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Al-Mukowama aka Hezbollah information thread: only arab (not really arab) army (not really an army) that knows how to fight.

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Ghajar operation  - 21 November 2005 - failed  attempt by Hezbollah  Special Force fighters using motorcycles and ATVs to take prisoners or capture bodies of IDF soldiers. IDF Corporal David Markovitch, shot a rocket-propelled grenade being carried by the Hezbollah militants, killing three, then shot and killed a fourth gunman.


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Well, looking at amount of info that i can get about Al-Mukowama, i decided to make a separate thread about them where we (or just me) will collect information about Al-Mukowama aka Hezbollah aka Isla

Current conflicts where Al-Mukowama is involved (Syria). [WIP]   Intervention        The first information about the presence of "Hezbollah" in Syria appeared in the media in the second half of

Small update in general info. If you have more or correction - feel free to post.


August 30, 2018 in the territory of the SAR, the Lebanese military adviser died:




- Haj Tariq Ibrahim Haidar (Abu Ali Jawad) from Kafr Dan, Baalbek district in Baalbek-Hermel.

According to rumors, a car exploded on a mine in the desert of Suweida.


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On October 22, 2018, 2 Lebanese advisers died on the territory of the SAR:







- Muhammad Mahmut Zeidan (Murtada) from Jebshit, Nabatiyah district in Nabatiyah.
- Muhammad Sa'id Sa'id (Abu Sa'id) from El Quseiba, Nabatiyah district of Nabatiyah.

Place and circumstances of death are not reported.


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Consortium News suggest a change in US stance towards Hezbollah may be imminent:




IIRC Lebanon & Iran are the only nations on the infamous 'list' that the US has not directly attacked yet.....Time to tick off another? 


You can never have too many military fiascos on-going at once, apparently.....But hey, Israel will be happy.

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On 1/26/2019 at 4:12 AM, Sgt.Squarehead said:

Consortium News suggest a change in US stance towards Hezbollah may be imminent:




IIRC Lebanon & Iran are the only nations on the infamous 'list' that the US has not directly attacked yet.....Time to tick off another? 


You can never have too many military fiascos on-going at once, apparently.....But hey, Israel will be happy.

It's a welcome change. Not so long ago it became apparent that the Lebanese Armed Forces are cooperating with Hezbollah, and are even transferring arms to them.

As the LAF failed in its main task - to curb Hezbollah's empowerment, and decided to aid them instead, there is no reason for the US to support them anymore. They can now be under the same sanctions Hezbollah faces.

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On the evening of February 16, 2019, "fulfilling the sacred duty of opposing the mercenaries of Wahhabism" adviser of "Islamic resistance" was killed:




Imad Hussein Seif Ed-Din (Mujaba) from Nabi Osman, Baalbek District in Baalbek Hermel.

The first dead this year, the place of death is not reported

Probable place of death - Syrian Badia, during one of clearing operations.

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8 minutes ago, MRose said:


All I'm saying is that Hezbollah is the by far more competent regime troops and the Russians aren't exactly bringing plentiful manpower. I'd imagine Hezbollah has learned how to make better use of combined arms operations. Remember the drone that had to be shot down with a patriot missile. Didn't a lot of the guys in Syria, also serve in Ukraine?


1) Al-Mukowama are not regime troops

2) They already had Iranian army and SAA to draw from on that subject. Russia couldn't bring them much more, as there was no serious combined arms warfare conducted by Russian Army in Syria.

3) No. 50 000 Army personal participated in operation, many of which never had combat experience or never participated in Ukrainian war (Air forces for example).


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4 hours ago, LoooSeR said:
5 hours ago, MRose said:


All I'm saying is that Hezbollah is the by far more competent regime troops and the Russians aren't exactly bringing plentiful manpower. I'd imagine Hezbollah has learned how to make better use of combined arms operations. Remember the drone that had to be shot down with a patriot missile. Didn't a lot of the guys in Syria, also serve in Ukraine?


1) Al-Mukowama are not regime troops

2) They already had Iranian army and SAA to draw from on that subject. Russia couldn't bring them much more, as there was no serious combined arms warfare conducted by Russian Army in Syria.

3) No. 50 000 Army personal participated in operation, many of which never had combat experience or never participated in Ukrainian war (Air forces for example).


1) Meant regime-allied.

2) The Afghanis got chewed through.

3) Some very notable Russians who fought in Ukraine died in Syria, who presumably would've been liasoning with Hezbollah.

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3 hours ago, MRose said:


1) Meant regime-allied.

2) The Afghanis got chewed through.

3) Some very notable Russians who fought in Ukraine died in Syria, who presumably would've been liasoning with Hezbollah.

2) they are still alive  and function. Moreover, they are not the only Iranian combat unit that participated in war, they were pictures of interesting unit near Al-Hader during Aleppo provide nice operations in 2015-2016.


3)Those people are not a majority, and I doubt that there is "a lot" of them in a first place. Almost all photos and videos of units that consisted of those people were from places where main/only forces were Syrian. I know of only single group of photos posted by Electronic Resistance with Russian SF members on them.


