Xlucine

Yeah,  I am Norwegian.  This sounds legit, though badly translated.  
 
The reason the warship sank by the way, is because they anchored the ship to land to keep it steady. But it was a poor job,  a wire broke,  and when they tried to reinforce it, it became too dangerous and they had to abort half way.  Later other wires broke,  leading to a chain reaction causing the reinforced wire to rip out a chuck of rock and the ship sinking.  
 
Sjøforsvaret tells the media that it has no ship rescue capability "because they are not a ship rescue company" .  That competence has to be outsourced.  
 
The ship is unofficially declared lost and not Worth repairing.
 
 
 
A lot of memes about it:

(It says boat is given away, has to be picked up in Øygarden and the batteries for the GPS has to be replaced. A captain can come with for free.)
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

I'm happy that here in Michigan, we overwhelmingly passed three state ballot initiatives that a lot of people had been working on.  Recreational pot is now legal in Michigan, Michigan citizens are now automatically registered to vote when they get their drivers license/state ID, and the creation of voting districts will now be in the hands of a non-partisan citizen board, which should reduce gerrymandering.  

The full title of this work is "Weaponeering - Conventional Weapon System Effectiveness" by Morris Driels, who teaches at the USN Postgraduate School, and the cover of the edition I have in hand can be seen below.


 
The book aims to "describe and quantify the methods commonly used to predict the probably of successfully attacking ground targets using air-launched or ground-launched weapons", including "the various methodologies utilized in operational products used widely in the [US military]." Essentially, this boils down to a series of statistical methods to calculate Pk and Ph for various weapons and engagements. 

The author gave the book to my mother, who was a coworker of his at the time, and is of the opinion that Driels is not as smart as he perceives himself to be. But, hey, it's worth a review for friends.

I will unfortunately be quite busy in the next few days, but I have enough spare time tonight to begin a small review of a chapter. I aim to eventually get a full review of the piece done.

Our dear friends @Collimatrix and @N-L-M requested specifically chapter 15 covering mines, and chapter 16 covering target acquisition.

Chapter 15
Mines

The mine section covers both land mines and sea mines, and is split roughly in twain along these lines.

The land mine section begins with roughly a page of technical description of AT vs AP, M-Kill vs K-Kill, and lists common US FAmily of SCatterably Mines (FASCAM) systems. The section includes decent representative diagrams. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the specification and planning of minefields, beginning with the mean effective diameter of a mine. Driels discusses a simplified minefield method based on mine density, and then a detailed method.

The simplified method expresses the effectiveness of the minefield as a density value. Diels derives for the release of unitary mines from aircraft

NMines = Fractional coverage in range * fractional coverage in deflection * number of mines released per pass * reliability * number of passes

and for cluster type

NMines = FRange * FDefl * NDispensers * Reliability dispenser * NMines per Dispenser * Reliability Submunition * number of passes

and then exploits the evident geometry to express the Area and Frontal densities. Most useful is the table of suggested minefield densities for Area Denial Artillery Munition and Remote Anti-Armor Mine System, giving the Area and Linear densities required to Disrupt, Turn, Fix, and Block an opponent. 


Whereas the simplistic method expresses effectiveness as a density, the detailed model views the targets and mines individually, assuming the targets are driving directly through the minefield perpendicular to the width and that there is only one casualty and no sympathetic detonations per detonation. The model computes the expected number of targets destroyed by the minefield, beginning with the Mean Effective Diameter and the PEncounter based on distance from the mine. 

Driels derives the number of mines encountered which will be encountered, not avoided, and will engage the target. I can't be arsed to type the equations in full, so here you go.



The section concludes with an example calculation using the detailed mine method. Overall, this shows the strengths and weaknesses of the book fairly well - it is a reasonable derivation of open-source statistical methods for predicting Pk and Ph and the number of sorties required, but US-specific and limited in scope and depth. 

The treatment of Sea Mines  begins by describing the various types and uses of said mines, importantly noting that they have both defensive and offensive uses, and that the presence of the threat of mines is equally important as the actual sinking which occurs. There are three classifications of sea mines, contact, influence, and controlled.

Shallow water mines are treated trivially, considering them equivalent to land mines with Blast Diameter in the place of MED, and assuming that the mines cannot be avoided.

