Mighty_Zuk

Neither Israel nor the USA are going for an upgraded 3rd gen tank in the long run. Both have programs for incremental upgrades to their tanks (ECP for Abrams, Barak for Merkava), just like KMW is putting out Leopard 2A7 upgrades and may even have a 2A8 in a couple years after enough countries bought the A7. They both have programs for conceptual breakthroughs through current and maturing technologies. The NGCV and Carmel, two very similar programs, will eventually include an MBT project. Neither of them is a standalone vehicle. Those MBTs should be the direct competitors to the MGCS.

Seems to be covering machine gun mounts, so I assume it's there to protect brushless mechanical parts from dust. The Robattle and M113 shouldn't really be competitors in most roles. The M113 simply has a lot more payload capacity. If it's just about carrying a machine gun and a squad's gear, then take a Robattle. Want to pack ATGMs or APS or something? Gavin.

Israel and the US are currently taking the leadership in the development of cutting edge ground combat technologies, and most importantly concepts of operation. This includes but is not limited to projects like mobile laser based air defenses, the OMFV/Carmel, and the Robotic Wingman/Robotic BtCT (in the US and Israel respectively). The Robotic Wingman/BtCT (Battalion Combat Team) concepts are visualized very similarly in the US and Israel. They talk about sensory, firepower, and decoys for the individual AFV up to battalion level capabilities. Some of the tasks may require only the small, 4x4 or 6x6 utility bots that are basically glorified shopping carts, like the IAI Robattle, and some tasks will require larger vehicles with larger capacity, getting somewhat closer to the capacity of a proper AFV. The cheapest and most dispensable vehicle that fits the description is the M113. The IDF wants to get rid of the M113 because it provides poor protection for the troops inside. But as a UGV it's no longer a factor. And instead of buying thousands of brand new, purpose-built vehicles, they can tap into this abundant resource of vehicles that would otherwise be scrapped, and are absolutely free.

I'm a Rafael fanboy. Anyone care to challenge me?

https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/29614

M113 as armed UGV:

The only official info on the Merkava 4's armor is that it uses a "continuous (i.e high coverage) semi-reactive armor". Rafael (who are among the producers of armor for the Merkava) are also strong believers in NxRA, deeming it optimal in a compromise between survivability of the armor module and its per-hit efficiency.

