LeuCeaMia

Dude, no. Just... I mean, did you fall into a coma in 2004 and only just wake up? Are you an amnesiac or something?
 
Knocking over other countries is a terrible idea if your purposes are to safeguard liberal democracy. Even if you grant someone the right to get rid of "dictators" and "terrorists" that run places in a way you don't like (and that's a planet-sized "if"), it never works. The locals never turn around, look at all the foreign troops lording it over them and go "you know what, we like these guys so much that we're going to vote for someone who aligns perfectly with their interests and never cause trouble again". 
 
If you actually believe in the concept of a liberal, rules-based international order, then the US declaring a bunch of countries guilty of a crime they didn't commit and invading them was one of the crimes of the new century. And even if you don't; it's results have been an unmitigated disaster by the very justifications that they themselves provided. No democracy flowered, no peace was achieved. The only beneficiaries were a bunch of defence contractors and an even more virulent crop of terrorists that the US effectively manufactured and spread around a quarter of the globe.
 
So if you are going to blame Russia for unprovoked aggression and breaking international norms, then you have to blame the US for showing them how it's done: never once apologizing for the act, and never facing any consequences except the inevitable blow-back that comes with some of the stupidest policy decisions in history. That's just basic mental consistency.
 
And if you really think that simply being able to paint your enemies as illiberal is all you need to justify any heinous act, then how is a democratically-elected Russian government, who sees the government in the Ukraine as the illegitimate result of a soft coup by the US, not also going to be able to use that to argue their case?
 
Learn to use your head, or get off this forum.

Wanted to do this post 2 days ago after digesting new events, but was too exhausted after workshifts to do effortposting, i was coming back to home during night time. My thoughts on this war, noise surrounding it, strategical implications and expectations, for those who care.
 
 
What i think.
   After 2017 it was obvious Ukraine will not do anything from Minsk agreements as Ukr politicians were publicly shitting on them and were doing nothing to make it real. DPR and LPR fate became obvious - they are not wanted in Ukraine. Putin's decision to recognize republics was constatations of situation. I expected thing to go slowly but deliberatly towards something i will describe later. But events went in very different way from what i thought would happen. Now, i'm not going to spit in the back of our soldiers executing orders, as Army should be this way, but politicians and other higher ups are free game im my eyes.
 
   Decision to start a full scale war in my opinion was stupidiest thing our political leadership have done in past 22 years. I'm not sure why or what triggered it, but looks like a plan was being worked on for long time, probably even before last year. Putin usually was carefull, but this is rackless decision.
   Our PR can scream about this operation being against nazis and nationalists, but the fact is this war is against Ukraine and everyone inside of it, as effects of war are going to touch nearly everyone who lives inside directly or indirectly.
 
   I don't have hard feelings about it, as i "burned down" during 2015, but this was wrong call. Not because war is bad, but because net result is not going to be what i would like to see.
 
 
   Good vs Evil
   Now, in medias narrative is that Good Democratical Ukraine is fighting Evil Russian dictatorship, in my view both states are dogshit.
 
   Ukraine is highly corrupted country that was run by oligarchs before coup in 2014 and now sort of run by oligarchs together by nationalists with piece of sovereignty outsorced to US foreigh policy makers, a country that effectively suppressed opposition in 2015-16 and where you have less rights than even in Russia, if you are not following "main course". One time per few years population needs to go to specific places where they instal another politicain as a leader who will became highly unpopular by the end of his term.
 
   Russia is highly corrupted country that was run by oligarchs before Putin and now sort of run by oligarchs together with Putin and his "clan", a country that sort of suppressed opposition in 2000s and where you have some rights, but there are workarounds, if you really want to. One time per few years population needs to go to specific places where we approve prolongation of power of our leader.
 
   Personally, i fail to see who is here an actual good guy. Both, in grand scheme of things, are kind of assholes. Maybe reason for people far away to see this conflict differently than war between Azerbaijan and Armenia is mix of agressor vs defender and Goliath vs David situation, and the fact that what they see on videos is a country and people more relatable than some Middle Eastern Arabs that are getting democracy delivered to their homes. But that is how i see it.
 
 
   Why this war is in such way it is (copy pasted from Discord): 
 
   I think we started this war with soft boxing gloves on, for some fucking reason. Maybe they expected less resistance, which may show how much attention they gave to situation on Donbass and how well they took into account 8 years of nationalistic propaganda and having armed conflict in 2.5 regions.
 
   Note absolutely no videos coming from our MoD, nothing about combat. Also note how for several days we used no artillery, very limited cruise missile strikes and no airstrikes (like in Syria with 100+ sorties per day from small base in Hmeimym). All this led to major units not being destroyed, equipment partially left in working condition. Internet was not turned off, mobile phones working. They did jack shit on this front. They did half measures and got half results.
 
   Thanks to that UAF was not destroyed. Convoy routes left undefended. No use of CAS, no proper AA coverage. Big units in bypassed cities left without serious blocking formations. They can orginise by using just mobiles phones. Thanks to ability to film and upload videos to the internet, net is now flooded with videos of Russian equipment destroyed and soldiers killed. Uplifting material for other side. All this instead of getting moral collapse of enemy faster and destruction and murder to minimun turned 180. Ukrainians are fighting back harder that what was anticipated is my expectation.
 
   Another boggus decision was using such small number of forces for operation. I saw claims of ~50k in initial phase. 100k is possibly going to be total number of forces. Ukraine is 40+ mln country. Not sure how they will hold it. Even with Rosgvardia there is not enough people to hold whole country.
 
   In the end results will be same on grand scale, but path to that result will be bloodier and longer. I guess thats why Putin fired that big star commander. But i guess they had plan B for bloodier route, which is why we now see MRLS used to bombard enemy.
 
   You can't "half-fight" the war, trying to look friendly on tv. What was supposed to be public flogging of Ukraine starts to be 1939 Soviet war with Finland, where USSR technically won, but Germans, looking at how it was won, thought Red Army was umm.. "incompetent" and decision to invade USSR was taken with taking into account poor results of that war. 
 
 
   Expectations, future
   After declaration of recognition of republics i thought we will start to help rebels in taking back 2 oblast', and this will be the end of hot-ish phase of conflict in Donbass region after quick strike against main forces of UAF in this region (which are most of their forces) and enforcing some sort of political comma in a conflict and moving to next phase.
 
   Reality went in different direction.
   I suspect this war will continue for a week (optimistically), 2-3 weeks if Russian command will not unfuck their plans, or turn into strange military stalment for a month or 2 when most of Ukraine is going to be technically captured, but vast territories and many towns/villages will not have any occupation forces to keep an order, so motivated people will have space to continue strategically unorginised conflict until we will pump necessary amount of internal troops to put it down enough for law enforcements to handle situation.  
 
   After that expect new government, neutral status and Russian troops leaving, with scars of stupidity of leadership. And after some time - nationalists will rise, again, maybe even at bigger scale. Reason - they were screaming about Russian invasion for 8 years and now it is a reality. Their voice was heard by people in Ukraine before, but and now it have big and firm foundation to stand on thanks to this war happening.
 

New section. 
 
The Small arms of the US Army Tanker: What they were issued and what they carried.  
 
