LeuCeaMia

The most manly way to apply perfume.
 

The MS-1's engine was hit hard with nerfs.
 

3 is irredeemable garbage. NV is playable. 1 & 2 are totally different games, and much better (though like many games of their generation, they suffer from severe clunk).
4 has a really nice trailer (alien stretch-armstrong dog excluded). So did Skyrim, Oblivion, and Fallout 3. All were terrible wastes (pun!) of time. 4 will suck because Bethesda brings people into stores ike you wouldn't believe but can't actually make a good game to save their lives.

I finally got the updated version up on Tank And AFV News.com.  Sorry for the delay on that Jeeps.  I need to do some work resizing the pictures though.
 
http://tankandafvnews.com/the-epic-m4-sherman-tank-information-thread/

A final update for the weekend.  The Sherman doc is up to 34,940 words. 
 
The US Firefly: Yeah I said US Firefly, they made some but none saw combat, and they were unique, not like the Brit ones.
(Only known pic)
    o
   Before the Normandy landings, the British had offered the US up 200 guns a month, if they were interesting in the 17 pounder gun. Their rearmament program was well underway, and would have enough Firefly tanks ready to go by D-Day. The US was not interested for a variety of reasons. The 76mm M1A1 and M3 90mm gun programs were well underway. Vehicles that used the guns were in the pipeline, even if there wasn’t much demand from the field yet. They did not want to complicate the supply situation with another tank ammo type.
   Another reason was the 17 pounder did not really impress the US officers who witnessed test of it. It had both a large muzzle flash, and breach flashback, that hinted to them of a poor design. The efforts to convince the Americans of the errors of their ways went dormant along with the program. It wasn’t until the Ardennes offensive, when the US faced some heavier German armor, and in larger numbers than thought to be possible, that the program came back to life.
   Conversions of 75mm armed US Sherman took place starting in March of 45. The US conversions were different in a few ways. The armored box on the rear of the turret was a little bigger to fit US radios, and the M2 machine gun brackets were welded to the end of the radio box. The tanks chosen for the conversions were all M4s, and M4A3. It’s possible some large hatch final production Shermans with all the improvements were a part of the 160 to 200 that were converted before the program was suspended. 
   No one has come up with what happened to the tanks, and it seems like none survived. None were ever issued to units,  it’s one of those little mysteries lost to the archives. 

Overrated: Patton

Well for reference, if you ignore the effects of hyper sloping, the DGJ02, which he said can only pen 20mm at 1000m compared to the M903's 23mm at 1200m, he gleefully didn't point out that the Chinese tested that against a 60 degree plate for the initial test, so, the actual LOS thickness would be 40mm at 1000m, or, basically what WW2 era Tungsten API could do at only 100m
 
He then tried to backpedal and claim he knew the effects of sloping all along because the link he got it from (that he posted much later) said it. despite the fact he listed unsloped numbers for M903, M2, and M8 betrays the fact he didn't. (That or he was being intentionally deceptive, but considering the massive list of idiotic things this guy has claimed or said, I don't think he's smart enough to do that.)
 
Lastly, I love his comment that there's not much difference between "full caliber APCR" (as if that line makes any fucking sense in the first place, they're full on AP/API) and M903 APDS (the same round type that obsoleted APCR), let's take a look at core proportion sizes and compare!
 
BS (Steel Cored and Tungsten)
 

 
M903 SLAP and M962 SLAP-T
 

 
 

 
 

 
God, the proportions and projectile/penetrator shape, they're goddamn splitting images of each other! am I looking into a mirror? did Colli spike my drink with DMT as part of my initiation? did I get hit with a stray lawnmower blade and suffer a severe concussion and trauma to the head? no wait, the last one can't be true, that might make me half as retarded as this guy.

"The 14.5mm BS was a tungsten cored API that penetrated 30mm @ 100m, or 25mm @ 500m
MV was 1000m/s
The .50 closest to that was M903 SLAP, saboted tungsten core
34mm @ 500m, and 23mm @ 1,200m.
MV 1214m/s
regular API is 25mm @ 100 meters, 18mm @ 500 m"
 
30mm at 100m vs the correct 40mm at 100m and 25mm at 500m vs the correct 32mm at 500m by Soviet tests? I mean, just a small mixup right?
 
"I listed the WWII standard US API. not that much worse. 5mm? big whoop.
And most of the Red Army didn't have those tungsten rounds, but the more common steelcore API"
 
[Citation needed]
 
and 15 and 5 are the same number now!
 
"the difference between sabots and full diameter APCR isn't that great for the sizes we are discussing"
 
Except for the part where it is of course, and even if it wasn't, perhaps there's a reason APCR/HVAP style rounds were basically rendered completely obsolete by the introduction of APDS in all but "standard" and small caliber firearms or something.
 