My understanding of the defeat mechanism comes mainly from this video: In the video you can see multiple instances of interception of KEPs, and all showing the grenade detonating slightly before it meets the KEP's front tip (obviously when a force is applied closer to the end of a rod, it will have greater potential to tilt it), so I don't understand the necessity to hit the fins. What purpose does it serve to target the fins specifically, and why do you believe a KEP cannot be tilted and yawed via application of force at its frontal tip? Are you using low numbers for the sake of an example or do you actually believe the Afghanit is not as effective as advertised. It's one thing to be skeptical about official Russian announcements on matters of procurement, but the tech is already established, and has been so for quite a long time. I would be more surprised if its Pk wasn't scratching the 99% mark that contemporary APS designs have achieved. I get what you're saying though. I just doubt that it's feasible, which I will explain why in the following replies below. A defeat mechanism centering around breaking the rod is only one of few approaches. The approach that Iron Fist, Trophy (in its first iteration), and most likely also Afghanit (static launchers don't go well with MEFP tech, as MEFPs would limit its coverage), took, is inducing yaw to the rod but keeping it intact. Even when intact, a tilted rod will be able to concentrate only a fraction of its energy on the tip, and will not be aligned with its flight trajectory so even that lighter hit will not be backed by any 'new' material. But I don't need to explain that to you. You know how all these APS work, so why even bother with this outdated approach of making rods more damage resistant when new APS are using a defeat mechanism that ignores the structural integrity of the KEPs. I don't understand why you don't believe that it's an established tech already. 2 countries should have MBTs with anti-KE APS in service within 2 years. Thousands such vehicles will be made by 2030, and these aren't systems with a laughable 50% success rate. All the ideas you've currently proposed are either only incremental, or standing in contrast with your opinion. Fool APS via decoys? Well to make this as reliable as possible, knowing that APS categorize the threats and draw interception data from a library which almost nullifies the usage of decoys, one would have to use a decoy that is similar in size, trajectory, and velocity, to the projectile it's trying to mimic. Trajectory is a non-issue, but when mimicking size, shape, and velocity, you might as well just use a real KEP and at that point you're basically firing 2 rounds at the same target, which brings us back to the drawing board. Jammers will have to be tank-borne and that adds complication to the tank. I'd say it adds even greater complication than an autocannon would, in terms of time and resources required to develop it and further maintain it (frequent software updates). And last but not least, using the APS's weaknesses against it. Of course it's being done. Just look at how Rafael marketed their Spike LR 2 - an anti-APS weapon via a 70 degree dive, which is a direct reference to the Afghanit's inability to intercept top attack munitions. But the Afghanit's radars can still observe the Spike LR 2 throughout its entire flight, and so retrofitting interceptors on the roof (e.g by replacing the large soft kill CM box on the turret roof with an interceptors' box) is the only thing required to overcome this issue. Adding a couple interceptors is the cheapest and easiest part of APS development. Yeah, I found the ramjet-powered APFSDS to be a very neat idea, but for the reasons I explained above, unless these ramjets can be made into the same size as the main rod, it won't really work. And even if it's possible to make the ramjets the same size and same speed (which I am inclined to believe is possible), making an accurate discrimination is a matter of a relatively very simple algorithm. Here's why I believe so: The radar detects 3 objects flying side by side. Knowing the possible construction of such a system, it's safe to assume the middle rod is the real one and the remainder are fake. Any maneuver of a rod to counter the problem in point #1 will have the APS classify it as a decoy, as real APFSDS cannot maneuver. Maneuvering at such ranges and such speeds is just seriously impractical for an APFSDS. If maneuvers are taken out of the equation to avoid problem raised in point #2, then any interceptor powerful enough to induce significant yaw and pitch on a rod will almost necessarily have sufficient force to also defeat the ramjet decoys. It will also bring back problem #1. Coating the tip may help, but stealth becomes less efficient as the distance to the radar decreases. Simple physics which you understand just as well as I do, perhaps better. It could work for a while, but it's a short term solution because an increase in computational power will allow radars to gradually reduce the minimum engagement range against KEPs, making stealth decreasingly important until it's completely irrelevant. Computational power is a resource developed extremely actively by the civilian industry, so it will always be abundant, and the retrofitting of new processors with substantially increased power will take a very short amount of time in terms of military procurement. That is an interesting idea, but I believe it is still an incremental upgrade, to be implemented in layers. Judging by the concepts shown in this thread, it seems to be a feasible idea, but I think it would be interesting to have a sort of competition for best design of AC in/on a turret as a practice. One idea off the top of my head is to make the gun retractable, but I'll have to think about how to make this feasible. To be fair, I'm strongly against the induction of the 57mm gun into Russian army service. But even if it's added, then I assume it's still not too big of an issue. The turret bustle on the T-14 can store these rounds if it's extended. It doesn't need a crazy amount of ammo. Current concepts of future MBTs such as Carmel and OMFV have omitted the gunner and now have the commander serve as a gunner, as much of the gunner's work has become automated, and portions of the commander's workload were also reduced by automation, allowing a dual qualification for roughly the same effort input. The crews of these vehicles will consist of a driver and commander (I assume both will be trained in all roles - gunnery, driving, and commanding to a limited extent) as the core crew, and a 3rd crewman being a systems and UxV operator. A feasibility demonstration for such a vehicle, if everything went according to schedule, was already made in Israel this year. While I find the idea of shutters extremely interesting, I don't think this is what @N-L-M envisioned, nor I. A shutter will have to look a bit like this: The issue was not about how their motors would work, but how the whole system would react to saturation fire. Then the fittest APS by concept is the Quick Kill. If radars can really be protected and be completely undisturbed by protective sheets capable of defeating fragmentation from medium caliber munitions, then I'm sold. Yes, Loooser. You don't have the privilege of Joo. That's probably why you call yourself "Loooser". Yeah, but I don't think it should complicate operation in any way if it's added as a single firing mode. I am under the notion that the past reasons for adding ACs aren't gone. They just got a little boost from 2 more reasons, and the disadvantages to their implementation were somewhat mitigated, which caused me to shift from being in the anti-AC camp to some level of intrigue, so I wanted to check this idea out with you guys.