Deep water mines are approached in a similar manner, with the desire to determine the number of mines needed to achieve the required probability of damage, and planning missions from there. Two features of sea mines must be considered, however - mine actuation by passing of the target, and mine damage to the target. The probability of activation is, unfortunately, dependent on the depth of the mine and distance, forming a series of stacked bowls as below.


The mean value of PActivation is the statistical expectation of the curve. Because I don't feel like screencapping another equation, the Width of Seaway where an actuation can occur is qualitatively merely the area under the actuation curve calculated for a specific mine and target combo.

The damage function is also of interest - because we require the mine to both actuate and damage the target, this limits our earlier area under the curve to that area integrated to the limits of the damage function. The selection of mine sensitivity plays a very large role in the effectiveness of our mines. A high setting will lead to many more actuations than damages, which can be indicated by the ratio of the actuation area and the damage area from earlier. Setting the actuation distance equal to the damage distance means that every actuation causes damage, but the probability of actuation is only around 42%. The compromise which selects some Areadamage / Areaactuation of around .8 to .93 is generally preferred. This gives us several useful terms -
PA+D = Reliability * Areadamage / Widthminefield . The probability that the first ship to transit a minefield is referred to as the threat, or
Threat T = 1 - (1 - PA+D)^NMines = 1 - (1 - Reliability * Areadamage / Widthminefield ) which can obviously be solved for NMines to get the desired number of mines for a desired threat level.

Anti-submarine mines are an interesting subset of deep sea mines, as they turn the problem from two-dimensions to three. Driels accounts for this by replacing the mine damage width with the mine damage area, to no one's surprise. Driels claims that the probability of actuation and damage is 

PA/D =  Damage Area / (Width * Depth of minefield). Despite my initial confusion, the reliability term safely reappears in the threat definition below.

T = 1 - (1 - (Reliability * Area damage)/(Width * Depth of minefield))^NMines, with a solution for number of mines for given threat level fairly easily taken out as before.

Lastly, there is a summary of topics for each chapter, though unfortunately they are qualitative descriptions. Including the final derived equations in this part would be a major benefit, but is overlooked. Ah well. They are quite good for review or refreshing the material.

As before, this is a relatively interesting if shallow engagement with the statistical methods to calculate Pk and Ph and the number of sorties required. Going more into detail regarding selecting Threat values or common (unclass) parameters would be interesting, but is lacking. Assuming I don't slack off tomorrow, I should have most or all of the Target Acquisition chapter covered.

Today I learned that before  Senator Joe McCarthy became famous for his anti-communist campaign, he lobbied for the commutation of death sentences given to a group of Waffen SS soldiers convicted of war crimes for carrying out the 1944 Malmedy massacre of American prisoners of war. McCarthy was critical of the convictions because of allegations of torture during the interrogations that led to the German soldiers' confessions. He charged that the U.S. Army was engaged in a coverup of judicial misconduct, but never presented any evidence to support the accusation.  Shortly after this, a poll of the Senate press corps voted McCarthy "the worst U.S. senator" currently in office.

About two and a half years ago i've stumbled across some russian book about western IFVs, which apparently was a mere compilation of articles from western magazines translated into russian. There was a mention of some 58-ton heavy IFV, called SAIFV, which was described as vehicle baised on Abrams chassis, and they also claimed that a prototype was biult and tested. (which seems dubious to me now) Than, two years ago, I've stumbled across this article about SAIFV https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-u-s-army-wanted-to-replace-the-bradley-38-years-ago-dffb6728dd11 which has 3 drawings - "artist conceptions". Than, half a year ago I was reading some US DOD bidget hearings transcripts about MICV/IFV development, and stumbled across mentions of 50-55 metric tons $800,0000 - 1,000,000 SAIFV of Crizer study, and than I've googled a Mobility analysis of IFV task force alternatives (1978-07) report (which is allmost the same as Appendix D of that report which is described below). Unfortunatelly there weren't any proper pictures, (and also i've thought that those 3 drawings from medium.com article are modern "artist conceptions", not one from 1978). 
Than several things happend in the right time and place, which invlolved twitter, AUSA-2018, NGCV-OMFV, and author of that arcticle at medium.com, and when I asked him about that article - it turned out that there is a report about SAIFV, which is readily available on the internet there http://cdm16635.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16635coll14/id/56079/rec/1


884 pages, with 7 normal chapters and chapter 8 which consists of 6 appendices.
 
