AdmiralTheisman

Wouldn't he be forced to not do anything because he doesn't accept his own authority?

Ni Ki Ta  Khru chio v

 

 

Rocket-tractor forces of Best Korea

 

That looks to me more like a default password since it sounds like it's for a computer that Podesta hasn't used yet.
 
Can't recall if I mentioned it already or not, but his password for Twitter and Apple and all that wasn't much better anyways.  You don't need pro Russian hackers to get into their stuff
 

Australia is racist, news at 11.
And yet some people hold that country up as a paragon of virtue because gun laws.

The scandal that will finally destroy Trump:

Relevant.

I chuckled.

I have a friend who worked at a zoo who said that gibbons were some of the most challenging animals they dealt with.  Sure, plenty of animals are stronger (although gibbons are shockingly strong), and plenty of animals are just plain mean-tempered.  But that can be understood and to some degree predicted.
 
No, the problem with gibbons is that they're smart enough to realize that they're in a cage, and that all the people are on the outside, looking in on them with some mixture of pity, curiosity and contempt, and a gibbon is smart enough to resent that situation and always be looking for clever ways to escape it.
 
But after ten years, youtube commenters have never arrived at a similar realization.  I guess they're just all dumber than gibbons.

Since the highest and best use of this thread is to make fun of Gary Johnson...
 

This is the weirdest election of my lifetime.

Jeb Bush
 

So this is a bit of an outgrowth of my comments on the LCS...
 
Corvettes and Cruisers - Surface Combatants in 2015 and Beyond
 
The year 2015 is an interesting time for the oft-forgotten surface combatants - corvettes, frigates, destroyers, and cruisers - which are used to operating under the shadow of aircraft carriers that have dominated naval combat. On the Western side, you have numerous sources in the Internet reporting doom and gloom for the American Navy, citing warship shortages compared to a growing Chinese Navy. Even the Russian Navy, which mostly remains underfunded, is featured in sensationalist articles like this one:
 
http://theweek.com/articles/583294/tiny-russian-warship-just-shocked-world
 
Which question how small Russian warships are able to carry many more missiles than much larger American warships.
 
The problem, unfortunately, lies with the lack of naval knowledge among the general news media and the public. Sensationalism and trivia tend to override context and timelines in the search for more viewers and clicks.
 
Fortunately, that's why this article exists to set things straight.
 
The Myth of the Declining American Surface Fleet
 
One of the most enduring and popular misconceptions on the Internet is the idea that the American surface fleet is declining. Too much focus is placed on the problems of the navy's two latest ship designs - the Zumwalt and the Littoral Combat Ship - while commentators whose naval knowledge is limited to playing Harpoon wax nostalgic about the days of a massive US Navy that had dozens of cruisers and frigates.
 
All of this tends to disguise a startling revelation: The US surface fleet is in fact incredibly strong now; and is more powerful than it was in the 90s.
 
The key really, which everyone doesn't seem to notice, is the US Navy's concentration on a single, proven warship type: The Arleigh Burke class. There are now 62 of these powerful warships serving in the US Navy, half of which only joined the fleet after the year 2000. This production run in fact exceeds the production run of any US warship for the past 30 years - the Knox class frigate for instance had only 36 units, while only 51 of the "cheap" OH Perry class were built for the USN,
 
And that's not even the end of the run yet. An additional 14 units had already been authorized - to make up for the cancellation of most of the Zumwalts - with potentially thirty more to be ordered. It may in fact come to pass that the Arleigh Burke's production run would exceed a hundred; which is quite an investment given that these are 10,000 ton warships that are more equivalent to World War 2 cruisers than the 2,000 ton destroyers from the same era.
 
Yet even with the existing run of 62 ships the production of Arleigh Burkes had in fact already outweighed the production total of the OH Perry class (which was half the weight of a Burke) and the Spruance class - the two ship classes they were really meant to replace. So while the total number of ships may have decreased, in terms of tonnage the fleet's overall weight in fact increased - while lowering manpower cost.
 
