Alzoc

Leclerc XLR pictures :


 
Pretty much what we saw on the mockup and nothing groundbreaking on the outside. The main upgrades are an RCWS on standard (finally), a bit of up-armouring and most importantly the Scorpion BMS on the inside.

Morana SPGH from Excalibur Army has its web out now. 
https://morana.excaliburarmy.cz/
 



 
Some info:
- gun module can be placed on various platforms 
- 155 mm L52 gun (AFAIK same with Zuzana 2)
- range 41,5 km
- gun traverse +/-60°
- fully automated (all crew sits in the front cabin during the mission) with APU for the gun module 
- crew of 3 (driver, commander and gunner), the cabin has 4th seat for potential additional crew member/specialist
- 6 RPM, MRSI possible 
- manual aiming possible if needed/in emergency
- direct fire possible with claimed effective range 5 km in daylight and 3 km at night
- time to first shot from stopping 40 seconds
- 45 rounds carried
- integrated retractable RCWS with 12,7 mm HMG for self defence (should be part of the turret)
- the Tatra vehicle is 8x8 with all four axles steerable (!), 600 Hp, automatic gearbox, 90 km/h, tyre pressure regulation
- STANAG level 2 protection
 
The vehicle is a demonstrator at this moment and will probably change in some ways before entering production. 

Leopard 1 retrofitted with a 105 mm Cockerill turret :
 

 

Caesar NG render:

 
A basic 6x6 Caesar with improved cabin protection and improved motorisation in order to compensate for the increased weight.
Unlike the Caesar 8x8 it doesn't feature the improved loading mechanism, nor does it carry the amount of ammo the 8x8 can.
All Caesar 6x6 in the French army will likely be retrofitted to the NG standard in the future.

Arquus, Thales and NTGS proposing a Sherpa Light carrying a 120 mm (or 81 mm) mortar :
 

 
https://www.forcesoperations.com/eurosatory-2022-un-trio-franco-espagnol-pour-un-sherpa-shoot-and-scoot/
30s to enter or leave battery 4 to 6 shells fired within 2 minutes with a range of 13 km Automatic gun laying and calculations Firing sequence under armor except for loading (only one person outside?) 40 120 mm shells onboard (more in the 81 mm version) Goal is obviously to minimize exposure time and risks of counter battery.
Will probably be marketed to Romania.
First demonstration expected around September.

Nexter propose a new artillery shell LU 220 :
 
https://www.forcesoperations.com/eurosatory-lobus-lu-220-de-nexter-arrowtech-un-coup-de-punch-pour-lartillerie-de-155-mm/
 
Almost the same than the LU 211 :
Improved range by working on the aerodynamics (44 km compared to 40 km previously) More explosive mass (11 kg compared to 8,8 kg previously) Improved lethality (double effective area claimed) Nexter Arrowtech is now working on the LU 320 with a goal of a 1000 m/s muzzle velocity for a range of 50 km and course correction

More pictures :
 

 

Griffon in the Sahel region :
 

Leclerc XLR pictures :


 
Pretty much what we saw on the mockup and nothing groundbreaking on the outside. The main upgrades are an RCWS on standard (finally), a bit of up-armouring and most importantly the Scorpion BMS on the inside.

More pictures :
 

 

More pictures :
 

 

@Alzoci have something for you, https://twitter.com/PGZ_pl/status/1536324327259398152?s=20&t=7Gm_HRpXIy1Oyge3-p4I_g 
Yep, K2PL is coming in hot more tanks for Poland I guess. Let's have a moment of silence in memory of Polish logistical and maintenance units, I peaty those brave men and women. Now, in theory, Poland will be using 247x Leopard 2PL and 2A5, +300x M1A1SA/FEP, 250x M1A2 SEP v.3, 232x PT-91 and probably some leftover T-72M1R with around 500x K2/K2PL to come. Our T-72M1R are being currently sent to Ukraine, but will we send all of them is hard to tell, though it is probable. The future of PT-91 is also uncertain. 