"50 SLAP is +9mm at 500m vs 14.5 BS Tungsten core.
I wouldn't call that 'pretty great'
BTW, Chinese DGJ02 'SLAP' is 1250m/s vs 1214m/s for 50 SLAP, and 20mm @1000m vs 23mm @1200m for 50 SLAP
For whatever reason, the 14.5mm just doesn't perform as well as all that extra ME would suggest."
 
Yes, the part where DGJ02 had that figure tested against a 60 degree angled plate doesn't factor in at all you fucking idiot, I am rly gud at understanding armor mechanics u guyz! Holy shit is he one of the same types of idiots who thinks the Chieftain had more effective armor then the T-64 too because they can't be bothered to do the most basic research of the topic at hand?
 
 
"Same 'Anti-Material' role, anyway.
Like in WWII, ineffective against MBTs, unless you count zapping the TC when the hatch is open.
But anything lighter in armor, well, still effective against BMPs and the like.
The real big change is decent optics vs iron sights for long range work."
 
"Like in WWII, ineffective against MBTs" ...........................................
 
I fucking hate this guy so much, my god, he legitimately does deserve an entire article explaining what a goddamn dumbass he is.

It occurred to me, while reading LoooSeR's account of how a bunch of peasants are clobbering the expensive Saudi military, that perhaps it was time to take a good, hard look at the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  What a vibrant and wonderful country!
 
Saudi Arabia leads the world in incest:
 

 
 
Saudi Clerics have novel theories of science.
 
They have a diversified, modern economy, which is definitely not unstable:
 

 
Including a booming agricultural sector!
 
What a swell place, with enlightened views on women!

Took off from Kerbin, landed on Mun, transferred to Minmus, landed on Minmus, and returned to Kerbin. Over 10k max ∆V with the boosters.
 

Its what every man strives for 
 

http://www.tank-net.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=34336&p=871044

http://www.tank-net.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=24473&p=555651

On tiger and tiger II the steering wheel makes sense.  It was one of a very few tanks of the era with multiple turning radii, so being able to give analog input would be helpful.  Leo II has continuously variable steering, so again, the wheel makes sense.  M48 had a single turn radius per gear, so as far as the driver was concerned you were going straight, going left or going right.

I updated the other things that used the Sherman Chassis section, including the ARV section. 
 
WWII Variants: Things Built Using the Great M4 Chassis
 
Tank Destroyers: They did Great things but the whole idea was bad.

(M10 in Italy)
M10:
    The M10 was a tank destroyer mounting a 3 inch anti-tank gun. It used the M4A2 chassis and the GM 6046 to power it. These tanks only had a M2 .50 caliber machine gun other than their main gun. The turret lacked power traverse. It had a five man crew and was generally liked by its crew. The American TD force was deemed a failure, but not because the men or vehicles performed badly, it was the doctrine that failed to pan out. It was used until the end of the war, and many TD battalions preferred it over the faster M18.  The TDs lacked a co-ax machine gun, this and their open top made them more vulnerable to infantry than a tank. Even so, these units were often given tank missions.
   The M10A1 version of this vehicle had a Ford GAA motor. There was no difference other than and minor improvements between an M10 and M10A1. Crews added this armored rooves to their turrets, often all hinged so they could open up to really see what was going on. It was not uncommon for TD units to be used as fixed artillery for several days.
   The M10 and M10A1 had all the gear aboard to be used at artillery. A few TD battalions spent almost as much time as artillery as they did in their TD role. This capability was used often in Italy because the 30 inch gun on the M10 didn’t tear up the vital roads as much as the larger guns did. I would be surprised to find out the M36 didn’t have the same gear. They built 4993 M10s and 1713 M10A1s.
 

(a funky M36)
M36:
   Another tank destroyer based on the Sherman chassis, basically an M10A1 with a new turret mounting a bigger gun. These tanks mounted the 90mm M3 gun. Often this tanks turret was fitted to otherwise stock M4A3 hulls due to a shortage of M10 hulls. These TDs had full power traverse. These TDs were well liked because the M3 worked well on both armor and soft targets, since the M3 had a nice HE shell.
   This TD suffered all the same problems dealing with infantry the M10 did, except in the M36 B1, since it was built on an M4A3 hull, it had a bow machine gun. It was also upgraded in a lot of units with some form of roof armor.
   There was a diesel powered version based on the base M10 chassis powered by the GM 6046. There were 1413 M36s, 187 M36B1s, and 724 M36B2s.  
 
. . .
 
Artillery: they have big guns, and their crews are usually deaf.
 
105 Howitzer motor Carriage M7& M7B1: 4316 produced
155 Gun Motor Carriage M12: 100 produced
155 Gun Motor Carriage M40: 418 produced
8 inch Howitzer Motor Carriage M43: 48 produced
 
. . .
 