The EFA uses a different defeat mechanism than the Iron Fist or Afghanit, which is a lot more specialized at defeating CE projectiles and EFPs than high caliber kinetic projectiles. Iron Fist and Afganit use a fragment-free blast (not sure if Afganit uses fragments but for KEPs it doesnt need them) to apply force at the tips of the rod to induce yaw and tilt. An undamaged but tilted rod will lose most of its penetration power to the point of inability to pierce even the side armor of MBTs. And @LoooSeR to you I will reply tomorrow.

What exactly have I gotten wrong there? Because I don't think anything has changed in the past few days Okay so let's say they can open and close quickly enough. How would the radar compute follow-up close-open cycles if it obstructs its sensing capability? And how would it deal with projectiles that don't have a consistent velocity reduction and therefore a different time of arrival than the calculated one? To illustrate my last point, consider a guided shell making a slight maneuver mid-flight in an otherwise completely ballistic flight, causing it to arrive a few miliseconds late, about when the shutter should open up but already be at a distance that is too short for the radar to respond (hence why some solutions use optical sensors or a combination).

One more thing I think people don't understand about me here is that I am a very harsh critic of using ACs on tanks myself, when it comes to current generation tanks. I only support the use of ACs on tanks of the next generation, when the new layout of tanks will negate some of the downsides of ACs, and rising threats will increase the number of advantages an AC can bring to the table. Combat inefficiency is declared at 50% manpower. Here's a possible scenario: BLUE and RED forces operating in a theater with a single BCT per side - i.e each side has tanks, infantry, well armed IFVs, artillery, and short to long range reconnaissance. We will assume the BCT operates 60 MBTs and 60 IFVs. BLUE spot RED forces movement 15km away. Artillery (old tech) is called in, and approximately 10% suffer damage to external modules including APS. Reconnaissance observe the hits and mark on a BMS (current tech) the targets that are likely no longer defended by APS. Via a fire tender (new tech) operating by a battle network (new tech), long range ATGMs (current tech) are used to hit the marked targets. 12 RED AFVs are destroyed, and are at 90% strength. RED forces return disruptive fire and manage to close the distance to 8km prior to being spotted again. Some of the BLUE AFVs obtain line of sight to RED AFVs and set up an ambush. A barrage of coordinated HE-MP shells is followed by ATGMs that leave them indefinitely out of service. An isolated force of 6 AFVs is destroyed. RED are at 85% strength. Since we're not talking about bots, all actions are mutual and both sides are at 85%, which reduces the ability of the initiating side to use overwhelming firepower. Mutual skirmishes continue until the range is 3.5km between the two forces. Both sides are now at 75% strength, and the goal is to bring the other side down by a further 25% of the initial strength. RED MBTs are now 40 current generation MBTs (e.g T-14). BLUE MBTs are now 40 next generation MBTs (e.g Leopard 3), equipped with a 40mm CTA coaxial AC. Each force is hunkered down behind some form of natural obstacle that renders artillery ineffective. Air power is unavailable. Both sides are ordered to advance to a certain point on the other side. The terrain they must cross is flat and will not allow skirmishes, rather will force both sides to a direct and brutal confrontation. Both are now advancing, and the RED MBTs are attempting to deplete the BLUE force's APS. BLUE MBTs are firing off their ACs first, destroying the APS of few. Vulnerable targets are marked on the network. Prior to that, due to similar numbers on both sides, coordination of firepower on a single MBT was impossible as it would mean some tanks would not be targeted at all, and would be free to fire for a protracted period of time. With the disabling of APS on the RED's side due to constant AC fire, BLUE MBTs can freely engage them with their main guns. Coordination of fire is also enabled. Let's assume a main gun's KE shot has a 10% chance to disable the APS, and an AC has a 50% chance to disable it in a single burst. This means that in the first cycle of engagement, the BLUE side can disable the APS of 60% of the enemy force, while the RED side can only disable the APS of 10%. Within that first cycle, 24 RED MBTs are damaged badly or destroyed, pushing the RED force above the casualty threshold, forcing a surrender. The BLUE forces lose 4 MBTs only, and remain combat effective. Focusing on a single tank is usually possible only in an ambush scenario or a limited skirmish as the forces ratio doesn't usually permit that. But it is indeed part of the solution. However, this