 
The US Army issued early Sherman tanks with a single Thompson M1928A1 .45 caliber submachine gun. They tank also had two boxes to hold a total to twelve hand grenades of various types. Two smoke and two thermite grenades were kept in a box on the left side turret wall, and there was another box under the gunner seat that held 2 smokes grenades, 4 M2 fragmentation grenades, and 2 M3 offensive grenades.  The tank also had a pair of M1919A4 machine guns and the M2 HB that could be mounted on the pair of tripods issued with the tank.  They had 600 rounds of .45 ACP and 4750 rounds of .30 caliber, and 300 rounds for the M2 HB. They
 
Later versions of the Sherman were issued with a slightly different setup. The single M1928A1 Thompson was replaced with 5 M3 submachine guns.  The other major change was, all the machine guns were provided with more ammo, 600 .50, 6250 .30, and the same 600 rounds of .45 for the new SMGs. The tank was also issued with a small number of spare parts that commonly broke on all the weapons and specialized tools to service them.
 
In all cases, each member of the Sherman crew would have been issued a M1911A1 pistol as a side arm.
 
Let’s talk about these weapons a little, first the Machineguns.
 
M2 HB .50 caliber machine gun: Who doesn’t know about this machine gun, developed before WWII, it was a legend by the end. It saw use everywhere the US Military fought. If it could mount a heavy Machine gun or guns, the American put one of these on it.  The Sherman had one, The M16 halftrack had four, the P-47 Thunderbolt, had eight! They used them on Ships, Jeeps, Aircraft, with the infantry, and as AA guns. There is a reason this machine gun, designed by maybe the greatest firearms inventor of all time, John Browning. It’s so well liked, slightly improved version still serve with the US Military and to many other Nations around the world to list here.
 
The versions issued with the Sherman had a 450 to 550 RPM, and a quick change barrel that still required it to have its headspace adjusted, so not all the quick. Someone who knew what they were doing could keep the barrel from overheating by firing in short controlled bursts.  The machine gun would rarely leave the tank, were the lighter M1919s might be pulled and mounted on a tripod for some reason, if the crew had to fight on foot, or to setup around a perimeter at night maybe.
 
M1919A4 .30 caliber machine gun: The Sherman crew was provided with two, sometimes three of these guns. They like their bigger, little brother, the M2, were designed by John Browning. For The US Military in WWII and Korea, .30 caliber meant the 30-06 cartridge.  This was a pretty decent round as .30 caliber rounds go, and would serve as the Army rifle and light/medium machine gun chambering until the adoption of the 7.62 NATO round. This gun spat round at between 450 and 550 round per minute and it was a reliable and well liked gun.  If it had a flaw, it was it was not easy to swap barrels on, for the same reasons as the M2, and it was a tad heavy for a light/medium machine gun.
 
The M1919 served with the US Army, and Marine Corps well into the 50s, they were eventually replaced by the M60 machine gun.  These Machine guns have a long and well recorded history, and my goal here is to talk about them without causing any new myths or bad information.
 
Now let’s talk about the Submachine gun.
 
M1928A1, .45 ACP submachine gun: This SMG is another American Classic, and it was a classic by WWII all on its own. Originally developed for use in WWI, it missed the war, and any Military contracts, but the gun was sold on the civilian market. Enough sales tricked in from a few small government and police agencies, along with foreign sales to keep Auto-Ordnance alive between wars. The weapon was sensationalized by the media after it was used by prohibition era gangsters and a few notable regular criminals, and this inspired some of the nation’s first federal gun control laws. In 1934 the National Firearms Act went into effect, after being passed by Congress. It limited the sale of Machine guns to civilians and made the one already in Civilian hands have to be licensed.
 
There was already one huge limiting factor on Thompson sales, if you were not a government agency; you had to be pretty rich to buy one. Sure, a few criminals were, but what normal Joe of the 1920s could spend $200 bucks on a machine gun when a new car cost around $400?  That 200 bucks was for the basic 1921 m model with 1 magazine if I recall right.  When you started adding things like the wood front pistol grip, deluxe wood furniture and drum magazines and fancy cases, the price could run into luxury car range.  
 
The M1928A1 was not all the different from the M1921, and still used the odd Blish lock and could still take the drum magazines but had dispensed with the front pistol grip. If it had a drawback it was that it was large and heavy for a SMG, but you would think this would help control it.
 
The Army would go on to have even simpler version of this SMG produced, but as far as I know only the M1928A1 was issued with Sherman tanks.
 
M3 and M3A1 .45 ACP submachine gun:  This SMG was designed to be the easiest to manufacture and cheapest SMG that could still perform as well as the M1928A1 and the M3 was born. After some use, the M3A1 came about to solve all the problems with the basic M3.  The M3 looks a little like a grease gun, so that name stuck, and the weapon would go on to serve into the 1990s as tank crewmen’s weapon.
The M3A1 was a simple no nonsense weapon that filled the tank crewmen dismounted weapon fairly well, and that’s why it no one bothered to replace the thing.  I may be wrong on this, I’ll have to check, but I think it was replaced with the MP5.
From the Sherman crewman perspective, I bet they’d say, five M3A1s is better than one M1928A1.
Next up, let’s talk about the pistol.
 
1911A1 .45 ACP Pistol:  So much has been said about the 1911, I’m not going to say much, but I’ll note for those who don’t know, John Browning designed it too. I will say this, it is not the finest handgun ever produced, nor is it even close to the worst. It is probably the most popular handgun in America, and I own two. What it was, was a reliable, tested, accurate enough handgun for soldiers, pilots, officers or anyone else who needed a hand gun.  Like all handguns, it should be viewed as a last resort, and the M3A1 or M1928A1 would be more useful in all but the most close of encounters for a tank crewman.  
. . .
 
Now so far, we’ve only been talking about the weaponry issued with the tank or to the crew. Soldiers and marines being soldiers and marines means as soon as they were out of an environment where the tank they and the tank was being inspected on a regular basis they would have started acquiring extra things for the tank.  Crews of early Shermans probably worked pretty hard to get more Thompson SMGs, or used captured ones.  I’m sure they stuffed extra grenades all over the tank along with extra .30 cal and .50 cal ammo. Depending on unit discipline and how aware they were of the risk, some crews might have carried extra main gun ammunition as well.  It wouldn’t be impossible for a something like an M1 Garand or M1 Carbine to make an appearance as well. 

Good use for a Tiger.
 

Premium T-34-85 discovered
 

I figured we should have a thread dedicated to transmissions and final drives of AFVs.  I'll kick the thread off by going old school with this article from the May-June 1921 issue of the Ordnance Journal on "Final Drive for Combat Vehicles."
 

T-80BV interior panorama

Situation with Oplots in 2015 - BMPD blog post.
 