M30 and M74 series of armored recovery vehicles:
   The M31, M32 and M74 armored recovery vehicles based off the M3 Lee and M4 tanks and almost all the chassis types seem to have been used in the conversions as well.

(M31ARV)   
Based on the Lee:
   M31: based on the Lee, and there were sub types based on other Lee hull types. 509 Lees were converted. This version was powered by the R975.
   M31B1: was based on the M3A3 and 296 were converted. This version was powered by the 6046.
   M31B2: Was based on the M3A5. I am unsure how many of this version was made.  This version was also powered by the 6046.
   There were other Lee based conversion, but ‘A history of the American Medium tank’ doesn’t have production numbers for them. On the Lee conversions, the 75mm gun mount was replace with a door, that had a dummy 75mm gun, and the back of the 37mm turret had a fake 37mm gun, and the front had a winch.  The idea was to make it look like an armed Lee. A crane was installed in place of the gun and mount, and it had a 10,000 capacity.  With boom jacks it could carry 30,000 pounds. It was also equipped with a 60,000 pound winch. The M31s had a single .30 caliber machine gun.

(M32B1)
Based on the Sherman hull:
   M32: Was a tank recovery vehicle based on the M4 Sherman hull, 163 converted.
   M32B1:  Was a TRV made from an M4A1 hull. There were 1055 M4A1 tanks converted
   M32A1B1: This version received an update, to A1 status, that meant improvements to the recovery capability and HVSS. There were only 37 of these converted.
   M32B2:  TRV based on the M4A2 hull. There were 26 of these conversions.
   M32B3:  TRV based on the M4A3 hull.  There were 318 of these tanks converted.
   M32B4:   TRV based on the M4A4 hull. One pilot model made, not approved for production.
   T14E1: was a M32B3 with HVSS made for the Marines at in the last half of 45. They produced 80 of these.
   The M32 series had a 60,000 pound winch, powered by powered take off, or PTO, from the drive shaft. The winch was mounted behind the driver and its drum mounted to the vehicle centerline outside. It had a crane mounted on the front of the hull, and the crane was moveable, folding back over the TRV for storage. It had an A-frame used for towing mounted on the rear hull.  It had stabilizers in the suspension that locked it in place when using the boom. If an M32 was equipped with HVSS suspension it was designated as with an A1.
   The M32 was armed with an M2 .50 caliber machine gun, mounted on the top of the vehicle, on the main hatch. They also retained the bow mounted thirty caliber machine gun. The early version were also equipped with an 81mm mortar to put out a smoke screen, it had 30 smoke rounds available. All these weapons were purely defensive, and the last thing an ARV crew wanted to do was get shot at.
 
   
(M74)
The M74 ARV: In early 1954, Bowen McLaughlin-York Inc. began production on the M74, converting M4A3 tanks to this configuration. Rock Island Arsenal conversions around this time and continued at late at 1958 but no total number on the conversions is known.  
   These ARVs had a 90,000 pound winch and a hydraulically raised boom. It also had a space on the front to help stabilize the vehicle when the boom was being used. The spade was hydraulic and could be used for light dozing work. These updates allowed the vehicles to retrieve heavier medium tanks like the M26 and M46 and were only replaced in service by the M88.
   The M74 had an M2 .50 caliber machine gun mounted on it’s all around vision cupola. It also retained the bow machine gun.
 
. . .
 
   Tanks when in combat and when not in combat break down, get stuck in mud, sand, or a tree stump. A pair of tree to close together could hang a tank like a Sherman up. Mines blew off tracks and damage the suspension. It was not unheard of for a tank to fall into a basement, or cause a bridge to collapse. Sometimes they tip over or lose a track or have a major mechanical problem and won’t run; it’s nice to have an ARV around and for some of the above cases like recovering a tank from a stream after a bridge collapsed, the boom and rigging on an ARV is essential.
   ARV’s were assigned to tank battalions; usually a pair of them would be assigned to the Battalion HQ Company with a dozer tank. I will need to dig up a tank battalion TO&E to confirm this. I’m sure the units that went out and salvaged knocked out tanks and repaired them would have these vehicles as well, though I’m pretty sure I read they used M26 Dragon Wagon trucks. If you needed help with pulling a turret, final drive and tranny housing, changing a motor, or repairing mine damage an ARV crew would be useful to have around.    
   These vehicles would be assigned one per Tank Company in as well in the independent tank battalions or when they were part of an armored division. I have not read any accounts of what a ARV crew charged in WWII or Korea, but, I read having to be pulled out of a rice paddy in Vietnam would cost the crew several cases of beer. I wonder how it worked in Korea and WWII.

http://www.tank-net.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=34336&p=871044

http://www.tank-net.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=24473&p=555651

I find this to be the most interesting.
 

M1A1 in Australia, engine removal.