 

cost figures from Appendices F and B:


things like those cost figures, coupled with deceiving percents like this (Ch. IV p.17):
(there were also other versions mentioned in Senate hearings of FY1978-1980s - 91.6%, 92%, 95%, and also they've mentioned soviet motorized rifle division instead of tank regiment)

apparently saved Bradley. Although in 1979 those $370,000 turned out to be $472,000 (in same FY1978 dollars), - and later according to FY1983 bidget hearings - $1,350,000 (which is about $880,000 in 1978 dollars). 
 
 
...
btw, GAO's report  "Army's Proposed Close Combat Armored Vehicle Team" (12 dec 1977) has following thing on page 23:

and that was BFV project manager's responce (hearings on military posture and h.r. 10929, part 2 of 7, p.183) several mounths later (somewhere in feb-apr 1978):

Open propulsors are meant to be a bit more efficient, which should be useful for an SSK (the extra wetted area of the shroud means more drag). It's interesting to see someone choose to not use a ducted propulsor for a better reason than "it's more expensive than turning the handle on the old design codes for open propellers"
 
 
Minimising surface area is the main driver for minimising drag underwater, so that means circular cross sections and ducts on propellers are only as long as they have to be - I suspect the extensions on the leading edge of the ducts for the propulsors aren't worth their area

Akula did some digging and it's apparently a research/proof of concept design.  5 meter hull width, approx.
 

hoo boy you are the fullest retard I've ever met. Your damping coefficient nears infinity and your Q approximates 0.
So, one at a time:
 
The USN superheavy shells more than match the IJNs shit. The IJN shells are only around 3200lb on a bore 2" greater. This means that their sectional density is worse, by a factor of roughly 7%. This basically nullifies any advantage you'd expect from a larger shell, and indeed the penetration of both guns is very similar. But the US guns are lighter, faster in both aiming and loading, and have far superior fire control layout, equipment, and technology. The Ford mk 1 Fire control computer was very good for the time and the Yamato had nothing of the kind. Optical rangefinders are fairly inaccurate, and ranging with them must be carried out in concert with salvo spotting. Radar gunnery gives very accurate ranges not only for the target but also for the shell splashes in each salvo, allowing quick and accurate correction of fire. Yamato falls WAAAAY short of the Iowa in this regard. Radar observation also works at night and in bad weather, where optical doesn't. There's a reason literally the entire world moved on to radar, and claiming otherwise is just objectively wrong no matter how you try to compensate. Read a bit about Surigao Strait and learn what integrated FCS with radars does.
 
You clearly have not been educated on the classics of battleship design and optimization. A speed advantage greater than 3 knots pretty much allows the Iowa to not only dictate the range, but also maneuver to avoid fire in a stern chase without losing the Yamato. The Iowa's superior FCS, in combination with superior turret drives, allows her to maneuver while firing with little loss of accuracy, and in a stern chase the Yamato would only have one turret available. For broadside fighting, salvo dodging would keep the Iowa very safe while she controls the range, while the Yamato cannot maneuver like that without giving up any semblance of accuracy.
 
The Iowa's reloading equipment was faster, not only because of the automatic gun indexing and elevating during runout- the Iowa's shell hoists lead directly into the ramming tray, and the 2-stage powder cart eases handling which again speeds the procedure, while  the whole system involves fewer, lighter moving parts and less complicated mechanisms improving reliability.
 
If you don't know what makes the US 5"/38 a DP gun you have no business taking its name in vain. Protip- it's everything other than the gun itself that matters. from the semiautomatic ramming to the automatic fuze setters to the surface/AA director control to the turret drives and elevation range to the ammo scuttles and handling rooms. The USN 5"/38 is far and away the best intermediate gun of the war, even before VT became a thing. And with radar director control, vs a AoN armored ship, it's more effective than the Jap 6.1". Against destroyers as well, as they were not armored. The greater number of guns firing faster and more accurately the Iowa can bring to bear against any enemy ship or aircraft blows your Jap mess out of the water. Or at least it would had carrier aviation not gotten to it first.
 