   The news agency RIA Novosti Ukraine, 4 January 2016 published an article by "independent military expert" Diana Mikhailova (an obvious pseudonym), "Ukraine - Thailand: one Oplot, two Oplots, zero Oplots", dedicated to the scandalous situation with the fulfillment of the known contract for the manufacturing and supply of the Oplot-BM main battle tank for Thailand by State Enterprise "Malyshev Plant".      Starting from February 4 of last year, when the Director General of the State Concern "Ukroboronprom" Roman Romanov [lol] has declared that "it is planned to increase the production of Ukrainian tanks almost 25 times in 2015, 40 Oplots will be made, and a year later, production will reach 120 units", the press service was not too lazy to prepare a colorful illustration of this vision of the future Ukrainian tank building. Production Schedule for Oplot-BM according to the press service of the "Ukroboronprom." February 2015      The process of summing up of 2015, that began in December, will continue for several months upon receipt of statistics and reports of companies for the IV quarter. However, some of the results were evident immediately.      Despite the promised of multiple growth of Ukrainian tanks production, not a single new Oplots was made in 2015.   (...)    Impressive plans were immediately implemented by the press service of the "Ukroboronprom" in the picture, which was widely circulated on specialized sites and in the effectiveness of the advertising companies of the concern, and also featured a number of presentations on the results of its activities. However, there were the first doubts about the correctness of the data presented. The first batch of five Oplot tanks to the Royal Thai Army was made in the second half of 2013, sent to the customer in December of the same year, and arrived at the port of Sattahip (Thailand) at 4 February of 2014.      Hence, as a starting point of the picture with the production schedule (rather than supply!) of Oplot-BM must be taken first in 2013, not the 2014, when the second batch of five machines was made.      The irony is that even though these tanks have been assembled and sent to the customer as a result of the efforts of returned in August 2014 of Nikolai Belov, the management company fired him a week later after the arrival of the second batch in Thailand in June 2015, "for the failure of production plans".      As the end of 2015 approached, officials of the "Ukroboronprom" less and less often refered to the ill-fated picture and in September, the first deputy director of the State Concern Sergey Pinkas commented an optimistic plan for the production of 40 tanks a year: "I can not say that the production of Oplot all serene and simple. It's very difficult. On the other hand, a year ago they were not produced at all. Today, we already have some series. I do not think that would be quite correct to voice number, because "Oplots" are also in defense orders, and a number of export contracts. To date, a boundary point on the contract with Thailand for the supply of five units we completed. The next point - 31 December. In short, the production speed may not be such as we would like, but let us live to see the end of the year, and we will give the official information".      But then came December, and at 2nd of Dec. a message was made, that shown a different way to look at the schedule. During New Year's press tour Kharkov chief engineer of the Malyshev plant, Alexander Sheiko, at the same time acting Director General of the company, responding to a question about the prospects of working with Thailand, said that "all export contracts are agreed with the Ministry of Defence Ukraine. Only with the permission of the chief of the General Staff of Ukraine sending are possible. I can not name the exact date. Tentative dates, if there will be the coordination of the Ministry of Defense - in December. The amount of equipment to be delivered in the next batch of "Thai Contract" is closed information. "      At the same time the chief engineer of the plant said that "the task for the next year - to completely "close" the Thai contract", which involves the production of at least 39 tanks. How this can be accomplished given the fact that the Ministry of Defence in 2016 ordered the production of nearly two dozen Oplots [18 tanks], already completely impossible to understand.      The last information received has enabled attentive criticism of "Ukroboronprom" and lovers of Ukrainian tanks with a high degree of sarcasm to transform the original production schedule of real achievements "Ukroboronprom" taking as a second point on it was the second batch of five BM Oplots, received by royal army in May 31, 2015, as well as a third - vague promises by Sheiko.     Evaluation of the production schedule of BM Oplot by the social networks. December 4th, 2015      Unfortunately, even such a hard-hitting assessment proved overly optimistic. According to the factory workers "today (December 4) only assembled Oplot from another party did not passed military acceptance, so can not be considered as "produced". So there will be no Oplots batch in March or early April." After another three weeks this was confirmed by the corresponding photograph, which shown only one BM "Oplot" in transit "after testing the factory for cleaning and inspection after running on the ground in Bashkirovka."     Given this information, the most realistic production schedule of the BM "Oplot" today is this:      It remains only to recall that agreed in September 2011 shipping schedule of Oplots under the contract for a total of 240 mln. USD. was as follows: December 2012 - 5 units, in August 2013 - 15 units, in December 2013 - 15 units, in August 2014 - 14 units. In fact the total number of issued and delivered tanks for 2013-2015 reached only ten instead of 45-50 pieces.       Significant impact on the situation is that at the beginning of November 2015 the new (seventh in two years) Acting Director of the State Enterprise "Plant named after Malyshev" appointed Alexander Hlan - the brother of one of the deputies of Ukraine. His predecessor, who worked as the general director of the Kherson Automobile "Anto-Rus" and "Kharkiv tank plant" Viktor Cozonac, who headed the company since late July, according to the factory workers, "went from the SBU abroad". At December 28th, another candidate for the post of the head of the plant will be discussed at a meeting.      

Just for fun, here are the excerpts from "Inside the Third Reich" by Albert Speer regarding tanks.
 
 

Hello, my friends and Kharkovites, take a sit and be ready for your brains to start to work - we are going to tell you a terrible secret of how to tell apart Soviet tanks that actually works like GLORIOUS T-80 and The Mighty T-72 from Kharkovites attempt to make a tank - the T-64. Many of capitalists Westerners have hard time understanding what tank is in front of them, even when they know smart words like "Kontakt-5" ERA. Ignoramus westerners!
 
 
   Because you are all were raised in several hundreds years old capitalism system all of you are blind consumer dummies, that need big noisy labels and shiny colorful things to be attached to product X to be sold to your ignorant heads and wallets, thats why we will need to start with basics. BASICS, DA? First - how to identify to which tank "family" particular MBT belongs to - to T-64 tree, or T-72 line, or Superior T-80 development project, vehicles that don't have big APPLE logo on them for you to understand what is in front of you. And how you can do it in your home without access to your local commie tank nerd? 
 
 
   Easy! Use this Putin approved guide "How to tell appart different families of Soviet and Russian tanks from each other using simple and easy to spot external features in 4 steps: a guide for ignorant western journalists and chairborn generals to not suck in their in-depth discussions on the Internet".
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Where to look, what to see.
 
T-64 - The Ugly Kharkovite tank that doesn't work 
 
   We will begin with T-64, a Kharkovite attempt to make a tank, which was so successful that Ural started to work on their replacement for T-64 known as T-72. Forget about different models of T-64, let's see what is similar between all of them.
 
 
 

 
 
   
 
 
T-72 - the Mighty weapon of Workers and Peasants to smash westerners
 
   Unlike tank look-alike, made by Kharkovites mad mans, T-72 is true combat tank to fight with forces of evil like radical moderate barbarians and westerners. Thats why we need to learn how identify it from T-64 and you should remember it's frightening lines!
 

 
 
 
The GLORIOUS T-80 - a Weapon to Destroy and Conquer bourgeois countries and shatter westerners army
 
   And now we are looking at the Pride of Party and Soviet army, a true tank to spearhead attacks on decadent westerners, a tank that will destroy countries by sucking their military budgets and dispersing their armies in vortex of air, left from high-speed charge by the GLORIOUS T-80!

The T-80 shooting down jets by hitting them behind the horizont 
    

More from here.

Yes.

Above test was an inert reactive armor test, an explosive reactive armour test gave this result:

(part B is the same as "t = 30 microseconds" in the first picture)
 
Interesting to note that the first ~5 cm of the jet in the inert test isn't damaged, but is in the explosive test. Is it because it had to pass through a shock front, or something else?
 
This is also interesting:

Actually peak ROF from the F-34 on a range was 20 RPM, get #rekt fascist scum

The  feels when you manage to torp a full health Iowa. 
 

Later upgrades greatly improved the Sherman's mobility.
 

OK I lied, I busted this out in just over an hour. I'll add pics and post it to the site tomorrow after work. Let me know what you guys think this is a first draft.  Now I need to unwind in 2 minutes before my sleep deadline!
 