On top of that those "ex-rebels" we're used as infantry, not some sort of advisors or coordinators that represented Army or Special services. Hell, I would believe more that FSB members were contacting Al-Mukowama than cannon fodder becoming a coordinators.

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On May 11, 2019, a military adviser of the Resistance was killed while performing his duty in Syria:




- Hamid Hussein al-Haq (Basil) from Haush al-Sayyid Ali, Hermel district in Baalbek Hermel.

Place and circumstances of death are not reported.


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   Translation that i used to translate to Eng:






   On the anniversary of the final cleansing of the Lebanese border from Syrian militants, the Al Ahed website erupted in a series of articles on the first Resistance operations in Syria.

   The first part is dedicated to the battle for Tel Nabi-Mend (the so-called "third battle of Kadesh"):



   Obviously, the enemy coalition relied heavily on Quseir, benefiting from it in supplying all other combat outposts. After the enemy took control of Quseir and villages west of the river, seeking to connect with northern Lebanon. To achieve this, they took control of the hill "Tel Nabi Mend", which is very important. Tel Mend, whose dimensions are approximately 400 meters from north to south, width from east to west, is approximately 300 meters, its height rises to seventy meters, and on top of this hill are ruins.






   One of the goals that the terrorists sought was to reach the sea and establish a connection with the north of Lebanon, which removes the obstacles they face when working from inside Lebanon.

   In March 2013, terrorists put the finishing touches on this plan. They took control of Tal Mend, and just three villages remained: Al-Khoz, Al-Mudan, Al-Karniya.


   Wake-up call ...

   It provided them with contact with the reservoir of Bahret-Homs, and then the disruption of connection lines between Bekaa and Homs. That is, the Sunun-Karnia line will be cut off, and this was the only line operating at that time, because the terrorists took control of the Quseir region. In practice, when the gunmen took the Tel Mend, and all this was alarming.





   In 2013, Hezbollah formations were deployed along the contact line, at a group of villages ranging from Hows al-Sayyid Ali in the south, with deployments to the areas of Safsafa, Al-Hamani and Al-Faroukiya. This was our line of defense of these villages from terrorist attacks at Sikmania.


   We defended Al-Aqrabia and the Al-Buueyt al-Gharbiya district up to Tel Nabi Mend. The Tel Mend region was in the hands of militants, from the east and west there were some formations of the Syrian army, such as the Dabaa airport, but it was under siege. The rest of the area was in the hands of the militants, with the exception of the area east of the river, which is the Christian village of Rabla at the crossroads. The Syrian army defended the road from Rabla to Jisr al-Mashtal.


   Some points on the east side of Al Quseir were occupied by the Syrian army and reached them through the Bargut checkpoint. But in practice, the whole city was in the hands of terrorists. At that moment, Hezbollah decided to protect the villages. Terrorists tried to strike at villages in which "Resistance" was in defense. We were only in defensive posture with some necessary special operations conducted in some places around.



   The seizure by the militants of Tel Nabi Mend was a warning. At this stage, it was decided that our presence in Syria, in Homs, Aleppo or even in Sayyid-Zeynab (r) continued to protect the shrines, as well as some villages from Bosra al-Sham to Nubbol, Zakhra, Kefaria and Foix.


   But in 2013, after the terrorists took control of the strategic Tel Mend, we revised the general direction of the battle.


   Leadership Decision: Return Tel Mend.

   After the terrorists took control of the mountain, the Syrian army made several attempts to return it, and several martyrs fell there, unable to return the mountain, due to the complexity of the battle theater. 21 meters of flowing water, and the enemy is deployed at a height of seventy meters.

   When the leadership decided that the Islamic Resistance would attack the mountain (15 days after the terrorists took control of it in March 2013), the intelligence process began. Resistance could not abandon the hill in favor of the militants.





   One of the problems we encountered in connection with the restrictions imposed by the Secretary-General was that the operation still did not go on the full offensive. The case is very sensitive. The directive was to preserve an operation called “Defense from attacks”, and our borders are a hill. We had problems with some houses on a hillside near the mill. After the approach, we made an attempt. On the first attempt, when we crossed the river, one of the brothers was martyred. One of the most important problems was how we cross the river, which is 70 meters from the hill, viewed and shot by militants, which will lead to additional problems when we climb a very steep hill.


   Our work was done at night, it was very cold. Mujahideen on the field were persistent and decisive. In the second attempt, the Mujahideen brothers crossed the river, and we expected that the militants would not give up and try to regain their positions. The Mujahideen created the formation of the army infantry, with the support of tanks, equipment and other support. The river crossing happened not at just one point; we crossed the river at different points, in groups separately from each other, referring to a river 21 meters wide.


   One part of the Mujahideen covered from the eastern sector, and the other group from the western. The main formation is that which narrowed the gap with the enemy and went up. In practice, the group was very small, consisting of 3 infantry groups, which were entrusted with climbing and establishing control, in addition support groups were distributed. The operation was scheduled for 6 o’clock in the morning. At that time, the fog seemed to interfere with the visibility of support groups providing a start to the attack of their brothers. For this reason, the start time of the process was delayed. After crossing the river, the brothers got wet in the water. The cold was severe. At 8:15, permission was given to attack. With permission to advanced infantry formations. Visibility becomes clearer. Towards the infantry approach, fortifications and bunkers were destroyed. A collision has occurred. Many militants were killed and the rest left. We controlled the top of the hill. It became clear to us that there would be an answer.