Do you know what a fineness ratio is? The Iowa has a far more efficient hull shape, and is much lighter and therefore smaller. Getting an Iowa places involves less fuel expenditure, particularly at high speeds. The Iowa has 212k SHP max, compared to the Yamato's 150k SHP. But power requirements roughly scale with the cube of the speed, and to reack 28kn, 1 knot faster than the Yamato can ever go, the Iowa needs only 110k SHP. It is a more efficient design.
 
Battleships fight enemy ships at unknown ranges in rough weather, provide AA coverage to carriers and taskforces, bombard shore targets, and so on.
In fact, let's take a look at the history of battleship actions, going backwards:
Surigao Strait: night and poor weather.
North Cape: Terrible weather in the early morning.
Second Guadalcanal: Night.
Casablanca: Clear day, supporting a landing.
Shrekking of Bismarck: Clear Day, once the Bismarck could no longer run away after getting torpedoed (as it too was a shit design).
Denmark Strait: morning, good visibility. Long range.
Cape Spartivento: Day, long range.
Beginning to get the idea? the battles are not a 2-way shooting range, they are more complex and tend to greatly degrade optical visibility.
Battleships also support landings, in which case fire support is essential. The USN HC 16" holds 70 kg of explosive, 10 more than the equivalent IJN 18" shell. So any claims that the Jap shell is superior belong in the trash, next to your opinions. But the Iowa has 150 rounds per gun, while the Yamato only has around 100. So the Iowa has more firepower to rain down on targets. When it comes to secondaries the capacity disparity is huge- 500 RPG for the Iowa, and only 150 for the Yamato 6.1" and 300 RPG for its 5". Again, Yamato loses. It just can't compete, it is deficient in firepower and staying power.
 
1v1 duel? I'd put good money on the Iowa winning. If it's during the day it can simply stay away until night, and then come in and wreck the Yamato because the Japs were bad at radar and literally cannot do anything other than fire at muzzle flashes at long range at night. In more normal conditions, the Iowa has already won.
 
Americans were actually competent TDS designers, and the Japs sucked at it. Deal with it bitchboi.
 
TL;DR: learn a thing or two about ships before posting about them.

long sentence short,  “Zero is already have no advantage against F4F-4 in East Solomon，and later facing F6F with 2x stronger engine power Zero is being slaughtered one side. This end up by a total massacre in battle of philipean sea(マリアナ沖海戦)"
second part is pretty much shitting on japanese zero lover " Zero is the most famous aircraft made by japan , the sign of japanese industry and patriotism. I (the author) can understand this emotion and feeling of yours(japan local zero lover), but as a weapon it get outclassed very quickly, battle of east solomon is where it falls, and later become basically free EXP."

Just to clarify, this is what I edited my initial post to add:
 
1. They're inferior to a degree that is only very slightly outside the tolerances for the thickness of battleship armor. It's immaterial.
2. You still have to hit the enemy ship, and the mediocrity of the fire control system on Yamato precludes that.
3. Your statement on speed in a gun duel is categorically and demonstrably false, and has been known to be so since 19-0-fucking-5. The IJN won the battles of Yellow Sea and Tsushima Strait because of their fleet's superior speed and maneuverability. 
4. The Iowa class' gun mounts reload faster -- see the middle of the second paragraph above for more details. 
5. I don't follow your point, the 5"/38 is a fine DP gun. The 5"/54 that replaced it was better, but the /38 is a great gun and it gets the job done. Heavy secondary low angle armament went out of style with Dreadnought.
6. I'm not sure where you get inefficient engines and inferior electronics from the Iowas. Their powerplant was perfectly fine and extremely reliable, and met specifications, and the electronics fit was in every way superior to that of the Yamato class.
7. Battleships do as they're told. 
8. The Yamato has inferior firepower due to the slower rate of fire. 
9. The Yamato most likely does not win because the Iowa-class would dictate the terms of the engagement, and could simply disengage at will and return in more favorable circumstances, like at night when the Japanese couldn't see or reliably engage at long ranges. 