The Transmission and Final Drives: Great on the Sherman!
The Transmission and final drives on the Sherman were very robust from the start of the Sherman design and proved to be rugged enough to take all the upgrades the Sherman had thrown at it over the years. The final drive had a gear ratio of 2.84:1, limiting the tanks top speed by RPM to 26 miles an hour in the M4A3 version of the tank. The RPM limit varied with engine model, and in the Jumbos case, a slightly higher gear ratio of 3.36:1, limiting its top speed to 22 miles an hour but giving the drive train a little more mechanical grunt to get the extra weight moving. This was the only modification major enough to be mentioned in any publication I’ve read so far. That says ‘damn good design’ to me. I’ve read several accounts of Sherman restorations being done, where after years on a firing range, or just rotting in a field somewhere, the final drives and differential unit needed no mechanical restoration.
 
Now a bit about gear ratios for those who are not gear heads before we get into the transmission, since it’s going to have even more confusing ratios. The meaning of the gear ratios in the above paragraph are, for every rotation of the drive shaft coming out of the transmission and going into the final drives and differential has to spin 2.84 times to spin the sprocket output shafts one turn.  What determines the Transmissions output rpm is what gear it is in, and what ration that gear is.  The higher the number, the more mechanical advantage is transferred to the final drive, but lowers the top tanks tops speed in that gear.  So for the Sherman, with a “Granny” first gear ratio of 7.56:1, the tank isn’t going to be moving faster than 1 or 2 miles per hour, before the driver would have to shift.  The next gear up, second is 3.11:1, on level ground, gear two is used to start the tank and drive it at low speeds. Say up to 5 miles an hour, on road and rarely off road third rarely you would then get into third gear, 1.78:1, and up to 12 to 15 mph.  Fourth would be the last gear to see regular use, coming in at an almost one to one, 1.11:1. This is your driving like a bat out of hell 15 to 20 miles an hour gear. Fifth gear is actually an overdrive gear, at 0.73:1, meaning .73 of a turn to spin the tranny output once. Meaning, this has to be taken to into account in calculating the tanks top speed and it could only reach its top speed on good roads in fifth gear! Reverse gear, 5.65:1, was almost as tall as first and really limited the tanks reverse speed. If you understand what be just covered, you can will understand the gear rations listed on your next cars window sticker.
 
Now that you understand gear ratios you may wonder what the term “Granny” gear means? The ‘Granny’ gear refers to a really high gear ratio gear, almost always first. The Granny gear was used for getting a vehicle started while hauling a big load, trying to tow another tank to get it started or heavy vehicle for the same reason, climbing a steep hill or obstacle, driving through thick mud or deep water or getting another tank or heavy vehicle unstuck from mud or another obstacle.
 
The Sherman Transmission was fully Synchromesh, meaning you did not have to depress the clutch twice, once to get it into neural, the next to go to the next gear, or “double clutching”. This in theory made the Sherman tank, though a manual transmission that used a clutch, much like any car that has a manual, was relatively easy to drive. There are several Sherman museums that will let you drive one if you have the right amount of money.  From what I understand, the key to how easy the Sherman is to drive comes partly from the motor and partly from how much you’re really willing to drive the thing and not worry about breaking it. The easiest motors are supposed to be the Diesel and Ford GAA, then A57 if it’s running right, then the R975 powered tanks. The R975 because it likes to get up into its higher RPM power band, and stay there for a while, it helps burn off carbon and keeps the plugs un-fowled.
 
The transmission, much like the final differential and final drives you always find it plugged into was a very tough unit. I know of at least two restorations where the transmission needed little mechanical work. This same transmission, and for the life of me I don’t think I’ve ever seen a name for the original designer/maker, stayed largely unchanged through the full life of the tank. The Israeli Shermans used into the 70s were using original Sherman Transmissions, though probably overhauled. That they could be, and continue to be on restored Shermans, kept working, and working well all those years also screams “DAMN GOOD DESIGN” and it’s a little sad I don’t, we don’t know who made them.  
 
How I forgot to do this section is a real mystery, you can’t have a tank without a transmission and final drives. Pics will be added soon. I was going to wait to write this until at least Monday, but I got the bug and did all this all in an hour and ten minutes. I did 920 words on the transmission and final drives on the Sherman, reference, Hunnicutt’s Sherman tank. 

Source
 
All Credit goes to: Mike Ennamoro
 
and Tiles Murphy 
 
I highly recommend checking out there other articles, espically that on T-72

BLACK SHEEP
 
      Ask anybody politically savvy aged 50 and above and they will tell you that the unending string of proxy wars during the Cold War exuded a mostly artificial, but ever-present atmosphere of an imminent danger of a escalation into a full-blown nuclear world war. Fear and paranoia drove an age of accelerated technology growth predominantly concentrated in the military sector, producing various innovations which have crossed over into the non-military world. The proof is in our history textbooks today. The first rockets that sent satellites to space, for example, were modified ICBMs, and the Internet was originally a military project. New tanks sprang up like mushrooms after rain all over the world in approximately decadal increments, always to counter the last, always eclipsed by the next, but sometimes bordering on obsolescence from the moment they were created. One unfortunate example of the latter is the T-62.
      The T-62 is undeniably the least memorable among all of its world-famous post war era brothers - the T-54/55, T-64, T-72, T-80 and T-90 all come to mind - and it is also arguably the least historically significant among them all, but it was a step nonetheless in the evolutionary path to the modern T-14 we know today, and its relevance on the battlefield was certainly undeniable for the better part of two decades.       The sentiment among the few amateur academic-enthusiasts that haven't forgotten the T-62's existence is that it was a highly mediocre design with a whopping gun, and in many ways, that is perfectly true from a technological standpoint in the evolution of armoured warfare during the Cold War. Between former Soviet tankers, however, the sentiment is slightly different. Many remember the T-62 fondly as a fairly reliable and endearing sweetheart that certainly had its own faults, but rarely ever disappointed - a sentiment echoed by Syrian and Iraqi tankers. The ones that lived, at least.       Although woefully obsolete at present (it had already been totally purged from the Russian Armed Forces' inventories since 2013), it could at least boast of having the second most powerful tank cannon in the world for a few short years before being usurped by the T-64. Indeed, the sole reason of the T-62's existence was its pioneering smoothbore cannon. Tactically speaking, there were very few differences between it and its predecessor the T-54 in the mobility and armour protection departments, and the T-62 and the T-55, and indeed, both shared the same make of equipment to a large degree, thus simplifying both production and logistics. In fact, the technology of the T-62 was almost entirely derived from the T-55, and most of the interior instruments and controls are practically identical, making the transition from the T-54/55 to the T-62 wonderfully seamless. This degree of commonality wasn't entirely positive, though, because this meant that there was an unacceptable stagnation in armour technology - the type of stagnation seen on the American side of the Iron Curtain in their Patton series of tanks, which began service in the early 50's and dominated U.S Army tank units up til the early 80's. Had the designers decided to only continually modernize a T-54-type design like the Americans did with the Patton, then surely the Soviets would have never achieved the level of armoured superiority and technological excellence as they did in the late 60's, 70's and early 80's.          The T-62 is an example of what Soviet tank armies could have been, but never was. It was flawed, redundant, unnecessary, and downright wasteful. But it was still valuable in its own little ways, and some of the technologies found in the T-62 even carried over to its successors. Many of its flaws (such as the U.S Army-propagated myth that it took 6 seconds to eject a spent shell casing) were in fact totally made up, but the tank was undeniably mediocre all the same. Tactically speaking, it had only a few advantages over its predecessor in the firepower department, but otherwise, the T-62 was nothing more than a more expensive T-55.            It was plain to see that the T-62 was considered nothing more than a stopgap solution until the new and radically superior T-64 arrived on the scene, though it is some consolation that the T-62 was considered the most advanced Soviet main battle tank during its brief tenure. Being a mere evolutionary stepping stone, though, we can observe the way Soviet school of thought on mechanized warfare evolved with it. In the early 60's, tank riding infantry was still considered a core part of mechanized warfare. The armoured APC had arrived on the scene in the form of the wheeled BTR-152 and tracked BTR-50, but infantry were sometimes obliged to move and fight as one with a tank, and so to that end, the T-62 had handrails over the circumference of the turret for tank riders to hold on to. When the BMP-1 was introduced in 1966, it drove a major revision of contemporary tank tactics, and the shift in paradigm can be very well seen in the T-62's successors. The T-64 did not have any handrails, nor did the T-72, and the T-62M introduced in the late 60's abolished them too.            The changes to the T-62 dutifully followed international trends too, most notably the global shift to jet power in the aviation industry. Too fast to be harmed by machine gun fire, the ground attack jet rendered the normally obligatory DShKM machine gun obsolete. The birth of the AH-1 Huey Cobra and the subsequent heavy use of helicopters for fire support and landing missions radically shifted the landscape, and the men and women at Uralvagonzavod obeyed. The DShKM was back by 1972.                  In the Soviet Union, the T-62 was produced from 1963 to 1975, with the first pre-production models appearing in 1961. After 1975, all "new" T-62s are actually simply upgraded, modified, or otherwise overhauled versions from the original production run.   COMMANDER'S STATION     The commander is seated on the port side of the turret, directly behind the gunner, and to his left is the R-113 radio station, created just as the T-62 first entered service in 1961. '           The R-113 radio operates in the 20.00 to 22.375 MHz range and has a range of 10 to 20 km with its 4 m-long antenna. It could be tuned into 96 frequencies within the limits of its frequency range.         In 1965, the radio was swapped out for a newer and much more advanced R-123 radio. The R-123 radio had a frequency range of between 20 MHZ to 51.5 MHZ. It could be tuned to any frequency within those limits via a knob, or the commander could instantly switch between four preset frequencies for communications within a platoon. It had a range of between 16km to 50km. The R-123 had a novel, but rather redundant frosted glass prism window at the top of the apparatus that displayed the operating frequency. An internal bulb illuminated a dial, imposing it onto the prism where it is displayed. The R-123 had an advanced modular design that enabled it to be repaired quickly by simply swapping out individual modules.  