   We remembered the restrictions imposed by the management, so as not to reach the houses near the hill.
   This section, which we simply looked through without moving further, the militants tried to use to regroup. The enemy mobilized up to 400 fighters and attacked in 8 groups. Each group of 50 militants. The clashes were one on one at times. The battle lasted from 12 p.m. until dawn. The attack was repeated 2 times. The first time is 3 groups, the second is 8 groups.

   It was decided that in order to preserve the hill, it was necessary to expand a bit, so we liberated the areas near the hill, and in this process the Resistance had several martyrs.

   The terrorist attacks continued, and then we submitted a request to expand the defense section. We cannot protect the hill from enemies already on the hill and its surroundings, we needed to protect the hill with enemies being outside the hill. At this stage, a management decision came. We got permission to free the village of Kadesh. Thus, this offensive operation began almost a week after our attack on the hill.

   Based on the fact that the depth of attack will be about 300 meters, a force of the same scale was mobilized. The forces that the militants deployed for the hill retake operations were their elite, having lost about 50 militants and leaders of major groups in the area, such as Omar Rachel (he was the direction commander).





   With the beginning of the first day a unit, the task of which was to cover the Kadesh region, reached their main goal and moved towards Radvania, therefore we ensured its advancement. This is a large conciliation procedure. The order of forces that we have reserved is 300 Mujahideen. The area was open in front of us, and we could move forward. The enemy has exhausted its forces, so we moved in two directions.


   At the end of the first day, we liberated five villages: Radvania, Burhaniya, Assaadia, Mansurie and Kadesh. We have established a relationship with an area called Sagmania. On the first day we were supposed to free the village, but we freed five villages with the same attacking force.





   At the beginning of the third day, we launched a new attack from east to west in the direction of Abu Khuri and completed the operation. By the end of the third day, we liberated about 22 villages. We made a connection from the west of the river to the east from the river to Ribla. This means that the forces took control of the area west of the Oront River, whose area is about 200 sq. km. Through this process, we reached the ultimate goal of the battle (leadership intervened, giving instructions to stop advances, so we completed the expansion of controlled territory and stopped).


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      The second part of the article is dedicated to the battle for Quseir and the operations preceding it.


   During Operation Jusia, the deployment of the Syrian army was sporadic. The Resistance considered each deployment point of the Syrian army as a fulcrum for the start of the operation. The Mujahideen launched a second attack from an east of the Oront River, with the aim of covering an area of about 120 square kilometers, including a group of villages: Jusiya, Al-Atifiya, Saediya, Zraya, Dusaria (with the onset of events in Syria, the militants entered Al-Atifiya and committed a massacre in which they left nearly 17 peaceful martyrs).
   The Resistance took advantage of the existing deployment points of the Syrian Arab army and conducted an operation with the participation of almost 800 Mujahideen, including mobilization forces [reservists - H.M.]. The process began in several directions: from east to west, from south to north, a flanking for a complete encirclement.
   In fact, the battle began at 13:00. Resistance lost 1 martyr, and before sunset, the offensive almost reached its decisive goals. Reserves arrived on the second day, and the cleanup operation was completed. Resistance returned the tank of the Syrian army, captured by militants. It is noteworthy that the shell was still in the tank gun discovered by the Mujahideen, that is, the terrorist loaded the shell, but did not manage to fire due to the rapid advance of the Mujahideen.


   General area around Quseir



   City of Quseir:





   One of the most important features of this process was a flanking/bypass maneuver. Resistance took control of a group of points, and the terrorists began to flee to an area called Tel Khanash.

   A section was formed near the resistance, from which it was possible to reach Quseir, from the Dusaria region to water treatment facilities. In this area, the Mujahideen fought for two days, in which four martyrs were lost, until the resistance reached the line of contact with Quseir.

   In the area of water treatment facilities and their environs, clashes occurred on the last day, when the enemy mobilized all his forces, because the resistance came into contact with Quseir. Chlorine was present in the filtration unit. One member of the hostile forces was tasked destroy chlorine tanks and detonate himself there in order to kill as many resistance members as possible. But after a collision between him and his brothers at close range, the Mujahideen killed him before he reached the object.

   Clashes between the Resistance and the militants continued in the area until an attack on Quseir began.










   The number of clashes that the Resistance conducted east of the river during the operation is as follows:
- Day 1: 46 regular encounters and one major encounter.
- Day 2: 6 regular and 5 heavy collisions.
- Last day: 18 heavy clashes.


   Features of this operation:
- Swiftness of advancement,
- Several maneuvers: in this operation we attacked in seven directions.
- close range fights with maximum use of fire,
“Using flanking maneuvers, the supply routes were cut and isolated, forcing them to flee before the circle of rings was closed.