Tsushima Strait was in 1905. I think you're conflating it with Surigao Strait. There's a big fucking difference, as I outlined in an edit to my initial post in this thread. To summarize, the IJN beat the shit out of the Imperial Russian Navy because their ships were a knot faster, slightly more maneuverable, and had a gun armament biased towards heavy guns. The same thing also happened at the Battle of the Yellow Sea the year before. 
 
Mechanical accuracy means dick all if you can't point the gun in the right direction because the FCS is primitive and incapable of working when you're turning.
 
Spotter aircraft are going to get killed either by 5"/38 fire if it's close enough to give meaningful corrections, or by fighter cover, or by the Curtis SC Seahawks on the Iowa. 
 
Yamato was capable of 27 knots, period. I don't have access to the data anymore (it's probably in the SNAME or RINA journal, or at the DTMB), but I saw some hull testing on the design that they did after the war at the David Taylor Model Basin and it was kinda meh -- it's a pretty efficient hull design with a good bulbous bow, but the Iowa hull form is better suited to high speed, and the powerplant is 62,000hp more powerful than that of the Yamatos. It turns out, when you design a ship that's bluffer, 25,000 tons heavier, and less powerful, it's like five knots slower than a ship with a crazy long L:B and a super fine entry. The Iowas were designed from the get-go to be insanely fast, and they accomplished that handily.
 
Oh, and for the sake of argument, if we assume the Iowas could only sustain 30kts (which, again, is not accurate), they were still 2.5-3 knots faster than the Yamatos, which is double or treble the speed advantage that Togo had over Rozhestvensky at Tsushima. 

@Peasant As Tsushima Strait showed, even a handful of knots speed advantage can provide a decisive advantage. The Iowa class might sacrifice some protection, but in exchange they gain between five and seven knots on the Yamatos. This would allow them to dictate the conditions of the engagement, and as seen at Tsushima (And also at Yellow Sea but I digress), a force with even a 1-3 knot advantage could and would dictate the terms of engagement. 
 
Additionally, the 16"/50 Mark 7 gun with 16" AP shell Mark 8 is so close in performance to the Japanese 18.1" in armor penetration that the difference is immaterial -- it's within +/- 0.75" either way, which is getting awfully close to the tolerancing for the armor. The mounts for the Mark 7 gun were also significantly faster in elevation, 12 degrees/sec vs 8, increasing the rate of fire by reducing the depression to loading/elevation to firing solution time. The Iowas also depressed the gun to the loading angle during run-out, further improving the rate of fire. Their turrets were also twice as fast in train, 4 degrees/second vs 2 degrees/second for the Yamato. This allows tracking at greater ranges and high speeds, especially during the vessel's own maneuvers. I don't really want to do the math to figure out the maneuvers required to invalidate a fire control solution for the Yamato based on train rate, but it's almost certainly not relevant outside maybe 5,000yd in antiparallel courses, but during heavy maneuvering it would be invaluable. 
 
The Iowa class fire control system was fundamentally more advanced than that of the Yamato, and I'm not sure how you arrived at the position that a system requiring manual data transfer and manual tracking of the calculated fire control solution is superior to a system that does not provide those opportunities for human error. Furthermore, the Japanese fire control radars (principally the Type 22 Mod 4) were nowhere near as capable as the Mark 13, nor did the fire control system incorporate a stable vertical, which is a significant problem in a ship that will be expected to maintain a fire control system during maneuver. 
 
Having written that before your most recent post, I'll include a TL;DR:
 
1. They're inferior to a degree that is only very slightly outside the tolerances for the thickness of battleship armor. It's immaterial.
2. You still have to hit the enemy ship, and the mediocrity of the fire control system on Yamato precludes that.
3. Your statement on speed in a gun duel is categorically and demonstrably false, and has been known to be so since 19-0-fucking-5. The IJN won the battles of Yellow Sea and Tsushima Strait because of their fleet's superior speed and maneuverability. 
4. The Iowa class' gun mounts reload faster -- see the middle of the second paragraph above for more details. 
5. I don't follow your point, the 5"/38 is a fine DP gun. The 5"/54 that replaced it was better, but the /38 is a great gun and it gets the job done. Heavy secondary low angle armament went out of style with Dreadnought.
6. I'm not sure where you get inefficient engines and inferior electronics from the Iowas. Their powerplant was perfectly fine and extremely reliable, and met specifications, and the electronics fit was in every way superior to that of the Yamato class.
7. Battleships do as they're told. 
8. The Yamato has inferior firepower due to the slower rate of fire. 
9. The Yamato most likely does not win because the Iowa-class would dictate the terms of the engagement, and could simply disengage at will and return in more favorable circumstances, like at night.