is yet another layer of capabilities that should be separated from the main topic. It is a capability that is good to have regardless. How exactly one would change the APFSDS design to negate the APS's effect is beyond me. An APS would use a stupid amount of force against that rod to tilt it. I don't think making it even twice as heavy or twice as short would help in any meaningful way. Any other wild solution does not seem feasible to me. How would one release any form of munition from an APFSDS mid-flight at a greater speed than the rod itself, and keep a very tight grouping for hundreds of meters of flight? The sabots themselves will have to actually fly along the rod to become decoys, and that's just a massive amount of drag. And again making them fly faster than the rod itself would be impossible. Not an RCWS or turret, but mounted coaxially to the main gun. The ammunition should be native to these tank units as it would match the ammunition used by the IFVs of the same units. Using 30mm on your IFVs? Then put a 30mm there. And if the tank units and infantry units are organic, then maybe it's time to make the switch to non-organic or semi-organic combat teams. The FCS would hardly be complicated by it. New advancements in technology are forcing in new features that would put far greater load on the central computer than the ballistic computations of an AC. The gunner's workload should not be increased because: A)Gunners probably won't exist on those tanks. B)It is possible to make the whole process automated, and similar in complexity and requirement of human input to today's engagement of targets. Actually, current technology already offers engagement features that will make even an operation with a so called 'anti-APS' mode substantially easier than current day's firing. And of course, if the enemy APS is known to be unable to defeat KEPs at a set maximum range, and the units on the ground are trained with that information in mind, then the usa of an AC is no longer necessary. We don't even know if the idea of shutters is realistic. IMI had to drop a 3-barrel design for its APS because the added weight of the 3rd barrel prevented quick enough operation that was crucial for the defeat of KEPs. I don't think a shutter several times heavier will be able to get the job done very well. But even if that idea is somewhat realistic, then the need for ACs is only reinforced, and I'll explain why: If a shutter closes prior to impact, and has to cover the interceptors as well (as they're the most vulnerable part of the APS), then a steady barrage of medium caliber fire capable of reaching out to 3km will keep these shutters closed until the gunner can send a high caliber shell down range. As the shutters will be closed to protect the system from the constant incoming AC rounds, nothing will be able to defeat the KEP and the vehicle will be hit and damaged/destroyed. You mock the idea of an AC, but support adding a flamethrower? Its very short range and very chaotic nature will make it too hazardous for urban warfare, which is where infantry is actually a serious threat. And it's also illegal. There may not be spare space inside the T-14, but I wasn't really talking about the T-14. I was talking about the later generation tanks that are currently in development for the replacement of the Leopard 2, Leclerc, and Abrams. Either way, a T-14 would achieve a similar result in weight and space saving so I guess it can be used as an example. First, the T-14 weighs ~50 tons, maybe more and maybe less. That's already a 15 ton decrease from the western standard, without any harm to ergonomics. To the contrary, ergonomics have vastly improved there. And if we talk about space, well that exists as well. The AC does not have to take any space within the hull, and can have all its ammunition stored in the bustle, with the gun added as either a module or as an integral part, depending on how one would want to have the internals organized. That will make the turret larger, but that's hardly a problem when the turret is unmanned and already saves a great deal of space in comparison with current turret designs. So even with that system, the turret will be of reduced size relative to any manned turret. APS is a force multiplier. All the other components you listed are incremental upgrades. Thus, the ability to negate an APS will be far more critical than other capabilities. In Israel and Russia there are at least publicly known programs for anti-APS weaponry and tactics. I am speaking about an AC that will engage with other targets as well, but was made more feasible as a concept because of a new emerging need to inflict damage to external modules that APS cannot defend against. There were always fanboys who thought the Moderna or Strv 2000 looked really cool with those ACs, and even though I have to strike one of these down at least about once a week, they at least know that there