The Burkes are also simply much better ships than the old frigates and destroyers because of the improved AEGIS sensors and the versatility of its VLS system; which can load many different types of missile depending on its mission. A single Burke for instance could theoretically carry 96 SAMs for air defense or 96 Tomahawk missiles instead - the latter loadout being four times more cruise missiles that the Russians fired on Syria using their four small ships. An old OH Perry by contrast could only carry 40 short-ranged SAMs and a handful of anti-ship missiles in its main missile magazine.
 
Moreover, the numbers of Arleigh Burkes available - alongside the twenty-two original AEGIS cruisers, give the US a grand total of eighty-four top-of the-line escorts. Compared to the nineteen US Navy Supercarriers and Marine carriers, the USN in fact has enough to provide four of AEGIS escorts per carrier. China by contrast has a mere dozen Type 51 and 52 destroyers that come close in weight class - but not in capability - as the Burkes. Indeed, their only match unit per unit are the six Kongo and Atago class ships of the Japanese SDF - who are of course American allies!
 
In this context, it also becomes easier to see why much of the "controversy" around the Littoral Combat Ship is misplaced. Many of its critics want it to be as capable as the outgoing OH Perry class frigates. What these critics don't realize is that the replacement for these ships were in fact the dozens of new Arleigh Burkes. The LCS was instead meant to fill the roles that the Burkes could't perform - and in doing so they spelled the doom of the 4,000 ton frigates.
 
 
The Death of the 4,000 ton Frigate
 
A perennial problem in amateur warship discussion is the insistence of many commentators on the need for particular ship types. "We need cruisers/destroyers/frigates", often uttered without realizing what the particular ships were actually meant to do. This applies to the 4,000 ton "multirole" frigate - which is an enormously popular type of warship worldwide and the OH Perry is an exemplar of this type. In essence, the multirole frigate promises decent all-around capability at an affordable cost.
 
However, for the present-day US Navy, there is no place for the multi-role frigate. The Burkes served as carrier escorts and independent cruisers for showing the flag in dangerous hotspots. The LCS meanwhile was a utility ship in a carrier battle group, or a low-intensity combat ship for showing the flag in safer waters. There was no space in between for a multirole frigate.
 
And that's because the well-loved frigate was in fact always riddled by compromise. It simply could not be good at anti-air combat, anti-submarine combat, and surface combat with only 4,000 tons displacement. Specialist ships meanwhile - such as the Knox - could not operate independently because they could not deal with all possible threats they encountered.
 
Even the idea that they could serve as "backup" for the primary carrier escorts proved problematic, particularly in anti-air combat. Experience in the Falklands showed that having multiple average SAM systems operating independently was problematic - you had mere minutes or even seconds to coordinate your defense volleys which proved impossible with multiple ships; leading to the possibility that some of the enemy aircraft/missiles were left un-engaged. Long-ranged SAM systems also tended to be radar-guided leading to the possibility of the escorts interfering with each other's radar.
 
The solution was a centralized and computerized SAM system on a single ship with a powerful radar - the AEGIS system on the US cruisers and the Burkes. Indeed, so powerful was this system that the Americans quickly scrapped their remaining non-AEGIS air defense cruisers while the OH Perry class was allowed to lose their SAM systems - it was better to have a handful of AEGIS ships doing air defense than a lot of lesser ships.
 
Interestingly, the only type of SAM system that would complement AEGIS was the short-ranged RIM; which was an IR-guided weapon that did not interfere with other ship's radar while providing last-ditch defense against an enemy missile that got through the long-ranged SAM volleys of AEGIS. It was probably not a coincidence that RIM was the only SAM system equipped on the LCS; while all of the US Navy's remaining carrier escorts were large AEGIS ships.
 
Meanwhile, anti-submarine combat had also progressed. The Knox and OH Perry class were designed with the idea that the warship itself may have to engage an enemy submarine in direct combat; which is why it had its own anti-submarine torpedo tubes and the ASROC launcher. The speed of nuclear submarines and their own guided torpedoes had long made this approach suicidal however, hence the switch to using helicopters to attack submarines without fear of retaliation. With this in mind, the only contribution of a multirole frigate in anti-submarine warfare was its helicopter pad - a helicopter pad also present on the LCS.
 