" De tekniska studierna delades upp i kompetensuppbyggande studier och försök, konceptstudier samt projektstudier. Fysiskt skydd kom att prioriteras före beväpningssystem, ledningssystem och rörlighetssystem. Tre huvudkrav kom att bli konceptstyrande:
Skjutning under gång varvet runt (360º) med huvudvapnet Direktutblick för vagnchefen från vagnens högsta punkt Överlevnad för vagn och besättning vid en träff i ammunitionslagringen Vidare beaktades de typiskt svenska förhållandena som normalt resulterade i speciella krav på försvarsmaterielen – den korta värnpliktsutbildningen följd av korta repetitionsövningar (dvs materielen måste vara lätt att handha) och det faktum att materielen under större delen av sin livslängd skulle ligga i mobiliseringsförråd med ett minimum av underhåll.
 
 
 
Skydd
I projekt Strv 2000 tillmättes skyddet i vid bemärkelse stor betydelse – eller stridsvagnens överlevnadsförmåga vad avser skydd mot upptäckt-identifiering-träff, skydd mot verkan och skydd mot efterverkan. Kraven sattes mycket högt både vad gäller låga signaturer inom våglängdsområdena för IR och radar, men framförallt för det ballistiska skyddet. Dessa inkluderade mycket förutseende krav på skydd mot minor och takverkande stridsdelar.

Grundprincipen för vagnens uppbyggnad var ett minimiskrov i pansarstål som var tillräckligt tjockt för att kunna ta upp krafterna vid körning och skjutning. Det skulle också kunna ta upp de krafter som en yttre skyddsmodul kunde åstadkomma då den träffats.
 
I det fall den yttre skyddsmodulen använde sig av principen med ett spontaninitierat tungt explosivt reaktivt pansar (t ex i kompositionen 15/3/9) – effektivt inte bara mot riktad sprängverkan, utan även kinetisk energi – kunde dessa krafter på grundstrukturen bli relativt stora. De försök som gjordes mot frontalt monterade moduler med denna typ av skydd visade att det var möjligt att kraftigt störa en penetrerande pilprojektil.

Tanken var också att Strv 2000 skulle använda en stor andel keram i skyddskonstruktionen. Det faktum att den totala andelen keram skulle komma att uppgå till flera ton i respektive stridsvagn gjorde att ett det så kallade Skyddskeramprojektet startade upp 1988. Under ett par års tid gjordes försök med många olika typer av keram - Al2O3(aluminiumoxid), B4C (borkarbid) och TiB2 (titanborid) – men trots ett brett deltagande från svensk industri, FOA och FMV, blev det inte så mycket mer än en medioker referenskeram.

Inspirerade av den valda skyddslösningen i den amerikanska stridsvagnen M1A1 DU där Chobhampansaret uppgraderats med skikt av utarmat uran, gjordes provskjutningar i Sverige även mot denna typ av material. Resultaten visade på möjligheten att nå bättre skyddsprestanda om volymen och inte vikten var gränssättande.

Stor möda lades även på att åstadkomma en från besättningen separerad ammunitionslagring som skulle tåla såväl krutbrand som en detonation efter direktträff på en RSV-stridsdel med övertändning som följd. Den lösning som utarbetades fungerade och hade stora likheter med motsvarande utrymmen i Leopard 2 och M1A1 med så kallade ”blow off panels”, men hade en utvecklad princip för att förhindra total övertändning med total utslagning som följd. Skotten var placerade längst bak i chassiet. "
 
Translation:

" The technical studies are divided up into competence building studies and trials, concept studies and project studies. Physical armor is prioritzed over weapon systems, FCS and mobility systems. Three main requirements have steered the concept:
 
        - Firing while on the movie, 360 degrees with the main weapon.
        - Direct sight for the vehicle commander from the tanks highest point. 
        - Survival of the tank and crew in case of a hit to the ammunition storage. 
 