is some merit to these ACs. They just don't know how impractical it is to add them to existing tanks. And the idea was toyed around with for a reason. I believe the main idea was to use these against infantry at close to medium ranges, and very lightly armored vehicles. Today you got 2 additional threats - cheap and dispensable UAVs and APS. The APS just made ACs more viable on MBTs, it doesn't make my idea of ACs into something that is mission-focused on one capability. Inside the now-empty turret bustle, as the main gun shells will be located in the basket. Then you're terrible at inferring. You know that I am traditionally against ACs on MBTs, and if you don't know then look at my other forum posts. I was looking into the different ways that an APS can evolve. I played with the idea of multi-layered APS consisting of something like Trophy, a high powered laser, an ADS-like system, and an RCWS. But no matter what I did, I couldn't find a solution to ACs and small arms fire. And so it clicked - if ACs are an unsolvable problem, then why not use them? Look at my reply to Loooser for an explanation on why I don't believe shutters can have a positive effect on MBTs, and why I think they may have adverse effects, such as blocking the APS from being able to engage a KEP. Look at my replies above, I answer that there. Another TLDR is that you can put the ammo in the bustle, and then it won't interfere with the basket's capacity. I'm not basing my entire concept on the usage of the AC. In fact, I have, multiple times, demonstrated exactly a scenario where an AC is only used only in set conditions, and other methods are used in other conditions. I have reiterated time and time again the need to generate a layered response, in which an AC is only one of the layers. I could use the same argument to debate the need of an LRF. Let's say the LRF only works up to 5km. Instead of firing to the maximum physically possible range of this cannon via ballistic charts, you'll be firing only to 5km, albeit much much faster. An LRF is not needed to ensure effectiveness, so why install it in the first place? Alternatives that are far shorter term and are bordering sci-fi that you choose to take as viable solutions while mock the inclusion of an AC as sci-fi despite it being deemed viable in the past. No, because the addition of an AC with bustle-stored ammunition should not interfere with the basket-storage of the 130mm ammo. And I'm going to need an explanation for the claim that MBTs can easily resist medium caliber munitions. Simple small arms fire can do significant damage to an APS if aimed at the interceptors, so now medium caliber shells are ineffective? The ability to engage an APS at longer range will also diminish with time. While I agree that spamming HE-MP shells with AB mode on APS is a good solution for long range engagements, certain APS can definitely engage and defeat HE-MP shells at a good standoff range. I believe Trophy intercepts at 30 meters. What happens when APS will be able to intercept such munitions at 50m, or 80m, or 100m via other more advanced means? Raytheon's Quick Kill, in concept, allowed long range interceptions. Even a 130mm HE-MP shell won't be effective enough at such ranges. Then a better analogy would be a battle knife instead of a 9mm pistol, if you're struggling with analogies. The point was that a soldier will need to pack his main weapon without any doubt, but have something to enable fighting in very close ranges. A grenade is another example of a weapon that is shorter ranged than a rifle, and in certain scenarios more effective. This is the BVR debate all over again from Vietnam. One might've thought that BVR missiles were going to end WVR combat, but they didn't. Plenty of tank on tank combat occurred at point blank range. If you design a tank under the notion that you will never engage with a target closer than 3km, than that's a failed design. I still don't understand how you propose to defeat an APS-equipped tank on the first shot. If you try that, not only will you expose yourself, but you'll do it for a far longer period of time. Which doesn't really explain why someone thought ACs were viable as armament for IFVs. I don't really know how it's possible to get 120rpm out of 120mm guns, but I'll bite. With an APS like the Afghanit, you're talking about firing at least 3 shots to damage a tank, with an added number that could depend on whether the tank traverses its turret. Against Iron Fist you'll need 5 shots to damage a tank. And if people actually start layering their APS, then that number may grow exponentially until one would have to use the entire on-board ammo. And how is any of them made possible? I at least explained how the autocannon solution would work. You could not explain yet how it would be physically possible to add decoys, stealth tech, or whatever other kind of alleged solution to allow KEPs to avoid an APS.