 

 

M1 Abrahams T-72 lookalike

 
Leopard 2 T-80 lookalike

 
Huey-Mi 24 

 
 
T-90 as Leopard 2 (or maybe a Tiger P  )

 
 
Soviet  mockups


 
 
 
 

 
 
Humvee BRDM's (Crashbots wet dream)

 

 
 
Bradley-BMP-2

 
I really like this one, Sheridan T-80

 
T-34 disguised as a less threatening tank (Leopard 1)
 

Update section and new section. 
 
British Shermans: Is it a Tank or a Teapot?
   The British took the Lee and Sherman into combat for the first time and they offered a lot of input into both tanks design. They even had a specific version of the Lee never used by US troops the M3A5 Grant.  The Sherman and Lee design saved their bacon at El Alamien. As we saw in an earlier section of this document, the US produced a lot of Sherman tanks, and the British received more than 17,000 Shermans. It would become the backbone of their tank force and remain so until the end of the war.
   They came up with their own naming system for the tank:
   The M4 was named the Sherman I in Commonwealth use, if it had 105mm gun it was an Ib, if it also had HVSS it was a Iby. The British received 2096 75mm Sherman Is, and an additional 593 105 armed Ib tanks, or M4 105 tanks. These numbers are not broken down further to sub models, so all the Ic Firefly tanks produced came from the 2096 they received, and this number would include the composite hulls too. This version was the preferred US Army version, and many of the one the Brits received came as replacements stripped from US Tank Divisions before the battle of El Alamein.  
   The M4A1 was named the Sherman II and in most cases just that. It wasn’t until late in the war the Brits took some M4A1s with 76mm guns, and these they gave to the poles or other commonwealth allies. A M4A1 76 would be called a Sherman IIa, or a IIay for a M4A1 76 HVSS tank. These M4A1 76 HVSS tanks made it to depots in Europe during or just after the war ended, but none saw combat. The M4A1 was also the US Army’s preferred version because it was basically the same tank as the M4, and the Brits only received 942 75mm Shermans. Something I found a bit of a surprise, the British received more M4A1 76 w tanks thank 75mm tanks, 1330 total.
   M4A2 was named the Sherman III and this was their second most common Sherman type. They received 5041 M4A2 75mm Sherman IIIs, far more than the Soviets got. They also received 5 M4A2 76 W or Sherman IIIa tanks as well, yes, that’s not a typo, five tanks. I wonder if the M4A2 76 HVSS, or Sherman IIIay, tank used in Fury was one of them?
   M4A3 was named the Sherman IV in British use, but they only received 7 seventy five millimeter tanks, and no 76mm tanks of this type. This became the US Army’s preferred model, and once they got it in numbers, they probably started sending more M4 and M4A1s to the Brits after this tank became common.
   M4A4 was named the Sherman V in British use, and was by far the most common British Sherman, they received 7167 M4A4s, or Sherman Vs, almost the whole production run . Chrysler really went to bat for this version of the tank and sent tech reps to Europe with the tanks to help manage the complicated, but less trouble than anyone could have expected, motors. There were no sub types of the Sherman IV other than the firefly, since it was never produced with a 76mm gun or HVSS suspension. The Sherman Vc was the most common version of the 17 pounder Shermans, and a wide variety were probably converted to fireflies, and many of the A4s they got later in the war had been through a remanufacturing process, that made sure the tanks had turrets updated with all the late improvements, and all the hull upgrades lake armored ammo racks and raised arm rollers and improved skids, along with a travel lock, on the front plate, for the gun.
. . .
 
   The British had their own set of modifications for the Sherman that they received through LL.  They added sand skirts, racks for jerry cans and an armored box on the back of the turret in some cases. They installed their own radios as well, the British wireless set no 19, and this went into the armored box in the back of the turret on Firefly’s, or just replaced the US radios in their normal location in regular models. Legend has it they installed some sort of stove to cook tea.  The only Sherman Mk I and Mk IIs they got were because Churchill practically begged Roosevelt for more Shermans just before El Alamien. 
   As the war progressed, the US Army put priority on the M4 and M4A1; the British had to settle for M4A2 and the M4A4. They when the Russians refused to take any Shermans but M4A2s, the Brits really had to rely on M4 and M4A4s. From what I’ve read they didn’t want the nightmare that everyone feared the A57 Multibank motor to be, in service it proved to be reliable enough, and more so than its British counterparts. I don’t think they got many M4A3 tanks at all. The M4A4 was by far the most common Sherman type, and the Brits like them enough they took a batch of refurbished M4A4, and would have taken more if production hadn’t been stopped.
   This presented a problem for the British, they did not like the M1A1 gun, and the T23 would not take the 17 pounder without major modifications to the gun or turret. The US did end production of 75mm tanks and when stocks of 75mm gun tanks ran low, they were forced to take M4A1 76 tanks these tanks would be designated Sherman IIB. The British sent most of the IIBs to their forces in the MTO, or gave them to the Poles.   
 