 
            It is quite clear that the commander's station is the most habitable one by far in the very spartan T-62. The close proximity between all the turret occupants with each other and the shortage of breathing space makes the internal climate hot and humid, contributing to the overall discomfort. This is compounded by the fact that the crew isn't provided with any local ventilators such as fans or directed air vents, so it can get quite stuffy inside. However, the commander seems to be the most well off, since he sits right in front of the sole ventilator in the turret and he isn't required to exert himself physically, unlike the loader. Unique to the rest of the dome-shaped turret, the area around his station was cast to be devoid of any vertical sloping or rounding whatsoever, which was necessary to enable his rotating cupola to be installed. This meant that the debilitating effects of the ostensibly dome-shaped turret are completely lost on him.           The cupola is mounted on a race ring. The fixed part constitutes half of the total size of the cupola, while the other half is occupied by the semicircular hatch, which has a maximum width of 590mm. The hatch opens forward, which is quite convenient for when the commander wants to survey the landscape from outside - perhaps with a pair binoculars - because being as thick as it is, the hatch is a superb bulletproof shield for protecting the commander from sniper fire.       There is also a small porthole in the hatch. It is meant for an panoramic periscope tube for indirect fire.      As befitting his tactical role, the commander's general visibility is facilitated by two TNPO-170 periscopes on either side of the primary surveillance periscope in the fixed forward half of the cupola, and further augmented by two more 54-36-318-R periscopes embedded in the hatch, aimed to either side for additional situational awareness. Overall, this scheme was sufficient for most purposes, but was deficient if compared to the much more generous allowance of periscopes and vision ports found on NATO tanks.   The TNPO-170 periscope has a total range of vision of 94° in the horizontal plane and 23° in the vertical plane. The four periscopes in addition to the TKN-type periscope aimed directly forward gives the commander a somewhat acceptable field of vision over the turret's front arc. The use of periscopes instead of direct glass vision blocks presents pros and cons - for one, the lack of any direct vision means that the viewer's eyes is protected from machine gun fire or glass specks if the device is destroyed, but a bank of periscopes offer a much more limited panorama than vision blocks like the type found in the commander's cupola on the M60 tank.    TKN-2 "Karmin"               The original 1961 model of the T-62 featured the TKN-2 binocular periscopic surveillance device (above) mounted in the rotating cupola. It had a fixed x5 magnification in the day mode, with an angular field of view of 10°, allowing a nominal maximum detection range of a tank-sized target at approximately 3 km, though this was greatly dependent on geography as well as weather conditions. The periscope could be manipulated up by +10° and down by -5°, while the cupola would have to be turned for horizontal surveillance.                The TKN-2 had an active night channel which picked up infrared light from the OU-3 IR spotlight attached to the periscope aperture to provide a limited degree of night vision to the commander. With a nominal viewing range of only about 300 to 400 m, the TKN-2 was all but useless for serious target acquisition at night, serving only to give away the tank's position the moment the spotlight was turned on. Performance could be improved with mortar-delivered IR flares, of course, but that doesn't count as an intrinsic merit of the device itself.                 Due to the fact that the periscope is unstabilized, identifying another tank at a distance is very difficult while on the move over very rough terrain. However, the commander is meant to bear down and brace against the handles of the periscope for improvised stabilization, which is adequate for when driving over a dirt road, but not when traversing over especially rough terrain. The periscope's small elevation allowance was for this purpose.   The left handle has a thumb button for turning the OU-3 spotlight on or off.     The OU-3 is a high-powered xenon arc lamp with an IR filter to create only infrared light. The filter isn't opaque, though, and the spotlight will glow faintly red. It is mechanically linked to the periscope, enabling it to elevate with the TKN-2.       ^OU-3 IR spotlight with the IR filter removed to transform it into a regular white light spotlight^   TKN-3 "Kristal" In 1964, the revised T-62 was instead equipped with the TKN-3 pseudo-binocular combined periscope, which is a direct descendant of the TKN-2. Pseudo-binocular meaning that although the device has two eyepieces, the two optic tubes are combined to feed from one aperture, which the viewer sees out of. It has a fixed 5x magnification in the day channel with an angular field of view of 10°, and a fixed 3x magnification in the night channel with an angular field of view of 8°. The periscope can be manipulated up and down for elevation, and the commander's cupola must be turned for horizontal viewing.     The TKN-3 was a sufficiently modern observation device of its time. It featured target cuing, was very compact, and had a relatively advanced passive light intensification system, but it wasn't stabilised, and featured only rudimentary rangefinding capabilities as a cost saving measure. It offered rudimentary night vision capability in two flavours; passive light intensification or active infrared. In the passive mode of operation, the TKN-3 intensifies ambient light to produce a more legible image. This mode is useful down to ambient lighting conditions of at least 0.005 lux, which would be equivalent to an overcast, moonless and starless night. In these conditions, the TKN-3 can be used to identify a tank-type target at a nominal distance of 400m, but as the amount of ambient light increases such as on starlit or moonlit nights, the distance at which a tank-sized target is discernible can be extended to up to 800m in dark twilight hours. Any brighter, though, and the image will be oversaturated and unintelligible.     The active mode requires the use of the OU-3K IR spotlight, which is practically identical to the OU-3 performance-wise. With active infrared imaging, the commander can identify a tank at 800m, or potentially more if the opposing side is also using IR spotlights, in which case, the TKN-3 can be set to the active mode but without turning on the IR spotlight.     Rangefinding is accomplished through the use of a stadiametric scale sighted for a target with a height of 2.7 m, which is the average size of the average NATO tank. Like the TKN-2, the TKN-3 is unstabilized, making it exceedingly difficult to reliably identify enemy tanks or other vehicles at extended distances while the tank is travelling over rough terrain, let alone determine the range. The left thumb button initiated turret traverse for target cuing, and the right thumb button turned the OU-3K spotlight on or off. The range of elevation is +10° to -5°, just like the TKN-2. The OU-3K spotlight is also directly mechanically linked to the periscope (the arm to which the spotlight is linked to can be seen in the photo above) to enable it to elevate with the TKN-3.     Target cuing is done by placing the crosshair reticle in the periscope's viewfinder over the intended target and pressing the cue button. The system only accounts for the cupola's orientation, though, and not the periscope's elevation, so the cannon will not elevate to meet the target; only the turret will.         Because the cupola did not was not counter rotated as turret traverse was initiated, it will be spun along with the turret as it rotates to meet the target cued by the commander, potentially causing him to lose his bearings. To prevent this, there is a simple U-shaped steel rung for him to brace with his right arm as he uses his left hand to designate the target. This wasn't as convenient as a counter rotating motor, of course, but it was better than nothing.     Ventilation for the crew is facilitated by the KUV-3 ventilator, identifiable on the rear of the turret as a large, overturned frying pan-shaped tumor on the rear of the turret.     A centrifugal fan inside the ventilator housing sucks in air and performs some low level filtration, ejecting dust and larger particles out of a small slit at the base of the housing (refer to photo above), and then released into the crew compartment, passing through a drum-shaped NBC filter unit inside the tank proper. The air can be optionally cleaned of chemical and biological contaminants by the filter in contaminated environments where the centrifugal fan is simply not enough. The filter unit also contains a supercharger to increase the positive pressure inside the tank to produce an overpressure, preventing chemical and biological agents from seeping into the tank.   Notice the PVC pipe connecting it to the ventilation dome on the outside of the turret rear
 
