Domus Acipenseris

I detail how superior the Su-25's gun is in this article: https://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2017/09/15/russias-10-warthog-su-25-rook-attack-jet-gun/

TIL that the Italian's Pugliese torpedo defense system was actually not that bad. The flooding issue that comes up when criticizing this system is due to it's own passive counter flooding mechanism. Pugliese incorporated several channels that ran through the triple bottom of the Littorio's that, when one side is struck and flooded, would transfer water towards the other side automatically, meaning the ship would roll less and would (hopefully) require less attention from the crew and could continue fighting. Counter flooding was normally done on all battleships after torpedo damage, to balance out the weight of the water in those compartments. Where the Pugliese (and all torpedo defense of that time) had problems is that torpedoes with magnetic fuses that ran just below the ship could do significant damage, as seen in Taranto 1940. 
 
further reading here: The Littorio Class - Google Books

Strategic ASW and Naval Strategy
 
http://kashti.ir/files/ENBOOKS/pdf. Strattegic antisubmarine warfare & naval strategy.pdf
 
Almost 40 years old but very interesting.  Appendixes have much good info.
 
Why was the Trident II missile given silo busting accuracy?  The author speculates that increasing the threat to Soviet land based missiles would force the USSR to use more naval assets to protest SSBNs, preventing these assets from being used to interdict NATO SLOCs.
 
Speculation about the size of the Typhoon class.  Elsewhere I have read that they carried 16 SLBMs and 4 satellite launchers, 2 commo, 2 surveillance.  They would stay underwater for a year, put the satellites up, send surveillance data and find any rebuilding activity in previously nuked countries.  They would then nuke it bouncing whatever was being rebuilt on the rubble.
 
This, and some other stuff I've read make it clear why the Seawolf class was limited to 3 vessels.  The Seawolf's major sensor innovation, a large sonar array, would have its range cut by Soviet sub quieting and would therefore not be able to search for subs very much faster.  Elsewhere I read that the Virginia was better at everything except ASW than the Seawolf.  As Virginia was improved further it caught up to Seawolf in ASW as well.  Also, the swim out torpedo tubes on the Seawolf would work for electric torpedoes but not so well for thermal torpedoes with toxic exhaust like the MK-48.  50 torpedo capacity would mostly mean more torpedoes in Davy Jones locker in a real war.  Larger sub to carry 50 torpedoes meany higher cost or lower performance for the other capabilities.
 
Exercises showed that USN subs had a 3:1 advantage over Soviet subs in getting off the first shot.  Assuming all torpedoes hit meant a 3:1 kill ratio.  If torpedoes miss, then the Soviets would be in much better shape given higher sub speeds, higher firepower, and better battle damage resistance.  All those advantages were magnified in shallow water and under ice, exactly where the US would need to go to hunt Soviet SSBNs.
 
Had the Cold War continued quiet Soviet subs would have made it too difficult for the US to hunt Soviet SSBNs and forced the US to find another way to protect SLOCs besides forcing the USSR to hold back its entire navy to protect SSBN bastions.
 
Author assumes Soviet SSBNs could be tracked but US SSBNs could not be tracked.
 
Today there is some controversy over whether Chinese SSBNs should be tracked in peacetime and threatened in war.  Apparently they can be tracked.
 
https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/10/24/u.s.-anti-submarine-warfare-and-its-impact-pub-77495
 
 

Yeah, I meant SeaRAM. Bloody RIM/RAM missiles confusing me! And yeah the Koreans have their own Burkes too.
 
One thing I haven't covered yet with regards to the smaller ships is the effect of drones to the equation. There is a school of thought that posits the creation of a drone-carrying ship that can replace the multi-role combatant.
 
Thing is I don't think the small ships can really carry enough to be super-effective against other top-tier navies; especially since the Russians and Ukrainians are now showing how you can EM and hard-kill each other's drones with sufficiently advanced tech. So my sense is that drones will be mainly complementing, and perhaps eventually replacing, helicopters. Figure that hangars meant for one helicopter can now carry three or four drones instead; which is very useful against pirates with no real EM or AA capability. Against a serious enemy, you'll need a sufficiently large drone wing to deal with attrition and that means something like the 20,000 ton Japanese "destroyers".
 