I believe the first one to report on it was Gurkhan, but finding his post on the topic is going to be hard, as this is something I remember from 2015.

IIRC the 44S-sv-Sh steel is meant for the protection of external modules (e.g panoramic sight and the turret's protective sheet) in vehicle applications. Otherwise it is marketed for use as body armor, as it is specialized for protection against small arms. So no, it's not going to save any meaningful amount of weight on the T-14, but it still exists on the tank as well as any recent AFV that has external modules to protect.

Yes, but: And also:

Nevermind @Marsh I managed to do it. Nice find!

@Marsh Mind posting that photo from 2000 of the Merkava 3 with prototype APS here?

That's literally the problem. This dude's following the program for so long, without seeing even one milestone achieved, and still supports the program. At least in the US they understand when they fuck up, and even then it's only after they create absolute marvels, so programs like the Crusader or Thumper are absolutely justified. The Arjun program did what in the final few years? Fail a single test of an ATGM? That's not a milestone, it just shows how fucked up the FCS is if it cannot even fire a missile right after so many years. It doesn't even take any ballistic calculations. And most of the calculations that need to be made are done by the missile's 'brain', not the FCS. When they think they need a guided munition to fire at what would literally be considered point blank range (1.2km), that's more than enough evidence of a tremendous fuck up even without talking about any other aspect. And these guys are no idiots when it comes to computer tech so it's gotta be corruption somewhere.

Thanks for getting out of this pistol efficiency loop. I'm the kind of person who gets absolutely bored when someone (MM) talks about some random (Leopard/Chally/T-72/Leclerc/Abrams) tank's armor and whether it's one inch thicker or one inch thinner. I'm also the kind of person who gets absolutely excited when someone talks about pure concepts. If one can get around an APS for a while, then that's all right. Will even save an extra round so HE-MP don't have to be fired at range to disable it. But it's going to have to be a solution that either requires extensive intel on the system, which needs to be both very accurate and very much in advance to allow proper study and development, or one that can be rather quickly countered. Russia tried adding a decoy to their RPG-30 and shortly after Rafael said their system can already overcome such decoys based on the software. A solution that can outright destroy the APS is far harder to counter. Heck, I don't even know how to protect APS from small arms fire, so now protect the whole system from medium caliber fire? Soft kill APS were once a thing. They were never really successful though, as they could only counter one type of threat at a time. Introduce a new ATGM whose specs local intel still hasn't acquired, and that soft kill APS ain't worth shit. Hard kill APS are similarly harder to do, but when they can blast literally anything out of the sky, it's no wonder they're so successful, with close to 2000 globally on order. It's simple, really. The closer you get to a kinetic kill of something, the more fail-safe it gets. And fail-safe is future-proof. I don't need to explain why future-proofing is so important for so many reasons.

Beats me, but apparently some armies find it necessary to equip certain types of soldiers with pistols for higher efficiency in close range engagements.