Furthermore, the typical Swedish environment is considered, which normally results in special requirements for defense materials - the short conscription followed by short repletion exercise (meaning that the material needs to be easy to handle) and the fact that the material in bigger parts of its lifetime will be located at mobilization storage with a minimum of maintenance. 
 
Armor:
In project Strv 2000 is armor of the highest importance - or the tanks survival chance against discovery - identification - hit, protection against impact, after armor protection. High requirements are sett for a low signature in the visual spectrum, for IR and for radar, men but most of all the armor. These include requirements for mine protection and roof armor. 
 

 
 
The principle of the tank construction is a minimal hull of armor steel, made strong enough to absorb the force when driving and firing. It should also be able to take up the force that a outer armor module would achieve when hit.

 
 
In the case of the outer armor module, the use of the principle with a spontaneously initiated heavy explosive reactive armor (composition 15/3/9) - effective not only against directed explosive force (I assume HEAT) but also kinetic energy - could these forces on the hull be reality large.

 
 
It was also thought that Strv 200 would use a large amount of ceramics in the armor construction. The fact that a big portion of ceramics would come to make up several tons in the tank in question, caused the so called ceramic armor project to be started in 1988. In a couple of years time a few tests were done with several different ceramics - Al2O3(aluminium oxide), B4C (boron carbide) and TiB2 (titan boride) - but even with a board cooperation between Swedish industry, FOA and FMW, the ceramics turned out the not be much more than a mediocre reference ceramics. 

 
Inspired by the armor solution chosen by the US tank M1A1, in which the Chobham armor was upgraded with a layer of depleted uranium, a firing trial was held in Sweden against this type of material. The results showed a possibility of better armor performance if volume and not the weight was the restricting factor.
 
 

 
A lot of effort was put into producing the ammunition storage, separated from the crew, which can take a direct hit and detonation from a ATGM. The solution developed was similar to the Leopard 2 or M1A1 with their so called "blow off panels", but was also developed to stop a chain reaction from detonating all the ammunition. The ammunition was placed in the hull rear. "
 
I translated the section covering the armor for you guys. Though I do not see anything indicating that the front engine required longer side armor. The requirements state the coverage, regardless of a front engine.  Though the coverage required is similar to the M1A2 and Leopard 2's turret. 
 
I can translate more if anyone is interested.

There's a lot of interest in hydraulic transmissions for wind turbines, although I don't know how widespread they are. That's very high torque low speed continuous-ish operation (probably easily continuous over several hours, which is more than long enough for heat to be an issue).

I guess they propose it as an upgrade on the Scorpène (possibly as a retrofit?) drawing from the experience they've got on the Barracuda:
 
Old Scorpène:
 

 
Barracuda/Shortfin-Barracuda:
 


Though that does raise the question of why they didn't directly copied the new propeller.
 
 
Supposedly this shape is hydrodynamically more efficient and thus stealthier:
 

 
But DCNS/Naval group does have a habit of proposing weird concepts every few years:
 
SMX-25:

Concept of a high speed patrol/recon sub (38 knots surfaced - 10 knts underwater)

 
 
SMX-26:
 
Sort of special forces and infiltration optimized concept

 
 
 

I used to write things.


 
 

After 23 days of drinking booze and random disappearing, judges finally picked winners of this competition!
 
   In a 45 ton category we came to the conclusion that a member of this forum, who only recently joined to us, was able to surpass all other contestants with his tank design. He earns a title of The Glorious Tank Autist of SH - comrade @N-L-M!
   His XM-2239 "Norman" tank was chosen by all judges as the best submissions of this competition. His work was fighting with Toxn's heavy tank for a 1st place, and managed to overtake it.
 

 
   @Sturgeon's XM12 "Donward" was disqualified from the competition as it was not fitting into one of basic requirements (width, 3.35 meters without skirts vs 3.25 meters required). 
   @A. T. Mahan's 120mm gun tank T44 also was disqualified for use of armor tech that was out of competition-imposed industrial capabilities limitation (1940-1950s level of tech)
   @ApplesauceBandit's AFVs were also not in a competition as submission was lacking in any stats, so we couldn't understand if vehicle fits into basic requirements. 
 