Finally, and this is utter naval heresy, I still think there's a niche for a 4,000-5,000 ton "patrol" ship for 3rd World Navies; which would be much better and more useful than the multi-role frigates everyone is buying now.
 
The ship will have small but efficient engines - sacrificing speed down to 20 knots if necessary. They will have a grand total of one deck gun as armament, and have no sonar system and only navigational radars. However they will try to fit as many helicopters (and later drones) as possible in the largest hangar possible - along with the necessary C&C space to direct the air wing - with the idea being this ship will specialize in being the airborne eyes and ears of smaller 1,000-ton craft whose job is primarily S&R or hunting smugglers and pirates. An enlarged LCS could have been this ship, but some idiot wanted that 40 knot ZOOM ZOOM speed. 

Here is a video series about the Soviet Homeland air defense systems.
The first two episodes were released on Binkov's Battleground channel, this is the 3rd.
(Links are in the video description).
 
There isn't any air defense topic so I opened here.
I guess air defense is aviation related.
 
The series will include the following systems.
 
SA-1 / S-25 Berkut (done)
SA-2A,B,F / Sa-75 Dvina,
SA-2C + SA-2E / S-75 Desna + S-75M Volkhov (done)
SA-3 / S-125 Neva
SA-5 / S-200 Angara, Vega, Dubna
SA-10A&B, SA-20, SA-21 /S-300PT&PS, S-300PMU1/2, S-400
S-350
 
Following these can come the IADS equipment (Vektor, Senhez, etc) and US SAMs, Nike + BOMARC, HAWK and PATRIOT.
 
The whole army air defense of the USSR + WPAC is a different topic which also will be presented.
 
 
 

Detailed explanation of the Cold War A-10A and the Avenger.
95% Cold War related content 5% post Cold War COIN.
 
 

I too have noticed this trend
 
 

I've noticed a lot of ballistics FEA simulations popping up on Youtube lately.  A result of the ever-dropping price of number-crunching power?  Who knows.

I cannot, of course, vouch for the accuracy of these simulations.  They sure are pretty to look at though.
 
 
 
 
 
 

Tungsten vs DU:  https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/25367911.pdf
 
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA395913.pdf

Basic History
State of PVO before MiG-25

During the middle part of the 1950s, the PVO (Soviet air defense forces) were poorly equipped to deal with future threats. The majority of its interceptors consisted of aircraft such as the MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, and Yak-25. These aircraft possessed sufficient performance to take on American bombers such as the B-29 and B-50, and were at least marginally capable of intercepting jets like the B-47 or B-52. However, they were horribly inadequate against coming bombers, such as the B-58 Hustler (which first flew in 1956).

The arrival of Mach 2 capable interceptors such as the Su-9, and later the MiG-21 in the latter portion of the 1950s evened the playing field somewhat. However, these interceptors suffered from severe deficiencies. The Su-9 (and to a lesser extent the MiG-21) had a cripplingly short range, a major shortcoming when defending a country as large as the Soviet Union. The Yak-27, a development of the Yak-25, had better range than either of the deltas, but was inferior in terms of speed and altitude. In addition to various performance issues, the PVO’s interceptors were also handicapped by poor armaments. The Kaliningrad K-5 (NATO AA-1) radar guided missile was equipped by most PVO interceptors following its introduction in 1955. Though decent for its time, it was limited by its beam riding guidance and short range. The infrared guided K-13 (AA-2) was introduced in 1960 after being hurried copied from a captured AIM-9B. Like the K-5, the K-13 suffered from poor range, and was also limited to being fired at the rear of a target.

These systems would clearly not be sufficient to reliably destroy the B-58, let alone the Mach 3 capable XB-70 (which began development in the late 1950s). The introduction of surface to air missiles such as the S-25 and S-75 had some promise (as demonstrated by the destruction of a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft by an S-75 on May 1 1960 at over 18,000 meters). However, these missiles required large fixed launch sites, leaving them incapable of covering large swaths of territory. In an environment where a single bomber was capable of destroying a whole city, the situation was clearly unacceptable. It was clear that a new interceptor was needed to equip the PVO.