The Firefly:  The Teapot with Teeth.
   The Sherman Firefly is often touted as the best version of the Sherman. This is a very shallow view of the tank; a tank is not just about AT performance alone. Let’s talk about the name, the Firefly was just a nickname, some say given by American testers because there was so much flash at the breach of the gun on firing, some claim it was just based on muzzle flash. Much like the Sherman naming mystery, it doesn’t really matter, it’s the commonly used name now, and if you just called them the Sherman IC, Sherman IC Hybrid, and Sherman Vc, no one but a total Sherman geek would know what the hell you were talking about. But everyone with a little Sherman history or WWII history under their belt should have heard of them called a Firefly so that’s what we will do here, while explaining the nomenclature and how to identify the various models.
The Firefly came about because the British wanted to get a 17pounder into a tank, and they homegrown ones planned to have it, were having issues.  The 17 pounder, a 76mm anti-tank gun, had to be extensively redesigned to work in the turret, the AT gun version recoil system was to long to work in a 75mm gun turret. They redesigned it, putting the recoil mechanism on both sides of the gun instead of the top. The gun was also rotated so it could be loaded from the left.  The firefly version of the 17 pounder gun was specific to the Sherman gun mount and could not be used on an AT gun or vice versa.  
They also had to cut a hole into the back of turret, to mount the radios, in a new armored box, because the gun still had to recoil into the radio bustle at the back of the turret. The armored box also worked as a counter weight for the longer barrel. They also eliminated the co drivers position, and put a cast armored plug over the gun port. The space was filled with ammo, since the 17 pounder ammo was longer than the 75mm ammo.  They also had to eliminate the gun stabilizer to fit the gun.
The 17 pounder gun had excellent armor penetration, in particular with APDS rounds, standing for armor piercing discarding sabot, but these rounds had very inconsistent accuracy. The problem that caused it was not worked out until after the war. At the combat ranges in the ETO and MTO, the APDS, worked ok, but the closer the better. The gun also lacked a decent HE round until after WWII ended when they came up with a system that used a smaller propellant charge for the HE rounds, and a new set of marks on the tanks site for the lower velocity rounds.
The Firefly in a generic sense is easy to identify, you look for a 75mm gun turret, with a much longer gun with a ball shaped muzzle brake. The turret will also have a loaders hatch and an armored box on the rear. The ball gun in the front will be covered by a big hunk of armor.  From there, you have to look at the details, but it’s easy enough.
 
 

Sherman Ic Firefly:
 This is the Firefly based on the Sherman I, or the M4. The lower case C after the Roman numeral designates the tank is armed with a 17 pounder. An M4 is a welded hull tank powered by an R975, so you look for the grate free engine deck, with the big armored flap covering an air intake. Or, if the tank is welded, and does not have large spaces between the bogie assemblies, then it’s an Ic Firefly.
 

Sherman IC composite hull firefly:
This version is based on the M4 composite hull; the version had a cast front hull, and a welded rear hull. It looks almost like an M4A1, but the rear and sides of the tank are all flat surfaces, just like a regular M4, the other difference is these tanks had the improved large hatch hull.  They would be the most comfortable version of the Firefly for the driver. These tanks were probably the last firefly’s built as well, since the composite hull tanks were some of the last 75mm Shermans produced. The British were not given any of the 75mm M4A3 tanks so none were converted.  One final advantage to this version from an ease of conversion point of view, is the composite hull tanks came with a loaders hatch already built in, so it saved time because they didn’t have to cut and fit one. Some of these tanks also had all around vision cupolas, so it’s possible a few made it onto fireflies.
 

Sherman Vc Firefly:
This version was based on the M4A4. These tanks are the “long hull” Shermans with the wide gaps between the bogie assemblies, and it has the distinctive bulges to the engine deck and lower hull. These hull features, with a firefly turret and gun is more than enough to identify it as Vc.  This Firefly type was powered by the mighty A57 multibank.  The Wiki on the Firefly is trash; don’t go crawling around trying to see if the lower hull has rivets, when most of the M4A4 production run had welded lower hulls. This may have only been a dubious way to identify a M3A4, you know, if you missed it being almost a foot longer with huge gaps between the wheel sets.
This was the most common version of the Firefly, since it was the Brits most numerous lend lease Sherman.  They got refurbished training A4s from the US, and took as many of these them as they could because production of 75mm Shermans had been drastically cut back and production of the M4A4 had been suspended.  
. . .
 