Arquus, Thales and NTGS proposing a Sherpa Light carrying a 120 mm (or 81 mm) mortar :
 

 
https://www.forcesoperations.com/eurosatory-2022-un-trio-franco-espagnol-pour-un-sherpa-shoot-and-scoot/
30s to enter or leave battery 4 to 6 shells fired within 2 minutes with a range of 13 km Automatic gun laying and calculations Firing sequence under armor except for loading (only one person outside?) 40 120 mm shells onboard (more in the 81 mm version) Goal is obviously to minimize exposure time and risks of counter battery.
Will probably be marketed to Romania.
First demonstration expected around September.

Lithuania's defence minister will sign a letter of intention for the acquisition of an unspecified number of Caesar SPG.
 
http://www.opex360.com/2022/06/13/la-lituanie-a-lintention-dequiper-un-bataillon-dartillerie-avec-des-caesar-acquis-aupres-de-nexter/
 
Lithuanian press also report a possible adhesion to the Caesar NG modernization program.
According to the Lithuanian chief of staff, it would be for equipping the entirety of the general Motiejus Pečiulionis brigade (actually using 54 105 mm M101 transferred from Danemark in 2002).
The chief of staff also hope for a deployment of French Caesar (within the frame of a NATO deployement) in Lithuania in order to start preparing Lithuanian soldiers to use the system.
 
As a reminder Lithuania also operate 21 PzH 2000.

EMBT with new turret, Trophy-HV and modified hull.
 

Tracked Boxer
 
KF51 Panther
Caracal
 

SMDR and NX70 lightweight UAV :
 
 

Russian armored train ferrying BMP-2 (for protection or as cargo?) into Ukraine :
 
 
As much as I like armored trains (who doesn't?) it does feel a bit anachronistic. If it works though...

Printscreen of the second video in the thread (+ other screen of the Caesar management system) :

 
@BeerSeem like the shells they are using are of French origin.
 
For the fuzes I can guess that "FRAPPE FR" stands for impact fuze (Fr) while "RALECF3 FR" stands for Radioélectrique F3 (probably programmable fuze for airburst/delayed/proximity fuze?).
 
As for the shells they are the OEF4 and OEF1. The OE (Obus Explosif) F4 is apparently the LU211 in Nexter's catalogue with a range of 40 km (base bleed) when fired from an L52. As for the OEF1, my guess is that it is the LU107 which is a derivative of the US M107 with a slightly improved range (22 km claimed) and that can be fired from L52 gun using a reduced propellant charge.
 
So all the range to the target claimed around 20 km could be the result of using the LU 107 which caps out around this range.
 
As for TCM, it stands for Top Charge Module.
 
In the second video, in the status screen, on the gun side (right) the "Trajectory correction" can be seen in red, which could mean that the Ukrainians didn't get guided shells or SPACIDO compatibles ones.
 
If anyone can understand what the guy is saying that would help^^
 

Printscreen of the second video in the thread (+ other screen of the Caesar management system) :

 
@BeerSeem like the shells they are using are of French origin.
 
For the fuzes I can guess that "FRAPPE FR" stands for impact fuze (Fr) while "RALECF3 FR" stands for Radioélectrique F3 (probably programmable fuze for airburst/delayed/proximity fuze?).
 
As for the shells they are the OEF4 and OEF1. The OE (Obus Explosif) F4 is apparently the LU211 in Nexter's catalogue with a range of 40 km (base bleed) when fired from an L52. As for the OEF1, my guess is that it is the LU107 which is a derivative of the US M107 with a slightly improved range (22 km claimed) and that can be fired from L52 gun using a reduced propellant charge.
 
So all the range to the target claimed around 20 km could be the result of using the LU 107 which caps out around this range.
 
As for TCM, it stands for Top Charge Module.
 
In the second video, in the status screen, on the gun side (right) the "Trajectory correction" can be seen in red, which could mean that the Ukrainians didn't get guided shells or SPACIDO compatibles ones.
 
If anyone can understand what the guy is saying that would help^^
 

Rheinmetall's new MBT is called "Panther". Spicy name.
 