Numerous solutions were tried. A modified variant of the MiG-19, the MiG-19SU was tested. This aircraft was fitted with liquid rocket engines in addition to the two RD-9s, giving (briefly) improved speed and altitude capability. This allowed flights to over 20,000 meters , however, the aircraft suffered severe controllability issues. In any case, it was clearly a temporarily solution. Another program was the development of various ‘heavy interceptors’, capable of engaging NATO bombers at extreme range, well away from populated areas or strategic targets. These included the abortive La-250, and more successful Tu-128 (developed from the Tu-98 bomber prototype). Though the Tu-128 entered service (indeed, it continued on into the early 1990s), it did not arrive until the middle of the 1960s. Even then, it was a large and ponderous aircraft, capable only of transonic speeds and completely lacking maneuverability.  It could not serve as the PVO’s primary interceptor.

An effort with more potential was the Sukhoi T-37. This aircraft was broadly similar in planform to the Su-9 (being a tailed delta) but was much larger. Powered by an R-15-300 engine, it was planned to reach speeds near 3,000 km/h at altitudes approaching 25,000 meters. Interestingly, it was also to have been fitted with equipment enabling it to be flown automatically under ground control (the US had the SemiAutomatic Ground Environment, a similar system capable of directing F-106s). However, it was plagued by numerous issues, and was scrapped in 1960 before it ever flew.

Requirements
The requirements for the MiG-25 were greatly determined by its potential adversaries. The main threat was the B-58 Hustler, capable of Mach 2 at altitudes approaching 18,000 meters. In 1960, the Soviets became aware of yet another threat; a Mach 3 successor to the U-2 was under development (this was the A-12/SR-71, though the Soviets did not know this initially).  As a result, it was decided that the new interceptor should be capable of flight at up to Mach 3, and at altitudes in excess of 20,000 meters.

Coincidentally, the VVS (Soviet Air Force, separate from air defense forces) was looking for a new high speed reconnaissance aircraft during the late 1950s. At the time, most of the VVS reconnaissance force consisted of variants of the Il-28 or Yak-25. The survivability of these aircraft against new NATO fighters such as the F-104 or Lightning was marginal at best. The Yak-25RV was in development, and promised comparable performance to the U-2 (it did not fully deliver), but this was an incremental step at best. A wholly new aircraft with exceptional performance was needed. By 1960, it was realized that the new recon aircraft had broadly similar requirements to the new PVO interceptor program (by then in development for over a year), so the programs were merged. The ability to carry photorecon equipment was added as a requirement to the interceptor program.

Development
The Ye-150/152 can be considered the direct ancestor of the MiG-25. Developed in the late 1950s and first flying in 1960, the Ye-150 was broadly similar in appearance to the MiG-21, but was significantly larger and was capable of reaching much higher speeds. The Ye-152 was a further development; it was fitted with R-15-300 engines, the same R-15s which would be fitted to the MiG-25. Like the Ye-150, it represented a massive performance leap over the MiG-21, but it was very much a testbed. The R-15s were supremely unreliable (early models had an average engine lifetime of roughly 20 hours), and the weapons system was tempermental. There was also the Ye-152A, which was fitted with two R-11 turbojets (the same engine as the MiG-21) instead of a single R-15. Though these aircraft did not enter production, they provided the Mikoyan-Gurevich design bureau with valuable data on high speed flight and the R-15 engine.

There is some uncertainty about the initial genesis of the MiG-25 program. There are rumors that Mikoyan instructed chief designed Seletisky to develop an interceptor similar to the North American A-5 Vigilante (which had first flow in late 1958) powered by two R-15-300s. Other sources state that work began before the first flight of the A-5. While there are obvious similarities in layout between the A-5 and MiG-25, there are also massive differences. At most, the MiG-25 was somewhat inspired by the A-5, and is very much not a ‘clone’ or reverse engineered copy. (Later proposed Vigilante derivatives such as the NR-349 or rumored J58 powered version would have been much more analogous to the MiG-25).