   After the leadership decided to attack Quseir, the discussion was related to the question: “We are attacking from the north, from Tel Nabi Mend in the direction of Arjun and from Arjun, bypassing the Dabaa airport, moving in the direction of Quseir, or we begin the attack from the south, where did we come in contact with Quseir and we begin our offensive operation from Jisr al-Mashtal to Quseir? "

   In the battle of Quseir, the Resistance encountered the most famous combat units operating on the field of the so-called "Syrian revolution." There was conflicting reports on the number of militants, but the lowest reported number was 6,000 enemies inside Quseir with weapons, equipment, tanks, heavy machine guns and artillery.

   ISIL had not yet appeared at that time, it was still part of the general structure of the so-called "Syrian revolution." Jebhat al-Nusra had its presence in Quseir, but the most powerful detachment was the Kataib al-Farouq brigades deployed throughout Syria. Al-Farouq battalions were then in Idlib, Aleppo and Deraa. But their infrastructure was in the Homs region and mainly Quseir (Quseir was the headquarters of Kataib al-Farouq).








   In general, in combat effectiveness there was an approximate equality between the Resistance on the one hand, and terrorists on the other, at the level of weapon quality. In terms of numbers, the militants were superior. The number of militants represented at least 6,000 people, and the largest number - 10,000 people. Formations of Resistance during the attack of Quseir amounted to: 14 sections, 14 companies. The actual fighting force was only about 1800 young people.

   The operation in May 2013 was carried out in four stages. Each stage is a day or more.

   The first stage was completed on the first day, when the Islamic Resistance attacked the city from several directions, each of which had several directions. The resistance had one detour on the west side and more than one on the south side. In the east there was a safety direction from south to northeast, and five directions from west to east, taking advantage of the positions of the Syrian army.

   The operation was aimed at achieving specific goals and achieved almost 70 percent of its goals. On the first day, the Resistance captured 40 percent of the territory of Quseir and established contact with the dispersed formations of the Syrian army in the heart of Quseir. Resistance forces approached the Quseir Arboretum and took control of the southeast lane. On the first day, the Mujahideen approached the church and the city hall, but for various reasons could not establish control over them. Significantly increased the number of martyrs.
   On the sixth day of the battle between the Resistance and the enemy, very heavy battles took place. Enemies prepared their defenses in width and in depth of the area.
   After the sixth day, the Resistance forces began to gnaw through the defense and prepare the Mujahideen brothers for the last major attack. Of the features that have benefited the enemy are the use of engineering work throughout the depth and width of the region, as well as the size of fortifications with the maximum use of earthwork.












   The tenth day of the battle was approaching, militants from outside Quseir tried to get from the city for support and reinforcements from the Qalamoun ridge, from the Al-Abuwadiya region, where they were cut off in the Dahiraj area a few minutes from the entrance to Quseir. But in clashes with the Resistance in the Al-Abuwadiya region, the terrorists retreated and then turned off the road onto the highway, reaching Dabaa. Thanks to this action, Abdul Kadir Saleh and Abdul Jabbar al-Akidi joined the militants in Quseir. The troops arrived from Deir Ez-Zor, Asvad as-Sharkiya and Aleppo (about 300 militants from Aleppo).

   Over the course of the days, the brothers' advancement developed, as well as tactics, for example, Resistance fighters moved from “street attack” to “storming houses”.
The most important goal is to get to the municipal area, which includes the church, the municipality, the main square of Quseira, because this is the heart of Quseira.

   The "nibbling" stage (third stage) lasted a long time. From the tenth day, the leadership of the Resistance gave orders to conduct maneuvers in other directions.

   Resistance fighters advanced into the Dahiraj area, cleared any passage to Quseir, and closed the entire territory to prevent possible entry into Quseir. In addition, the National Defense, in cooperation with Resistance units, launched an offensive operation, during which a group of points was captured, the most important of which was Dabaa Airport and the Javadiya region.

   In preparation for the last major offensive, the battle lasted almost 14 days, and the main goal was the municipality. The attack began at about 7 a.m., and at the end of the day, at sunset, the municipality was in the hands of the Mujahideen. According to one estimate, 2,000 militants were killed. The battle ended when the municipality fell and the final stage for the militants arrived (before Resistance reached the municipality, the militants began negotiations to get out, the Resistance set a set of conditions, but did not reach an agreement).
   After the municipality began preparing to storm the northern alley the next day. At 12 a.m., signs began to appear that militants were fleeing the center of Quseir.
   This was logical: the number of dead and wounded was high. By dawn on the sixteenth day, a process of breakthrough of militants from Quseir to Dabaa and to the east began. The battle was over, only pursuit operations continued. "The group from Aleppo headed to Aleppo, and the largest part of the Quseir militants and the Homs militants turned to Qalamoun." This actions of the terrorists was not organized, leaving behind a large number of vehicles, machine guns and weapons.














   "They had dozens of wounded and contacted Mukhtar Dhairaj, who in turn contacted the Resistance. His Eminence assisted the wounded militants in accessing hospitals."