In short, the problem with the multirole frigate was that too much of its systems had become dead weight. Its SAM systems were more of a liability if it were not up-to-date, and the anti-submarine weapons redundant in the context of using the helicopter for submarine hunting. Indeed, it could be considered wasteful to use multirole frigates in carrier battlegroups since some of their tasks were so mundane - such as the "plane guard" whose mission was to pick up any pilots who may have crashed into the sea while trying to land on the carrier. Is it really necessary for a 4,000 ton frigate with a large number of weapons (most of which it cannot use while so close to the carrier) to be saddled with this role, or is better for a smaller, cheaper vessel like the LCS whose sole anti-air weapon can be used to defend the carrier?
 
Quiet New Dreadnoughts: Corvettes and Cruisers
 
Put together, the Burke and the LCS both point to two emerging trends in surface combatants; as well as the dangerous continuation of many navies down the path of the multirole frigate.
 
First, the Burkes showed it was possible to have a powerful surface combatant theoretically capable of surviving heavy air attack (theoretical as the system has never been tested fully in combat) that nonetheless retains sufficient anti-surface and anti-submarine punch. However, this design requires the ship to be nearly 10,000 tons. The Chinese Type 52D for instance is now around 7,500 tons in weight compared to the original Type 52's 6,000; and the future proposals are definitely looking at a 10,000 ton design. The British Daring class had an even more dramatic size increase, doubling in size from the previous Type 42s. All of these ships are equipped with VLS with actual or theoretical capability to load multiple types of missiles for different missions.
 
These 10,000 ton "Destroyers" are more rightly classified as "cruisers" given they are also capable of independent action in addition to serving as escort; and their presence spells the obsolescence of the 4,000-5,000 ton "multirole" frigate. The new 10K Cruisers can simply do everything the frigates are supposed to do and better except in terms of acquisition cost; which is why the frigate will remain primarily with budget-stricken navies trying to pursue paper advantages at a discount. The higher-end Corvettes like the Sa'ar V, which are even more cash-strapped implementations of the multirole frigate that also sacrifice seakeeping, may also soon suffer the same fate.
 
Meanwhile, new 1,000-3,000 ton corvettes like the LCS will be developed to fill the existing gap in warships suitable for low-intensity conflict or mundane tasks with a battlefleet. Given the cost of the 10K cruisers these smaller ships will focus not on packing as many weapons or capabilities as possible, but focus on a handful of roles at the most efficient possible cost. These ships will be characterized by omitting features seen by traditionalists as "standard" pieces of equipment - kept "just in case" - but for the most part really only add to the operating cost of the ship in the long run.
 
Of course future technological developments may result in new ship types and capabilities - including perhaps a renewed interest in long-ranged naval gunnery. However, I suspect that many of these new technologies will simply be incorporated in the large cruisers and then the smaller corvettes as necessary; and that these two core types will serve as the basis of future surface combatants for the world's fleets.

I start this thread about music of Romania. Not sure if belongs here as will be more about older music than recent one but if it is more appropriate in the history section please move it there.
 
Without further ado, I'll start with a classic folk-rock album of Romanian rock band Phoenix - Muguri de fluier (Flute buds) - 1974. After they run away from Romania they named themselves Transylvania Phoenix despite the fact that the band originated in Banat region. Obviously they were banned by Communist censorship but after 1989 their music exploded, especially in university environment. 
 
Muguri de fluier album was perhaps the most played of all their creations due to its peculiar sound inspired from folklore ranging from Southern Balkans to gypsy music or Central European music. It is considered to be the best of their albums. 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9lhzNEPHTAk&list=PLYUvzRPuJpOlj2lwCMp_7T5qEeN1oMqFE
 
LE: about full album, only managed to link it this way: "Phoenix - Mugur De Fluier (1974) [HQ]"
 
Few words about each song.
 
Lasa, Lasa! (Leave it, Leave it!) it is just an interlude between songs that appeared on The Immortals soundtrack (1974)
 
Pavel Chinezu, leat 1479   - about a local hero, guitar solo a bit a la Rory Gallagher 
 
Strunga (The Gorge) - also for the soundtrack of Immortals movie. 
 
Andrii Popa (name of a famous Hajduk) - song about an Hajduk known to free people enslaved by Ottomans. 
 