The new aircraft was assigned the designation Ye-155 by Mikoyan (the prefix Ye for yedinitsa denoting a prototype or testbed aircraft). It was decided very early to use the R-15-300 engine. However, there remained uncertainty as to the layout of the engines. Though a conventional side by side layout was ultimately chosen, a vertically stacked layout (such as on the English Electric Lightning) was also considered, as was a staggered engine arrangement (as on the I-320 prototype). Unlike previous Mikoyan-Gurevich designs, it was decided not to utilize a nose mounted intake, but instead place the intakes under the wings. This allowed for a smaller fuselage (in both length and cross section). The underwing intake placement worked well with the shoulder mounted wing placement, which was needed to allow for the carriage of very large AAMs. This wing layout also allowed the wings to be constructed in one piece, simplifying constructing and improving structural rigidity.

 

Numerous planforms were proposed for the wing before the design of the prototype was finalized. At one point variable geometry designs were considered (this would have significantly predated the introduction of the Su-17, though variable sweep designs had been studied at least since 1945). The variable sweep design was seriously considered enough that a model of a recon MiG-25 with variable geometry was made, it somewhat resembles an F-14. One of the benefits of the variable geometry design would have been improved takeoff and landing performance, however, it was decided that this was not worth the added complexity and weight associated with such a design. Following numerous wind tunnel tests, a trapezoidal wing of low aspect ratio was chosen.

 

As with many Soviet designs in the 1950s and 1960s, lift jets were considered for use to improve takeoff and landing distance. The proposed STOL design would have used two small RD36-35 lift engines, mounted in a slightly staggered arrangement in the fuselage, with intakes along the back of the aircraft. While the lift jets would likely have improved takeoff and landing distances greatly, they also decreased the internal volume available for fuel. This was a serious drawback, especially for the reconnaissance version. As a result, the lift jets were discarded, with the STOL design not progressing beyond the model stage.

 

As the MiG-25’s design grew closer to being finalized, materials selection became a serious issue. The leading edges of the wings, inlets, and nose of the aircraft would experience extremely high temperatures at Mach 3, well above the melting point of conventional aluminum alloys commonly used in aircraft construction. Alternative materials had to be found, and many were considered. At first, titanium seemed a logical choice. It has excellent thermal properties, is quite strong for its weight, and the Soviet Union possessed large reserves of the material. However, the Soviet aircraft industry had little experience working with titanium, which was notoriously temperamental (for instance, when manufacturing the SR-71, Lockheed engineers were forced to use special tools, as normal tools contained cadmium, which made the titanium brittle). In particular, the automated welding methods commonly used in Soviet aircraft manufacturing plants would not be suitable for titanium. As a result, it was decided to use steel alloys for the majority of the MiG-25s structure (titanium was used in some areas, but at much lower quantities). Initially, there were some doubts as to whether certain components (such as the integrated fuel tanks) could be made strong enough without seriously increasing weight, or absorbing the cyclical flight loads. Tests showed that this was not the case, and the MiG-25 ended up being built using large quantities. In addition to the issues with materials selection for the aircraft structure, the thermal loads associated with high speed flight caused trouble in other areas. Normal lubricants and hydraulic fluid would break down at the temperatures the MiG-25 would experience, and normal canopy glass would melt. In many ways, this mirrors the problems faced by the Skunk Works team designing the A-12 at around the same time.

 

Throughout 1962 and 1963, the design of the MiG-25 was further refined. In 1963, construction began on the first prototype, Ye-155R1. Its completion took most of the year, and it was not rolled out from the Zenit Machinery Works (the common name for the MiG bureau’s experimental aircraft factory) until December. Despite this, Ye-155R-1, a prototype of the reconnaissance variant, was missing much of its operational equipment. Still, it had more than enough to validate the basic flight characteristics of the airframe.

 

In addition to lacking various pieces of equipment, Ye-155R-1 differed from production MiG-25s in several ways. For one, the aircraft had a pair of 600 liter fuel tanks mounted at the wingtips. These both increased fuel capacity, and prevented flutter. Ventral fins were attached to the fuel tanks, to improve lateral stability at high speeds. Both of these features would be absent from production MiG-25s. Ye-155R-1 also had provisions for the fitment of canards to the sides of the forward portion of the air intakes; these would have been used for pitch control at high Mach numbers, but they were never installed.