   The battle for Quseir ended, the Resistance returned to a defensive position, but the threat remained from the highlands. At the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014, the terrorists gathered all the militants of Quseir and Qalamoun and tried to knock out the Resistance using an offensive operation. The attack began from 3 points: Tel al-Khanash, 14 and Al-Abuwadiya. The offensive lasted about 20 days. They tried to make a breakthrough to get to Jusia, and then make their way to Quseir. After 25 days, the Resistance carried out a bypass operation from the area of the 67th Brigade, Al-Dabhasia, then Jamra, then Hamra, then Jubb al-Jarrah and took control of the entire territory.


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   Another article about Hezbollah/Resistance actions, now against Israeli navy vessel "Hanit" (was linked on otvaga).


Timing: 8:00 pm
Date: Friday, July 14, 2006, the third day of the aggression on Lebanon
Location: Off the coast of the Lebanese capital Beirut
Event: First Tod / Military Media Reveals for the first time the scenes of the operation (The operation of targeting the Israeli military vessel off the shores of Beirut)



   Radar showed in article, was used to find target.









   Looks like ship was under observation for several hours:





   "This is fiction." An Israeli navy officer responded to a colleague's question about the possibility of Hezbollah possessing a weapon that would pose a serious threat to Israeli naval vessels. The battleship «Hanit», a model «Saar 5», bombed civilian homes in the southern suburb of Beirut. The "naval power" in the Islamic Resistance is ready and waiting for the command to strike the Durrat Taj of the Israeli navy.

   The operation was called “First Tod,” and the aim was to sink the ship


   At 8 p.m., the command ordered the implementation of the plan, from a hill overlooking the area of Ouzai, two whistles sounded in conjunction with the word of the Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (may Allah protect him), at the moment he revealed the first surprises of the enemy of the Resistance.


   Missile launcher vehicle being prepared for firing:











   In firing position, rising containers to launch AShMs.








   1st is out



   2nd missile launch






   Probably fire on a ship.





C-802 anti-ship missile









   Containers for launch and for transportation of C-802.




   Ship was targeted. After more than two hours of continuous burning, the crew began to inspect results of attack. The body of a Marine soldier was found shortly afterwards. However, the census showed the loss of three others, one from intelligence, and two Air Force personnel from the helicopter crew. The three remained unaccounted for the following day, and teams of commando divers and a special air force rescue unit were called to the scene. The search continued for many hours, before finding parts of the bodies of the three soldiers assembled to confirm their death.


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   Yuri Lyamin found what launcher Al-Mukowama used (shown in video above)


   This is Iranian launcher for AShMs (probably iranian copy of C-802 - Noor), also was supplied to Syria before war. 


   ^Summer of 2012.





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   More about Al-Muqowama action in Syria.

   Original: https://www.alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=10080&cid=142

   Translation by Hort that i used to translate to Eng: http://otvaga2004.mybb.ru/viewtopic.php?id=2170&p=7#p1250441




   Combat operations on the borders at Qalamoun from June 2014 to August 28, 2017.


   The harsh climate of the mountain range of East Lebanon led to the fact that both sides were not initially present there. With the end of operations in Qalamoun in June 2014, armed groups began to appear on the slopes towering over the Lebanese areas, especially those from which the Brital' were controlled, in particular the Harf al-Hawa area (2400 meters high and an overview of the entire Bekaa Valley and camps of Resistance, belonging to the Brital region and adjacent to the Tufail region, historically this territory was Syrian in terms of cattle breeding and land ownership).


   In June 2014, militants-controlled territory ranged from Zabadani, the wasteland of Zabadan and the wasteland of Bludan to Wadi Barada, which means that there was a communication line from Arsal to Ghuta and Wadi Barada, and Wadt Barada was connected to Eastern Ghuta and thus, to the western part of the Qalamoun mountain range, extending to Badia, Tanf and Nasiria. The first step was to split this chain. Tufail was selected. The height difference between the terrorist bases and centers of Resistance was about 1000 meters. The brothers in the leadership decided to intercept the “head line”. Night pinfiltration was carried out by mobilization units that turned around on the "head line", while the brothers in Qalamoun reached the borders of Tufail.










   It was decided that the brothers from Qalamoun would conduct an attack maneuver in the Tufail region and its environs and take control of this area. The battle lasted about four days, until it became a defensive position of Resistance. The attack was carried out in two directions, occupying a group of positions, primarily Kaleat al-Numrud, Mukhtarakat al-Safra and Kabe al-Hatmi, as well as from the other side of the Safra region. One of the most prominent results of this operation is that it separated the concentration of armed groups that took place in the Wadi Barad region associated with Eastern Ghouta and the concentration of armed groups spread throughout the Arsal valley.


   Almost a month later, in July 2014, it was decided to conduct an attack by forces brothers from Qalamoun in the direction of Telet Musa and with other forces from the Lebanese direction to the areas of Akabat al-Baida, Akibat al-Zaitun, Al-Heshat, Ras al-Hawa and Al-Keshk, in order to connect troops at important points. In these areas, heights reached 2000 and 2500 meters (Akibat al-Zaytun 2500 meters, Akabat al-Baida 2450 meters). These elevations made breathing difficult due to the low oxygen content in the air, so the climatic factor played an important role.