Mica Tiganiada (Small Gypsiliad)  - dulcimer, bongos, violins, a very complex music inspired from gypsy folklore well sustained by rock instruments
 
Ochii negri, Ochi de tigan (Black eyes, gypsy eyes)- an archaic sound which was initially considered to develop a rock opera based on it. 
 
Muzica si muzichia  (Music and diminutive for music which is a slang word that I have no idea how to translate it, sing-song maybe or musicy as spending an Y is often taken as a diminutive)  - this song conserve the best the character of the music from Banat, the home region of this band with alternative measures and broken rhythm that reminds peasants' fairs music with oriental and Balkanic influences
 
Mugur de fluier (Flute buds) - with Romanian  shepherd flute integrated between rock instruments, gives the name of the album; some say it's inspired from Christmas Song of Jethro Tull from Living in the past 
 
Anule, hanule (Oh year, oh inn) - last two songs anticipate more their future songs, closer to hard-rock 
Dansul Codrilor (Dance of woods)
 
Songs from this album featured on the soundtrack of Nemuritorii (Immortals) movie. You can watch it here if you like with English subs. 

A Chinese airline has reportedly warned passengers that "precautions" should be taken when visiting areas in London mainly populated by "Indians, Pakistanis and black people".
 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-37298803
 
They were published in its monthly Wings Of China magazine and read: "London is generally a safe place to travel, however precautions are needed when entering areas mainly populated by Indians, Pakistanis and black people.
"We advise tourists not to go out alone at night, and females always to be accompanied by another person when travelling."

Tank design is often conceptualized as a balance between mobility, protection and firepower.  This is, at best, a messy and imprecise conceptualization.  It is messy because these three traits cannot be completely separated from each other.  An APC, for example, that provides basic protection against small arms fire and shell fragments is effectively more mobile than an open-topped vehicle because the APC can traverse areas swept by artillery fires that are closed off entirely to the open-topped vehicle.  It is an imprecise conceptualization because broad ideas like "mobility" are very complex in practice.  The M1 Abrams burns more fuel than the Leo 2, but the Leo 2 requires diesel fuel, while the omnivorous AGT-1500 will run happily on anything liquid and flammable.  Which has better strategic mobility?  Soviet rail gauge was slightly wider than Western European standard; 3.32 vs 3.15 meters.  But Soviet tanks in the Cold War were generally kept lighter and smaller, and had to be in order to be moved in large numbers on a rail and road network that was not as robust as that further west.  So if NATO and the Warsaw Pact had switched tanks in the late 1950s, they would both have downgraded the strategic mobility of their forces, as the Soviet tanks would be slightly too wide for unrestricted movement on rails in the free world, and the NATO tanks would have demanded more logistical support per tank than evil atheist commie formations were designed to provide.
 

 
So instead of wading into a deep and subtle subject, I am going to write about something that is extremely simple and easy to describe in mathematical terms; the top speed of a tank moving in a straight line.  Because it is so simple and straightforward to understand, it is also nearly meaningless in terms of the combat performance of a tank.
 
In short, the top speed of a tank is limited by three things; the gear ratio limit, the power limit and the suspension limit.  The tank's maximum speed will be whichever of these limits is the lowest on a given terrain.  The top speed of a tank is of limited significance, even from a tactical perspective, because the tank's ability to exploit its top speed is constrained by other factors.  A high top speed, however, looks great on sales brochures, and there are examples of tanks that were designed with pointlessly high top speeds in order to overawe people who needed impressing.
 

When this baby hits 88 miles per hour, you're going to see some serious shit.
 
The Gear Ratio Limit
 
Every engine has a maximum speed at which it can turn.  Often, the engine is artificially governed to a maximum speed slightly less than what it is mechanically capable of in order to reduce wear.  Additionally, most piston engines develop their maximum power at slightly less than their maximum speed due to valve timing issues:
 

A typical power/speed relationship for an Otto Cycle engine.  Otto Cycle engines are primitive devices that are only used when the Brayton Cycle Master Race is unavailable.
 
Most tanks have predominantly or purely mechanical drivetrains, which exchange rotational speed for torque by easily measurable ratios.  The maximum rotational speed of the engine, multiplied by the gear ratio of the highest gear in the transmission multiplied by the gear ratio of the final drives multiplied by the circumference of the drive sprocket will equal the gear ratio limit of the tank.  The tank is unable to achieve higher speeds than the gear ratio limit because it physically cannot spin its tracks around any faster.
 