   Demand for the Firefly dropped off late in the war. They had produced enough that just about all the commonwealth nations the British supported received them. The Brits were able to put two Fireflies into most of their tank platoons, just as German armor became so scarce they didn’t really need them. By the end months of the war, the Firefly may have been more of a liability, than useful.
   If you compare the Firefly to the upgraded M4A1 76w, you will see it really isn’t the best Sherman by any measure but raw gun penetration. We’ll use the composite hull Ic in the comparison, since the same motor powered these tanks, and the composite hull had a very large casting for its front hull, making this as close to a second gen Sherman as the Firefly could get. Yet the composite hull tanks were produced early enough, they did not get wet ammo racks. They did get the armored ammo racks, but they really only offered protection against fragments lighting the ammo off.  
   This fix did not work nearly as well as the wet ammo racks on the M4A1 76, and other fully second gen Sherman tanks got. The main advantage was having the ammo lower in the tank, below the bottom of the sponsons, and encasing it in water jackets. It was found the most benefit came from the change in location, and the liquid part was discontinued post war.  The wet ammo rack second gen Shermans were amongst the safest WWII tanks to be a crewman on.
   Now on to the turrets, the M4A1 76 tank has the improved T23 turret. These turrets came with the all-around vision cupola, a loaders hatch, and the 76 M1A1 gun, with a 30cal co-ax. The turret was designed around the gun, and was nice and roomy, offering relative comfort and ease of movement to the crew.  It had better armor than the 75mm turret.  The fireflies all used a modified 75mm gun turret, and even after redesigning the gun, the 17 pounder took up a lot of space, and recoiled into the bustle, where the radio used to be. This made for a cramped turret, and a slower reload time.  The T23 turret is better, and it’s a shame the Brits would have had to redesign the 17 pounder gun again to fit one into it.
   At first glance, most people when they compare the M1A1 gun and the 17 pounder conclude the 17 pounder is ‘better’ based on its armor pen.  This doesn’t take into account the other factors that make a good tank gun. In WWII, tanks faced other threats far more often than tanks. For the forces facing the United States in particular, tanks were never overly common, and got rarer as the war went on. What Shermans faced most often, and what killed them most often was AT guns and infantry with AT sticks.  The 17 pounders lack of HE round during the war, along with its lack of a bow machine gun, really hindered the Firefly in the infantry support role.  The M1A1 didn’t have the best HE performance, but it was still adequate. It had enough AT performance to handle the PIV, Stugs and various TDs it would face. Including the cats, the M1A1 did not have the best balance of AT/HE performance, but it would get the job done, and as the war came to a close HVAP ammo, that really helped the guns AT performance, become increasingly available. The M1A1 also had a very big performance lead in rate of fire; double that of the 17 pounder.
   When you take all these factors, it is clear the 76mm T23 turreted second gen M4A1, A2 and 3s were all better tanks than the Firefly, of any model. The reasons for this are the second gen Shermans all had wet ammo racks, and along with all the other minor improvements that came with the second gen Shermans. The 17 pounder gun would eventually get a good HE round, but not during the war,  so the dual purpose us M1A1 gun is clearly a better choice for a general use medium tank.
   I won’t go so far as to say the British should not have produced them. Since the Brits faced the majority of the German heavy armor in Normandy, a pure AT tank was more useful for them, and that’s why they built them. I’ve read in more than one place that the Germans always tried to kill off the fireflies first, and the firefly units used a cool paint scheme on the gun barrel to make it seem shorter to help hide the fireflies, but I’ve never seen it confirmed from the German side.  These tanks were potent enough, killing the famous Nazi tank “Ace” Michael, the Nazi punk, Whittmann, when he foolishly trundled by himself into their guns.
   I find it amusing the most mechanically complicated Sherman was turned into the best pure AT Sherman by the Brits, and was still more reliable than any Nazi tank.  It may be a tad overrated, but it did exactly what it was designed to do, without compromising the reliability of its base platform. That makes it a smashing success and it gave the Brits a capability their American cousins lacked until much later in the war. It did so well, the Brits offered to convert some, and there was an abortive program the petered out because army ordinance thought the M1 gun would be good enough.  During bulge hoopla, the program was revived.  

Between May 31 and July 28, 2014, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began the annual large-scale exercise codenamed “Stride 2014.” The Stride exercises have been a regular occurrence, focusing largely on the rapid deployment of large field formations into unfamiliar territory and conducting confrontation drills. The 2014 version, however, was different in its scale, unit composition, intensity and the nature of the opponent the units faced. No fewer than seven of the PLA’s top brigades from seven different group armies (GA) were deployed to the Zhurihe Training Base in Inner Mongolia, under the Beijing Military Region. During the six confrontation exercises that followed, only one resulted in a victory for the visiting “Red Forces” (REDFOR), and at heavy cost. The drubbing received by the REDFOR actually reflects a new age in PLA training that is closely linked with the unit that taught them the lesson, China’s first dedicated opposing forces brigade (OPFOR). 
 “Stride 2014” Exercises Participants and Results 
 

 
Exercise Segment
 
Military Region (MR) Army Unit Result vs. OPFOR A Nanjing 12th Group Army (GA), 2nd Armored Brigade-Lost
 