It's been reported that a report filed by a committee inspecting the readiness of the IDF, has presented 41 recommendations to the IDF Chief of Staff, all of which were accepted by him. Among them was a recommendation to up the land army's budget by 1.5 to 2 billion NIS (or $400 mil to $530 mil) to fund acquisitions of additional Merkava, Namer, and Eitan vehicles. It should be noted that the Merkava 4's export price is $4.5 mil, the Namer's is $3 mil, and Eitan is said to be "half the Namer's cost" so ~$1.5 mil. The recommendation was for an annual budget increase, not a one time addition.

I think I am being misunderstood here all over again, which seriously harms any practical debate on the topic. Few things to clarify: My proposal for an autocannon to be mounted coaxially to the main gun (horizontally but not vertically aligned), is only one layer of a solution to APS. This is supposed to be the lowest tier defense, for ranges from point blank to the maximum range at which a burst of medium caliber munitions can accurately hit a turret sized target and reliably neutralize an APS. Higher tiers are HE-MP shells from the main gun, going up to ATGMs either from the MBTs or from IFVs with an ABM-like effect, and at the top just good old shelling of tank units with artillery munitions to generally just soften them up. Diversification of the means of firepower is just as important as the diversification of the sources of firepower. The changing architecture of AFVs, and MBTs especially, should free up a lot of resources (in terms of weight and volume alike) to add additional weaponry to better engage with additional threats. The main function of a coaxial MG is to allow the MBT to engage with targets that would not be deemed "worthy" of a main gun shell, whether from an economical standpoint, or a practical one. An autocannon will expand the spectrum of targets that an MG previously allowed to engage with. I'm not really following your rationale here. Adding a means of firepower does not limit the capabilities of the other means of firepower. The main gun shouldn't automatically become weaker because an autocannon was added. It could theoretically be somewhat hindered if the main gun munitions are reduced significantly, but the idea of using an autocannon should only slightly decrease the amount of actual shells, and increase dramatically the number of effective shells. That is, it may cost a few shells in terms of space, but it will spare the crew from firing off 2 main gun shells instead of 1. As I said, an autocannon may only be effective to 2-3km, but the tools to defeat an APS at greater threats still exist, and are not hindered in any way. It just allows the tank to be more effective at defeating an APS at closer range. To me, your argument sounds a lot like claiming a soldier's efficiency is reduced because his pistol is only effective to 80 meters, even though he's clearly still packing a rifle able to send lead up to 400 meters. True, but the alternative is worse. Think of it like this: The FCS lays the main gun and autocannon on target, each vertically laid differently because of different ballistics. The target is 3km away, basically where the autocannon is still considered effective. You fire a burst, and within 3 seconds all shells hit the enemy tank. You immediately fire at that point through the main gun, with a delay of 3 seconds. Alternatively, you can get it down to 2 second to account for horizontal laying of the main gun, and have the main gun fire its round in a way that all shells impact at nearly the same time, with the main gun ammo arriving just slightly after the medium caliber shells. To implement such a mode, one only needs to utilize a not-very-new technology that allowed artillery guns to perform MRSI. Delayed firing and automatic coordination of fires is definitely existing technology, and should not be complicated if human supervision is added (IIRC there is a ban in many states on systems that fire autonomously). If you decide to fire off 2 shells from the main gun, you're not gaining any advantage from being at short range, and the theoretical engagement time would be as long as the loading time. The T-14 boasts a rate of fire of 12 RPM, which means 5 seconds to load the gun. So already you're advocating for a solution that is theoretically longer to perform and thus more threatening to the crew in terms of exposure time. Would shutters not negate the core functions of the APS's sensors and interceptors? How reliably would a radar be able to detect and discriminate various threats through a thick shutter? And even if the shutters don't create a disturbance for the radars in their entire sequence of operation, how quickly can the shutters be removed to allow the interceptors to fire upon the incoming threat? Because I don't think any APS will be able to fire through shutters. Not to mention that existing APS would already feature shutters as small arms fire is very much an issue for such systems, because they have 0 armor. The Trophy has shutters, but these are only put in place when tanks are parking, and removed prior to driving off. Neither can a 7.62mm do any of these, and yet MGs are practically a MUST for any AFV. Sure, against any other AFV, barring lightly armored vehicles, a main gun shell will always be better, but against infantry it should be a more economical (in terms of ammo stowage) choice. In urban scenarios it's doubly important as quite rarely are vehicles needed to bring down whole buildings, as opposed to just smacking a hole in a wall and obliterating everyone inside without causing the building to collapse, or bring it close to collapse (in case the troops need to take the building for shelter or as a post). There are many downsides to main guns compared to autocannons in urban settings, to the point that some even thought of refitting existing tanks with ACs just for that limited scenario. IFVs are hardly the most common target for MBTs. Not even in a high intensity conflict. 130mm ammo is substantially longer and that may cause problems. An ammo rack could definitely be designed to hold the same amount of ammo as a 120mm, but definitely not more. There aren't many approaches to alterations of the munitions themselves, that can be future-proof for a good enough amount of time, and simultaneously not terribly hindering the projectile's core function. At least, not one approach that I know of.