Most spec sheets don't actually give out the transmission ratios in different gears, but such excessively detailed specification sheets are provided in Germany's Tiger Tanks by Hilary Doyle and Thomas Jentz.  The gear ratios, final drive ratios, and maximum engine RPM of the Tiger II are all provided, along with a handy table of the vehicle's maximum speed in each gear.  In eighth gear, the top speed is given as 41.5 KPH, but that is at an engine speed of 3000 RPM, and in reality the German tank engines were governed to less than that in order to conserve their service life.  At a more realistic 2500 RPM, the mighty Tiger II would have managed 34.6 KPH.
 
In principle there are analogous limits for electrical and hydraulic drive components based on free speeds and stall torques, but they are a little more complicated to actually calculate.
 

Part of the transmission from an M4 Sherman, picture from Jeeps_Guns_Tanks' great Sherman website
 
The Power Limit
 
So a Tiger II could totally go 34.6 KPH in combat, right?  Well, perhaps.  And by "perhaps," I mean "lolololololol, fuck no."  I defy you to find me a test report where anybody manages to get a Tiger II over 33 KPH.  While the meticulous engineers of Henschel did accurately transcribe the gear ratios of the transmission and final drive accurately, and did manage to use their tape measures correctly when measuring the drive sprockets, their rosy projections of the top speed did not account for the power limit.
 
As a tank moves, power from the engine is wasted in various ways and so is unavailable to accelerate the tank.  As the tank goes faster and faster, the magnitude of these power-wasting phenomena grows, until there is no surplus power to accelerate the tank any more.  The system reaches equilibrium, and the tank maxes out at some top speed where it hits its power limit (unless, of course, the tank hits its gear ratio limit first).
 
The actual power available to a tank is not the same as the gross power of the motor.  Some of the gross horsepower of the motor has to be directed to fans to cool the engine (except, of course, in the case of the Brayton Cycle Master Race, whose engines are almost completely self-cooling).  The transmission and final drives are not perfectly efficient either, and waste a significant amount of the power flowing through them as heat.  As a result of this, the actual power available at the sprocket is typically between 61% and 74% of the engine's quoted gross power.
 
Once the power does hit the drive sprocket, it is wasted in overcoming the friction of the tank's tracks, in churning up the ground the tank is on, and in aerodynamic drag.  I have helpfully listed these in the order of decreasing importance.
 
The drag coefficient of a cube (which is a sufficiently accurate physical representation of a Tiger II) is .8. This, multiplied by half the fluid density of air (1.2 kg/m^3) times the velocity (9.4 m/s) squared times a rough frontal area of 3.8 by 3 meters gives a force of 483 newtons of drag.  This multiplied by the velocity of the tiger II gives 4.5 kilowatts, or about six horsepower lost to drag.  With the governor installed, the HL 230 could put out about 580 horsepower, which would be four hundred something horses at the sprocket, so the aerodynamic drag would be 1.5% of the total available power.  Negligible.  Tanks are just too slow to lose much power to aerodynamic effects.
 
Losses to the soil can be important, depending on the surface the tank is operating on.  On a nice, hard surface like a paved road there will be minimal losses between the tank's tracks and the surface.  Off-road, however, the tank's tracks will start to sink into soil or mud, and more power will be wasted in churning up the soil.  If the soil is loose or boggy enough, the tank will simply sink in and be immobilized.  Tanks that spread their weight out over a larger area will lose less power, and be able to traverse soft soils at higher speed.  This paper from the UK shows the relationship between mean maximum pressure (MMP), and the increase in rolling resistance on various soils and sands in excruciating detail.  In general, tanks with more track area, with more and bigger road wheels, and with longer track pitch will have lower MMP, and will sink into soft soils less and therefore lose less top speed.
 