Norwegian M109A3 spotted in Ukraine around Kiev :
 

I'd add another point related to China because not everything caused by this war benefits China. It's true that the more dependent on China Russia is, the cheaper resources China can get etc. On the other hand by starting this war Russia caused a headache to China by removing the option of ground trade route China - EU. EU is by far the largest trade partner of China but its trade routes are essentially controlled by US NAVY. In case of war between China and US the US is effectively able to starve Chinese economy by blocking its overseas trade. For that reason (and for possible switch of its trade from Dollar to Juan) China needs an alternative trade route which can not be controlled by US but that option basically disappeared when Russia attacked Ukraine. 

Yes but if China become the sole supplier of critical components to Russia and their main buyer for natural resources China will be the one who set the prices, not Russia.
The main risk long term is to see an increased vassalization of Russia to China. China is already the senior partner in the relationship between the two country, and regardless of the issue of the war it will only get worse at times goes on (heck if Russia is actually perceived as winning the war, the sanctions could always potentially become worse).
 
A Russia dependent on China for it's key imports and exports will have to sell it's resources for cheap and China may be actually able to get their hands on a few key technology they still have issue with (like fighters jet engines), potentially driving Russia out of the weapons export market by proposing cheaper alternatives with a similar technological level. Reduced income from sale of raw resources (potentially compensated somewhat by increased market price) and a civilian and military industry that's becoming less competitive will only see the Russian economy worsen.
 
The longer this war drags on the worse it will be for everybody but China :
Europe will be lacking energy and raw resources (at least in the short term) and is currently spending a lot to plug the biggest gaps (abyss) in it's defence (though the later will probably help in the long run). For the US, in the short term they will see Russia disappear as a threat (not that Russia was much more than a regional power with access to nuclear weapons at this point anyway) and they will be able to sell gas and weapons to Europe. Long term they'll have to face China as a country with access to cheap Russian natural resources and that didn't spent anything (be it resources, money or military potential) during the war in Ukraine (same problem apply to Europe as well). Russia will end up in a much worse situation by the end of this war, that much is a given at this point (Worse economy, severely depleted military potential, a part of the educated population having fled the country, isolation on the international scene, etc). The only question is by how much. As for the rest of the world, they'll have to suffer from the long term consequences of a major economical crisis potentially coupled in the short term with a lack of wheat for some country.  
Also keep in mind that China may not want to alienate it's western economical partners too much (at least for a time) so the support it will provide to Russia may be limited (potentially making Russia fall faster and harder and thus cheaper to buy out when they'll get really desperate).
 
Really the best scenario for the world as a whole (Ukraine and Russia will get shafted in one way or the other anyway) is for the war to end as fast as possible (which should be obvious at this point). One reason for the war to end would be one side suffering unsustainable attrition be it in men or material. Russia still have the mobilization card to play (but that may be a hard sell to the Russian people) and potentially greater reserves of soviet era material. Ukraine meanwhile, may gain the technological edge if western weapons supply goes on and they have a population that is ready for full mobilization. On the other hand, Ukrainian moral seems to be flagging lately (at least in Donbass) and it's their country which will be in ruin when the dust settle. Russia could also stop the invasion if they manage to take enough of the Donbass to sell it as a victory, but Putin and the associated system is really playing their political future on this war (from the outside it looks like more and more that they locked themselves in a do or die situation) so it will have to be somewhat significant gains.
 
The way I see the situation right now is that Ukraine is aiming for maximal attrition of Russian forces in order to make the political and economical cost of the war unbearable while refusing to fall back in Donbass (even if regrouping could help militarily) and pushing back where they can (like in Kherson which would also double as slap in the face for Russia if they actually manage to retake it). Ukrainians knows that every territory they lose now, they'll have a very hard time reclaiming it once the war is over. Russia on the other hand is trying to gain as much control of the Donbass as possible in order to achieve a victory of some kind while taking minimal risks to limit their losses (advancing slowly while destroying everything in front of them by a massive use of artillery).
 
There is also a risk that Russia may escalate the conflict in some way (Full scale mobilization for example), the rethorics of some Russian reporter or even politicians is becoming increasingly disconnected from reality and we are hearing absurdities like a presenter saying on Russian state TV that we have entered WW3 and that Russia will have to demilitarize the entirety of NATO :
 
Or a member of the Douma seriously saying that Russia should kidnap a minister of defence from a country member of NATO while they are in official visit in Kiev.
 