https://defence-blog.com/army/israel-received-kolchuga-m-passive-radar-system.html Israel (probably) buys Ukrainian Kolchuga-M radar, to be used for aerial exercises.

Again, that's only a part of the solution. The concept of distributed firepower has been successfully implemented over the years in many armies, and it's a damn solid concept. But it needs to be pushed further and further because there's a lot of room to keep it going. Air raids are first response. Artillery is second. Then come the maneuvering forces like tanks and infantry. All of them should have the capability to deal with certain common threats. And all of them should have the right set of tools to deal with those threats at ALL ranges at which they are expected to initiate contact with enemy units. You have to distribute the firepower, and you gotta layer it, like an ogre. It doesn't really matter. Optical systems are part of the evolution of APS (albeit, not of all of them), and their reliability, on the conceptual level, should not be taken into account. If they have the potential to guide the APS to defeat the KEP, then they have to be dealt with as well. Although the idea of jamming radars of an APS doesn't seem like a viable solution to me. Jamming radars, or attempting to overcome them through stealth, is only really effective at range. The closer you get to the radar, the less effective it becomes. The optical sensor only has to identify a shot was fired, and the radar will eventually see the KEP. Actually you don't even need the optical sensor to do anything here. Perhaps, but I don't think you can really apply a "Metal Storm" concept here. These are not necessarily conflicting ideas. Every platform with firepower should ideally have different layers of response and firepower. What you're describing is a different layer, and I am a proponent of using guided HE shells to 'soften' targets as well. I appreciate the well calculated and presented data, but I am talking, after all, about typical engagement ranges of 3km. I still hold the belief that beyond that range, or at a range where APFSDS cease to be effective against the encountered target, lobbing HE shells or coordinating a shifting artillery barrage is the way to go. From what you're saying here, I am inclined to believe that at a range of 3km, at which 30mm autocannons are said to be effective, their dispersion is far too great to consider them even close to being effective. Don't forget I'm talking here about not the current state, but what will be when we'll be approaching the 2030's. By that time, I assume many will try to make a shift towards larger medium calibers such as the British-French 40mm CTA which doesn't necessarily take more space per desired fire volume, and a shift will be made to a limited use of guided munitions, partly driven by the recently realized threat of cheap and dispensable drones, and perhaps to also reduce the dependency on ATGMs as precision strike weapons. With some form of guidance and an ABM mode, there is no reason why an autocannon cannot be effective with a single short burst at a range of 3km.

And they both hate Damian.

The intention is to have a burst of medium caliber shells detonate in front of an MBT-sized target and have a high statistical chance of neutralizing an APS. Not to time the impacts to have a main gun shell strike at exactly the same time. And isn't 4km already regarded as a range at which engagements between contemporary MBTs are ineffective or of limited value?