 

 
But being the commander is still a mixed blessing, because his seat is seated right in front of the hydraulic pump, subjecting him to more acoustic fatigue than anyone else in the tank (the green canister is the hydraulic pump).   Nevertheless, the commander's station is the second most roomy one in the tank, besides the loader's station. Here in the photo below, you can see his seat back and the few pieces of equipment that he is responsible for.   Sometime during the 70's, a select few T-62s received a shield of sorts over the commander's hatch. It is a sheet steel face shield with a canvas skirt draping down. Being so thin, the face shield is not bulletproof, though perhaps resistant to hand grenade fragments and small mortar splinters.     Since it doesn't really do very well as ballistic protection, the main function of the shield appears to be to conceal the opening of the commander's hatch to disguise his exit from the prying eyes of snipers, and to keep away dust if the commander feels like sitting outside during road marches. Either way, not many T-62s received the addition, though almost all T-72s did. The reason for the bias is unknown.     GUNNER'S STATION   The gunner is squeezed into his corner of the turret, wedged between the turret wall to the left and the cannon breech to the right, and between the commander and the sights. It is so cramped that the commander must partially wrap his knees around him.   As was, and still is common among manually loaded tanks, the gunner doesn't have a hatch of his own. Instead, he must ingress and egress through the commander's hatch. The biggest flaw with this layout is that if the commander is unconscious, incapacitated or killed, then the gunner will suddenly find it extremely difficult to leave the tank unless the commander was somehow completely vaporized. Even worse, if the tank has been struck, there is a very distinct possibility that the interior is catching fire.   Plus, another flaw with the layout is if the turret was perforated through the front on the port side cheek, both the gunner and commander would be killed, effectively rendering the tank useless in combat. For extra visibility, the gunner has a single TNP-165 periscope pointed forward and slightly to the right, though for what exact purpose this lone periscope is meant for is unknown, since the field of view from it is so small that the gunner can't really see very much, nor can the commander seated behind him. It is more useful for the commander for checking directly in front of the tank.    
 
  In addition to all of the necessary switches and toggle buttons to activate this and that, there are also some other odds and ends at his station, including a turret azimuth indicator, which is used to orient the turret for indirect fire. It is akin to a clock, having two hands - one for general indication measured in degrees, and the other in 100 mil increments for precise turret traverse.   SIGHTING COMPLEX   TSh2B-41 sight aperture port, with nuclear attack seal in place     The gunner is provided with either a monocular TSh2B-41 or a TSh2B-41U (in later models) primary sight and a TPN-1-41-11 night sight, which also functions as a backup sight in the event of the failure or destruction of the primary sight.   TSh2B-41    The TSh2B-41 is a monocular telescopic sight, functioning as the gunner's primary sight for direct fire purposes. It has two magnification settings, x3.5 or x7, and an angular field of view of 18° in the former setting and 9° in the latter setting. As was and still is common for all tank sights, it has an anti-glare coating for easier aiming when facing the sun. It comes with a small wiper to clean it from moisture, and it comes with an integrated heater for defrosting.     Like most other tanks of its time, the T-62 lacked a ballistic computer, but it was also unusually deficient in the rangefinding department. For rangefinding, the gunner had to make use of a stadiametric ranging scale embossed on the sight aperture. Compared to optical coincidence rangefinders, stadia rangefinding was terribly imprecise, but also much simpler in both production and employment, and much more economical than, say, optical coincidence rangefinding. In fact, stadia rangefinding is essentially free, since all that is needed are some etchings into the sight lens. The savings made from the exclusion of an optical coincidence rangefinder were enormous, amounting to many thousands of rubles. Ranging errors of up to several hundred meters is often the norm, especially if some of the lower part of the target vehicle is obscured behind vegetation or other terrain features. It isn't uncommon for the first shot on faraway tank-sized targets to fall woefully short or fly clear over.   Below is the sight picture:   From left to right: APFSDS, HEAT, HE-Frag, Co-Axial Machine Gun    When the gunner has obtained range data, he manually enters the necessary correction into the sighting system by turning a dial. The dial adjusts the sight to calibrate it for that range.     Calibration is when the chevron is elevated or depressed to account for range. If the target is very far away, for example, then the chevron will be dropped significantly, forcing the gunner to sharply elevate the gun to line up the target with the chevron, thus forming a ballistic solution. Because APFSDS, HEAT and HE-Frag shells all have different ballistic characteristics, the gunner must refer to a set of fixed range scales drawn on the upper half of the sight in order to get the proper gun elevation. For instance, if the target is 1.6 km away, and the gunner wishes to engage it with high explosive shells, then he must line up a horizontal bar (which moves up and down with the targeting chevron but at different speeds due to a reduction gear) with a notch on the range scale for "OF" shells that says "16". If the gunner wishes to use APFSDS instead, then he need only line up the horizontal bar with the "16" notch on the "BR" scale. Then, the chevron will show how much supraelevation is needed in order to hit the target with the selected ammunition. The gunner will then lay the chevron on the target and open fire.     The sight has an internal light bulb that when turned on, illuminates the reticle for easier aiming in poor lighting conditions such as during twilight hours or dawn.   Unless the gunner had 20/20 vision and the tank was completely still, considerable ranging errors in the neighborhood of 100 or so meters was the norm, and as the distance from the target increased, the accuracy of the measurement decreased exponentially, deteriorating drastically past 2000 m. As such, it is more difficult hitting targets with lower velocity ammunition like HE-Frag and HEAT shells, and even harder for moving targets. However, the inclusion of near-hypersonic APFSDS ammunition in the T-62's loadout greatly helped counterbalance this issue, making it markedly easier for the gunner to hit both stationary and moving tank-type targets, while most targets requiring HE-Frag shells like machine gun nests and pillboxes and other fortifications would be stationary anyway, thus making pinpoint accuracy much less of a priority. Even so, on account of the extremely high speed of the APFSDS rounds fired from the 2A20 gun, the sight can be battlesighted at a very generous 1000 m, allowing the gunner to confidently hit a tank of NATO-type dimensions at any distance between 200 to 1600 m by aiming at center mass without needing to ascertain the range beforehand.     However, one inescapable flaw of the TSh2B-41U was that it lacked independent vertical stabilization, being directly mechanically linked to the 2A20 cannon, forcing it to elevate with it when the loading procedure is underway. This causes the gunner to (very annoyingly) lose sight of anything he is aiming at at the moment, making the commander's the only pair of eyes to observe the 'splash' and give corrections or search for new targets. This led to the development of the independently stabilized TSh2B-41U.