Words have a meaning, and it should be high time that the Russian elites remember that. Because spouting that kind of non sense all days long on public channels will end up leaving a mark in the long run.
 
 

Yes but if China become the sole supplier of critical components to Russia and their main buyer for natural resources China will be the one who set the prices, not Russia.
The main risk long term is to see an increased vassalization of Russia to China. China is already the senior partner in the relationship between the two country, and regardless of the issue of the war it will only get worse at times goes on (heck if Russia is actually perceived as winning the war, the sanctions could always potentially become worse).
 
A Russia dependent on China for it's key imports and exports will have to sell it's resources for cheap and China may be actually able to get their hands on a few key technology they still have issue with (like fighters jet engines), potentially driving Russia out of the weapons export market by proposing cheaper alternatives with a similar technological level. Reduced income from sale of raw resources (potentially compensated somewhat by increased market price) and a civilian and military industry that's becoming less competitive will only see the Russian economy worsen.
 
The longer this war drags on the worse it will be for everybody but China :
Europe will be lacking energy and raw resources (at least in the short term) and is currently spending a lot to plug the biggest gaps (abyss) in it's defence (though the later will probably help in the long run). For the US, in the short term they will see Russia disappear as a threat (not that Russia was much more than a regional power with access to nuclear weapons at this point anyway) and they will be able to sell gas and weapons to Europe. Long term they'll have to face China as a country with access to cheap Russian natural resources and that didn't spent anything (be it resources, money or military potential) during the war in Ukraine (same problem apply to Europe as well). Russia will end up in a much worse situation by the end of this war, that much is a given at this point (Worse economy, severely depleted military potential, a part of the educated population having fled the country, isolation on the international scene, etc). The only question is by how much. As for the rest of the world, they'll have to suffer from the long term consequences of a major economical crisis potentially coupled in the short term with a lack of wheat for some country.  
Also keep in mind that China may not want to alienate it's western economical partners too much (at least for a time) so the support it will provide to Russia may be limited (potentially making Russia fall faster and harder and thus cheaper to buy out when they'll get really desperate).
 
Really the best scenario for the world as a whole (Ukraine and Russia will get shafted in one way or the other anyway) is for the war to end as fast as possible (which should be obvious at this point). One reason for the war to end would be one side suffering unsustainable attrition be it in men or material. Russia still have the mobilization card to play (but that may be a hard sell to the Russian people) and potentially greater reserves of soviet era material. Ukraine meanwhile, may gain the technological edge if western weapons supply goes on and they have a population that is ready for full mobilization. On the other hand, Ukrainian moral seems to be flagging lately (at least in Donbass) and it's their country which will be in ruin when the dust settle. Russia could also stop the invasion if they manage to take enough of the Donbass to sell it as a victory, but Putin and the associated system is really playing their political future on this war (from the outside it looks like more and more that they locked themselves in a do or die situation) so it will have to be somewhat significant gains.
 
The way I see the situation right now is that Ukraine is aiming for maximal attrition of Russian forces in order to make the political and economical cost of the war unbearable while refusing to fall back in Donbass (even if regrouping could help militarily) and pushing back where they can (like in Kherson which would also double as slap in the face for Russia if they actually manage to retake it). Ukrainians knows that every territory they lose now, they'll have a very hard time reclaiming it once the war is over. Russia on the other hand is trying to gain as much control of the Donbass as possible in order to achieve a victory of some kind while taking minimal risks to limit their losses (advancing slowly while destroying everything in front of them by a massive use of artillery).
 
There is also a risk that Russia may escalate the conflict in some way (Full scale mobilization for example), the rethorics of some Russian reporter or even politicians is becoming increasingly disconnected from reality and we are hearing absurdities like a presenter saying on Russian state TV that we have entered WW3 and that Russia will have to demilitarize the entirety of NATO :
 
Or a member of the Douma seriously saying that Russia should kidnap a minister of defence from a country member of NATO while they are in official visit in Kiev.
 
Words have a meaning, and it should be high time that the Russian elites remember that. Because spouting that kind of non sense all days long on public channels will end up leaving a mark in the long run.