 

The first prototype suffered from numerous issues. Among the most serious of these was roll control issues in the transonic regime, in some cases severe enough to render the aircraft uncontrollable. The wingtip fuel tanks caused vibration as fuel was depleted and sloshed about. The intakes were inefficient at high Mach numbers, and the aircraft’s static margin decreased as well. Finally, Ye-155R-1 was overweight, causing its range to fall short of the target.

 

The second prototype, Ye-155R-2, was also a prototype of the recon MiG-25. This aircraft was broadly similar to the previous prototype, though it did incorporate some refinements. There was one immediately obvious difference; the wingtip fuel tanks were deleted. This would be the last prototype built at the Zenit plant; the factory was tasked with producing the first MiG-23 prototypes, and had no more room for further Ye-155s. As a result, it was decided to build prototypes from Ye-155R-3 onward at Mikoyan’s Gorkii plant, the same as would produce the production aircraft. This resulted in a delay in producing Ye-155R-3 as the factory was retooled, but it would ultimately allow production to commence quicker. Ye-155R-3 was a milestone in and of itself; it was fitted with a full suite of photorecon equipment, and would be used for testing various camera arrangements (among other things).

Belenko Defection
Later Variants
Post-Soviet service
Variants
Prototypes
Ye-155 models

Operational
MiG-25P/PD/PDS
Export MiG-25P

MiG-25RB
MiG-25R
MiG-25BM
MiG-25PU

Other
Ye-266M
Ye-155MP
Buran testbeds / training aircraft
Various other concepts and variants


Production
In Red Air Force Service
Other Operators
Combat Performance
Egypt vs. Israel
Iraq
MiG-25 vs. SR-71

Structure
Materials

Engines
 

Electronics
Radar
Early versions vs. Later

Recon variants - cameras

Armaments
Air to Air
MiG-25P
MiG-25PD

Ground
MiG-25RB
MiG-25BM


Other Systems of Note
Citations
http://www.kamov.net/russian-aircraft/mig-19su/
http://www.kamov.net/russian-aircraft/sukhoi-t-37/
MiG-25 'Foxbat', MiG-31 'Foxhound': Russia's defensive front line By: Gordon, Yefim. Aerofax 1997
Skunk Works: a personal memoir of my years at Lockheed By: Rich, Ben R., and Leo Janos. Little, Brown 1994

Looks like model is finished. Keep in mind that part of it is most likely just a guesswork.
https://twitter.com/xmszeon
 

 
 

Xmszeon nearly finished his Object 477 model:

 
 

Comparison of mock ups/models with Xmszeon made 3D model:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Xmszeon made renders of finished 477 3D model.

 
 

Polish numerical simulations for the new APFSDS round against stacked RHA plates and complex targets:

1. stacked RHA
2 - 4. spaced armor arrays
5. spaced steel plates with rubber interlayers (no empty space)
6. ceramic tiles and RHA
 

Targets 4 and 6 cannot be penetrated, but the rest can be defeated.
 
 

It makes no sense to compare MiG-23 with MiG-25. Those are planes of different category used for different tasks. MiG-23 replaced MiG-21 and it was much better than MiG-21 in everything with the exception of the initial MiG-23S batch with RP-22 radar and armamament from MiG-21 (and the cost) and the Arabic "monkey" export model MiG-23MS which had the RP-21 radar and armament from MiG-21. Also the other comparisons are strange... 
 
GSh-23L has muzzle velocity 715 m/s and it's much more interesting feature is its operating principle since it is one of the only two operationally used Gast-principle guns (where recoil of one barrel operates the other and gives the gun rather extreme rate of fire with a low gun weight). AFAIK only Soviet GSh-23L and GSh-30-2 work on this principle of all serially produced guns ever (although the idea comes back to WW1 Germany). When you write about cannon the MiG-27K (used by USSR and India only) with 6-barrel 30 mm is the most interesting variant IMHO because while its GSh-6-30 gun has somewhat lesser muzzle energy than GAU-8/a it weights half, has higher rate of fire and since it is gas-operated it is more efficient in short bursts. On the other hand the MiG-27 clearly wasn't the right airframe for the gun...  