   Due to certain circumstances, forces from Qalamoun did not attack as planned, but other forces from the Lebanese sector attacked and succeeded (the area is on the outskirts of Baalbek). Resistance fighters attacked 32 points of the militants and took control of 28 of them, a number of martyrs died in this operation (in one operation, one in another - 2).

   Now the resistance had a line adjacent to the wasteland of Brital', and another, adjacent to the wasteland of Baalbek-Nakhle, but the area between the two lines was not connected.





   "Amir 1", a security threat to Lebanon.

   In August 2014, the Lebanese army arrested one of the main commanders of terrorist groups and one of the most dangerous militias (Imad Juma “Abu Ahmad”, commander of the “Fajr al-Islam” brigade). About 200,000 militants and their family members were present in the Arsal area and near the camps.


   The Resistance had a readiness schedule before Operation Amir-1. In the winter of 2014-2015, due to Hurricane Zeyn, snow fell in some places up to 10 meters. Some of the brothers were injured and nearly died due to snow and very cold weather in remote areas as a result of this. Some suffered cold burns. At some point, the temperature in one of the directions reached minus 20 degrees. Water bottles were frozen, and in order to preserve drinking water, they had to put the bottles in a large bowl of water on low heat. Resistance fighters used new methods, such as snowmobiles. The difficulty level was high, and this was one of the most important concerns of the resistance. This is an important stage that deserves pride. Stability in these positions and the protection of the highlands were an achievement.


   At that time, clashes between resistance and terrorist groups continued until the summer of 2015. At the same time, Jaish al-Fatah was formed in Idlib, and Abu Malek al-Tali met with all the military formations and began to prepare for what he called Fatah Dimashq.

   A command decision was made about the need to clear all the wastelands from Tufail to the wastelands of Baalbek. On this basis, areas of responsibility and areas of operations in the Lebanese and Syrian directions were identified. On the Syrian and Lebanese fronts, there were formations from various units of Hezbollah, which opened a front with a width of 28 kilometers.





   The operation was bilateral (274 km on the Lebanese side and 500 km on the Syrian side). The methods and types of work were different, of which one type was similar to resistance operations (penetration of infantry formations, attack on some sensitive points). There were two stages: the "loud" phase and the "quiet" phase. The phase of silence is to take advantage of resistance methods to penetrate small formations and occupy these points and objects (geographical types of objects, key, fundamental, critical) in addition to their camps.


   The number of active and armed militants for Operation Amir I amounted to 3,000 terrorists who were entrenched in caves. This number may be increased or decreased depending on the circumstances. The militants recruited [agitated?] about 200,000 people in the Arsal camps.

   The area posed a serious threat to the Lebanese areas where car bombs came from to attack civilians. After the liberation, a number of explosive factories were discovered, including car bombs with Lebanese numbers.


   Prior to disagreement between the terrorist organizations in the region, there were Al-Nusra, ISIS, Saraya Al-Sham, and the Free Syrian Army.





   On May 2, 2015, terrorists attacked the direction of Al-Jubba, and two martyrs appeared at the resistance positions there. At this time, the brothers from the Resistance penetrated Kirnat al-Nahle (Harf al-Daar camp). On the way back, masked forces were discovered and a clash occurred. At this quiet stage, several infiltrations occurred, followed by collisions at a 28-km front. But one of the most important points that they entered was Kirnat al-Nahle, with Musharraf rising above it, which led to the collapse of the militants and a rush of resistance that launched the offensive operations of Al-Muwadine, Mashruy Al-Akhdar, Mashruy Al-Dashar and Mashruy Al-Hadra. Fierce fighting, 4 wounded resistance fighters, and 1 martyr in the Shamas Ain al-Ward region took place in Harf al-Dishart. The attacking forces stopped in the vicinity of the vineyards and began to control the Al-Amdat camp for Saray Ahl al-Sham.


   To coincide with these operations, resistance fighters in other units infiltrated Karnat Abd al-Haq, and the brothers in Qalamoun took Telet al-Musa under control.

   One of the most important features of the Amir-1 operation is that it liberated almost 500 km and deprived the Jaysh al-Fatah of hope, eliminated threats from the Brital and Baalbek areas and closed many checkpoints and thereby reduced the security risk for Lebanon.



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2 members of Resistance that were killed in Israeli airstrike in Damascus few days ago






- Hassan Yusuf Zabib from Nimairiya, Nabatiy district in Nabatiy. The son of the technical director and board member of Al-Manar Channel.
- Yasser Ahmad Dahir from Blida, Marge Ayun district in Nabatiyah.









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   2nd part of combat operations on the borders at Qalamoun from June 2014 to August 28, 2017

   Original: https://www.alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=10080&cid=142

   Hort's translation that i used for Eng translation: http://otvaga2004.mybb.ru/viewtopic.php?id=2170&p=7#p1250458









   Amir 2: the end of armed groups.