I liked your drunken Russian gimmick better.

In my defense, I was pretty drunk at that point.

The T1 Heavy is fast becoming one of my top 3 favorite tanks of all time. One of the reasons I like it so much is that it's so poorly regarded by the playerbase. This not only means I am routinely underestimated by other tanks (like a Marder 38T in a battle a few minutes ago that decided he could stand and fight me instead of running away like he should have), but it also provides me unique opportunities to troll enemy players. First, that battle with the Marder 38T:




 
Now, you will understand why I call the T1 CONANTANK:



 
Enemies successfully crushed, and driven before me; lamentations of the women were heard (replay here):




 
Note that these two games were played back-to-back. Really, the WoT playerbase regards the T1 as utter garbage, which makes for one of the most fun tanking experiences there is. The trolling potential of this tank is higher than probably any other in the game that I play, right now.

This is what I have so far.  Keep in mind this is the first draft, and I'm still working on the engines section. 
 
The Sherman of the future:  Advanced Sherman updates that almost made it into production.
 
The US Army was always looking for ways to improve the basic Sherman tank. Some of these didn’t pan out because they just were not that much better than the basic M4, or the US Army had no interest, or the war ended production of the Sherman before an improvement could be fully developed, or in some cases, just added to the production lines.  These ranged from whole new tanks based on the M4, like the T14, or in some ways like with the T1/M6, to improved guns, engines/transmissions to aiming devices.
Let’s start with Armor:  Add on Kits, they got developed, but were never used.
 
Bolt on Armor kits: CDA was asked to develop a set of bolt on armor for the Sherman, there are pictures of wooden mockups, but this program was canceled before the second gen large hatch hulls started production. At this point the best source for info on this program is R.P. Hunnicutt’s Sherman. He does not note why it was cancelled. It seems like with the success of the M4A3E2 Jumbo, and it’s only marginal effect on the reliability of the automotive components of the Sherman, this would have been a hit with the troops.
 
There was another program to improve the armor of the early differential covers. Both the early three part bolt together designs, and the early one piece cast designs, were found to have areas more vulnerable to penetration than the rest of the differential cover. They came up with add on armor for each type. After testing these kits were found to be good enough to make the differentials the best protected front area of the tank after installation. The Army approved them, but no evidence of any being used has been found. The final production cast differential cover was improved and would not have needed these kits. That may have been the reason the kits didn’t get used, since they could just use the ultimate production casting when doing rebuilds.
 
Plastic Armor and Spikes: When the threat of AT sticks like the panzerfaust become more prominent, an add-on armor kit made from called the HCR2 plastic armor kit was developed. It was made from a mixture of quartz gravel and a mastic compound made from wood flour and asphalt. It was held on by cables, and could be jettisoned with ease. The armor from this kit protected the Shermans turret well, but sponson penetrations could still happen. It also offered a little extra ballistic protection. It also did not cover the front of the hull or turret.
 
Another attempt to defeat shaped charged weapons involved installing spikes in lengths varying from 7 to 8 inches all over the armor. The idea behind this was to break up a heat warhead before it could detonate properly.  Testing on this continued after the war.
Now let’s talk about improving the tanks less passive defenses:  Improved Machine Guns and Flame Projectors!
 
The vulnerability of the Sherman, like any other tank, to close infantry assault was a problem the U.S. Army was always looking to solve.  This is why the Sherman prototype retained the .30 caliber mini turret on the commander’s hatch. This was a hard to use and unpopular cupola, that did not make it onto any production Shermans, but that wasn’t for lack of trying on the US Army’s part.
 
Improved ball mount with sight: The first thing we will cover is the improved ball mount for the co-driver/BOG. What they did was come up with linkage at connected the bow mounted .30 caliber machine gun to the gunners periscope. The co driver’s periscope would have a telescopic sight much like in the gunners periscope. The linkage and sight allowed much more accurate use of the bow mounted machine gun. Only the cessation of production on the Sherman stopped this one. It would have been useful if we had to invade Japan.
 
M3 grease gun adapter: Another interesting defensive device they came up with was a special adapter for the M3 grease gun that allowed the gun to be hooked up to a curved barrel extension fitted to a standard rotating periscope mount. Then a special periscope with sight could be installed and the M3 fired and aimed from inside the tank. It was found to be accurate enough to engage targets within 33 yards of the tank. I suspect this one didn’t make it into production because it seems like more trouble tank it would be worth, but it is still an interesting idea.
 
Co-ax M2 and M1919: A more conventional way was the installation of a M2 .50 caliber Machine gun, alongside the .30 caliber M1919 machine gun, mounted coaxially with the main gun. This would have worked out better if one of the advanced guns mounts using a concentric recoil system had made it into production. I’ll cover these mounts later in this post.
 
The T121 twin machine gun mount: This mount replaced the all-around vision cupola on the commander’s station with this rather large twin machine gun mount. The mount could take the M2 or M1919. This was a remote power turret and could be operated without being exposed. This mount missed the war, and development continued on it post war. I can’t find any pictures online though. It was very tall, almost as tall as the Sherman turret by itself.
 
Fragmentation grenade mounts, mines and pipe bombs: The Army decided to try mounting these to tanks and test how they would work to combat close in enemy infantry as a kind of last resort weapon. This did not work very well and only the grenades were found to have an effective fragmentation effect. They all risked damage to the tank so they were dropped. Shielding to protect the tank made them even less effective.  None of these worked as well as having close infantry support, and the idea was dropped.
 
The Scorpion/Skink anti-personnel flame projectors: This might have seen use if the war had gone on. This is just the type of thing to use on Japanese suicide troops if they have scared or killed off all your close infantry support. This system had four self-contained, phosphor based, flame projectors mounted at each corner of the tank. Each one could let off 20 to 30 bursts of the flaming phosphorus in a fan from each device, giving great coverage all around the tank. They could be fired off individually or all at once from inside the tank.   
 
 
Now let’s talk about to vehicles that almost made it to production: The M4 Improved and T14.
 