The largest loss of power usually comes from friction within the tracks themselves.  This is sometimes called rolling resistance, but this term is also used to mean other, subtly different things, so it pays to be precise.  Compared to wheeled vehicles, tracked vehicles have extremely high rolling resistance, and lose a lot of power just keeping the tracks turning.  Rolling resistance is generally expressed as a dimensionless coefficient, CR, which multiplied against vehicle weight gives the force of friction.  This chart from R.M. Ogorkiewicz' Technology of Tanks shows experimentally determined rolling resistance coefficients for various tracked vehicles:
 

 
The rolling resistance coefficients given here show that a tracked vehicle going on ideal testing ground conditions is about as efficient as a car driving over loose gravel.  It also shows that the rolling resistance increases with vehicle speed.  A rough approximation of this increase in CR is given by the equation CR=A+BV, where A and B are constants and V is vehicle speed.  Ogorkiewicz explains:
 
 
It should be noted that the lubricated needle bearing track joints of which he speaks were only ever used by the Germans in WWII because they were insanely complicated.  Band tracks have lower rolling resistance than metal link tracks, but they really aren't practical for vehicles much above thirty tonnes.  Other ways of reducing rolling resistance include using larger road wheels, omitting return rollers, and reducing track tension.  Obviously, there are practical limits to these approaches.
 
To calculate power losses due to rolling resistance, multiply vehicle weight by CR by vehicle velocity to get power lost.  The velocity at which the power lost to rolling resistance equals the power available at the sprocket is the power limit on the speed of the tank.
 
The Suspension Limit
 
The suspension limit on speed is starting to get dangerously far away from the world of spherical, frictionless horses where everything is easy to calculate using simple algebra, so I will be brief.  In addition to the continents of the world not being completely comprised of paved surfaces that minimize rolling resistance, the continents of the world are also not perfectly flat.  This means that in order to travel at high speed off road, tanks require some sort of suspension or else they would shake their crews into jelly.  If the crew is being shaken too much to operate effectively, then it doesn't really matter if a tank has a high enough gear ratio limit or power limit to go faster.  This is also particularly obnoxious because suspension performance is difficult to quantify, as it involves resonance frequencies, damping coefficients, and a bunch of other complicated shit.
 
Suffice it to say, then, that a very rough estimate of the ride-smoothing qualities of a tank's suspension can be made from the total travel of its road wheels:
 

 
This chart from Technology of Tanks is helpful.  A more detailed discussion of the subject of tank suspension can be found here.
 
The Real World Rudely Intrudes
 
So, how useful is high top speed in a tank in messy, hard-to-mathematically-express reality?  The answer might surprise you!
 

A Wehrmacht M.A.N. combustotron Ausf G
 
We'll take some whacks at everyone's favorite whipping boy; the Panther.
 
A US report on a captured Panther Ausf G gives its top speed on roads as an absolutely blistering 60 KPH on roads.  The Soviets could only get their captured Ausf D to do 50 KPH, but compared to a Sherman, which is generally only credited with 40 KPH on roads, that's alarmingly fast.
 
So, would this mean that the Panther enjoyed a mobility advantage over the Sherman?  Would this mean that it was better able to make quick advances and daring flanking maneuvers during a battle?
 
No.
 
In field tests the British found the panther to have lower off-road speed than a Churchill VII (the panther had a slightly busted transmission though).  In the same American report that credits the Panther Ausf G with a 60 KPH top speed on roads, it was found that off road the panther was almost exactly as fast as an M4A376W, with individual Shermans slightly outpacing the big cat or lagging behind it slightly.  Another US report from January 1945 states that over courses with many turns and curves, the Sherman would pull out ahead because the Sherman lost less speed negotiating corners.  Clearly, the Panther's advantage in straight line speed did not translate into better mobility in any combat scenario that did not involve drag racing.
 
So what was going on with the Panther?  How could it leave everything but light tanks in the dust on a straight highway, but be outpaced by the ponderous Churchill heavy tank in actual field tests?
 

Panther Ausf A tanks captured by the Soviets
 
A British report from 1946 on the Panther's transmission explains what's going on.  The Panther's transmission had seven forward gears, but off-road it really couldn't make it out of fifth.  In other words, the Panther had an extremely high gear ratio limit that allowed it exceptional speed on roads.  However, the Panther's mediocre power to weight ratio (nominally 13 hp/ton for the RPM limited HL 230) meant that once the tank was off road and fighting mud, it only had a mediocre power limit.  Indeed, it is a testament to the efficiency of the Panther's running gear that it could keep up with Shermans at all, since the Panther's power to weight ratio was about 20% lower than that particular variant of Sherman.
 