   A few days later, the resistance leadership decided to complete the attack on the Arsal region in order to capture the terrorists and surround them. An operation was performed under the name "Operation Amir II." The most famous areas where there were fierce battles with terrorists in this operation are Hard ad-Dabul and Karnat al-Rasif districts.

   As a result of this operation, the wasteland of Arsal was reached, the Al-Rahwa plain was completely controlled, and the Wadi al-Khail triangle threatening Qalamoun was cut off. The Nahle and Yonin Wastelands were completely secure by expanding ties with the LAF.

   Among the features of Amir 2 is a variety of working methods from silent to noisy, as well as a multiplicity of maneuvers (flanking and bypassing maneuvers, front, surroundings, penetration).

   The problem with the militants is that they could not tactically calculate the region and discern the features of all points, could not cope with the resistance maneuver. The resistance maneuver was more successful because they were able to analyze the area at a tactical or operational level and benefit from the methods and types of enemy maneuvers. Analytical working methods and reconnaissance during maneuver gave the resistance the advantage of quickly conducting an operation with a large number of fortifications.



   A Resistance member looks through his binoculars in Umm Khorj in the Lebanese eastern mountain range close to the Syrian border on October 9, 2014, after capturing the area from Islamic State terrorists.










   2017 .. Start with Daish or Nusra?

   In 2016, the Resistance was preparing for Operation Sadyk al-Muhammad. But the option of military operations in Zabadani was accepted instead. In 2017, the Resistanc decided to attack the eastern region in order to stop the presence of takfiri for several reasons, including addressing this security threat.

   The options were to start the process from the Daish organization, then continue towards Nusra or start from Nusra and then continue towards Daish. In the month of Ramadan 2017, planning for hostilities by Daish began, and we encountered a number of difficulties on the ground.

   Resistance worked to stabilize the Lebanese army’s defense line near Arsal, fearing that terrorists would rush to Labue. The army has established checkpoints at crossings (crossing Wadi Hamid, Wadi Royan and Wadi Hamid).


   Sayyid Nasrallah intervenes in the military details of the operation.

   Hezbollah’s Secretary General participated in the eastern invasion operations planning. He called us to a meeting and asked to explain every maneuver, every idea in detail.

   In previous operations, the Secretary-General intervened at the operational level, looking at general trends, but in this process, the Secretary-General asked us to explain the whole process. After listening to all the details associated with the operation: the Secretary General was interested in the types of maneuvers, infantry units, how to get around and analyze the area ...

   At this meeting with the resistance leaders responsible for the operations of the eastern chain, Sayyid set a number of restrictions and borders, the first of which should not be affected by the civilian population, “especially on the issue of camps, even if we see fire, we try not to attack”. The second of these restrictions is that if resistance fighters are forced to respond to a source of fire in the direction from civilians, then it must be targeted and accurate shooting from a weapon in order to respond to the source of the fire precisely without the possibility of error, and even to this answer to it special permission required. Sayyid remained with us in all operations, he followed everything with us. The Secretary General, during a meeting with his officers, speaks a military language and acts as a military commander in order to lay down a field and military environment. He set boundaries and restrictions and gave orders to officers. Then Sayyid left us the time we needed and more, he told us that you are not “limited” by time.

   Sayyid also intervened in determining the line of resistance in terms of distance from the camps.










   Elimination of "Nusra" forces

   The main objective of this operation was the complete elimination of Jebhat al-Nusra in region and the cessation of its presence, as well as the liberation of the entire Lebanese border, which would make Lebanon the first country declared free from terrorist presence. One of the main objectives of the operation was the desire to exert pressure on Jabhat al-Nusra in one place from Abu Malik al-Tali, with the help of which we seek to uncover the fate of the Lebanese military, abducted at that time, and our compatriots from Idlib. This goal was implicitly present, but was not publicly voiced.

   Unlike resistance forces, enemy forces consisted mainly of Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahl al-Sham battalions and other forces. In total there were about 700 militants of two formations. But this number at any time could increase to 3,000 militants (due to human support from the camps, knowing that these camps are far from the initial resistance positions of about 6 to 7 km, and if it is impossible to shell the resistance camp from outside the limits and limitations of the leadership and from due to religious restrictions, these camps were centers of reinforcement of militants).


   Accordingly, the resistance created a fire base in Wadi Hamid. Resistance fighters sought to cross the fortification area of Dahr al-Arbat. This maneuver consisted of four types of maneuvers:
- Maneuver from south to north in many directions.
- workarounds in the Dahr al-Khuwat district, the main goal of the district.
- the surrounding maneuver, which is a maneuver that passes through Wadi Dakik and reaches Dahr al-Safa al-Zab. At the beginning of the battle, two main sections were present at the junction: al-Anza and opposite Dahr al-Khuwat, as well as a set of detour beams.


   The operation began on July 20, 2017. The fighters took advantage of Wadi Dakik and advanced towards it, performing a flanking maneuver. From Friday to Sunday, the actions were almost militarily finished.