R-35-300 diagrams


 
 
We had MiG-23 too (MF, ML, BN) and they were good although rather difficult to fly and maintain. They were also quite prone to bird strikes compared to other planes we had. We had a lot of accidents with them in early 90' but those were caused mainly by general lack of discipline and spares in the rather chaotic times after the fall of the iron courtain. 
 
Some points about ML from our ex-pilots
- they mostly liked it
- they said it was very difficult to fly straight and to land if automatic flight support systems failed but manageable
- automatic landing approach up to several meters upon the runway
- they trained to use in-flight parashute release to shorten the already short landing run
- two seater had shifted center of gravity and the old, weak and problematic R-27 engine and was a bitch to fly in dogfight (most of our two-seaters were destroyed in dogfight training)
- the radar was well liked, it had also look-down/shoot down capability 
- if I unerstood right they usually trained to attack the NATO planes from bellow and from the side using ground control for ideal approach (take it with a lot of salt from my side)
 
Fun fact one. They trained to approach SR-71 flying routinely like a clock at some 15 km from Czechoslovak border. The Blackbird was tracked by common DDR-Czechoslovak air control and MiG-23 started from České Budějovice, climbed to 10000 meters, accelerated to M1,8 and climbed on a parabolic curve to have the approaching Blackbird close to 12 o'lock at some 5-6000 meters higher with the approach speed of around M4,8. At this point there was a a few seconds window where it was possible to lock the radar and fire R-23, it was always only an excercise and there was never any intention to actually shoot it down but allegedly at least once the Blackbird was shortly locked by a trigger-happy pilot. The probabiliy of successful interception like that was very low and it was all about perfect timing from the ground control (allegedly the probability of successful interception was around 30% when trained with Soviet MiG-25, i.e. lower with SR-71). They say they used both automatic guidance via LASUR datalink and human ground controler command. In this scenario the armament was one R-23R and one R-23T. 
 
Fun fact two, the first Czechoslovak pilot to fly solo MiG-23 (BN ground attack variant in 1977) was pplk. Šrámek (lieutenant colonel), a pilot who in 1953 piloting a MiG-15 shot down US F-84E of Korean-veteran G. A. Brown in a two-on-two encounter which started near Pilsen, Czechoslovakia but ended over Western Germany. 
 
 
 

The Breguet Range Equation looks like a distant cousin of the Tsiolkovsky Rocket Equation.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bu0wPgZVkyw
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=38MnOxQokM4
 
Millennium7* has some videos on the F-35.  If you have not seen his channel yet, it is excellent.  He is an aero engineer and goes into actual depth with facts and stuff.  He's like the anti-Blacktail anti-Matsimus YT channel.
 
 

Another one from F35 pilot, Hasard Lee:
 
 

One of the frustrations of being a child and reading lots and lots of books on combat aircraft was that there would be impressive-sounding technical terms bandied about, but no explanations.  Or if there were explanations I didn't understand them because I was a child.
 
One of the terms that got thrown around a lot was "relaxed stability" or "artificial stability" or even "instability," and this was given as one of the reasons for the F-16's superiority.  Naturally, an explanation of what on earth this was was not forthcoming, but it had something to do with making the F-16 more maneuverable.
 
This is partially true, but relaxed stability doesn't just make a plane more maneuverable.  It makes a plane better in general.
 
Why is this so?  Let's look at a schematic of a typical aircraft:
 

 
There are two points of interest here; the center of lift (CL) and center of gravity (CG).  The CL is the net point through which all aerodynamic forces acting on the aircraft pass.  Various things can cause the CL to shift around in flight, such as the wing stalling or the transition to supersonic flight, but we'll ignore that for now.
 
The CG is the net center of mass of the aircraft.  The downward force of the weight of the aircraft will act through this point, and the aircraft will rotate around this point.
 
The reason that this configuration is stable is that the amount of lift a wing generates is a function of its angle of attack (AOA, or alpha).  AOA is the angle of the moving air relative to the wing.  If the wing is more inclined relative to the air, it generates more lift up until it starts to stall.  The relationship looks like this:
 

Obviously this depends on the exact shape of the wing and the airspeed, but you get the idea.  The lift increases as alpha goes up, but falls off after the wing stalls.
 
