Mighty_Zuk

I stole this one.

I have my doubts, but why would it matter? The T-14 has clearly a lot more available weight to spare for additional armor.

I guess I'm going by 2015 information right now because it seems I can't really find any sources for that anymore. Even the links posted to the wiki page on multiple languages were either changed or outright deleted. From now on it's just rule of thumb then. Not that armor thickness past perhaps the 500mm is of any importance anyway.

In terms of cost: 130mm gun - Same as the production costs of a current 120mm plus development costs. Autoloader - Not considered an expensive technology, creates savings in the long run by reducing the resource-hungry crew by 1 in MBTs (or several in SPH). Autocannon - Again, dwarfed by the cost of electronics. APS - Somewhat expensive during peacetime, but significantly lowers the cost of operating a tank formation during wartime (the only time for which MBTs were designed anyway). With the use of napkin math (the best kind of math), I masterfully calculated a factor of 3 in reduction in acquisition costs alone in a medium to low intensity conflict scenario. You can play around with the numbers but it always gets ridiculously cost effective no matter how you do it. Sensors and other electronics - The expensive part for sure, but rather substantial improvements in computational power are made every year, creating a comfortable power/$ curve that is comfortable for industry to work with. It seems that all MBT users nowadays who are packing 3rd gen tanks can afford the sensors, so it's a non-issue. Think about the whole tank like a package deal offered in the JSF program. It's expensive at first but you're buying it in bulk so the price goes down to normal levels pretty quickly. Reshaping it is not really an option. Coating it will come at the expense of penetration power due to lower mass of the penetrator, fragility caused by its lowered width, or lowered velocity if the coating is simply added on top of the rod. Second, a good portion of APS, including those designed to defeat KEPs, are using optical sensors as well, so no coating will help against them. That would require significantly lowering the energy of the actual penetrator to the point where even a 130mm gun might not achieve overmatch against future threats. Second, the usage of decoys was attempted with the RPG-30 and it ended up a failed project, simply because some APS are designed in a way that part of their engagement process includes discrimination of threats based on a library, and an analysis of weight, size, and velocity if it's an unknown threat. So a decoy would have to be of the same size and same velocity as a typical APFSDS, at which point you're basically just shooting 2 rounds one after the other. I guess when APS become so abundant, some will try to make tools to jam their radars and disrupt their optical sensors. But that is only half of a solution and is not guaranteed to work. Think about how aviation does this. You jam an enemy's radar so they don't get a lock on you, but at the same time you bring enough munitions, specialized munitions, to defeat the SAM battery if needed. Again only a part of a solution, because the tank needs an independent capability to engage APS-equipped vehicles. Yes, firing off a burst right before a main gun shell is out of the barrel adds a couple seconds, but firing 2 rounds of main gun ammo will take longer and it will also spend more ammunition on the target in terms of volume, for the same effect or less. Concepts for operation of an AFV with 2 crewmen are now being developed. At least 2 families of universal AFVs are supposed to enter service before 2030 (both Carmel and OMFV for 2027 IIRC). The way they work is by improving the situational awareness on the individual level. Through new technologies, a single crewman is as efficient at scanning the environment as 2 men are, or more. The commander and driver are the core crew after the loader is replaced by an autoloader, and the gunner's duties are given to the TC. In the Carmel, both the driver and the TC stations are universal, so through proper training a driver can also fulfill the tasks of a gunner, and the TC can be a driver. In both projects, a 3rd crewman is added with the specific duty of operating UxVs and specialized payload. The technological means to improve situational awareness are peripherally mounted cameras that are able to capture panoramic footage and display it on both crew members' HUDs or screens. It will, however, use more volume of ammunition (one 120/130mm shell is not equivalent to two 30/35mm or 40mm telescopic shells). Are you suggesting a detonation mechanism on an APFSDS? It seems the APFSDS would have to sacrifice a lot of length for that, and would potentially throw itself off balance. The way APS defeat APFSDS is by tilting them via a strong pressure wave hitting their sides. Any imperfection will tilt the APFSDS much like an APS would. Not to mention that any detonation will have to come at the expense of the KEP's velocity, as the loss of velocity would be directly related to the desired mass of projectiles hitting the surface of the vehicle. If used in the way I suggest it be used, it should reduce the time of engagement by a good percentage relative to firing 2 separate projectiles from the main gun.

So what happened to Tal's rule of thumb that 7cm of diesel equals 1cm of RHA? (i.e factor of 7:1, not 3:1).

Officials claim 900mm (of what? ERA and armor, or armor after ERA?). I think it's definitely possible. But it's not really relevant at all. With the removal of most of the armor from the turret, they have a lot of weight to allocate to the hull front. So we can basically treat the hull front as tough as shit, and turret as weak shit, as a rule of thumb.