There were other factors limiting the Panther's speed in practical circumstances.  The geared steering system used in the Panther had different steering radii based on what gear the Panther was in.  The higher the gear, the wider the turn.  In theory this was excellent, but in practice the designers chose too wide a turn radius for each gear, which meant that for any but the gentlest turns the Panther's drive would need to slow down and downshift in order to complete the turn, thus sacrificing any speed advantage his tank enjoyed.
 
So why would a tank be designed in such a strange fashion?  The British thought that the Panther was originally designed to be much lighter, and that the transmission had never been re-designed in order to compensate.  Given the weight gain that the Panther experienced early in development, this explanation seems like it may be partially true.  However, when interrogated, Ernst Kniepkamp, a senior engineer in Germany's wartime tank development bureaucracy, stated that the additional gears were there simply to give the Panther a high speed on roads, because it looked good to senior generals.
 
So, this is the danger in evaluating tanks based on extremely simplistic performance metrics that look good on paper.  They may be simple to digest and simple to calculate, but in the messy real world, they may mean simply nothing.

One of the many issues facing nuclear power in the US is economics. Once operational, nuclear energy is quite cheap in terms of $/MWh. However, the startup costs are enormous, which results in the overall cost of power going up. In an environment like today, where there's cheaply available natural gas, nuclear power becomes quite unattractive, especially with all the extra taxes levied on it and public fears.
 
This article has some good info; http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/economic-aspects/economics-of-nuclear-power.aspx
 
One interesting aspect which I first heard today is that the inclusion of renewables in the energy grid hurts nuclear energy. Nuclear plants are best run at a steady power level, providing base load. However, renewables such as wind and solar provide wildly varying amounts of power depending on the weather conditions or time or day. As a result, the nuclear plant is forced to vary its power level, running less efficiently. For reasons that I'm not 100% sure of, gas and coal plants can respond to variations in base load better, and so are more economic.
 
There's a couple ways I could think of to get around this. One is mass production of standardized reactor designs, I believe there's already been a lot of work on that front. Another is putting multiple reactors in the same plant; that article I linked says the Chinese estimate you get a 15% cost reduction (in $/MWh) by putting two reactors on the same site instead of separately.
 
I also heard that before building wind and solar was the cool thing to do to score political points, hydro and geothermal were the big renewable energy sources. Because they were economically viable, not because of hippies. Hydro being economically viable is obvious, but I'm more curious about geothermal. It seems like a pretty good energy source to use (where available).

So I found this paper on DTIC; http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a187901.pdf
 
Judging by the abstract and that it was written in 1986, it's probably ridiculously pro-German, but I don't know enough to refute it in detail. Also, I'm curious to know more about German defensive efforts against the Soviet Union in general. I'm guessing they weren't that effective by the end of the war, but they did have earlier successes like 2nd Kharkov. But a lot of that was probably due to Soviet failures as much as the Germans being aryan ubermensch.

If Newt Gingrich being VP results in a sweet moonbase I might actually consider voting for Trump. Congratulations on nominating the shittiest candidate, dems.
 
Also, the problem with not letting people on the watchlist buy guns is that there's not sort of trial or anything that gets you on the watchlist, so it would probably violate the 14th amendment (depriving people of their constitutional rights without due process).

Still a better love story than Twilight

Here is a good source about nuclear energy, totally unbiased and highly scientific basis

Credit for most of the photos goes to Ulric.

I realized that we don't actually have a thread about the British Chieftain tank.  
 
I posted a bunch of Chieftain related stuff on my site today for anyone who is interested.  The items include:
 
Magazine Articles
 
1970 article from ARMOR
1970 article from IDR  - Chieftain-Main Battle tank for the 1970s
1976 article from IDR - The Combat-Improved Chieftain – First Impressions
1976 article from IDR - Improved Chieftain for Iran
 
Government reports
 
WO 194-495 Assessment of Weapon System in Chieftain
WO 341-108 Automotive Branch Report on Chieftain Modifications
DEFE 15-1183 – L11 Brochure 
WO 194-463 – Demonstration of Chieftain Gun 
 
WO 194-1323 – Feasibility study on Burlington Chieftain