This means that in a conventionally stable aircraft in level flight, anything that causes the nose to pitch up will cause the amount of lift to increase, but because the CL is behind the CG, this increased lift will cause a torque on the aircraft that will rotate the nose back down again.  Thus, any disturbances in pitch are self-correcting.  This is important because it means that a human being can fly the aircraft.  If random disturbances were substantially self-magnifying, the plane would begin to tumble through the air.
 
There's a bit of a problem though.  Because the CL is behind the CG, the plane has a tendency to rotate downwards.  So, to keep the plane level the tail has to apply a torque to trim out this tendency to rotate.  The torque that the tail is applying is pushing downward, which means that it's cancelling out part of the lift!  Keeping the tail deflected also increases drag.
 
These problems would go away if the arrangement were reversed, with the CG behind the CL:
 

 
However, this would make the plane unflyable for a human.  But this is the 21st century; we have better than humans.  We have computers.
 
A computer (actually, an at-least-triply-redundant set of computers) and an accelerometer detect and cancel out any divergences in pitch faster and more tirelessly than a human ever could.  The tail downforce becomes tail upforce.  Also (contrary to wikipedia's shitty diagrams), the distance between the CG and CL is closer on unstable designs, so the trim drag of the tail is smaller too.
 
OK, so unstable designs get a slight reduction in drag and a slight increase in lift.  Why is that a big deal?
 
Think of a plane as a set of compromises flying in close formation.  Everything in aerodynamics comes at a cost.  Let's take a look at how this principle can kneecap people trying to be clever.
 
The quicker of you will have no doubt objected to my characterization of stable aircraft losing lift due to tailplane downforce.  "But that doesn't apply if the plane is a canard design!  The CG will be in front of the CL, but still behind the canards, so the canards will generate an upforce to trim the plane out!  No need for fancy computer-flown planes here!"
 
Yeah, they tried that.  But the need for CG/CL relationships ends up screwing you anyhow.  Let's look at a stable canard design (and one of my favorite aircraft), the J7W1 Shinden:


 
Note that the wings are swept.  Now, this is a prop-driven plane, so I can guaran-fucking-tee you that the wings aren't swept to increase critical mach number (I don't think the designers even knew about critical mach number at the time).  Instead, the wings are swept for two reasons:
 
1)  To move the CL back so that the plane is stable
 
2)  to move the rudders back so that they're far enough behind the CG that they'll have adequate control authority.
 
There are lots of reasons you don't want swept wings on a prop fighter.  Since the thing is never going to go fast enough to encounter the benefits of them, in fact, the swept wings are almost entirely a negative.  They reduce flap effectiveness and have goony stall characteristics.  If you could get away with not having them, you would.
 
But you can't.  You can't because it's 1945 and the computers are huge and unreliable.  Your clever dual-lifting-surface canard design's advantages are heavily watered down by the disadvantages imposed by the need for stability.
 
That is the big advantage of instability.  The designer has a lot more freedom because there's one less thing they have to worry about.  This can indirectly lead to huge improvements.  Compare a mirage 3 and a mirage 2000.  The mirage 2000 is unstable, which adds some extra lift (nice, especially on takeoff where deltas really hurt for lift), but more than that it allows the designer to move the wings further forward on the fuselage, which allows for better aft-body streamlining and better area ruling.  Instability doesn't allow for better area ruling per se, but it frees the designer enough that the could potentially opt for that.

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/how-to-win-in-a-dogfight-stories-from-a-pilot-who-flew-1682723379
 
Very interesting article.  Some takeaways:
 
 
-The East German model fulcrum wasn't particularly impressive BVR.
 
-The IRST was surprisingly lame.
 
-Mirage 2000 apparently sucked in DACT.