This demonstrated part of the next challenge other than neutralizing APS. As I've said, the reduction of crew size to 2, subsequent reduction of protected volume, and additional reductions of weight through material improvements and new production methods, will allow future tanks built in new plants to pack a considerably higher amount of armor, and so Rheinmetall's bet on a rising need for kinetic overmatch against such threats will, IMO, pay off. The 130mm will become standard past the 2030's, but it will include to a limited extent the drawbacks that were discussed when pitting the 140mm against incrementally improved 120mm guns. Here's a comparison between shell sizes: I have no doubt that ammo capacity will suffer quite greatly from that, and even today the ammo capacity of MBT's is nothing special. So a coaxial gun will have to then fulfill some of the main gun's tasks in the anti-infantry and anti-material roles. Hence, a dual feed is a MUST! Here's to hoping the guys at the design bureaus see this as a challenge to be solved and not as some natural obstacle to be avoided.

Adding ATGMs is really unnecessary when they fulfill the same function as the main cannon, except far worse.

That is definitely a good solution for the current generation of tanks, but not so much about the next generation where the firing of a burst of medium caliber ammunition, followed by a main gun shell, would be done as a single process computed by the FCS. I don't agree however on the ERA neutralizer part. Modern ERA is designed to be insensitive to certain munitions, and it probably includes fragments from the M230. ERA is also one technology that has been successfully countered with the 'kill on first shot' approach (specialized tips).

2 missiles hit 4 places? Something's not right with that version.

I realized we don't have a topic for a proper discussion of what future AFVs should look like, in the style of a general AFVs discussion rather than country-specific threads. I spotted a revived potential need for future MBTs - a coaxial autocannon to replace the coaxial MG. The reason? An APS neutralizer. Here's my short post on why I think it should happen: I didn't add it there, but I see lasers as a potential alternative. However, I don't think they're viable because of the power required to properly neutralize an APS's components, especially if these components are dispersed, or worse yet, effectively camouflaged. An autocannon will be able to disable not only the APS but other external components all at once. Similar to the engagement method showcased by Russia where they fired 2 Kornet missiles (almost) simultaneously to defeat an APS, a hypothetical mode of operation could include firing a burst of 2 KETF shells at a target prior to firing a main gun shell. An additional alternative could be to use a single main gun ABM shell that would initiate outside the scope of the APS's engagement range (e.g engagement range is 30m so it initiates at 50m), but it would have 2 main issues that are a longer time to kill a target and a greater consumption of ammunition (up to a 3rd of ammo would have to be allocated to ABM munitions strictly for anti-armor operations).

Aye. APS development should not necessitate a revision of infantry tactics at all. In fact, the thought of that alone proves a great deficiency in current tactics and thinking. Statistically, an APS will actually reduce the chances of infantry casualties. Therefore, sending troops to an area where an APS may be activated, is already a far more dangerous action than the one they're trying to prevent that would provide an alternative. That's why when an IDF official finally commented on BreakingDefense about the rumor of tactics being revised to address an alleged threat to infantry, he concluded the whole story with a longer version of what could be summed up as "This is BS!". Basically, if you're sending your troops to a place where ATRs or ATGMs are abundant, the line of sight is far and wide, can be surrounded by enough enemies to be confident enough to engage with an MBT, and you are aware of it to be able to tell your grunts to keep a distance from the tank and from each other, then that's far more fucked up than the possibility of friendly fire through APS.

Trophy and Iron Fist are advertised with a long list of key features. These include protection against top attack munitions at a "significant angle". I think the Iron Fist can be aimed to 90 degrees from horizontal, with one of the grenades on each launcher (the grenades rotate vertically on independent axis). Because the typical layout is 2 launchers for both systems, they don't even need the ability to aim straight up, and instead just intercept the missile at a short range from the vehicle. Both systems also have the ability to do very close range interceptions, while a long range would be around 20-30 meters. No such statement was made on the Iron Fist, but the US Army officials said the Trophy worked exactly as advertised. Both the Trophy and Iron Fist, much like competing systems, have their own methods to eliminate risk to nearby troops. Trophy has an MEFP with a very limited amount of penetrators, only enough to ensure a high probability of interception. A total of 17 fragments, all precisely directed, is not enough to pose any significant risk. Iron Fist uses a fragment-free warhead that uses a shockwave to 'cut' through the projectile, or tilt it in case of a KEP. The only fragments are those of the casing of the grenade, which can be made disintegratable. The Armata is frozen, not dead. Its 2300 units by 2020 were reduced to ~100 but it's still something. Enough to equip the Tamanskaya, and create overmatch against the British Army (sorry bois). I think it's pretty much safe to say now it's in service, even if in very limited numbers. Some APS mechanisms are more focused than others at neutralizing the warhead. But even Trophy which sacrifices neutralization chances for longer standoff and more compact interceptors, has a neutralization rate of more than 50%. Thus to be statistically more dangerous, or at least as dangerous as not intercepting an ATGM/ATR, the Trophy would have to produce at least as many fragments as an ATGM/ATR and with the same chaotic nature (i.e seemingly random dispersal rather than a focused blast).

