobile warfare." (However, his assertion that the US used tactics similar to Germany's in WW2 isn't supported by the November 1944 edition of FM 17-42, which says, "Armored infantry usually fights dismounted. Under favorable conditions vehicular armament either mounted or dismounted is used to support the attack." And later: "The armored infantry battalion uses its transportation to move quickly to initial attack positions where the infantry dismounts to fight on foot. Vehicles, except those used for fire support, are then withdrawn to the best available concealed and protected positions.")
Germany's aggressive use of their half-tracks during the war, and similar use of the HS.30 postwar, was a factor in finally prodding the US Army to change its armored infantry doctrine: General William DePuy had admired the Germans as soldiers since fighting them in World War II, and in the mid-70s he became enamored with their Panzergrenadier tactics to the point that he started using the term to describe what he had in mind for new American armored infantry tactics; DePuy even invited General Fritz Birnstiel, the German Army staff chief of combat arms, to lecture US Army combat branch schools on the German tactics in late 1974. The new version of FM 100-5, partly written by DePuy himself, was released a couple of years later.

"...We had to say farewell to the Emchas. It would be a sad moment. We had wished it would be otherwise. A funeral parting, a great pain.
"Finally, an order arrived. But with other, stunning contents, that sent chills running up and down our spines: 'Remove the turrets and hull machine guns from the Shermans. Warehouse them. Deliver the armored hulls--as tractors--to civilian enterprises.' We had to report compliance with this order within five days.
"Why, for what reason, from where did such an abrupt change in the subsequent fate of the foreign tanks come? What forced Moscow to take such a final ['murderous' in the original text] decision?
"For days after the receipt of the 'death certificate' [as the tankers nicknamed the order], work proceeded on a broad front. All the brigade, corps, and army maintenance units were thrown into the demilitarization of the tanks, making 'tractors' out of them.
"I cannot forget the total dejection of the crews as they stood on the sidelines with heads bowed. The death of each tank showed on their faces. At one time the Emchisti had signed hand receipts for the tanks from the brigade command. We all were heavy-hearted. Many choked back tears, and some, not holding back, cried bitterly. How could this be? How much effort and energy had been given to them--the Shermans--there in the dry Mongolian steppe, in the silent desert sands of the Gobi, in the rugged southern reaches of the Grand Khingan? And how many obstacles had been overcome on the cenrtal Manchurian plain? These men had cared for them, cared for them like the apple of their eye. And now this final humiliation. Farewell, Emcha! Each inomarochnik will have good memories of you for the rest of his life.
"An epitaph came out of these mournful days (how could it not): 'Yesterday it was a menacing tank, and now, by order--they took off the turret--it has become a tractor. Front-line comrade, how painful to witness the death of the Emcha. Try not to cry!'"
Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks, Dmitriy Loza, trans. James F. Gebhardt