 
   In 25 ton category a rivalry was stronger as more light tanks proposals managed to get through basic requirements. Judges examined several war vehicles proposed by A.T. Mahan, Sturgeon, NLM, Toxn, and made their choice. The winner of this category is no other than a Supreme Warrior of Napkinpanzers comrade @Toxn!*
 
*vehicle should receive a change in co-axial MG placement, as now it is a danger for driver's head when he is entering/exiting his station or anytime when he have his head outside of the hatch.
 

Our Great AFV designer Toxn pictured with tank drivers that his tank is going to kill before modernization programm will be launched to reposition co-axial MG to a safer place.
 

Place for a memorial is ready to accept new heroes of SH Tank design bureau.** 
**Not in Kharkov
 
   Winners of this competition now should receive their prizes, after that - locked in their houses and allowed to get out only to work on AFV designs until retirement.

Check out the third pic - I haven't seen an open stator/rotor combo on a sub before, I like it
 
 
I've also seen this concept from euronaval 2018:
I would like some of their drugs

Check out the third pic - I haven't seen an open stator/rotor combo on a sub before, I like it
 
 
I've also seen this concept from euronaval 2018:
I would like some of their drugs

" En 10,5 cm kanon monterades ovanpå Mardern i ett enmanstorn. Med denna rigg UDES 19 genomfördes ett flertal olika försök – körning, skjutning, med mera.
Det gjordes egentligen två riggar för UDES 19. Utöver kör- och skjutriggen tillverkades även en laddrigg. På dessa genomfördes kör-, skjut-, observations-och laddförsök. Laddriggen testade principen att låta en laddpendel som roterar runt samma axel som kanonen föra skotten ett och ett från magasinet till kanonen.
Konstruktionen visade sig fungera bra och vara så robust att varken snö eller de grenar man testade med (upp till 5 cm) tjocka utgjorde något hinder för funktionen, däremot sågs det finnas risk att skräp följde med skotten in i kanonen. Man testade dock inte känsligheten för beskjutning.
Under skjutförsök bekräftades att det gick snabbare att inrikta kanonen - detta eftersom den har lägre massa än ett vanligt torn. Dock fick riggen långa skottider som berodde på dåligt fininriktningssystem.
Parallellt testades även denna princip med ovanpålagrad kanon på ett chassi till Strv 103. "
 
Translation:
" A 105mm canon was mounted on top of a Marder AFV in a one-man turret. With this rig, UDES 19 completed several different tests - driving, firing and more.
It is actually two rigs for UDES 19. For driving- and shooting-rig a loading rig is added. Driving, firing, observation and loading test are done on these rigs. The loading rig is to test the principle that a loading pendulum that rotates around the same axis as the canon can feed ammunition from the magazine to the cannon. 
This system appeared to work well and was so robust that neither snow or branches that was tested (up to 50mm) thick made a hindrance for the system, however, there is a risk of rubbish coming with the ammunition into the cannon. Therefor, the sensitivity to firing was not tested. 
In the firing trials in was found that the cannon was faster at aiming, because of the lighter tower. However, the rig high aiming time was thought to be because of bad FCS.
In parallel this principle was tested on a chassis of the Strv 103."
 
Source:
http://www.ointres.se/udes.htm

Translation:

 
 

 
 

 
 

And a day later:
https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/first-bombs-dropped-by-f-35-jets-launched-from-hms-queen-elizabeth/
 

The local university had a book sale, so I basically swept up everything with as much as the word "tank" in it off the military history table.
 

 
But wait, there's more. Zoom, enhance!
 

 
These books bound in red cloth are each worth as much as the rest of that stack combined. 
 

 
They're official histories of the Canadian army, published only a few years after the war with the backing of the Department of National Defense. As a result they have amazing photographs and maps actually drawn by military cartographers.
 

 
And the best part is that since they've been printed 70 years ago, so they're all out of copyright

Doom doesn't work as a movie and people should stop trying to make it into a movie.
 
   Ummm.. that was DooM 4 that was in development hell until fresh blood of ID Software rebooted it into what we know as Doom 2016. Devs scraped that game as it was "Call of Doom". NoClip made a documentary about development of DooM 2016, with footage from working prototypes of "Call Of Doom".