All tests and combat employments showed either perfect results, or very close to perfect. The US tested 2 systems to the point of accepting them into service, and determined both to be safe enough for use in infantry-filled environment. In Trophy's case alone, they test fired it 48 times and it worked every time. These tests also disproved the myths spread by Raytheon that the system somehow "shreds nearby infantry". With the Iron Fist LC it was even more important to ensure safety, and it qualified as well. Both these systems also protect against top attack munitions. The only in-service system that won't defeat top attack munitions is the Afghanit, but that is because this design flaw was embedded within it willingly, for reasons only the Russian MoD will understand.

I guess the concept of unbalanced MBT production in Europe will forever elude me. One of the few programs in the IDF's ground forces that I can say has remained very consistent in its efficiency is the tank, and subsequently AFV, development and production program. And a key reason to that is the fact that other than times of budgetary crisis when there was simply no money to pay for new tanks, production has run continuously and with little to no fluctuations in the output. This created a situation in which every tank that reaches its universally agreed age of obsolescence (30-40), it gets replaced just on time (actually a few years earlier just in case there will be unexpected delays). The way to do this is by producing only 30 tanks per year, i.e one battalion. Scale this to the number of battalions, or companies (really depends upon the size of the army), and what you get is an army that is always fairly modern, supported by an industrial base whose stability is ensured by an IDIQ (Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity) type contract.

Some random Namer photos: And this absolute LAD single-handedly takes into service a whopping 100 FMTV trucks, and an unspecified number of HEMTT trucks. The current contract for FMTV trucks is for a total of 250. They said the process for assimilating additional HEMTT trucks has been going for 2 years now, and includes 'hundreds' of trucks.

Yep. The superstructure is rarely ever meaningful when talking about cost and ease of production, let alone risk.

T-Rex is dead, all hail the new weekend craze! https://defence-blog.com/army/ukraine-confirms-development-of-next-generation-main-battle-tank.html Ukraine to develop yet another tank.

A true sign of all-aspect superiority. Guess I'm rooting for Griffin now. Seriously though, they kinda need that added frontal protection because the weight economy will not favor much armor.

Ahh, the good old "why bother with a GPS/INS kit that literally everyone has in their phone, a gun laying computer that can fit in one hand, a cheap fucking electric motor or tiny diesel power generator, and perhaps a half assed loading assisting arm, when we can just pay for triple the men?"

Gabriel 5, or ANAM, for those wondering. I don't know exactly why it was kept semi-secret for so long, despite being seen several years ago, but I believe the IDF will soon buy it in large quantities, as they never upgraded their Harpoon missiles since they bought the outdated Block II.

Slovenia will buy Boxer IFVs with the same Samson II turret as Lithuania's Boxers. https://www.janes.com/article/85225/european-boxer-programmes-take-final-shape

Just maybe it's time to look for a tank to get the job done and not tick a box. So here's hoping for new builds.

US Army to buy Iron Fist APS for at least one Bradley brigade worth of vehicles, citing an 'urgent' threat (European theater). This is an early announcement but the intentions seem very clear - They want the Iron Fist and are only held back from buying immediately as only less than half the funds were cleared ($80 mil out of $200 mil). The RFI posted earlier requires an APS that was "characterized" on the Bradley and is TRL6. Only the Iron Fist meets both these requirements simultaneously. RAFAEL's testing of the Trophy on the Bradley earlier this year (most likely) does not qualify as "characterization" as it's a company's independent test, but they and Leonardo DRS are likely to put up some legal fight. https://breakingdefense.com/2018/12/army-bradley-brigade-will-get-israeli-anti-missile-system-iron-fist/ My personal take is also that the testing of additional APS systems like the RAP is either off, or indefinitely delayed, as it seems much more urgent to them to field a critical mass of vehicles with APS rather than find the absolute best solution under the MAPS program for what would be a more americanized system for the OMFV and other NGCV vehicles. EDIT: Looser'd I was. By Ramlaen.

The tank upgrade rotations are one battalion per year. There are typically 3 battalions per traditional brigade (armored, pre-BCT), so it's a 3 year process (won't withdraw from the Merkava 4M production though), and it should initiate once the trials for the system are done and it's cleared for production. Now, in February this year an experimental tank was shown with the system, along with an official statement that the process should take 3 years. Since the last enlistment cycle of the year is in November, I assume we should see the first battalion operational with the tank around January-February 2019.