B Guangzhou 41st GA, 122nd Mechanized Brigade-Lost
 
C Jinan 20th GA, 58th Light Mechanized Brigade-Lost
 
D Shenyang 16th GA, 68th Mechanized Brigade -Win/Draw
 
E Chengdu 14th GA, 18th Armored Brigade-Lost
 
F Lanzhou 47th GA, 55th Motorized Brigade-Lost
 
Beijing 27th Group Army (GA), 7th Armored Brigade-Unclear
 
 

 
The visiting forces were under simulated attacks from the moment they arrived at their marshalling areas, and then placed under continued nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) as well as air attack throughout the exercises (Xinhua Net, June 24, 2014). The OPFOR possessed total dominance in the air and artillery arenas as well as tactical advantage due to advanced reconnaissance being denied to the visiting units. Most of the units lost 30–50 percent of their forces by the time they came into contact with the OPFOR, and some lost up to 70 percent by the time their exercise segment ended. Never before has the PLA been given such a test by such an opponent, and the Zhurihe experiment sent shockwaves throughout the officer corps.
 
The Birth of “Blue Force”

 
The Zhurihe Training Base in the Inner Mongolian desert has been an important training ground for China’s armored troops since 1957. However, it was only from 2007 that it evolved from a simple target range to a combined arms training center. This was a surprisingly long time coming as the PLA has been acutely aware of its backwardness since the 1991 Gulf War, after which the speed of military modernization increased drastically. Previous OPFOR units were largely on very short rotations and mimicked Soviet formations, which were the main land adversaries during the Cold War. Despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, this remained largely unchanged until the 2000s. This transformation was given extra impetus since Chinese President and Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, when he decided to implement reforms within the PLA in order to achieve a fighting force that “can fight and win battles” (PLA Daily, February 21, 2013).
 
The mysterious “Blue Force”—as the PLA terms its OPFOR—is actually the 195th mechanized infantry brigade, commanded by Xia Minglong, under the Beijing MR (formerly the 1st Armored Division, 65th GA, one of the early pioneering units in “informatized warfare”). This unit appears to have been retrained during 2013 and activated in January 2014. By March 2014, the Central Military Commission (CMC) under President Xi issued the directive “Recommendations Concerning the Improvement to the Realism of Military Exercises” (Xinhua, March 20, 2014), and the 195th was to be the “grindstone.” “Stride 2014,” therefore, was personally approved by Xi according to the new “2014 to 2017 Trans-Regional Base Located Training Regulations” (Liao Wang Dong Fang, August 6, 2014).

 
Although the unit is equipped largely with obsolete equipment, such as Type 59 main battle tanks (MBT) and Type 63 armored personnel carriers (APC), its strengths are actually in its deep integration into combined arms. Also through the large-scale deployment of laser engagement systems similar to the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) used by the U.S. military, the unit quite possibly simulated M1s and Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles. This is never implicitly acknowledged by official media but open source evidence seems to suggest that the unit sometimes utilizes doctrine similar to that of U.S. Brigade Combat Teams, meant the 195th proved to be a lethal opponent (China Military Net, June 16, 2014).

The 195th is commanded by Colonel Xia Minglong, who was the deputy chief of training for the Beijing MR until he was given command of the OPFOR brigade in January 2014 (Ministry of National Defense, February 4). According to media interviews, Xia was already aware that his new brigade would be taking on the best of the PLA later on in the year. The brigade only completed its reorganization in April 2014, only 20 days before the first “Red Force” arrived at Zhurihe. Pointedly, he described previous types of training as “overly formal, with little achieved… even though many commanders want to put training on a more realistic basis, there was little in their minds as to how this should be achieved—largely due to a lack of combat experience over many years” (Liao Wang Dong Fang, August 6, 2014).

Prior to the establishment of the OPFOR brigade, opposing forces were always made up of rotated units with little experience in the role. This is due to political as well as doctrinal issues. If an OPFOR unit defeats a high-profile visiting unit, then there is a chance that the senior generals of the latter will take offense, something that within a military such as the PLA—with its intricate web of patronage and personal allegiances—can prove disastrous to one’s career. Therefore, institutionally, there had been little incentive for OPFOR officers to try and defeat visiting forces (Sina Military, August 8, 2014).

The composition of the visiting “Red Forces” was also different in 2014, with the focus on “combined brigades,” namely brigades with several other service arms attached. In essence the PLA was testing the effectiveness of the ‘brigadization’ reforms conducted in the early 2000s, when divisions were streamlined into highly mobile mechanized brigades. The results from “Stride 2014” seem to suggest that there is much improvement yet to be made.