About two and a half years ago i've stumbled across some russian book about western IFVs, which apparently was a mere compilation of articles from western magazines translated into russian. There was a mention of some 58-ton heavy IFV, called SAIFV, which was described as vehicle baised on Abrams chassis, and they also claimed that a prototype was biult and tested. (which seems dubious to me now) Than, two years ago, I've stumbled across this article about SAIFV https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-u-s-army-wanted-to-replace-the-bradley-38-years-ago-dffb6728dd11 which has 3 drawings - "artist conceptions". Than, half a year ago I was reading some US DOD bidget hearings transcripts about MICV/IFV development, and stumbled across mentions of 50-55 metric tons $800,0000 - 1,000,000 SAIFV of Crizer study, and than I've googled a Mobility analysis of IFV task force alternatives (1978-07) report (which is allmost the same as Appendix D of that report which is described below). Unfortunatelly there weren't any proper pictures, (and also i've thought that those 3 drawings from medium.com article are modern "artist conceptions", not one from 1978). 
Than several things happend in the right time and place, which invlolved twitter, AUSA-2018, NGCV-OMFV, and author of that arcticle at medium.com, and when I asked him about that article - it turned out that there is a report about SAIFV, which is readily available on the internet there http://cdm16635.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16635coll14/id/56079/rec/1


884 pages, with 7 normal chapters and chapter 8 which consists of 6 appendices.
 
 

cost figures from Appendices F and B:


things like those cost figures, coupled with deceiving percents like this (Ch. IV p.17):
(there were also other versions mentioned in Senate hearings of FY1978-1980s - 91.6%, 92%, 95%, and also they've mentioned soviet motorized rifle division instead of tank regiment)

apparently saved Bradley. Although in 1979 those $370,000 turned out to be $472,000 (in same FY1978 dollars), - and later according to FY1983 bidget hearings - $1,350,000 (which is about $880,000 in 1978 dollars). 
 
 
...
btw, GAO's report  "Army's Proposed Close Combat Armored Vehicle Team" (12 dec 1977) has following thing on page 23:

and that was BFV project manager's responce (hearings on military posture and h.r. 10929, part 2 of 7, p.183) several mounths later (somewhere in feb-apr 1978):

John W. Golan just released a video supplement to his book on the Lavi:
 

 
The video is well worth the 18:44 if you're interested in the Lavi at all.
 
 
I just got the book, but it's at the bottom of a pile of other books.

If you're interested in the Lavi, get this book.
 
About a third of the book is the story of the Lavi.  This is the story of the Israelis suddenly losing access to French and British weapons, turning to the USA as weapons suppliers, and deciding the USA wasn't quite reliable or timely enough after nearly losing the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  Thoroughly spooked, the Israelis decided to increase their self-sufficiency in weapons production, and proceeded to develop a rifle, a tank, some missile boats, and various other gadgets.  The thing about fighter planes is that they're outrageously expensive, even compared to tanks, and in the 1980s a host of must-have new technologies like fly-by-wire, directionally aligned and mono-crystal turbine engine blades, and graphite composite construction came about and made fighter aircraft even more expensive.  And some people in the US weren't too happy about the Israelis developing a jet.  As it turned out, some people in Israel weren't all that hot on the idea either. 
 
The remaining two thirds of the book are extensive appendices explaining technical, quantitative assessment of combat aircraft.  Things like the pros and cons of canard designs, E-M diagrams, operational range estimation, how pulse-doppler radar works, how range-gate-pulloff jamming works, are all covered in great detail.  In fact, anyone who is interested in the engineering aspects of the design of combat aircraft should probably get this book, because it's way cheaper than something like Design for Air Combat.

A little off topic but I have read that aircraft production stats in WW2 Germany were inflated because they counted aircraft destroyed at the factory and rebuilt twice.  I forgot the source on that.  Maybe someone else has knowledge of it.
 
Adam Tooze is the source for this.  The limiting factor on German WW2 armaments production was steel.  They could not produce more ships, planes, tanks, shells, or machine tools without lowering production of one or more of the others.  This is despite conquering the steel production of most of Europe.  It seems like grossly incompetent management.  
 
I posted a video a few weeks ago that contains an analysis of German management of their piston aeroengines.  TLDR:  Gross incompetence on a staggering level.
 
As for the Panther, does anyone have the source comparing the number of hoses and number of different diameters of hoses in a Panther engine vs a Sherman?  I saw it on YT (forgot which vid) and it was staggering how much more complex the Panther was.
 
I'm an older guy and most of the books we had access to back in the day were implicitly pro-German.  Seeing the internet was like being the unfrozen caveman from Saturday Night Live.  Even neanderthals like us Gen X'ers can see the facts and make good analysis now that we have the internet.  I don't see why so many guys who grew up with the internet admire the German equipment.