The M4 Improved or the idea behind an improved M4 started just about as the time the first production Shermans were rolling off the line. The proposed new tank design that came along was very interesting but not deemed enough of an improvement to change up the production lines.
Since the tank didn’t make it into production, you would think it would be hard to have an idea what one would have looked like. Normally that would be the case, but the game World of Tanks has added the M4 Improved as a premium tank, and they did a beautiful HD model for it.
The proposed M4 I would have used the same M3 75mm gun, with a welded turret, and an improved hull with thicker, sloped armor. It also used a modified version of the M6 heavy tanks suspension, a complicated precursor to the HVSS suspension installed on late production Shermans. It would have used the 625 horse power Wright G200 motor. Considering the US Army would have just been getting their hands on their first Soviet T-34, I think you can see the influence the T-34 had on the M4 Improved. The wide tracks and extra slope in the side armor being the most prominent.
Even though the improved Sherman had some big flaws, like putting the gas tanks under the turret floor, many of the improvements would be refined and make their way into the later improved Shermans. The suspension is clearly the father of the HVSS suspension, and the tracks probably showed the advantages of center guided tracks over end guided, at least on suspension that wide.
The T14 Heavy tank: They even made a few of these things.
On March 30th 1942 representatives from Chief or Ordnance, Aberdeen Proving Ground and the British Tank mission had a conference to discuss tank stuff.  The need for an assault tank was established at this conference, pushed for by the British. The US Army had no interest in an assault tank at that time. It was decided the US and British would each produce a pair of pilot tanks, and then the better of the two would be put into limited production.  The Brits would go on to produce their assault tank on the Cruiser VIII, and the US would use the M4 as the basis for theirs.
By Juned they had finished the requirements, design, and wooden mock up, and American Locomotive Company was contracted to build two real tanks. Pilot 1 was finished in July of 43, and the second one was done a month later.  The pilot tanks used nearly the same suspension that was proposed for the M4 improved the horizontal volute spring suspension out of the M6, and the same M3 75mm gun the standard M4 carried.  It also carried an M2 .50 caliber machine gun in the bow, and a 1919 coax with 75mm gun. It would have also had either a M1919 or M2 for AA use mounted on the commander’s hatch.
The Tank used a Ford GAZ V8, an slightly uprated GAA. Other than the motor, and a final drive gear ratio change, the automotive components were standard Sherman fare.  The tank came in at 47 tons, and had a pretty good armor. The Armor was much better than the standard Sherman, but not as good as the later Jumbo, and there was really nothing the US Army found interesting about the tank. The design was supposed to have the provision to take bigger guns, and it had the same 69 in turret ring as the Sherman, but it also had problems.
It was a dog, the GAZ had trouble moving the 47 tons around. The track system was not very good at this point. Tracks were easily thrown in testing, the tanks armored skirts made getting the tracks back on a pain. Even with the wide tracks it wasn’t very mobile. It did have a scope for the BOG to aim his gun with, so it had that handy feature going for it.
Pilot one was shipped off to Fort Knox for further testing, and pilot 2 was sent to England. It is still there, and it seems to be in ok condition. It’s at the Royal Armored Corps Tank Museum at Bovington Camp in Dorset. None ever saw any kind of combat, and the program was canceled in 1944 after no one showed any interest in the tank.
Practically space age improvements that almost made it: Sherman advanced gear, multi axis stabilizers, better gun recoil systems, better trannys and motors. Concentric recoil systems: The Army had seen how good a concentric recoil system was from the one used on the M24 Chaffee.  Late in the war they had Rock Island Arsenal working on a similar mount for the 76mm M1A2 gun. A normal tank gun recoil system has a pair of cylinders on both sides of the gun to absorb the recoil energy of the gun. These systems are pretty bulky.  A concentric system uses one larger hollow cylinder and the gun is mounted inside it, this works better and saves space, it was named the combination mount T103.  There wasn’t much of an advantage in combat, but it would have allowed more room in the turret for other gear and ammo. It also would have left room for the M2. 50 Caliber machine gun being mounted along with the regular co-ax  gun.   This system was being tested and was doing well, when the war ended, ending any chance of seeing the mount on new production Sherman tanks.
 
The rigid gun mount: Yeah, just what it sounds like, the tank is the recoil system.
The rigid gun mount: A rigid system has a lot of advantages; it takes up way less room in the turret. The gun doesn’t retract into the crew space on firing making it safer, and you don’t need any kind of recoil guard. A rigid system is probably lighter too, but the mount has to be pretty beefy to handle the loads.  They designed the gun mount to take both the M3 75, and M1A2 76 guns, and it was tested with both.
The gun was mounted in a lightweight turret, and then onto an M10 hull. Test firing showed the stabilizer and turret race bearing took no damage, but the turret hold down bolts had stretched, and some threads were stripped.  Larger stronger bolts would solve that problem, and when installed in the heavier Sherman turret, would absorb the recoil better than the light weight turret it was tested on.
Can we all guess what killed this one off? Yep, the end of the war, boy, if the Japanese had held out, they would have been real sorry.
The two axis stabilizer: Two axis stabilizers almost made it in.
The Army had seen through battle experience crews trained in the use of the Shermans stabilizer had a advantage over the ones who didn’t. Unfortunately during WWII it was all to common to find units who were not in the systems use. So a very advanced system, something the Germans could not match during WWII, often went unused because of poor training.
The late production stabilizer in Shermans was simplified and easier to use. Experiments at Fort Knox found there was some backlash in the system, and they solved it at first with weights, and then later with a minor modification on how the stabilizer worked.
Once the elevation stabilizer was improved, the Army started to look into and azimuth stabilizer.  International Business machine had a design and it was tested at Aberdeen in late 43. At first the design did not work well, but after a series of modifications, they got the system working well enough to test. At the same time Ordnance came up with their own design, using off the shelf components, and it was ready for testing around the same time.
During the testing they used M4A3 75 tanks, a standard tank, and then one with each IBM and ordnance systems. The crews would be rotated through all three tanks to eliminate crew experience in one tank affecting the results. The IBM system worked better than the Ordnance system, but the ordnance system was much easier to adapt to the Sherman already in the field.
If you sensed a theme here, then you know what’s coming, the war ended before any of these two axis systems could see combat use. The Ordnance system was fitted to a 76mm Sherman and testing of the system continued after the war, comparing it to the Vickers system the Brits came up with. The Ordanance system needed to be beefed up and made more resistant to vibration, and what was learned here was probably passed on to later designs like the M26.
Better Motors: Motors that never had a chance or almost made it
 
Chrysler’s A65: This was a huge V12 that Chrysler designed on their own dime. It was 1568 cubic inches, was gas powered and made 650 gross horsepower, and 580 net HP, and was water cooled. A test installation was done to an M4A4, and they had to lengthen the hull another 9 an ½ inches to fit the mammoth motor. The tank only weighed around 500 pounds more with the motor in. The tank was a real hot rod, and climbed hills better and out accelerated the standard M4A4. Even after dropping the final drive gear ratio from 3:53:1 to 3:05:1, and it still out climbed and accelerated the standard M4A4 and even the M4A3.
After 400 miles of testing, the engine was pulled and examined and found to be in perfect running order.  The project closed with the Army recommending further study on engines in this power range. 

Went though my school's virtual library to see if it had anything interesting. It did. It has a the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, which had an article in 2012 by a dude named Gary Dickerson on Soviet Tank Repair Rates in WWII. 
 
Data is mostly based off of Soviet records after 1942. 
 
70% of Soviet Tank losses ended up being repairable with 30% of losses being due to non-battle related reasons. I noticed he used Krivosheev as a source of total losses, who would have guessed? 
 
15-20 days into an operation would result with nearly 80% of the original strength being losses, but not irrecoverable losses.  
 
Here are some graphs and charts.

All animea is bad, just some animea makes you wish that it was done in an art style that isn't hot garbage