The nature of the exercises was very different from previous brigade-sized maneuvers. These ranged from the doctrinal—no more scripted confrontations, to the mundane—no more large red banners and flags on the vehicles. Everything was done to create “realistic real-war conditions” (PLA Daily, December 31, 2014). The most significant change, however, was in “allowing” the OPFOR to win. The role of previous, temporary OPFORs was to delay and obstruct the “Red Forces” but not to defeat them. Thus a Red brigade commander could previously issue commands that resulted in large losses without fearing defeat. However, the painful defeats inflicted on “Red Forces” in “Stride 2014” were not only highlighted as a major takeaway from the exercises, but also gleefully rammed home repeatedly by official PLA media coverage (Xinhua, June 22, 2014).

The Aftermath
 
The purpose of the “Stride 2014” exercises was significant. Strategically, they were designed to shake the PLA out of its sense of peacetime complacency and to face up to its primary responsibility of fighting and winning wars. Operationally, they removed the safety blanket of operating in familiar surroundings and forced the units to fight in locations not of their choosing against a foe that fought differently. Tactically, units discovered the difficulties of operating their equipment while under such constant attack and electronic interference, forcing officers at all levels to improvise their attacks. Politically, and arguably the most important objective, has been the removal of the risk aversion factor in the exercises. No recriminations against the OPFOR brigade were allowed, and reports of defeats were encouraged (PLA Daily, November 11, 2014).

One of the other key issues identified during the exercises was the proper usage of new equipment. Several of the formations that were defeated by the OPFOR possessed the most advanced hardware within the PLA, including Type 99 and Type 96 MBTs as well as Type 04 IFVs. Nearly all the formations possessed highly mobile, organic, mechanized or truck mounted artillery. In essence, they represented the fruits of two decades of hardware upgrades for the ground forces aimed at fighting a fully mechanized war. However, these did not save them from defeat. The only unit that scored a win/draw was equipped with the most advanced Type 99 MBTs, but it was a scratch battalion led by a captain (the higher ranking commanders all having been ‘killed’) that “won” the fight (Guancha, July 8, 2014).

The main organizer of “Stride 2014,” Senior Colonel Yang Baoyou, a professor at the Shijiazhuang Command College (the PLA equivalent of West Point), told Xinhua afterwards that the Zhurihe experiment was intended to expose the shortcomings of combat units at a fundamental level, some of which include “weak command abilities, inefficient collaboration between units, inability to utilize new equipment to their advantage,” among other issues. Yang points out that these are all largely due to a previous regime of “incomprehensive, low standard, and low objective training programs” (Modern Express, August 8, 2014). It is clear that the reason for the choice of units—one brigade from each military region—was so the lessons learnt can be taken back to their respective regions and that no one can say that they could have done better.

The Future of Zhurihe OPFOR
 
It was not only the regular army units that would be pitched against the 195th in 2014. Over the course of the year, no fewer than 20 exercises were held at Zhurihe, including the annual Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO) “Peace Mission 2014” in August, and even a visit from one of the two PLA Marine Brigades (China Youth Daily, February 13, 2014). Traditionally based in the south, the brigade was thrown against the newly activated 195th in February 2014 and returned for a rematch in 2015 (Guangcha, February 5). It is evident that the PLA is keen to test all of its formations outside their comfort zones. According to the PLA Daily’s Weibo account on February 5, 2015, ten brigades from all seven MRs will descent upon Zhurihe to take on the OPFOR for the 2015 “Stride” exercise. The difference this year will be that each battle will be broken down into three rounds, perhaps to allow the “Red Forces” time to assess their shortfalls and attempt to overcome them.

The commander of the OPFOR is not complacent about his brigade’s achievements in 2014 either, and highlighted his concerns of two main bottlenecks for the brigade’s continued development, namely personnel retention and advanced equipment. In terms of the former, Colonel Xia stated that it is difficult to find the right officers, who are versed in “foreign combat doctrine,” and to retain them. In terms of the latter, despite simulating the latest in western MBTs, the OPFOR brigade’s aged Type 59s will require replacements in the future (Liao Wang Dong Fang, August 6, 2014).

It is highly unlikely that the PLA will let the OPFOR’s fighting qualities be eroded by the usual PLA issues of personnel retention and political backlashes. It is clear from “Stride 2014” that this formation has embodied everything that President Xi has called for under his tenure. However, this model will likely be permeated down to the MR level, and regional OPFORs will also be set up to train other local forces. Considering the size and distribution of the PLA, this localization of the “Zhurihe model” would go far in tempering the fighting qualities of the ground formations.

Yet, questions still remain on whether the new training regime, with all the emphasis on realism, reflects a broad enough spectrum for the kinds of threats the PLA might have to face in future. It is uncertain whether all future engagements will involve large-scale NBC strikes, for example; and the lack of counter-insurgency training is also glaring. The OPFOR has demonstrated at Zhurihe that the age of large-scale mechanized war might be coming to an end, but what is to replace it still remains to be answered amongst the planners of the PLA.