  • July 21, we tried to surround not only one side.
  • July 22, we reached the hills of Anza and Hikab al-Tibb.
  • On July 23, we took control of the Hikab al-Hale district and the surrounding area.
  • On July 25, we conducted an offensive operation, faced fierce hostilities and took control of Surj al-Khirbet and Telet al-Nisab.
  • A ceasefire was proposed that day on the basis that negotiations had come to a conclusion.
  • On the night of July 26, three fighters went astray, reached the checkpoint of armed groups and were taken prisoner.
  • On July 31, a negotiation committee consisting of the head of the Hezbollah’s liaison and coordination department, Hajj Wafik Safa, and Lebanon’s general security director general, Major General Abbas Ibrahim, arrived at our position at night. They told us: "They have an inflated opinion, the community will not negotiate." We said: "Stop negotiating, and we are able to attack." At night, we prepared the starting conditions for conducting offensive operations in order to complete the task in accordance with the instructions of the command.

   We took measures to prepare the territory, prepare fire bases, we adopted a plan of attack. At this point, Abu Malik al-Tali was based in the Wadi al-Dam area.


   In practice, the fierce battles that opposed the resistance in Kalamun were mainly held in the Al-Qir area and on the Al-Burkan hill, while the remaining points were taken under control almost without a fight, such as Harf Wadi al-Dib, Kaleat al- Heil, Kaleat al-Hosn.


   On the Lebanese side, the main and concentrated hostilities took place in Dahr al-Hauwat, Dahr al-Safa al-Zab. On August 1, 2017, the militants began to retreat, but the resistance did not advance to the center of the valley at the request of the leadership, as there were still civilians in the camp.

   After  the resistance took under control Dahr al-Khuvat, the Ahl al-Sham battalions announced their surrender, announcing their intention to withdraw from the battle, and we captured their militants and returned them 10 bodies. Also, one of the conditions established by the resistance for the exit of the Nusra was to inform us about the locations of the bodies of the martyrs and the release of prisoners, as well as the cessation of the presence of the Nusra and the Free Army throughout the territory.










   Full coordination between resistance and the Lebanese army to eliminate Daish

   Regarding Daish, on August 3, the Lebanese army announced its intention to seize the area. The army must seize points and free areas in full coordination with the Resistance. The operation against Daish was partially divided between resistance and the army. Resistance and Lebanese Armed Forces officers discussed the planned plan, and it was decided that the most important stage was Tel al-Khanazir. The plan was that with the fall of Tel al-Khanazir, the army could take control of all Daish points. Daish lost its ability to strengthen the height, so when the Lebanese army arrived, there were no clashes north from Arsal.


   In Operation Wa In Edtum Edna, we used a set of tactics: "seeping" through the unevenness of the terrain, a series of maneuvers tied with many directions of action.

   The Wah in Edtum Edna process began almost a week after Operation Sadik al-Muhammad. During the offensive, Daesh was defeated, and some of them surrendered at the Al-Zamrani crossing.


   In the Lebanese sector, the Lebanese army used very large formations (brigades and regiments, fifty 155 mm guns, as well as MLRS). In the Syrian direction, the Resistance attacked from several axes and directions. Many axes and directions of advance confused armed groups.

   The benefits of these operations include: liberation of all land and the return of prisoners (for the first time in history, Daish returned prisoners). Daish had families and civilians, and the role of leadership manifested itself here to put an end to the battle (but where will the families go?). This battle could not be ended militarily, especially since Daesh had nowhere to go (Palmyra and Makhin were freed and that wa a problem for those, who called themselfs “the kings of Homs and Damascus”). Here, the role of strategic battle management and negotiation was great, an exit strategy was developed to end the battle the way it ended.

   One of the difficulties encountered by the resistance is the nature of the region and its geographical conditions (hills, mountains and peaks and altitudes up to 2500 m) in addition to the complexity of the roads.









100 mm AA gun (KS-19) used as artillery support gun



130 mm SPG




   This battle gradually began with the arrival of the militant in Quseir in 2013, right up to the failure of the consequences of this project in 2017, which is a 4-year military operation in which working methods ranged from defense to attack and special operations (ambushes, planting bombs, use of guided weapons, assassinations of main militants).

   One of the characteristics of the battle is that resistance appeared in various types of environment (urban environment, forest areas, mountain environment) with the ability to adapt to the climate and these environmental conditions. It also has front dimensions that were larger than it was possible to prepare units. The advantages of combining various types of weapons, especially in the Quseir region and the western direction of the river and east of the river, as well as the combination of tanks and infantry, as well as between army tactics and maneuvers and resistance tactics.





LAF in action at last stage of Qalamoun operations:






   Jihadists remains been greenbused:


   One of ISIS commanders that surrendered (first pic) and other ISIS jihadbags (about 150-200 of them in total)








   Some of videos can be found here, at Al-Masdar (not a good as a source of info, but videos are hard to find and Youtube versions were deleted)



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   ATGM attack on Israeli vehicle by Hezbollah/Al-Mukowama, claims from Israeli side that there are no casualties, Lebanon claims around 2 wounded, linking to the video.



Evacuation of enemy casualties from the helicopter site Avhaim (video)


   Location where car was ATGM'ed


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